What's confusing me is that I don't see what either the tech-bros like Musk or the nativists like Bannon (I'm not really sure where Vance falls on this) are getting out of this. — Echarmion

Tech-bros are getting EU laws/tax against American Big Tech down and prevent the formation of European big-tech competitors (keep an eye on AI and how AI will be integrated within military industry or how American crypto currencies will be injected into the European system). Bannon with his fascist-leaning mindset and propaganda aspires to be the guru of European far right movements (see Salvini in Italy who is waving between becoming a Putin's bitch and Trump's bitch, or both), so he helps steal the European far-right movements/propaganda from Russia. All three are helping each other.

It’s good that Trump wants peace. — Mikie

It's called peace by prostitution. If you are a European prepare your lubricant coz you are gonna be next... ah but you are not European but from the US? Tell us your dirtiest desires, master.

Whatever Trump agrees on with Putin about a new world order, it should be maintained under and possibly after Trump presidency (as long as it lasts) and after Putin. What might possibly ensure this?
Whatever Trump is ready to concede to Putin concerning this world order, implies that Putin must be ready to concede the same to Trump: e.g., if I'll break Western alliance to contain Russia, then Russia must break with its alliance (China, Iran, North Korea). If Russia occupies pieces of Ukraine or widens further its boarders, then the US (including Israel) can do the same. If Russia wants to sell oil to Europe, then the US will take Ukrainian resources (like rare earth).

(Don't mind the fact that is breaking international law and setting examples to others e.g. China with Taiwan)

More on Mearsheimer's infallible predictions:

US President-elect Donald Trump won’t end the Ukraine war because he has appointed “a bunch of hawks” who suffer from “Russophobia in the extreme”, international relations scholar John Mearsheimer has claimed.

Mearsheimer argued the West and Ukraine must — but won’t — accept two conditions for Russian President Vladimir Putin to enter negotiations. First, “that Ukraine will never be in Nato”. Second, “that Crimea and the four Oblasts that the Russians have now annexed are permanently lost”. He continued: “I find it hard to imagine the US, even Trump, accepting those two conditions.”

https://unherd.com/newsroom/john-mearsheimer-trump-is-appointing-russophobic-hawks/

So what is it you expect from me? Convince you somehow? To try and 'win the argument’?

If you're not even willing to believe I'm being honest about my credentials, then what possible point would there be to carry on conversation? — Tzeentch

To me the point of this conversation with you has nothing to do with believing your honesty over your credentials or whatever else, of course. As I said, I find it rather irrelevant, even if you were honest: indeed, I find irrelevant any argument from authority if that’s meant to replace arguments de re.
If I do not understand the criteria for sexing chickens, and ask you clarifications, it would be pointless to tell me: “see these two chickens? Well, the right one is male and the left one is a female and the criteria are that I’ve academic credentials on sexing chickens, I’ve sexed chickens for 30 years in tens of farms and I’m honest”. Even if you were 100% right, 100% honest, 100% convinced, 100% believed by all the people in the universe, past, present, future (ME INCLUDED!), yet you didn’t offer any criteria for me to understand how to sex chickens.
I think the purpose of a conversation in a philosophy forum is not just to exchange opinions about things one takes to be evident but also to investigate and question grounds to believe things. That’s why I’ve joined this philosophy forum and this thread. Is this why you too joined this philosophy forum and this thread? If not, for what other purpose are you here?

↪neomac
Out of courtesy I did read your entire post, but I will not be getting into a repetition of moves where we write entire essays about what has already been said. — Tzeentch

Out of courtesy I’m thanking you for your courtesy. However, I doubt the that your problem is repeating moves, as you claim, since you keep repeating moves [1] (including the claim that you have already said this and that so no need repeating [2]). Even in this last post of yours.
You can give synthetic answers to my questions (I consider all of them equally pressing, then it’s up to you), at least we can verify where you said that already as you claim.
Besides, the fact that you keep repeating claims may also point to the fact that you think to win arguments by repeating the same response to challenges against what you keep repeating. Unfortunately, I’m sure you agree that “you don't win arguments by repetition”. Maybe try something else instead of repeating.

[1]
“That's something I've repeatedly argued in this thread: NATO, the US in particular, was purposefully seeking conflict in Ukraine from 2008 onward”.

[2]
“I’ve probably written about a book's worth and can't be arsed to repeat it all”

I'll only answer those questions where I think my position may require clarification.


Could you provide criteria that would make such difference so much morally grey in one case over the other? — neomac


In the case of the Israel-Palestine conflict:
- +/-70 years of thorough documentation
- Mountains of reports by human rights organisations, including those within Israel itself
- Mountains of UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions
- Near-unanimous global condemnation
- Condemnation within Israel itself
- Admissions by Israeli politicians
- Having studied the conflict in-depth as part of my academic education, and having visited the region as part of a research tour.

— Tzeentch

In what way this is a clarification of “It is perfectly clear to me what has gone on over the past 70 years, and the world as represented in the UN General Assembly agrees almost unanimously, just like virtually every human rights organisation imaginable, including Israeli human rights organisations” when my explicit challenge to you was: “I find more interesting to discuss explicit moral criteria, hopefully not “ad hoc”, than just provide moral opinions. And I will charitably assume that your criteria are not something like: if after 70 years there is unanimous agreement by all human rights organisation imaginable (excluding Russian human rights organisations, since apparently there aren’t much left there unlike in Israel, even under Netanyahu) on the Russia’s aggression of Ukraine, one is entitled to morally condemn Russia’s aggression of Ukraine” ?
I do not question that you may be more convinced in one case than the other, but I’ll repeat that the criteria you are repeating seem rather arbitrary.
A part from the fact that if a conflict lasts 70 years of course one may have evidence and complaints spanning over 70 years to support the “genocide” accusation, while if a conflict lasts 3 years of course one may have 3 years of evidence and complaints to support the “genocide” accusation. But most importantly, really are you waiting for 70 years of evidence to make moral assessments about wars? 3 years are not enough? BTW moral rules like “do not kill”, “do not lie”, “do not steal”, “do not break promises”, sound rather intuitive, so do you seriously not have amassed enough evidence in 3 years that Russia is committing more violations of moral rules against Ukraine than the other way around in this conflict or its genesis? Or you want to say that Russia’s aggression of Ukraine was a morally “proportional” response to the Ukrainian desire to join NATO while Israel’s response against the massacre of its civilians by Hamas wasn’t? No temporal constraints are part of the legal definition of "genocide".
How fair is it to recall certain criticisms from within Israel vs lack of similar criticisms from Russia given the fact public opinion in Israel is much more free than in Russia?
Concerning your appeals to your expertise or experience (not the first time you are doing it), how is not that convenient, besides being unverifiable to us? Appeal to your authority is as good as an attack ad hominem against your interlocutors. Actually its complement.
Finally, a part from the fact that the accusation of “genocide” is legally different from the accusation of committing war crimes or crimes against humanity, you can read more about appeal to near-unanimous human rights organizations and UN Assembly condemnations against Russia here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allegations_of_genocide_of_Ukrainians_in_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War
So much so that there are ICC arrest warrants for Putin as much as for Netanyahu (and also for Hamas representatives but not against Zelensky).
Concerning the UN Security Council resolution the trick is that it requires the permission of Russia, which is the perpetrator of the alleged “genocide”. Besides the accusation of committing “genocide” against Israel by the Security Council concerns specifically the massacre of Sabra and Shatila, not the current conflict:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_Nations_resolutions_concerning_Israel#United_Nations_Security_Council_resolutions
And the problem is not only in the criteria which you mention, but also on criteria which you do not mention now, while being so important to you in other posts. I'm referring to your claim: “it is good for countries to draw a line in the sand in the face of a blatant disregard for their security interests”. You made this claim to justify/explain (until you do clarify better how you distinguish them, I’ll put both) Russian aggression of Ukraine, but not the Israeli aggression on Hamas. Why? Is it “it is good for countries to draw a line in the sand in the face of a blatant disregard for their security interests” a moral criterium for moral condemnation/justification or not?

Concerning genocidal intentions and war crimes, can you articulate a bit more your moral views on that? — neomac


War crimes are an unfortunate reality of war. They happen in every war, and criminals ought to be punished.

Things take on a different guise when war crimes are carried out intentionally on a large scale, at a governmental level. — Tzeentch

That sounds to me a plausible criterium when accusing governments of committing genocides because it stems from the legal definition of “genocide” which includes the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”. The problem is to understand what evidences are needed to prove such an intent in one conflict over the other. There are evidences coming from human rights organizations and UN resolutions, one can check historical patterns, one can check political decisions and declarations. I think one can find lots of compelling evidence in both cases.

I don't believe Russia has genocidal intentions in Ukraine. Ukrainians are returning to Russian-occupied territories every day. — Tzeentch

If the criterium of assessing “genocidal intentions“ is Ukrainian ability to go back to occupied territories, then the same holds for Palestinians, see here : https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/27/middleeast/palestinians-return-north-gaza-intl-hnk/index.html

Anti-Western authoritarian government will do their propaganda, but if people see that things are better in the West than they are under the authoritarian government, they will draw their own conclusions. — ssu

"more than half (52%) of Gen Z thinks that "the UK would be a better place if there was a strong leader in power who doesn't have to worry about parliament and elections" and a third (33%) believe that "it would be better if the army led the country"
https://assets-corporate.channel4.com/_flysystem/s3/2025-01/Gen%20Z%20Trends%20Truth%20and%20Trust_0.pdf

But what happens if none of them can fix it now, in one week, in months, in years, ever? You learn to live with it (hoping that one day it gets fixed) or you try to change the service (and hope the problem won’t replicate). — neomac

You simply have a defective product. It's your loss.

as if you were hinting at some solution, it looks rather empty to me. — neomac

Look, what I'm saying that if you want a functioning democracy, a prosperous country, then a lot of things have to be right.

…

First of all, you cannot think that a country is a democracy without all the necessary institutions and by just having elections.

…

Because you have to start with the reality that you have. Like for example the US. What it desperately needs is for it's citizens to think that the government works for them, and not the oligarchs. The only way for people to change their views is for the government really seen to work for them. — ssu

Not sure if these claims are meant to be objections to my arguments, because they sound pretty in line with what I’ve already said.

But the authoritarian looks at democracies being weak with all the woke nonsense. Yet in fact it's the authoritarians who are in the fundamentally weak, because they actually fear their people. — ssu

Russian is authoritarian, China is authoritarian, the US is moving from democracy to authoritarianism.
Russia, China and the US seem to be stronger than democracies like France, Italie, UK and Germany.
In some sense, in authoritarian regimes political leaders won their fear of people, more than political leaders in democratic regimes.
Besides, after compering authoritarian regimes, one can notice that the popular support for Putin doesn’t seem as weak the popular support for the Iranian leader in Iran.

The only way for people to change their views is for the government really seen to work for them. — ssu

if people see that things are better in the West than they are under the authoritarian government, they will draw their own conclusions. — ssu

Precisely, but the problem is that in authoritarian regimes, “people” exclusively refers to the relative majority that vocally supports or silently tolerates the regime, also in a period of crisis where protracted collective sacrifices are required, the rest is forced into political irrelevance and suppression. While, in democracy, “people” doesn’t exclusively refer to the relative majority that vocally supports or silently tolerates the regime, but includes also people and political movements that criticise the regime. So in a period of crisis where protracted collective sacrifices are required, there are always margins for disputes and blame gaming.

There are 2 issues that I brought up repeatedly in this thread and yet, to my surprise, nobody looks/looked interested in discussing them as vocally as I was: the problematic link between democracy and security, and the problematic link between morality and security.
The first one is worth digging into because it can contribute to explain the authoritarian turn of Trump's administration, his antagonism against EU and Trump’s philo-Putinism.
The second one is worth digging into because it can contribute to better assess analogies and differences between the Ukrainian-Russian conflict vs the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The strategic stakes of the war between Russia and Ukraine were mostly about a new world order in which powerful authoritarian countries can impose their rule over the others through direct negotiations between supreme leaders (independently from the qualms of international law), including Western democratic countries no matter how justified their moral outrage is.

The Ukraine conflict is not comparable to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Ukraine is much more morally grey.

In the case of Israel-Palestine, it is not morally grey at all. It is perfectly clear to me what has gone on over the past 70 years, and the world as represented in the UN General Assembly agrees almost unanimously, just like virtually every human rights organisation imaginable, including Israeli human rights organisations. — Tzeentch

In a philosophy forum, I find more interesting to discuss explicit moral criteria, hopefully not “ad hoc”, than just provide moral opinions. And I will charitably assume that your criteria are not something like: if after 70 years there is unanimous agreement by all human rights organisation imaginable (excluding Russian human rights organisations, since apparently there aren’t much left there unlike in Israel, even under Netanyahu) on the Russia’s aggression of Ukraine, one is entitled to morally condemn Russia’s aggression of Ukraine.
Concerning criteria relying on the advise of international law and humanitarian organizations, the allegations that Russia is committing genocide and war crimes in Ukraine do not look so much less severe than the Israeli case to me, see here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allegations_of_genocide_of_Ukrainians_in_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War
What actually sounds even morally worse in the Russian case than in the Israeli case (assumed the notion of “genocide” equally applies to both) is that in his article ”On the historical unity of Russian and Ukrainians“ Putin has claimed “Our kinship has been transmitted from generation to generation. It is in the hearts and the memory of people living in modern Russia and Ukraine, in the blood ties that unite millions of our families. Together we have always been and will be many times stronger and more successful. For we are one people” . (https://www.prlib.ru/en/article-vladimir-putin-historical-unity-russians-and-ukrainians). So Putin’s war against Ukrainians is not only genocidal, but also fratricidal. Nothing of the sort can be said of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Finally, also the moral outrage of the perceived "provocations" look more problematic for Russia than for Israel: indeed, what's evidently morally outrageous in the idea of having Ukraine joining NATO some day in the future compared to the massacre of Israeli civilians in Israel by Hamas?
Concerning history, the struggle of Ukrainians to gain independence from Russia is going on for centuries (the last one is just the 4th war of independence). So the claim that the Ukrainians badly want to be independent from Russia and Russians do not let them doesn’t sound so far fetched. Not to mention the case of the “Holodomor” which looks to me way more atrocious than the “Nakba”. Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term "genocide" in 1944, explicitly applied the concept of ”genocide” to the Soviet oppression of Ukrainians, including the Holodomor. He considered the destruction of the Ukrainian nation as a "classic example of Soviet genocide" and "the longest and most extensive experiment in Russification”.
Concerning political principles, as I said elsewhere, Russia’s war against Ukraine looks pretty hegemonic in nature. Indeed, Russia not only has a state which Ukraine acknowledges and hasn’t invaded or attacked (at least prior to this conflict), but it has the largest state on earth, and abundant land for hosting way more ethnic Russians than currently exist compared to Israel (the population density in Israel is roughly 50 times higher than in Russia). Besides Russia has previously formally acknowledged Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the other side, Israel’s war against Hamas doesn’t look hegemonic in nature. Israel so far is just trying to establish its own nation state and keep it safe from Palestinians’ and other neighbouring middle-eastern countries’ aggressions, and it has never acknowledged the existence of Palestinian state. Besides, in accordance to the premises I made explicit in my previous comment, if one holds the right to people self-determination, it’s much more easy to condemn Russian hegemonic ambitions as violating Ukrainian people’s self-determination, than to condemn either nations between Israelis and Palestinians which are fighting for their right to self-determination over exactly the same land.
So what is it making so “much more” morally grey one case over the other to you doesn’t look evident to me at all. Could you provide criteria that would make such difference so much morally grey in one case over the other?

Second, when geopolitical actors meddle in ways that are misleading and exploitative, I have no qualms with making moral statements about that.

Russia is clearly a wolf and widely perceived as a calculating geopolitical actor. The US on the other hand is a wolf in sheep's clothing, and therefore much more dangerous because people are ignorant to its true nature. — Tzeentch

Well, given the case of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, I thought your moral assessment depends not only on honesty and exploitative intentions , but also genocidal intentions and war crimes.
Concerning honesty and exploitative intentions, since Russia is a “wolf”, what would you consider as misleading and exploitative by Russia in the current conflict with Ukraine? Do you have concrete examples in mind to provide? Maybe the fact that Russia acknowledged Ukrainian territorial sovereignty on many occasions (including the one Mearsheimer wrote an article about in “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent”)?
Concerning genocidal intentions and war crimes, can you articulate a bit more your moral views on that? Indeed, since you accused others of cognitive dissonance, let me point out that I also see a risk of cognitive dissonance on your part too. Honestly I don’t remember much of your moral statements against what Russia is doing in Ukraine. And the problem is not much that you seem way more focused on the moral status of the US and its European “vassals” than on Russia because, as you claim, the US is much more dangerous than Russia. The problem is that you even look “favourable” to Russia’s aggression of Ukraine, given this comment [1]: “it is good for countries to draw a line in the sand in the face of a blatant disregard for their security interests” (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/968536). Now, if this argument is not apologetics for Russia’s genocide in Ukraine (territorial annexations included), then also arguing that Israel is reacting against the Palestinian aggression (territorial annexations included) is not apologetics for Israel’s genocide in Palestine as “it is good for countries to draw a line in the sand in the face of a blatant disregard for their security interests”. If it is apologetics in one case, than it is also in the other.
Given your views, it must be convenient for you to argue that Russia is not seriously committing a genocide in Ukraine or war crimes (because you are morally against genocide or war crimes, right?), at least until you provide more explicit and non-ad-hoc criteria. The alternative would be that committing genocide and war crimes are morally justified if “it is good for countries to draw a line in the sand in the face of a blatant disregard for their security interests”. Which is it?

Considering the US is objectively the most powerful, and most dangerous, nation on earth, at the very least the idea of deliberate strategy should be exhausted before assuming incompetence. Currently, it remains conspicuously absent from the discussion. — Tzeentch

The principal threat is not an 'angry' US - the US is thousands of miles away across an ocean - but European 'Trans-Atlanticists' prostituting Europe to the American agenda. — Tzeentch

These two comments remind me a bit of the joke “It's Schrödinger's war machine.”
Instead of indulging into sarcastic retaliations, let me highlight the following dilemma.
Either the US is objectively the most powerful and most dangerous compared to Russia, then recalling the geographic distance shouldn’t be enough to dismiss the security threat coming from the US, nor suggest that’s batter to provoke and keep provoking/antagonising the US (so yes one must be definitely be worried about a “angry” US).
Or the US is NOT objectively the most powerful, and most dangerous compared to Russia, then recalling the geographic distance shouldn’t be enough to dismiss the security threat coming from Russia, nor suggest that’s batter to provoke and keep provoking/antagonising Russia (so yes one must be definitely be worried about a “angry” Russia).
Which is it to you?

The Ukraine war neither suggests they have the intention nor the capacity to threaten Europe. — Tzeentch

Are you saying that it’s thanks to the war between Russia and Ukraine that we know that Russia has not “the capacity to threaten Europe”? How so?
Besides, if Russia has not the capacity to threaten Europe, then the fear of an “angry” Russia seems less compelling, do you agree?
These statements in addition to the previous ones do not make it more clear how you assess the Russian threat to Europe. More on this below.

I support Ukrainian independence. What I do not support is incompetent nations like the EU, or exploitative nations like the US leading it down the prim rose path by feeding it fake promises of security. — Tzeentch

How do you know that populist movements or national leaders are less incompetent than EU leaders?
Do you mean that Russia is not an exploitative for making fake promises of security to Ukraine like the Budapest memorandum?

About European 'emancipation' I have little to say. Europe is a lost cause. It will take decades for it to undo the damage of post-Cold War soft power US colonialism. But for the US to leave is obviously a prerequisite for things to get better. — Tzeentch

The problem of the European emancipation must also go with some important acknowledgement from you:
did the US oppress Germany, France, the Ntehterlans or Spain as Russia is oppressing Ukraine?
Obviously, I can get that a nation wants to become independent from foreign interference which is perceived as oppressive. But the US hasn’t been oppressive toward EU countries as Russia is toward Ukraine, or Israel toward Palestine. Actually the EU prospered in peace for several decades. Do you agree?
Besides what do you mean by “for the US to leave”? One can say that Soviet Union has left Hungary, still Hungary has been supporting Russia over EU and the US as a European vassal may support the US. That is to say, that even assuming that the US military bases leave Europe, that doesn’t imply that the US “the most powerful and dangerous” country has not economic and military interests in Europe that will still constrain Europe margins for strategic emancipation (things may get even trickier if "Europe" refers to individual European countries instead of groups of European countries like the EU).

I don't believe in the narrative that the Russians are coming for Berlin. — Tzeentch

Europe's population is roughly four times that of Russia. It's GDP is roughly ten times that of Russia.
Even if Europe organises its defense inefficiently on a country-by-country basis there ought to be no Russian threat. — Tzeentch

First, Russia has military resources to threaten Germany and a nuclear arsenal (indeed Russia has not spared itself from making nuclear threats when its strategic interests are at stake), Germany has an insufficient military capacity wrt Russia, Russia has historically invaded Germany and taken a good piece of it, so Russia doesn’t need to come for Berlin anytime soon to be a security threat to Berlin.
Second, as I pointed out in another post: aggregating GDP (or population) of EU countries doesn't make much sense if one overlooks the deep divisions over security issues among European countries. Besides Berlin is just one European capital, there are other Eastern European capitals for which Russian conventional military aggression could be a serious problem.
Third, most importantly, Russia’s threats to Europe are not limited to conventional warfare. Hybrid warfare must the taken into account and hybrid warfare can be enough to induce concessions to Russia’s demands. So if European countries want to emancipate themselves from being vassals of foreign powers like the US, then the same must hold against Russia. Besides a source of security concerns comes also from Russian minorities populating many European countries (including Germany). They are a good resource for pretexts to rise tensions, covert operations (like sabotaging) and political trafficking.

The only reason Europe is vulnerable is because American interests have infiltrated its every institution like a Trojan horse, disallowing it from making sensible decisions. — Tzeentch

What about a “victorious” Russian interests in Europe? Did Russians infiltrate European institutions and far right populist movements like a Trojan horse? What if the US will leave and Russia wants to ensure that the US doesn’t come back again and for that it will do its best to fill the void of power left by the US? It shouldn’t sound so far-fetched that outside NATO/EU e.g. Hungary might be interested in hosting Russian military bases. Or that European countries which need Russian oil/gas/wheat could be blackmailed in various ways including buying Russian weapon systems to feed the Russian military-industrial complex and its power projection like in the middle east, Mediterranean sea, North Africa and Baltic sea (around Europe).
So while Russia is arguably far more oppressive and aggressive over nations under its sphere of influence than the US is toward European countries, it seems you worry more about a vassal status of the EU toward the US, and as if there was no risk that European countries would turn into vassals of Russia once the US has completely gone. Unfortunately, I wouldn’t even exclude a worse scenario one in which an “angry” US and a “victorious” Russia will turn European states into more submissive vassals (for the US, Italy is a good candidate, as much as Hungary is for Russia).

I thought I was enough clear, the quotes I’ve reported are all linked so anybody can click and get more context. Anyways, I doubt that more context is gonna help address my points, so I’ll try another way. This time I will not use full quotes but I will report your views as I roughly understood them. No sarcasm, no rude tone, ok? Feel free to highlight and correct where I’m badly misrepresenting your views.

There are some basic factual premises which I find handy to start investigating/explaining interstate conflicts. They concern respectively: people’s “right” to self-determination and power relations among countries.
People’s “right” to self-determination (whatever its degree of codification in the international law) can DE FACTO inspire political struggles for greater emancipation from foreign or sovranational powers perceived as oppressive interference, exploitation or occupation (see Ukraine vs Russian, EU vs the US, Palestine vs Israel, Taiwan vs China, European nations vs EU, Catalonia vs Spain, ex-colonies vs ex-colonial powers, Kurds against Middle Eastern regional powers, etc.) and spin propaganda accordingly or be ready to fight down to its most bitter consequences (and fail).
Then there are DE FACTO power relations among countries as a function of their demographic, economy, technology, defence resources, geography, collective psychology, powerful allies, etc. which DE FACTO political leaderships can exploit to advance foreign political agendas. From that perspective, if power relations favour Russia over Ukraine, Russia will more likely prevail over Ukraine on certain contended issues, if power relations favour the US over EU, the US will more likely prevail over EU on certain contended issues, if Israel power relations favour Israel over Palestine, Israel will more likely prevail over Palestine on certain contended issues, etc.
What is the link between people’s “right” to self-determination as a motivational factor and power relations? Well, people’s ‘right’ to self-determination as a motivational factor can nourish people cohesion (e.g. in light of collective historical traumas) and morale (i.e. determination and tolerance for privation and suffering) so this important motivational factor among others can weigh in establishing power balance. On the other side, if power balance is not determined exclusively by collective psychological factors and collective feelings about a political predicament, then it’s possible that power relations will eventually frustrate “people’s ‘right’ to self-determination” aspirations.

What I just drafted shouldn’t be controversial because it’s totally independent from personal preferences, moral/juridical justifications/condamnation or political propaganda. Now, the reasons why I bring that up are two:

1) In some posts you stress the fact that you are explaining not justifying (e.g. when you talk about Russia strategic interests), in other posts you seem condemning more than explaining (e.g. when you talk about the Palestinian genocide by Israel), in some others you seem to mix the two (e.g. when you talk about the US provocations and engage in blame talking). However you do it in ways that look to me somehow inconsistent. Here is a more concrete example: believing that the Ukrainian emancipation from Russian hegemony and the Ukrainian chumming up with the US was perceived as a “provocation” by Russians sounds to me as plausible as claiming that the European emancipation from the US hegemony (especially under the form of anti-American or anti-Washington populism) and chumming up with Russia (especially under the form of anti-American or anti-Washington populism) was perceived as a “provocation” by the US. If Russia’s reaction was justifiable in imposing its will over Ukraine, even brutally, because Russians felt provoked, then also the US’s reaction was justifiable in imposing its will over EU, even brutally, because the US felt provoked. And if US/Ukraine are to be blamed for provoking Russia and Russia’s consequent reaction, then also EU/Russia (even more so the anti-American or anti-Washington populist) are to be blamed for provoking the US and US’s consequent reaction. In other words, the symmetry in attributing “hegemonic aspirations”, “emancipation aspirations” and “provocations” between Russia vs Ukraine and the US vs the EU is such that justification/condamnetion and blame can be equally distributed on both sides. So they can NOT ground the asymmetry you seem to believe in: namely, that the US’s reaction was less justifiable than the Russians’, and that the US/Ukraine are more to be blamed than European populism/Russia for this conflict. And since you mostly insist on the US hegemonic aspirations, US provocations against Russia, and European (especially populist) aspirations to emancipation from the US, my point is precisely that “hegemonic aspirations”, “emancipation aspirations” and “provocations” can be symmetrically distributed so they do not explain the asymmetry of judgement. Other premises must be invoked to ground the asymmetry in judgement and blaming: something like the US provocations against Russia were significantly worse than Russia provocations against the US, or it was the US which started all of it, or the US is more evil than Russia, or I don’t care about Ukrainian emancipation as much as I care about European countries emancipation, and the like. Whatever premises ground your blame attribution and condemnation, I think they would deserve more focus than the US “hegemonic aspirations”, European “emancipation aspirations” and Western “provocations” against Russia.

2) In your “realist” explanations, you often brought up Mearsheimer’s arguments mostly to back up your own views, however I’m not sure how committed you are toward his arguments or where your views diverge from his (the fact that you think there is more strategy than incompetence per se doesn’t improve understanding over the strategy, nor does the idea that the blob hiddenly pushing Trump now is the same crew pushing Clinton/Bush). One related example is when you talk about “the blob”: indeed, one of Mearsheimer’s arguments is that American antagonism with Russia (and exporting democracy) was driven by neoliberal agenda while Mearsheimer’s ideas were more open to accepting a division of sphere of influence to avoid American overstretching and ally with a weaker/declining Russia to contain the rising China. So Trump’s approach seems very much in line with what Mearsheimer’s was suggesting. Yet the problem for the European emancipation from the US hegemony is that the change in strategy from neoliberal to Trump’s (and Mearsheimer’s) doesn’t look less worrisome, on the contrary it looks more worrisome because it’s openly humiliating and threatening European “allies” down to obedience to avoid nasty retaliations. And given Trump-Musk support for European far-right populism (like AfD), I’m not sure if European populism is still the right horse to bet on for European emancipation. So not only changing strategy by the US doesn’t look more promising for European emancipation neither European populism does. Your belief that that the same hidden crew of Washington is frustrating European emancipation aspirations or serving American imperialist aspirations or abandoning allies, before or under Trump’s administration, besides looking unverifiable to me, it doesn’t change the fact that the strategy looks pretty different, the prospects for the European emancipation look rather compromised now, in spite of (or maybe even thanks to) rising far-right populism, and the pattern of American abandoning allies can not be explained via neoliberal hypocrisies because they are grounded on Mearsheimer-style reasoning over foreign politics.

Said that, here are two major differences between my and your views (among others): while you were warning and still keep warning about provoking Russia, Russia’s security concerns and the danger of servile pro-US European elites. I was warning about provoking the US, Russian aggressive imperialism (which goes way beyond than just not having Ukraine inside NATO) and the dangers of servile pro-Russian (and now tempted to turn pro-US) populist movements.
And while, prior to this conflict, the Europeans under the neoliberal agenda (the one you despise so much) grew prosperous and relatively safe, and had the best opportunity to develop a collective European military-industrial complex for their own security (but I suspect you are against a collective European military-industrial complex) without risking the kind of retaliations that a “victorious” Russia and “angry” US are capable of, as of now. You seem/seemed to believe that precisely this Ukrainian conflict was the best chance for Europe to emancipate itself from the US without risking Russia’s retaliations by making political choices that would have anyways led to a “victorious” Russia and “angry” US (and without a collective European military-industrial complex).

Even if Finnish politicians are as virtuous as you claim (the rise of right-wing populism in Finland, pro-Russian sentiment and problematic future of NATO makes me doubt Finns are immune from growing political polarisation and controversies), — neomac

The migration issue has naturally been a similar discussion as in other parts of Europe, however the True Finns -party, which is the local populist party, is and has been accepted into coalitions and actually is now in the present administration. However unlike the typical populists, they are all for Ukraine. Here is the party leader giving a speech to the Ukrainian parliament and getting a standing ovation:


But, more to the point, how much of their satisfying political performance compared to other states’ leaders, does actually empower Finnish politicians to instill wider social cohesion among nations, make them understand the utter peril of political polarization and get the real support of their people, genuinely answer to the worries of the people, and that the best thing is to tell things how they are, don't lie? — neomac

Quite confusing what you say here. First of all, domestic politics should be left to sovereign states. You don't start messing in others own politics and work with all administrations from one country. It's an issue that at normal relations you wouldn't touch at all (unlike Vance did). But to get wider cohesion, well, basically Finland got Sweden also to join in NATO, even if Sweden had to haggle a lot with Turkey. — ssu

OK I’ll note down that you are happier of your politicians than other Europeans of theirs, fine.
But you still do not get how basic (common sensical?) my comment was. I’ll try another way.
Think of ordinary commercial services (like the ones for power supply or mobile communication). What do you do when you have an issue with this type of services? First, you try to see if you can fix it yourself, if you can’t you call the help desk. If the help desk can’t fix it, they will call the admins. If the admins can’t fix it, they will call the experts (development, infrastructure, etc.). But what happens if none of them can fix it now, in one week, in months, in years, ever? You learn to live with it (hoping that one day it gets fixed) or you try to change the service (and hope the problem won’t replicate).
Now we have been discussing for a while of international conflicts like the one in Ukraine or Palestine, or the troubles with the American or Russian foreign politics. These problems are of such kind that single individuals can neither fix by themselves, nor see them fixed just by escalating to higher levels of expertise. Indeed, it’s powerful people on the top of the hierarchy which are struggling to find fixes. Or worse if/whenever they come up with one, maybe it’s not the one you wished for, actually it could even be the opposite.
Keep repeating something like “in Finland things work swell because there are Finnish moral champions running their governments, why can’t they do the same in Russia or the US or the EU, or Israel, etc.?” as if you were hinting at some solution, it looks rather empty to me. Indeed, Finnish politicians’ exemplar behaviour by itself doesn’t trigger the political resolution you wished for. Nor you can escalate those problems to Finnish politicians so that by virtue of their moral virtues those problems get fixed. And the reason of that is not much that the Finnish politicians should not interfere in other sovereign countries politics to fix their problems, but more that Finnish politicians most likely can’t fix those problems even if their moral imperative was to interfere. Why can’t these problems be fixed in a morally satisfying way as in Finland? That’s what needs to be understood better. Maybe it’s because the nature of the conflict in Ukraine or in Palestine is more complex and politically costly than the problems handled by Finnish political moral champions, and/or that pre-existing selective factors that favored the rise of moral champions in Finnish politics do not exists in the US or Russia, etc. In other words, Finnish politicians are not EMPOWERED by their moral status to fix the world issues we are discussing, or worse, to shield Finland from the nasty cascading consequences of those world issues.

In other words, as long as the information flow in Western-style democracies has certain features that by institutional design can be hacked by authoritarian regimes against Western democracies themselves (not vice versa), and independently from Western people or politicians’ best intentions or education, prohibiting social platforms from collecting data won’t off-set this asymmetric advantage which authoritarian regimes are benefiting from as authoritarian. — neomac

First, do cut down with the sentences. Very hard to read.

Secondly, a functioning democracy, a republic, needs a lot from both it's citizens and it's institutions. Those institutions have to function so that the citizens appreciate them, which isn't something that you get only with free elections. Those countries incapable of having a functioning republic will have the extremely stupid idea of authoritarianism being the solution. It won't be, it will make just things far worse, because an authoritarian state can easily just let loose unrestricted corruption, oligarchy or nepotism. — ssu

Stupid or not, the risk of a spiralling political polarization inside democracies can end up in the political protracted paralysis of necessary reforms to effectively addressing growing internal or external challenges. And this polarizing escalation can eventually bring about civil wars or the rise of authoritarianism. Does knowing this risk help people avoid polarization? Hopefully yes, but there are also reasons to doubt. Why? Because in democracy people want to be free to oppose policies and politicians they do not like, vocally and publicly so. That’s an in-built feature of Western democracies. It doesn’t matter which side one is on.
And feeling morally entitled per se doesn’t mitigate this effect at all, and not only because there people can also diverge over moral issues. Indeed, morally self-entitled citizens do not want to self-censor themselves, “people must know the truth” (like that of “universal human rights violation”). And if others warn them about the risks of being instrumental to hostile foreign powers, they may exercise their “critical thinking” and certainly suspect that some immoral political villain is using this argument to induce self-censorship, out of fear that the truth will eventually triumph. So they are going to voice their moral outrage even harder, and if others do not want self-entitled moral political activists to censor themselves on the contrary they give them a megaphone, these others might surely share their moral battles in politics. Unfortunately that’s precisely how foreign authoritarian powers can hack self-entitled political militants to foment political polarization. The paradoxical conclusion is that being instrumental to foreign hostile powers is justified if it is inspired by moral outrage, apparently no matter if this is going to backlash against them.
In other words, democracy + appeal to universal human rights + free speech + critical thinking (all traits typical of Western democratic institutions and pedagogy) put together can be source of polarization that a foreign attacker can exploit against democracy + appeal to universal human rights + free speech + critical thinking.

So here is a bitter conclusion on the limits of viewing politics in moral terms:
1. Appeal to morality doesn’t fixes per se clashes in moral sensitivity over lots of political issues: wealth redistribution, immigration, abortion, gender relations, religion, environment, etc.
2. Leading by moral example is effectively depending on moral sensitivity (e.g. if I'm politically left-leaning I'll look for moral champions in the left-side of the political spectrum, if I'm politically right-leaning vice versa). Besides it doesn’t necessarily bring about the morally desirable collective behaviour in people by itself (namely without law enforcement), because people can be morally fallible no matter what is morally desirable. BTW one way people show moral fallibility is their disposition to detect hypocrisy in others more than in themselves, and often for the wrong reasons (since they assume their moral sensitivity to be the universal moral compass).
3. Political activism to moralize homeland politics is exploitable by rival foreign powers. And anti-Western authoritarian regimes have an asymmetric advantage to sow division over Western democracies.

I agree. Which is precisely why I proposed the prohibition on using personal data as a free resource to allow influence on an industrial scale. Your previously unedited post (thanks for this improvement) seems to consider me hopelessly out of touch with just about everything. So what would you propose to do about this? — Benkei

In this forum I’m more in a contemplative mode and therefore I’m more interested to better understand pros/cons of proposals than to actually “propose” anything to anybody. And this attitude helps me understand that politics may be replete of thorny tradeoffs to make as much as various degrees of tolerance for failure, especially of trust. Of course, the heigher one’s expectations are the easier it is to remain disappointed.

Concerning your proposal, I see three main issues:
1. Business, politicians, and law enforcement are compelled to collect and access personal information to shape and target their business/political/enforcement activity. As I said controlling the information flow is of paramount importance for politicians in democracy as in authoritarian regimes. In democracy, freedom of information, public right to know and security concerns can be always be invoked in democracies (also manipulatively of course). One can at best wish to reconcile this with protecting a subset of personal data, “private data”, hence the regulatory solution.
2. However depending on the technological evolution (especially in the Information Technology field) regulations risk always to lag behind and make it tricky for an executive power to enforce them effectively. Even more so if regulations vary from country to country (e.g. in Europe rules forbid European companies from collecting data about everyone but American do not forbid American companies to collect data from European people). Besides disruptive technologies like Artificial Intelligence may find smart ways to work around data classified by regulations as private, especially if AI algorithms do not need more personal data to improve user profiling (AI algorithms might be able already or soonish to successfully profile users on the fly even with little personal input from them).
3. Geopolitical competition: preventing social platforms to collect personal data will impact the interference of foreign powers propaganda but also that of local governments. However if a Russian-style, China-style, Iran-style information control over social networks is a valid instrument of control and for nurturing domestic consensus, while interference in democratic social platforms through troll armies, bots and influencers, and trough more traditional means outside social platforms (e.g. corruption of politicians and media) is enough to create the information war asymmetries that are advantageous to their regimes, then prohibiting the usage of personal data didn’t help off-set this asymmetric advantage. In other words, as long as the information flow in Western-style democracies has certain features that by institutional design can be hacked by authoritarian regimes against Western democracies themselves (not vice versa), and independently from Western people or politicians’ best intentions or education, prohibiting social platforms from collecting data won’t off-set this asymmetric advantage which authoritarian regimes can exploit. While turning authoritarian can more easily offset this asymmetric advantage: I think Trump is on this path. Hence my sarcasm: those Westerners who didn’t like hypocritical Western-style propaganda and censorship because at least Russians are non-hypocritical (whatever that means) hoping to get less manipulation and censorship from their Western governments by voicing populist outrage everywhere, including hackable social platforms, now they are risking to experience a rising trend of non-hypocritical Russian-style propaganda and censorship inside the West, then we will see if that's really what they prefer. This makes look such Westerners more as part of the problem than being part of the solution since their moral outrage was intentionally aimed at getting better Western leaders and policies but eventually it worked de facto to discredit Western institutions themselves on world stage and aggravate their dysfunctionality.

Not only, you are 100% unable to find politicians that do what you wish them to do. Not only, you are also 100% unable to persuade enough people to make win politicians which would do what you wish them to do. — neomac

Well, in my country politicians do act like that.


For starters, they understand that they will get to power only by forming a coalition. Now if they go on and personally attack other politicians ad hominem and basically dehumanize other parties, they will surely now that the party won't have anything to do with you and the politician will be your enemy for the rest of your life. The kind of attacks and then total turnarounds that happen in US politics would be treated as utter dishonesty and spinelessness. Sorry, but we don't have that fake Professional wrestling theatre that State side Americans have and love so much.

It's the US that has a severe problem with it's citizens thinking that their real enemy is their own government. That's just a bizarre, unhealthy state which leaves you prone to attacks by your enemies. We here know what a real enemy looks like. We might not like everything the government does, but it still isn't the enemy our grandfathers fought. — ssu

Maybe I wasn’t clear, but it’s not Finnish politicians that you are criticising but American politicians right? (“If you know politics better than the politicians you so bitterly complain about, why don't you yourself fix politics right now?”). Even if Finnish politicians are as virtuous as you claim (the rise of right-wing populism in Finland, pro-Russian sentiment and problematic future of NATO makes me doubt Finns are immune from growing political polarisation and controversies), I would look into historical conditions (like the historical experience of Russian pressure) and geopolitical conditions (being a small and relatively homogenous community, being abundant of natural resources and nuclear energy which have sustained a generous and distributed welfare system, high standards of education, technological progress) that favoured the emergence of such cooperative political environment so far. But, more to the point, how much of their satisfying political performance compared to other states’ leaders, does actually empower Finnish politicians to instill wider social cohesion among nations, make them understand the utter peril of political polarization and get the real support of their people, genuinely answer to the worries of the people, and that the best thing is to tell things how they are, don't lie? how much of their satisfying political performance compared to other states’ leaders, does empower Finnish politicians to influence more than being influenced by major world crisis, like fixing the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and geopolitical competition between Big Powers like the US, Russia and China?
I’m asking also because their example doesn’t seem to inspire all political leaders to become more like Finnish political leaders, right? And that’s why to me assessing the chances of a collective change in society or politics based on decontextualised analogies as you do sounds really misleading to me (it sounds to me as arguing something like: “man, why don’t buy a Ferrari if you like it so much? If I bought a Ferrari so can you, what’s the big deal?”).

The Americans are making mea culpa over the Ukraine debacle? — neomac


Is that not exactly what they are doing? They've all but said that the Russians were right all along, while pinning the principal blame on Ukraine.

I never said the mea culpa had to be sincere or believable. Just that it had to happen in order for negotiations with the Russians to have any chance of success.

And despite being a precondition to peace, if the Europeans can be successfully goaded into continuing the conflict without the US, that's of course a massive new obstacle to peace. But that won't be Washington's problem after they've extricated themselves. — Tzeentch

It is exactly what they are NOT doing. Russians were right all along they say, all right, but they are blaming Ukraine, Europe, and Biden administration. Not the Americans represented by Trump. And it’s not matter of Russia being right for pro-Russian propaganda purposes but of Ukraine and Europe being blamed for the conflict, since Trump could have put all the blame on just Biden’s administration alone. By doing this Trump seems to advocate for total surrender by Ukraine to all Russia’s demands and burdening Europe of the consequences.
All this doesn’t seem to add up with things you said elsewhere. Indeed, despite belonging to the neoliberal blob (as you claimed) the foreign policy of artificially sparkle geopolitical tensions between Europeans and Russians to be more free to pivot to Asia, now it’s Trump that is doing it on steroids, the one you claimed was fighting the neoliberal blob to change American foreign policy. The problem is that Trump changed American foreign policy in ways that are not dictated by the neoliberal approach to American foreign policies (the one that Mearsheimer was bitterly criticising and you were following) but still it is against Europe (in a way that is perfectly in line with Mearsheimer’s idea of sphere of influence where Russia should ally with the US against China). So now not only Russia is threatening Europe (however it is much weaker than it used to be before starting the war) but also the US is threatening Europe. And while insisting on the Russia’s penchant to bond with Europeans just for business (with apparently no threats for Europeans worth warning people about), you have always ignored the Russian penchant for a privileged link with the US to reach a superpower status (perfectly in line with Russian imperialism) and contain China and other Asian countries’ imperial aspirations (like that of Turkey or Iran) which can both weakend Russia’s influence in the Middle East or Caucasus or north Africa or Mediterranean Sea.
What I also find rather baffling in your reasoning is that while you can so easily condemn Western provocations against Russia you do not seem to put any condamnation on Western populism which was provoking the US as you so candidly admit. And if you have predicted that Russia was threatening to wreck Ukraine as a consequence of Western provocations or Ukrainian independence, you seemed very hopeful the US (the Great Satan with plenty of lackeys in Europe, according to you) would have NOT found ways to backfire at European provocations and anti-American emancipation (by European populists whose delusional aspirations do not beed to be condemned). Not to mention that populist anti-Americanism in Europe was also supported by Russia (at least until now since Trump is openly trying to steal European far-right populism from Russian claws) as much as the US was supporting anti-Russian feelings in Ukraine.
The paradox of your reasoning is that on one side you are ready to sacrifice the Ukrainian emancipation from Russia in the name of the European emancipation from the US (so apparently self-determination for Europeans and Palestinians it’s fine but for Ukrainians and Israelis no), on the other side you keep reasoning as if Europeans or the European populism had greater chances to emancipate Europe from the US (the Great Satan which betrays all allies and has all europeans as their vassals) than the Ukrainians to emancipate Ukraine from Russia (which is just happy to have a piece of Ukraine for its existential survival and then just do business as usual with Europeans).

Europe has and has had a massive blindspot for the type of games Washington likes to play — Tzeentch

So you mean that the blob has won again and Trump turned into a blob crypto-puppet?

Flipping Ukraine pro-western has been a decades-long project of the Neocon foreign policy blob, under leadership of chief blob Nuland. — Tzeentch

Many presidents, including Trump and Obama, tried to change the course of US foreign policy, but were unable to fight 'the Blob'. — Tzeentch

The Americans are making mea culpa over the Ukraine debacle?

The Americans making a mea culpa over the Ukraine debacle is a precondition to return to stability in Eastern Europe, which the Russians have been signaling is what they are interested in ever since the war began. — Tzeentch

You said lots of things... you know

Vladimir Solovyov, a leading Putin TV propagandist, has reversed his stance on America after witnessing the Trump administration's efforts to end the war, which included dismissing Europe. Speaking to his viewers on Russian state TV, Solovyov proposed: "Why not create a military coalition of Russia and America and divide Europe to hell?" He added: "Well, who needs it? It's possible - I think it's a great idea, right? " Solovyov envisioned a scenario where Russian and American troops would assume control, thereby relieving Europe of its need for defense forces.
He continued: "Bring in Russian and American troops, and Europe won't have to defend itself from anyone. Quietly, carefully, we'll set up our bases in the usual places. Berlin, Paris, like in 1814.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-s-confident-he-s-on-brink-of-winning-war-with-europe-division-fears/ar-AA1zmoTe

From a geopolitical competition point of view a key problem is that Western democracies have open social media that anti-Western authoritarian regimes can troll and intoxicate with convenient fake news, but Western democracies can't do the same against them. Western democratic regimes are compelled to compensate this asymmetry one way or another, but unfortunately the easiest way they can do it is by turning authoritarian as their rivals. — neomac

Or then, they can try to

a) Instill social cohesion, understand the utter peril of political polarization and how cheap shots at your competing parties can backfire when the political sides don't respect them. Get the real support of their people, don't just assume that if they won some election, they don't have to think about the people until the next elections.

b) genuinely answer to the worries of the people and take these seriously on both sides of the aisle.

c) and the best thing is to tell things how they are. Don't lie. Have the ability that if the country finds itself on really tight spot, the opposition can and the administration can set differences aside and agree on the large issue, even if this naturally gives a lot of points to the ruling parties.

d) Avoid gerrymandering and avoid situations when one party can take all the power. Coalition governments are usually better than one-party governments, especially those that can pass through the representative all kinds of laws. — ssu

First of all, you are still reasoning from what is desirable not from what is feasible. All you just wrote deserves hours of universal standing ovation, sure. Unfortunately the point is that you yourself are 100% unable to do yourself what you expect politicians to do (like telling what they think to be the truth honestly, persuasively and to the best of humans’ knowledge). Not only, you are 100% unable to find politicians that do what you wish them to do. Not only, you are also 100% unable to persuade enough people to make win politicians which would do what you wish them to do. Can you prove me wrong now? Tomorrow? In one week or month or year?
I think that realistic understanding of politics and political competition and debate should start from this very basic fact. This truth should curb any temptation to assess politicians’ performance more subjectively, namely based on what we think it’s desirable independently from what they actually can do. At least in a philosophy forum.
Secondly, politicians do not move in a vacuum of pre-existing contingent cultural and historical factors that constrain and shape their options. Politicians have to work with what they have not with what they wish they had, and with what is attainable given available means and uncertainties not with what they wish they could attain. If Trump has been elected despite being a “fascist douche” and is now able to centralise power in his hands maybe as no other American president could in the past, it would be more enlightening to dig into the pre-existing historical and geopolitical circumstances which favoured his rise to power. And explore his options for achieving what he has promised to achieve to satisfy his supporters better than available alternatives. I’m afraid neither gerrymandering nor the peril of political polarization is the issue among pro-Trump supporters, lobbies and trusted advisors (like Miran or Musk).

What people may happen to disregard is that information is a strategic resource that is contended by competing political forces to aggregate consensus. It's paramount political priority for politicians to control the flux of information - no matter the type of regime or ideology or the degree of leaders' integrity - in a way that best allows politicians do their job for the bad and/or for the good. And since truth, detail and reliability are not the only params that make the information valuable but also TIME, politicians are compelled to control the timing of the information flux and engage in a informational race with their competitors (that's why discovering or knowing since ever that that politician is lying about something is not enough to discredit a piece of political propaganda and related strategic reasons).
It absolutely doesn't matter if or how much people educate themselves and wish to not be manipulated. Believing otherwise it's not only arrogant but evidently self-defeating (BTW this belief is typical of Westerners spoiled by the myth of "critical thinking" and "rights to know" and "freedom of speech"). If you know politics better than the politicians you so bitterly complain about, why don't you yourself fix politics right now? Instead of patronising political leaders, let's see if you can run for president or prime minister of your own country without manipulating or even without being accused of being manipulative by random anonymous people (like on the internet) even when you didn't have absolutely no intention to manipulate anybody or you made your BEST to not look manipulative. Anybody is instrumental to political agendas and everybody has enough blind-spots and biases, independently from their good intentions, and which politicians normally are and MUST be in condition to exploit TO WIN POLITICAL COMPETITORS OR PREVENT POLITICAL COMPETITORS FROM COUNTER-EXPLOITING. It's precisely inherent to their job. At best, ordinary people can make the intellectual effort to understand what side one could be instrumental to in a power struggle by fallible political competitors in certain historical circumstances and have the honesty to acknowledge it.
From a geopolitical competition point of view a key problem is that Western democracies have open social media that anti-Western authoritarian regimes can troll and intoxicate with convenient fake news, but Western democracies can't do the same against them. Western democratic regimes are compelled to compensate this asymmetry one way or another, but unfortunately the easiest way they can do it is by turning authoritarian as their rivals.

Apparently even the guru Mearsheimer [1] didn't expect this turn around which he was so vocally very much predicting suggesting for years: the alliance between the US and Russia against China. The irony.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m5-L5pyXLZQ

More on "The Americans making a mea culpa over the Ukraine debacle"

Meanwhile, another executive order by Trump to further centralize power: https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-reins-in-independent-agencies-to-restore-a-government-that-answers-to-the-american-people/
Autocracy waaaaaay much better than a deep state.

Ukrainian leaders were at fault for the war for not agreeing to surrender territory — NY Times

Perfectly matching with what the maximum expert on economy, military, propaganda, morality, geopolitical realism in thread said: "The Americans making a mea culpa over the Ukraine debacle".

BTW who could possibly be at fault for the war for not agreeing to surrender territory in Palestine? Does anybody have any clue whatsoever? The maximum expert on economy, military, propaganda, morality, geopolitical realism must know, mustn't he?

Donald Trump Keeps Teasing a Third Term. Here’s What to Know
https://time.com/7222820/trump-third-term-president-explainer-pathways-constitution-courts-legal-experts/

The Trump administration says a land expropriation law South Africa recently passed was “blatantly” discriminatory against its white Afrikaners, who are descendants of Dutch and other European colonials. The Trump administration said the South African government was allowing violent attacks against Afrikaner farming communities.
https://apnews.com/article/south-africa-trump-musk-afrikaners-0f58dfe1651671d30fcbe16d00c3d99c

The EU has a combined GDP of $22bn and Russia has around $4bn so I don't see why the countries of Europe can't band together to deter Russia. — BitconnectCarlos

1. Aggregating GDP of EU countries doesn't make much sense if one overlooks the deep divisions over security issues among European countries, especially as perceived by a spoiled and old populace ("people want peace" not justice, not freedom, not prosperity, "people do not want immigration or the EU and euro" traditionalist and ethnically pure nation states waaaaaaaaay better than technological advanced big sovra-national markets and powers).
It would be different if Europe had its own Putin who centralized federal power, wrecked all forms of national independence by destroying and butchering civilians, murdering and imprisoning reluctant economic, financial, industrial elites, independant press journalists and political activists, who could send Italians, Germans, French, Netherlands, Hungarians, Poles as cannon fodder or criminals or mercenaries and threat nuclear wars to establish red-lines. It's not primarily matter of means but of unity over long term goals. This is a PRO-RUSSIAN RUSSIAN ANALYST that makes it clear this point and which Europeans should veeeeeery carefully listen to:
Since the military conflict in Ukraine is not an all out war, the loser will not be the side who physically runs out of strength, but rather the one who loses the will to fight sooner. What is important here is a clear vision of victory and a clear strategy for achieving it.
Russia initially had problems with this: The start came as a shock to everyone and just as suddenly turned into a protracted military conflict with a series of humiliating defeats. [1]
Russian society was able to withstand the blow last year and – albeit not immediately, only towards the end of the year – pulled itself together and prepared for a long and hard struggle. The conception of our victory is clear: We still need the demilitarization of Ukraine (a radical reduction of its army), neutral status for Kiev (and a mechanism to control it) and the recognition of some form of territorial changes. The latter, by the way, will be the most difficult legally; here – for the sake of international legitimacy – Jesuitical forms such as a 99-year lease are possible. But we are getting ahead of ourselves, on this point.
Although this concept of victory has not been articulated, it is intuitively clear; the actions of the authorities at all levels do not contradict it; and society, although not very happy (only people who are not completely healthy enjoy armed conflicts), has rallied and is ready, if not to participate directly, then to support or at least tolerate it. All this will sooner or later produce results at the front – IF THE ENEMY DOES NOT RESPOND WITH THE SAME UNITY.
(source: https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/counteroffensive-is-failing/)

[1] Who remembers those idiots, pardon I meant the maximum experts on economy, military, propaganda, morality, geopolitical realism, in this thread who were spinning the pro-Russian "feint theory" raise your hands!

2. The US is not compelled to rise a fourth competitor power in the Eurasian continent as much as it is to keep competitor powers divided, which is not that difficult since their default divisions are even bigger than the ones dividing European countries. So Europeans are coerced into becoming SERVILE AS THEY WERE NEVER BEFORE to the US by Trump administration [2]: US security as a service. Europe MUST NOT build its own military-industrial complex and military for its security and perpetually pay to sustain and grow American defence industry and business all around the world (American imperialism 2.0), and no more whining. Otherwise they have to remain divided economically, politically and military, and fearful of Russia. On the other side, Russia is now weaker than it was at the beginning of the war and depleted enough of its military/naval/political assets, and Putin (being so nostalgic of the Soviet era) is so wet for Trump that it could turn into US bitch anytime now and sell it as "strategic victory" (well, to be fair, at this point this was the best they could hope for). I guess in this chess board also Israel plays a strategic role to keep Europe separated from the only option it has left for a strategic alliance to strategically emancipate itself from the US: China. [3]

[2] if they were so servile, why is Trump punishing and mistreating them so publicly in the name of Make America Great Again? The same holds for Zelensky

[3] Who remembers those idiots, pardon I meant the maximum experts on economy, military, propaganda, morality, geopolitical realism, in this thread who were spinning the propaganda that Russia and Europe will ally and grow prosperous in peace ever after because the US is doomed to fight China (and Isreal is doomed to disappear from earth thanks to the Palestinian cause) raise your hands!

I think it's more than just laziness. The entire behaviour of this US government seems to be purposefully geared to undermine collective security. You can callously throw an ally under the bus behind closer doors. But that's not what they're doing. They're putting a spotlight on how they simply do not care.

Which is in line with the domestic political policy, particularly via DOGE. The policy is not one of reform, it's one of revolution. And it's possible the people who provide the philosophical underpinnings of this revolution (who do not include Trump himself) do not actually envision rebuilding any of the things that are being torn apart. — Echarmion

It's very much in line with the Miran plan:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Miran
“In December 2024, president-elect Donald Trump named Miran as his nominee for chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.”


“How can the U.S. get trading and security partners to agree to such a deal? First, there is the stick of tariffs. Second, there is the carrot of the defense umbrella and the risk of losing it. ”
https://www.hudsonbaycapital.com/documents/FG/hudsonbay/research/638199_A_Users_Guide_to_Restructuring_the_Global_Trading_System.pdf?bsft_eid=a30f775d-a95b-4704-ba5b-9fcd5291f465&bsft_clkid=d77202ed-6243-4868-80b3-cac2e2cc0204&bsft_uid=9cbb1a3f-fa2f-419b-b7c7-e6dd5fdc9654&bsft_mid=41525857-7d6a-4c17-8c4b-32fa072a0d0a&bsft_txnid=71ccf64d-01ad-4629-b814-d2085bc58599&bsft_utid=9cbb1a3f-fa2f-419b-b7c7-e6dd5fdc9654-Newsletter_COR_WHATEVERITTAKES&bsft_mime_type=html&bsft_ek=2025-02-17T05%3A00%3A00Z&bsft_lx=8&bsft_tv=513&bsft_aaid=72bb9dec-3452-4075-a63c-0f8d60246a1e

Remember those in this thread (but also outside) who were whining over Biden's support of the Ukrainian neo-nazis? How silent they were/are about the support of the European neo-nazis by Putin and, now, also by Trump. The irony.

I would correct that to "The American elan". — ssu

American acted as the Western leader. And no matter how blameful , ill-minded , and ominous the US look and looked to many, I would still insist that the strategic need to export "democracy", "universal human rights" and the rhetoric "the end of history" was integral part of the globalization project in which the German-led EU, China and Russia could prosper. The two sides of a coin. And we should never discount German-led EU, China and Russia agency in how things evolved.

Seems that the dividing line starts to be Russia-Trump vs Ukraine & Europe.

Because it likely is worse than I thought. — ssu

Perfectly in line with what I said 2 years ago:

Outside the EU (or some other form of federation) Europeans might go back to compete one another not only economically but also for security. And outside the US sphere of influence, we might compete not only with Russia, and China and other regional or global competitors, but also with the US. Good luck with that. — neomac

And 7 months ago:

Indeed, it’s funny to see this dude completely overlooking another hypothetical scenario which his guru Mearshaimer would likely support, and even Trump (his beloved American President) would arguably welcome: the scenario where the US reconciles with Russia to better contain China using Ukraine as a bargaining chip.

Now let’s consider a scenario where Russia:

- can be flattered by 2 great powers like China and the US,

- can experience a boost in its fuel and wheat exports (nurturing its power projection in all contended areas, including in Europe), even more so if Ukraine will completely surrender to Russia (something which is welcome because apparently Ukrainian lives matter to Trump voters! And it’s totally risk free and harmless for Europe because if Russia could blackmail EU for its fuel supply when Ukraine was NOT under its control, how could Russia blackmail EU for its fuel supply AND wheat supply when Ukraine is completely under its control ?)

- can enjoy free pass for expanding in North Africa and the Mediterranean (namely, ENCIRCLING EUROPE)

- can have UK+East Europeans locked in an anti-Russian stance due to their historical fear of Russian imperialism conveniently boosted by the US of course (Trump didn’t like North Stream 2, right? nor the German or European economy outperforming the American one, right?) and the rest of European countries with self-conceited anti-US/pro-Russian lackeys (replacing the pro-US lackeys’) as political oppositions or leaders

In this scenario, who doesn't give a fuck about Europeans to put their heads out of their ass more than Russia?

Not only Europe won’t get completely rid of the US but it would completely get split in smaller regional spheres of influence between the US and Russia (however not with the same antagonism as in the Cold War, at least as long as China remains the greatest security threat to both), and with no prospect of boosting their economy or army other than as a function of their hegemon’s interest (BTW I let you imagine how fantabulous is the prospect of experiencing an economic boost under far-right populist political elites when Russia is your hegemon, it’s enough to see the envious example of the ex-Soviet Union republics).
In a wonderful multipolar world, market/industry/technology inputs and outputs and commercial routes are under the political/military control of regional hegemonic powers, negotiating on trading conditions or imposing them for everybody else.

In short, in this hypothetical scenario, there is no way that Europeans simply chum up with Russia and economically profit from the conflict between China and the US, living in happiness, peace and bliss ever after. — neomac

The Western elan of exporting democracy and universal human rights to the Rest is transmogrifying more and more into importing authoritarianism and despise for universal human rights from the Rest. The irony.

:up:

BTW it seems to me that pro-Trump's propaganda is caught in some rhetoric conundrum: if Russia is no threat to Europe and ironically is looking forward to normalising relations with the West because the Russian red-line is just to cleanse and genocide the Ukrainians as some pro-Russian genocide apologists believe and justify ("it is good for countries to draw a line in the sand in the face of a blatant disregard for their security interests") :eyes: why do Europeans need to buy from the US defense industry or even be in charge of Ukraine sovereignty? If Trump wants to appease Russia, why can't Europeans do the same and gift whatever is left of Ukraine to Putin in exchange for resuming business? If the US can leave NATO, why Europeans can't join the BRICS?
If Russia is a threat, why should Europeans rely on the US for military assistance and weaponry which is something that can be withdrawn at some US president's whims to the point of even explicitly encouraging Russia to act more aggressively to establish its sphere of influence in Europe manu militari [1]? If Europeans have to turn into actual US bootlickers why can't they turn into Russia or Chinese bootlickers? We have plenty of anti-Americans that would rush into bootlicking Russia and China. Even in this thread.


[1] Trump says he would encourage Russia to ‘do whatever the hell they want’ to any NATO country that doesn’t pay enough (https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html). I'm sure the pro-Russian and pro-Trump idiots in this thread don't get the logic presupposition: if Russia IS NO THREAT to Europe independently from the US provocations Trumps' THREAT AGAINST Europe would make no sense.

I've been mostly pro-Ukraine and anti-Russia — BitconnectCarlos

If there is a geopolitical strategic ratio in Trump's policy toward Russia (besides taking a personal revenge on Zelensky), this is most likely to detach Russia from China and from EU and from Iran. Getting Russia to stabilize the middle east, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and curb Islamist ambitions may be worth sacrificing the Ukrainian national self-determination.

Far better is simply a loose but working coalition of countries. — ssu

Fusing defense industries would favour the rise of a military-industrial complex lobby which may be the necessary step to build a valid political and military deterrence against hostile powers. It’s also economically important to preserve a unite and dynamic market and technological development to compensate for the demographic and morale decay of spoiled Europeans.

There will be always some country like Hungary or whatever, that swims in the other direction. Far better is simply a loose but working coalition of countries. NATO countries around the Baltic and the North Sea would be a great start. — ssu

That would sound more promising. But once NATO is gone without being replaced by some comparable EU collective defence, not sure if the EU will survive. Imagine if countries like Hungary or whatever that swim in the other direction, will continue to do it also over security matters e.g. by hosting Russian military bases.

To me that sounds like being a hawk. It's like the essence of what hawks are. — Arcane Sandwich

Not sure what you are talking about. To me, "hawkishness" in foreign policy roughly refers to a tendency to favor military action or aggressive diplomacy, while "dovishness" leans towards diplomacy, negotiations, and peaceful solutions over military intervention. Claiming that the risk of having a military industrial complex is that, among others, you may have a "hawkish" lobby, is a fact. And facts as facts are neither "hawkishness" nor "dovish".

because it would create our own military industrial complex, I changed my opinion in this very thread 3 years ago — Benkei

Precisely… but you must change you opinion once more. Indeed, there are all sorts of moral hazards that are inherent to accepting a military industrial complex: like POLITICAL HAWKISHNESS, POLITICAL CORRUPTION, SELLING WEAPONS IN CONFLICTS AROUND THE WORLD, COVERT OPERATIONS, BEING EXPOSED TO AND ACCUSED OF SECURITY PROVOCATIONS, MENTAL AND PHYSICAL MILITARIZATION OF THE SOCIETY (people need to be able to sacrifice their lives if needed, and kill other lives), USING PEOPLE AS CANNON FODDER, RISK TO COMMIT OR GET INVOLVED IN ALLEGED OR ACTUAL WAR CRIMES, MAKING NUCLEAR THREATS.
Sure you can morally stomach a military industrial complex?

I've been hammering on the EU leaving NATO since then as the only reliable way forward for our security. — Benkei

A EU military/army and home nuclear deterrence are a greater risk than US-led NATO for Russia, obviously. In history Europeans have invaded Russia, the US never did. And while the US can feel safe far from Russia, shift strategic focus elsewhere or withdraw from overstretching in Europe, Europeans can not afford the same. Besides while the US strategic interests where shifting toward China and the Pacific, the NATO financing for the European security was decreasing (https://www.nato.int/docu/review/images/66d708_2_grand_nato-canada-fm-1989-to-2022e_nato_article.jpg).
If the US has no reason to support a European military and ESPECIALLY a competing European military industrial complex, even less has Russia that’s why interfering with European politics and find pro-Russian bootlickers in Europe is vital for Russia’s imperialism as much as building buffer states.

I give the UN another 10 years at most after which it will have become irrelevant in its entirety due to the continuous undermining of it. — Benkei

The UN project (which is originally an American project) was more likely to succeed if all countries turned more democratic and respectful of universal human rights standards. But it didn't happen because non-Western authoritarian regimes so decided, right?
The cheap/spoiled moralism of many Westerners accusing the American imperialism of hypocrisy and undermining International institutions can now enjoy American imperialism without hypocrisy and constraining international institutions. This is the great improvement Western moralists and idealists (and self-entitled realists) were DE FACTO "working for" so hard (with the blessing of Russia, China and Iran), precisely because Western moralists and idealists (and self-entitled realists) do not get the link between power and morality. It's much more easy to rely on hard power than to rely on soft power. Discrediting the American soft power and depicting the US as the Great Satan won't make Western self-entitled nobodies' moral wishes come true, it may actually bring about the opposite. This is a silly expectation of spoiled Westerners, especially spoiled Europeans, which they have to pay for. Bitterly.

Trump has thrown Ukraine under the bus, that much is clear. Yet many people still don’t seem to fully grasp the consequences. — Benkei

And you are among these people, because what Trump is doing is less erratic than what you think, here is why https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/963479