Poll says 32% of Ukrainians open to territorial concessions for quick peace
https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/poll-says-32-of-ukrainians-open-to-territorial-concessions-for-quick-peace/

The first big difference is the Russians aren't committing a genocide in Ukraine, as I just explained. — boethius

But again, mainly, the most important thing, is that Russia isn't carrying out a genocide whereas Isreal is. — boethius

Legally speaking, allegations of genocide. And there are allegations of Russia committing a genocide against Ukrainians too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allegations_of_genocide_of_Ukrainians_in_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War

Russia is following the law of armed conflict pretty well: extremely far away from starving whole civilian populations to death. And this is born out in the stats of civilians killed during the conflict and in particular children. — boethius

Some more allegations, that one can find in the Ukrainian case too:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/24/war-crimes-dossier-to-accuse-russia-of-deliberately-causing-starvation-in-ukraine

The second big difference is that Russia is not implementing apartheid system and occupying parts of Ukraine without giving those occupied peoples any rights. — boethius

Allegations of discriminatory policies from Russians against indigenous people, you have aplenty:

https://www.coe.int/en/web/kyiv/-/human-rights-situation-in-territories-of-ukraine-occupied-by-russia-committee-of-ministers-gravely-concerned

https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/EUR5078052024ENGLISH.pdf


People involved in the Crimean Tatar civil rights movement repeatedly noted strong similarities between the conditions suffered by designated "special settlers" and victims of apartheid as well as Palestinians under Israeli occupation
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tatarophobia

Third, the territories occupied by Russia have large portions, arguably a majority, of ethnic Russians that actually want to join Russia (hence the separatists fighting for 10 years), so there is not only an element of self-determination in the Russian speakers taking up arms against Kiev oppression of their language and culture, but also no one really cares all that much whether Russian speaking Ukrainians become Russian speaking Russians. Russia isn't conquering territory and then keeping Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians that don't want to be occupied by Russians in a giant ghetto with zero rights and lot's of murder, sexual abuse and so on, for the foreseeable future. Of course there will be exceptions, but in general there has been no insurgency against Russian occupation nor Ghettoizaton of conquered territory. — boethius

There is no need to ghetto anybody if forced displacement can do the trick. Mearsheimer has argued that’s the intent of Israel, cleanse territories to dodge the accusation of apartheid.
There is a recognisable historical pattern. Indeed, when territorial disputes are triggered by people aspirations to build a nation-state as for both Israel and Palestinians, cleansing and genocide are likely consequences. Western countries in Europe (https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/35457/) and overseas like in the US , Austrialia, Canada are not immune from this phenomenon either (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Native_American_genocide_in_the_United_States, https://nwac.ca/media/2023/06/is-a-genocide-taking-place-in-canada-short-answer-yes, https://kooriweb.org/foley/resources/history/genocide.html) .
The appeal to self-determination sounds more compelling to me when it’s matter of people aspirations against political leaderships imposing their rule by authoritarian means (inspired by devine mandate?) or against foreign imperialism, less compelling when it’s matter of conflicting national aspirations between different ethnic groups over the same land, or a minority over a majority within the same nation state.

In otherwords, Russia is implementing a "one state solution" in their occupation of new territory. The one state solution is one of the two solutions that everyone agrees solves these kinds of problems, therefore all is well and you can rest your pretty little head.

The situation in Gaza is simply not similar at all to the situation in Crimea or the Donbas.

Israel does not offer Gazans citizenship and equal rights.

There is not one state or two state solution, but oppressed stateless people in a ghetto that have a right to fight the forces of oppression.

Now, Ukrainians in territory occupied by Russia would have the same right of insurgency against an occupying force (just it's less palpable because they are offered equal rights) — boethius

It’s not up to me to decide for the oppressed ones what is palatable. I do wonder if all Palestinians in occupied territories find it palatable to convert to Judaism, which would bestow them a right to join Israel and definitely have their own nation-state without spilling a single blood drop.
Anyways, Russia is annexing territories AFTER forced cleansing, colonization and russification in the occupied areas, so I wouldn’t be surprised if the majority of people in the occupied areas (arguably ethnic Russians) would be fine in being part of Russia (however I don’t think they have the ultimate decision on this matter, that’s all) and Russian would welcome it.
For Israel, the situation is different and the comparison to immigration in Western democracies can help understand why. No Western democracy (ESPECIALLY with a regime supporting populist views) would accept mass migration (ESPECIALLY from alien ethnic groups) that would dramatically alter the demographics of a State, for security and economic reasons. Discrimination and oppression of stateless people are very common conditions in the West for illegal immigrants (apartheid state, here too?).
So it’s politically questionable to expect Israel to accept a one state solution altering its demographics in favour of the Palestinians minority. Besides there are Palestinian living as Israeli citizens and enjoying the rights which the Palestinians in the occupied territories do not have. So the problem for Israel is not the civil/democratic integration of Palestinians per se, but how to deal with those Palestinians that are pressing outside its borders. Which is even worse than the case of the illegal immigrants for Western countries, since those Palestinians pressing on the Israeli boarders are fighting for their right to same land and they are led by Hamas (with the support of foreign powers hostile to Israel) into an asymmetric war against Israel and Israelis. So security concerns are in order and no state is expected to intentionally sacrifice the security of its own citizens at large for humanitarian concerns over alien people perceived as hostile at large.



To me, Western priorities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should not ideologically withdraw from historical tragedies and people’s nation-state aspirations , but take hard decisions informed primarily by ideological proximity, political-economic-military cooperation and common challenges.
Try to address the points I’m making (wording and phrasing included), not the ones you wished I made.

4. Regardless of what you think about fighting a disastrous war to (maybe) get something that would offer protection (maybe) from disastrous wars, it still only makes sense to do if you can actually win.
For example ssu's argument at the start was that while agreeing with me that he saw no way Ukraine could win, well maybe Ukrainian general have something or know something we don't and will pull off a brilliant victory. Turns out Ukrainian generals had no such thing and exactly what was predictable given the available information is what happened. The corollary of @ssu's position is that if Ukraine had no surprise then their war effort is a disastrous mistake, immoral, got many people killed for nothing, and definitely they should have taken the Russian's offer at the start of the war (or before the war). But these positions are just conveniently swept under the rug of "Ukrainian agency". — boethius

I won’t argue for SSU’s claims, he can do it by himself. I can argue for my claims.
And I think here again you are playing with words, like “victory”.
I’m less concerned with a military notion of “victory” and more with a strategic notion of “victory”. I doubt that a military notion of “victory” automatically translates to a strategic victory.
The problem from the West and the US perspective is the political, economic, and military threats posed by authoritarian regimes growingly powerful, ambitious and hostile to the West and the US. That means that there is a serious risk for the West its elites and its people to lose all the economic, political, security privileges they could enjoy in a Western led world order.
If enemies can/should not be military defeated in a significant way, then enemies need to be contained or deterred. Ukraine is an important piece to counter-balance hostile powers like Russia which aspires to lead the revolt against the West by the Rest of the World.
Ukraine has decided so far to side with the West and now pays the consequences for its choice, as much as Palestinians decided to side with Iran and now they pay the consequences for their choice. Was this worth it? I’d let the Ukrainians (and Palestinians) decide. This is why I’m talking about “Ukrainian agency".
And I don’t think that “their war effort is a disastrous mistake, immoral, got many people killed for nothing, and definitely they should have taken the Russian's offer at the start of the war (or before the war)” at all. So far, Ukraine managed to keep its political independence, to control its most important cities (including Odessa), and to control a good part of economic resources against a much stronger enemy. As long as Russia will keep fighting, Ukraine will be out of NATO and EU and wear out its capacities, but this also ensures that there is no buffer state between Russia and NATO, and that Europeans have more time to properly regroup against Russia. I wish the West could do more and better for Ukraine, but they seem unable/unwilling to do it. So I don’t need to exclude that, for the Ukrainians, this war can turn to be as endless as the Israeli-Palestinian war is, and as disastrous to Ukrainians as the Israeli-Palestinian war is disastrous to Palestinians. But I wouldn’t say it’s immoral and people died for nothing in either case just because they were disastrously defeated. BTW, how strange it is to read such an objection from a self-proclaimed man of honour: aren’t men-of-honour those ready to sacrifice life, wellbeing of themselves and people they are responsible for to save their honour? There are people who kill themselves and their children with their own hands to save their honour.
Concerning the Russians’ offer which Ukrainians should have accepted, the problem remains: both were requiring Western security guarantees with no benefits for Western alliance, only for Russia. So Ukraine could have accepted the deal with Russia without the Western assistance. But they preferred not to. You can speculate it wasn’t good for Ukrainians, but I do not give a shit about your speculation, you are not Ukrainian, right? And even if you were, it doesn’t seem to reflect the views of Ukrainians at large.

5. Regardless of what you think about fighting a war you can't win, the West's policy has clearly been to make sure of this result by drip feeding in weapons systems. Now that the drip feed of weapons systems has run its course, the West has turned to drip feeding "maybe we will, maybe we won't" send in ground troops to turn the tide, to maintain the policy of having Ukraine fight, giving them hope (such as the next wonder weapon or wonder intervention; something we've already seen at the start with all the hullaballoo about a "no fly zone" which was critical in encouraging Ukrainians to fight while the weapons drip feed system was put into place: as that takes logistics).
As I've argued, this is my main problem with Western policy. We are clearly not even trying to help Ukrainians, but just propping them up to take an absolute beating in order to accomplish other things, all harmful to Europe. — boethius

Western policies look pretty disappointing to me as well. But while I’m more sure about the underlying strategic reasoning for the West to support Ukraine, I’m very much less sure about what the West could actually do, especially because the West harbours its own internal conflict of interests and nasty devisions, even in the face of such dramatic and epochal historical events. On the other side these constraining factors are expected since we live in countries with democratic institutions (i.e. more exposed to people’s mood and opposing political views) and a system of allegiance which grants greater political autonomy wrt the hegemonic power (i.e. less submissive to hegemonic power pressure, see Hungary). It could have been very much different for Russia if European countries had authoritarian regimes like Belarus and responded to USA’s demands like Belarus responds to Russia’s. This leads me to believe that your effort to discredit the drip-feeding approach of the West is DEFINITELY not only a pro-Russia argument, but a pro-authoritarian regime argument.
Your critic of the drip-feeding approach would be more compelling if you could actually argue for MORE EFFECTIVE Western policies to counter anti-Western authoritarian regimes’ political/economic/military challenges in general or Russia’s hegemonic ambitions in particular, in a democratic and peaceful way. But you didn’t offer any so far. Also because if you really could do such a thing, I do wonder: why aren’t you leading the Western world instead of wasting your time on the internet as an ordinary nobody like me?
The drip-feeding approach is arguably also the result of conflicting interests: the US wants to contain Russia but also wants to reduce its engagement in the European defence. The US wants Russia to lose but not too much to favour the collapse of the Russian Federation which may also benefit China. Leading EU countries want to contain Russia’s hegemonic ambitions, but they do not want to sacrifice their economic ties with Russia and China, or worse risk a nuclear war in Europe. Leading EU countries need the US protection for their national security, but they do not want to contribute to it significantly nor want to align with the US foreign policies in the face of anti-Western challenges. So what you are framing as “we are clearly not even trying to help Ukrainians, but just propping them up to take an absolute beating in order to accomplish other things, all harmful to Europe” is questionable. There is no single Western head taking decision wrt Ukraine as in Russia. And the Ukrainians without Western help would have not lasted 2 years war against Russia as they did which is still very far from being disastrous or absolute beating as you claim. The Palestinian aspiration to their nation state is what looks to me disastrous and an absolute beating so far. And yet Palestinians are still fighting, foreign powers support their fight materially as much as people like you support their fight politically. And once you accept that the Palestinians misery, destruction and alleged genocide is worth if done in the name of their nation-state (that’s Hamas argument) and support for anti-US forces (like Iran) how credible are your objections against the Western support of Ukraine, really?
On the other side Russia has neither made Ukraine a pro-Russian buffer state (actually it achieved the opposite) nor strengthened its international status and regional control (like in Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict and on Kazakhstan) nor secured its Black Sea backyard to support its power projection.

6. Regardless of what you think of the drip feed theory, if there was some genuine intent to use the leverage of clearly being willing to drip feed weapons into Ukraine to seek a diplomatic solution that is favourable to Ukraine, the Western leaders would put on their big boy pants and go and try to negotiate that happening and using their leverage (such as the sanctions and so on; whole point of sanctions being to serve as leverage to compel compliance, if the goal to effect Russian decision making and not just have a big giant war for the sake of all the sweet, sweet profiteering).

Furthermore, sending money to a pervasively corrupt polity is a de facto bribe to the elites of that polity. That the West puts zero controls or supervision on the money nor the weapons sent into Ukraine is making explicit there's not even pretence that this money is not a de facto bribe. That the West recognizes a lot of that money and weapons "disappears" but has not found one single Euro of laundered money or laundered weapons outside Ukraine, is explicitly participating in the money laundering scheme. — boethius

Surely sanctions are not a magic wand to fix international conflicts, they are a double edged swards since they can damage the economy of the sanctioning countries, not only the sanctioned one. But also excessive fever can kill people, still fever can be effective in killing parasitic bacteria. And even though sanctions may not be effective in inducing compliance, still they can increase costs and constrain power projection opportunities, so they have an attritional force. If sanctions were utterly pointless there was no need to strengthen them against Iran (as Trump did) and for China to refrain from openly doing business with Russia and Iran, and avoid sanctions. It’s a power struggle so also economic sanctions can be a valid defensive mechanism within a wider and long-term strategy. What the impact of sanctions against Russia or Iran shows is that Russia can count on a network of strategic alliance, which needs to be countered by a network of strategic alliance not by a single actor, no matter if it as powerful as the US.
Concerning the bribing argument, assuming it’s broadly or decisively true or just plausible what you claim (but what are your evidences to support it, really?), I would counter as easily that Russia too is bribing Ukrainian politicians (oh… and Western politicians too!). So if Ukrainian politicians are there to be bribed, better to be bribed in support of pro-Western objectives than pro-Russian. A similar argument to that one about dumb people who believe in propaganda, better they believe pro-Western propaganda than pro-Russian propaganda. The point is not propaganda or bribery but efficacy in advancing pro-Western objectives with whatever leverage currently available. Politicians do not operate in a world starting from ideal conditions, effective and efficient tools, universal good will and patience, to fix a cosmetic local issue but from any shitty predicament humanity ended up with at certain time in history where one problem is connected to every other problem, and conflicting interests press in all directions from all directions. So they are compelled to use whatever they can afford to gain relative advantage wrt competitors. And this reflects in the policies of the countries they lead as well as in the off the record measures they take to advance national interest (if we are lucky).
Moreover it is naive to expect that a country struggling for hegemony or national aspirations would spare itself from using a questionable but effective measure (be it bribing, torturing, exploiting terrorists, committing war crimes, using weapons of mass destruction, concentration camps, provoke famines, killing civilians, etc.) if the enemy doesn’t do the same, unless its power to impose its will with other means (including a valid network of allies) on its enemy is overwhelming. There is also some karma here: the more unfairly demanding our expectations about our politicians versus foreign politicians are, the more easily we will get disappointed.

Therefore, the policy of propping up Ukraine is to have it destroyed, have hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians killed and maimed and traumatized, depopulate the younger generations making the existing demographic collapse that much more catastrophic, simply for the gesture of "our hearts being in the right place" of wanting Russia to lose a war and "learn a lesson”. — boethius

…unless you are projecting on the West the martyrdom rhetoric of Hamas (which btw you support, right?). One could also argue that Iran is propping up Palestinians to have them destroyed, have hundreds of thousands of Palestinians killed and maimed, traumatized or cleansed, depopulate the younger generations making the existing demographic collapse that much more catastrophic, simply for the gesture of "our hearts being in the right place" of wanting Israel to lose a war and "learn a lesson”. And this is perfectly in line with what was declared by the Palestinian political leaders governing Gaza.
My counter argument is that you may be confusing reasons and consequences: precisely because "our hearts being in the right place" are not wanting Russia to lose a war and "learn a lesson” that Ukraine may be utterly destroyed, have hundreds of thousands of people killed and maimed and traumatized, and trigger a demographic collapse. Indeed, it’s people like you underestimating the Russian threat and pointing at the US as the Great Satan, among the reasons of why many Western politicians can afford at best a drip-feed strategy policy. You are pointing at a problem rooted in people more persuaded by pro-Russian arguments like yours than by pro-US ones, but simply too scared to irritate the US. And, my objection sounds even more plausible to me after reading your defamatory argument: indeed, your argument shows how you cornered yourself into a position where whatever Russia does against Ukraine and the West, this will be nothing compared to what the US has done and is responsible for (that’s actually one of your major claims, you argued a while back if I remember correctly). So the more perverse you can depict Western intentions in Ukraine the more self-rewarding your feel it is your piece of propaganda against the Great Satan. As far as I’m concerned I find such arguments more speculative than evidence-based, more rhetorically appealing than analytically appealing. Yours is just populist porn. Intellectual misery at its finest.

The war is not existential for the Ukrainian people, Russia has no way of conquering all of Ukraine anyways and clearly doesn't want that headache if they could, the Russian speaking regions have pretty solid evidence they (a lot, perhaps even a very solid majority) happy being in Russia (considering the real repression they experience by Ukrainian speakers). — boethius

I disagree. The Ukrainian war is existential in that it has to do with the very existence of an independent nation state with its territorial integrity. In order to do that Russia is ready to destroy Ukraine, massacre Ukrainians, reject Ukrainian national identity and commit war crimes at convenience . So yes Russia is an existential threat to the Ukrainian people too.
On the other side, even Russian security concerns which Putin is waving at to justify his war in Ukraine are not existential for the Russian people, since Ukraine (or the US, for that matter) has no way of conquering all of Russia anyways and clearly doesn't want that headache if they could. So if Russia has security concerns, Ukrainians too has.
This raises another issue: not only the claims that the war in Ukraine is not existential for Ukrainians and that Russian security concerns are legitimate are questionable, each one in its own merit, but why are you using different criteria?! Why are you assessing Russia’s case in terms of its legitimate security concerns but not Ukraine, while Ukrainian’s case in terms of existential war?! And if legitimate security concerns and existential wars are related then why Russia’s aggression of Ukraine can be explained/justified in terms of security concerns but Ukrainian self-defence can not be explained/justified in terms of existential war?!
Concerning the UKRAINIAN MINORITY happy of being part of Russia against the Ukrainian majority, either they could pursue a war of independence (no matter if the autonomy of related Ukrainian regions was already acknowledged prior to this war) but that wasn’t their choice. The alleged civil war was imported from Russia, actually by Russia private imperialist and neo-nazi militias (with the blessing of Russian politicians), plotting with a few local likeminded (or bribed?) politicians, as far as I can tell. Or they could migrate to Russia to avoid persecution, as Jews fled to Israel to avoid persecution. I’ve heard Russia is plenty of unpopulated lands where they could host their fellow pro-Russian Ukrainians. I’ve also heard Russia is also impressively effective in forced migration of non-Russian people and Ukrainian children, so I let you imagine how effective they could be in supporting wilful migration of fellow pro-Russian Ukrainians eager to be enrolled in military armies in the pursuit of imperialist goals, right? But if a minority of Ukrainians want to keep Ukrainian land while rejecting the Ukrainian rule and replace it with a Russian rule, why on earth should the majority of Ukrainians let them do it? Russians too repressed Chechen independence movement for the same reasons with two (civil?) wars. So, under the questionable assumption that there were all the premises for an indigenous civil war, also Ukraine should be allowed to repress independence movements within its territory in blood, and Russia’s military siding with the independence movement should be deemed as an illegitimate interference.

Therefore, if the war is not existential, there must be some reasonable cost to waging it to accomplish the objectives.

This is the core question, which no one on the self described "pro-Ukrainian" side has even attempted to answer: no matter what you think of "justice" there must be some limit to the cost to Ukrainians in their war. Likewise, regardless of what you think of Ukrainian just cause, it is not good for this so called just cause nor moral in and of itself for the West to continuously manipulate Ukraine with false promises and false assurances. — boethius

I’ve attempted to answer your and your sidekicks’ analogous “core” questions sooooo many times that I was really looking forward to doing it again, of course. The answer that best fits your “core question” to me is that your “core” question is dumb, so I’m not surprised if other representatives of the “pro-Ukrainian" side didn’t answer. People can't take seriously answer so grossly misleading questions. It's like asking people how many grey-looking hair has the current king of France on his head. If the question is flawed, then it should be denounced as such.
Indeed, you are asking people who do not put their skin in this war to answer for those who put their skin in this war, based once again in non-shared assumption surreptitiously taken to be shared (that the war in Ukraine is not existential for Ukrainians?! But Russian security concerns are legitimate?! Are you crazy?!). The “reasonable” costs of fighting for a Ukrainian Westernisation are decided by Ukrainians as much as the “reasonable” costs of fighting for a Palestinian nation state are decided by the Palestinians. Ukrainians have agency as much as Palestinians. And Ukrainians are arguably better equipped in terms of military support and strategic allies than the Palestinians. These people do not fight because they are brainwashed by Western or Iranian propaganda into fighting, they are struggling for their nation-state and they rely on the support of INTERESTED strategic allies accordingly. Palestinians strategically allied with Soviet Union and then with Iraq before allying with Iran to oppose Israel, while Ukrainians allied with Habsburg and then with the German Nazis, before allying with the West to oppose Russia’s hegemonic ambitions.
Besides when people are driven by identitarian motives there are uneconomical sinking costs which explain why nations are built into blood, genocides and cleansing over generations, and their wars can be ENDLESS (see the Afghans and the Kurds).
So I gave you two reasons why your “core” question looks preposterous to me: first reason, national interest is by definition identitarian, and costs and benefits are shaped by identitarian national interests. This is why you should not ask me what is worth fighting against Russia for Ukrainians, I’m not Ukrainian. In the end, it’s their motivations that guides their choice of fighting Russians not Western motivations for Ukrainians to fight the Russians. Second reason, identitarian aspirations are grounded on uneconomical sinking costs, such uneconomical sinking costs of human life and welfare are very much essential, intrinsic, inherent part of nation building processes. And such aspirations can go as far as the logic of martyrdom by Hamas (which you support, right?) goes. I don’t think it’s the case of the Ukrainians though.
Your one-sided moral blackmailing is a goofy way to dispense Russian leaders from the moral burden of starting and prosecuting this war until Ukrainians surrender to all their demands. And if you dispense the Russians, I’ll dispense the Westerners.
All I can concede is that the West will more easily succumb to its enemies if Westerners are not ready to fight against its enemies as much as Ukrainians are ready to fight against Russia, when the time has come. So Ukraine, far from being a dumb puppet of the US proxy war, is giving the West a bitter but decisive moral lesson and precious time to regroup against the common enemy.

Try to address the points I’m making (wording and phrasing included), not the ones you wished I made.

1. Regardless of what you think about Russia, countries in our system have a right, and rationally do anyways, act in preemptive self defence. What's been referred to as legitimate security concerns. A nuclear power creating missile bases nearer and nearer to you is one such obvious security concern. — boethius

You don’t seem to follow through your own reasoning here. Indeed, what is true for Russia, it is true for the US and Ukraine too: regardless of what you think about the US and Ukraine, “countries in our system have a right, and rationally do anyways, act in preemptive self defence. What's been referred to as legitimate security concerns.” A re-arming nuclear power with hegemonic ambitions over the US own sphere influence (e.g. Europe) and elsewhere (like in Africa and Middle East), engaging in Russia’s direct/conventional threats or asymmetric/unconventional threats, programmatically hostile to the US-led Western hegemony and pledging a strategic allegiance with other hostile authoritarian regimes like China, Iran and North Korea is a legitimate security concern for the US-led allegiance. Actually, the security dilemmas you think explain or justify Russia’s imperialist war are very much the same that led the US to become world hegemon, build-up a Western alliance and turn into some Great Satan to people like you. Russian elites imperialist's ideology and military build-up, supporting Western enemies and projecting military power in Africa and Middle east at the expense of Western interests, are all provocations from Russia against the US and its allies in their backyard. That’s why your argument looks so self-defeating to me.
Concerning the idea that a “nuclear power creating missile bases nearer and nearer to you is one such obvious security concern”, that’s currently the case of Russia at the expense of the US allies (see Kaliningrad). States can live with it. And also the Cuban missile crisis shows another way in which hostile hegemonic powers dealt with their security concerns, without engaging into a war with territorial annexations. If Russia wishes to be treated as the US in terms of security concerns, but the US and its allies don’t acknowledge the right of Russia to be treated as the US in terms of security concerns, then Russia has to impose its will against the US and its allies like enemies do. Western DO NOT need to feel rationally compelled by Russia’s claims of legitimacy about its security concerns, other than for the threats the go along with it. Russia and the US are not the same, do not play the same role in the Western world so they do not have to enjoy the same status AT ALL. Europeans have American bases in Europe, and yet they can live with it despite they may be seen as a national security threat. Switzerland borders with countries with US military bases, and yet they can live with it despite this may be national security concerns. So Europeans have to take position wrt Russia’s hegemonic ambitions in Europe and all its implications in terms of security, political stability, and economic opportunities.

2. Regardless of what you think about point one above, it is just dumb to provoke a war, then actually fight a war, on the principle of denying Russia has legitimate security concerns that would lead a rational actor in the international system to wage preemptive war ... when apparently we all now agree that Ukraine would never join NATO anyways, but also not really we'll just go ahead and claim that's going to happen someday from time to time. Fighting for something you can never actually have is dumb. — boethius

There are several issues with such claims. The idea that the war was provoked PRESUPPOSES the idea that Russia has hegemonic ambitions over Ukraine either for very limited security concerns (e.g. by creating a “neutral” buffer state between Russia and Nato which doesn’t exist yet, right?) or for wider imperialist ambitions and power projection, because 1. Nobody attacked Russia proper, as Hamas attacked Israel proper (this is where I would talk about provocation but I guess Israeli has no “legitimate” security concerns even in this case, right?) 2. No NATO missile bases have been installed in Ukraine yet. But this war started by Russia made this undesirable outcome for Russia more compelling for Westerners (as in a self-defeating prophecy). 3. There was no arm race against Russia (“NATO is brain dead”, Trump’s willingness to have Russia on the US side against China). That’s also why Westerners have great difficulty to military supply Ukraine. BTW it was Mearsheimer himself who suggested Ukraine shouldn’t have returned the nuclear arsenal to (a however much weaker than today’s) Russia at the end of Soviet Union, for Ukrainian preemptive security concerns, especially given their historical beefs. But the logic of appeasement of Russia prevailed in the US back then, not provocation.
I put “neutrality” under quotes because the very existence of the Russian Black Sea Fleat in Ukraine shows that a “neutral” Ukraine is nothing more than a base for Russian power projection led by corrupt politicians bribed by Russians with a pretence of autonomy as Russians understand it.
You are playing with the word “legitimate” in “legitimate security concerns“. To me security concerns are “legitimate” because acknowledged according to relevant politically commitments. Westerners could acknowledge Russia’s security concerns based on international laws and treaties, or based on a strategic logic like that of strategic allegiance in response to security concerns and hegemonic ambitions. Neither case holds for Russia. Russia is not a Western ally nor there are treaties that commit the West to comply with Russia’s security concerns at their own expense.
So according to such an understanding of “legitimate”, Russia has NO “LEGITIMATE” SECURITY CONCERNS to justify this war. Russia is an enemy to the West and should be treated accordingly. At this point, talking about Russia’s “legitimate” security concerns is like talking about mafia’s, terrorists’ and nazis’s “legitimate” security concerns. The enemy has no “legitimate” security concerns. The enemy has just “illegitimate” security concerns.
The problem for the West is to understand Russia “illegitimate” security concerns to better weaken Russia not to acknowledge them, as much as the law enforcement would need to understand mafia “illegitimate” security concerns to better weaken mafia.
Ukraine doesn’t need to be inside NATO as long as circumstances are not amenable to such an outcome. The point is that NATO is taken to be a military alliance which challenges Russia’s hegemonic ambitions in Europe. Other forms of wide military allegiance comprising Ukraine but not Russia could be a problem as well for Russia. Ukraine not turning into a buffer state and neutralising the threats coming from the Black Sea Fleet would help against Russia’s hegemonic ambitions as well. WHATEVER security system that involves Ukraine and Western countries, BUT EXCLUDES Russia may be perceived as a security threat by Russia. And it’s even worse for Russia if Europe manages to become a competing power that could engage in an arm race, build its own security system of alliance, with its own nuclear weapons, and power projection in Africa and Middle East (historically Russia got invaded from Europeans not from the US). Russia needs a weak, defenceless and submissive or divided Europe to counter balance China, even in the case where the US has completely withdrawn from Europe.
So containing and deterring Russia is an imperative ALSO for Europeans, including Ukraine, not only for the US, if Russia can not (or should not) be significantly defeated. There is a balance to be found of course, given the emergence of other hegemonic powers in the international arena (e.g. China) that could profit from Russia’s defeat, the growing challenges coming from the rest of the World with all their aspirations or grievances against the West (which are in good part nurtured by Westerners themselves, including random nobodies like you), the growing discredit and lack of unity suffered by political elites in the Western world. Not easy task I guess but there is nothing inherently dumb in struggling for this goal, that’s part of the game with all its hazards. Once we agree that Russia and its sidekicks are definitely the enemy then we can discuss how, how long it takes, at what cost. And uncertainty remains no matter what path one follows.
That’s not all, talking about “provocation” has little explanatory power wrt the timing of Russias’ gambit. Actually it hides the OPPORTUNISTIC motives which led Russia to aggress the West in a time where the US looks much weaker than it looked after the end of the Cold War while Europeans look extremely vulnerable to economic and security shocks. Pro-Russians underestimate the Ukrainian and the European agency as much as they underestimate the Russian agency. There is only one agent morally and politically responsible for every evil: the Great Satan. All the others are mechanically reacting to the US abuses. So the perceived weakness of the West is the relevant motivational factor for this war NOT provocation. And so the West has to take more seriously its weaknesses as perceived by self-assertive anti-Western authoritarian regimes. The msg here is not: “they wronged me so this is the pay back” or “they made me do it”. But “the US is weak, now it’s time to challenge him, turn its coward allies against him, stab the boss in the back”.
Anyways, I’m looking forward to hearing you whining about China’s security concerns threatened by the US and Western provocations in China’s own backyard.

3. Regardless of what you think about how smart it is to fight for a right to have something the relevant parties never give you (which, if they did, the whole point would be to then avoid a disastrous war such as what is happening right now[b/]). Fighting a disastrous war to (maybe, hopefully, wishfully) get something to protect from fighting disastrous wars, is completely moronic. — boethius

You can conclude it’s all moronic if you present things as moronic in all your premises. It’s tautological. But I do not share your questionable assumptions so the conclusion has no appeal to me.
There is not metaphysical necessity in saying “fight for a right to have something the relevant parties never give you”, right? It’s matter of choice, so one has to make an effort to understand the reasoning behind such choices. I find moronic to consider “moronic” certain political moves just because some random dude thinks politicians are playing or should play in the way he suggests, as much as I find moronic to consider “moronic” certain game moves just because some random dude thinks people are playing or should play the ball as in soccer, whiteout considering that maybe people are playing basketball and fine with it.
To me, the reasoning behind such political choices transcend HOW THINGS ARE PRESENTED TO PEOPLE, so beyond pro-Russian and pro-Western propaganda (in the press, on TV, in the social media, etc.), and it is grounded on my understanding of how politicians are compelled to reason in a highly competitive and uncertain political struggle, constrained by all sorts of conflicting interests and limited resources. Besides, the conflict we are discussing has long term and worldwide consequences that most likely will survive us, so I would refrain from putting too much credit on drawing lessons limited to how things look now.
Concerning your onanistic propaganda criticism you so tirelessly and self-conceitedly indulge on, my argument is that if people are dumb to engage in a war because NATO will save them from future wars with Russia, they would still be dumb to not engage in a war because their economic welfare, social freedoms and political autonomy would be safer under Russia.
Dumb people will believe things based on dumb arguments no matter what they are, even when arguments are based on whatever propaganda one wishes to denounce. So politicians are compelled to ensure that dumb people would believe their own propaganda not that of their rivals or, even worse, enemies. Surely, also propaganda war can be played badly, but that’s not necessarily an argument against propaganda in general (no matter how misleading, false and dishonest), just against the efficacy of specific propaganda moves vs others. In that sense, I have no problem to acknowledge that Western propaganda wasn’t as effective as desirable and that Russian propaganda was more effective than desirable, no matter how false.
But, besides the fact that propaganda is only one aspect of the problem, there is also a legitimate security concern about propaganda wars, which you keep ignoring with your populist rhetoric: assuming that there are dumb people believing in propaganda in the West, Ukraine, Russia, China and Iran, the problem is that Western propaganda can be easily infiltrated and instrumentalized by hostile foreign powers while the West can’t do the same against them if they are authoritarian (see Russia, China and Iran). Russia can exploit useful idiots (or honorable men as you wish) in the West but the West can to the same as easily, so Russia has an advantage over the West in terms of propaganda war, which is multiplied by the network of anti-Western authoritarian regimes supporting Russia.

Try to address the points I’m making (wording and phrasing included), not the ones you wished I made.

far right and nazis uncorking bottles of champagne in Europe with Putin's great satisfaction but sure the Ukrainian denazification by Putin is what we should be concerned about and welcome.

> It is simple, clearly, unambiguously genocide.

Even if that's the case, Hamas and Palestinians who support Hamas are to be blamed for it. They provoked Israel. Israel has legitimate security concerns. They kept repeating this for decades. Given the disproportionate military capacity of Israel wrt Hamas this would be the likely conclusion. There is no single moment in which Hamas didn't lose the war to Israel. Palestinians should surrender and concede to Israel, to Netanyahu, whatever he asks of them. We should stop supporting Palestine. There was a time in which Palestinians could negotiate peace, but they refuse to accept because some dude from Iran told them to continue fighting. Israel could use nuclear bombs, etc. etc. etc. right?

If we should not confuse military achievements with political goals, then we MUST NOT confuse Russia's military achievements with political achievements, even more so if political leaders (like Putin) defined their conflict ends in terms of strategic political achievements (like Ukraine out of NATO, denazification/demilitarization of Ukraine, keeping NATO far from Russia's boarder and out of Ukraine, stop Western provocations, create a non-Western-led world order, etc.). But the manipulative reasoning which certain pro-Russian propagandists in this thread keep showing off, dictates otherwise unfortunately.

> But not if the US manages to embroil the two in a war with each other.

Ok let's stick to your reasoning, despite the manipulative framing. Here is my question: by signaling willingness to a diplomatic settlement with the US since 2008 until now AND yet persisting in a conflict with Ukraine where European puppets are cheerfully embroiled into, isn't Putin (along with European political leaders), who all know to be unsurprisingly dumber and/or uneducated than Tzeench on economics, military strategy, politics, finance, propaganda etc. (so much so that he can solve anything in politics with 2 cents anonymous comments on the internet) playing by the US book and failing strategically EVEN IF he is "winning" the war ?

We can go further back: the Arabs colonised Palestine too. — neomac

Which "Arabs"? When? Coz, if you want further back, we can consult Deuteronomy.
Of course, that response was to the issue of self-determination, not who settled where in pre-history. — Vera Mont

OK, if "The whole situation is one of the many dark sides of colonialism" is not the issue of "who settled where in pre-history" but an "issue of self-determination", how is the reference to colonialism help us understand better a predicament where two people (or relative political leaderships, if you prefer) ultimately pursue self-determination aspirations over exactly the same piece of land?

The whole situation is one of the many dark sides of colonialism. Britain promises everything to everybody in order to further its own war effort and then arbitrarily disenfranchises some of its allies, while enabling other groups. They did the same with natives in North America and Africa a few decades or centuries earlier. All that guff about self-determination went on the scrap heap when the Big Four were carving up Europe after WWI, and and the even bigger three redrew the borders after WWII. — Vera Mont

We can go further back: the Arabs colonised Palestine too. What shell we do with this piece of information now?

↪neomac
↪neomac
Oh fun, let's pretend it's inevitable for two people to bash each other's head in. — Benkei

I didn’t write it’s inevitable, nor implied it, nor suggested it, nor think it’s inevitable.

The reductio of that argument is that genocide is ok. So, yes, it's wrong. And I don't care that they don't care but I (e.g. my country) shouldn't be picking a side as a result. — Benkei

If genocide is ok or not, that’s up to you to decide so I’m fine with you claiming “I don't care that they don't care but I (e.g. my country) shouldn't be picking a side as a result.”
However if you write “I don't care that…” to others, others can say the same to you. Still the burden of costs and risks for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is more on the Palestinians AND the Israelis, than on an avg Westerner (I assume it’s your case too). So since they have much more skin in that game than an avg Westerner, my guess is that their motivation to the conflict is much stronger and unifying than that of an avg Westerner about the same conflict. What I think Westerners should care about is how strong and unified the will of certain people, countries, governments is (by comparison with theirs), what they are ready to do, what sacrifice are willing to accept or impose to achieve their shared goals. As much as they should care about means and opportunities that powers hostile to the West can exploit in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
As long as the “not picking side“ policy is contributing to stability or symmetry of the power balance, it’s impossible to not pick side. Not to mention that the “not picking side“ policy can be perceived as a sign of weakness and cowardice by others.

Unfortunately contended territories easily end up in genocidal or cleansing perceived practices. When one evokes self-determination aspirations against empires is one thing, another is when self-determination aspirations of some people irreparably clashes with the self-determination aspirations of other people. That's the dark side of self-determination.

So, really what's your point? Two people are fighting and they both don't want to stop? So they should continue? That seems the wrong answer. — Benkei

Why though? Why should the two people care about what seems wrong to you about their beef? Why do you take your humanitarian feelings as universal if the two people do not feel the way you feel about their conflict?

Russia is not invincible, but is winning because that's NATO policy for Russia to win. — boethius

So NATO is winning too now? Or is NATO policy to slowly lose to Russia?

What about Russian security threats from NATO enlargement?
Did Russia get rid of such security threats? Is NATO now more likely unable to threaten the Black Sea fleet or make military drills on Russian borders or put nuclear missiles on Russian borders or to have Ukraine fall within Western sphere of influence or give Ukraine a second chance to attack Crimea, Donbas, and land bridge in ten years or so? Did Russia get its wunderbuffer to contain Western imminent invasion of Russia and genocide of Russians? Are Western provocations finally over?

Are War Crimes Ever Justified?

I guess your question refers to a non-instrumental evaluation of “war crimes”. Indeed, if “justified” means to have compelling reasons to believe that war crimes will likely enough succeed in attaining the desired outcome, then of course one can justify “war crimes”.
The question sounds less trivial if we are talking in terms of legal and moral justification, because desired outcomes may be successfully achieved also by violating legal and/or moral constraints.
Now, when we classify certain acts as “war crimes”, I take it to mean that those actions are major violations of the law and therefore can not be legally justified by (legal) definition. There is no legally justified crime.
What about moral justification? If one takes morality as a set of “universal” para-legal or pre-legal norms (like do not kill, do not steal, do not lie, etc.) and takes the legal norms defining “war crimes” as a legal codification of moral norms, then I find it reasonable to take “war crimes” as morally unjustified, again, by definition.
As far as I’m concerned, I deeply question such an understanding of moral claims. Moral norms (and, ultimately, also legal norms) MUST be grounded on historical and political conditions. This is a rational requirement, since historical-political conditions set what CAN be done by individuals in some contingent yet constraining sense.
I’ll try to make my point more clear with a concrete example: one may believe that Netanyahu SHOULD stop the current massacre in Gaza, because killing innocents as collateral damage (i.e. unintentionally but consciously) is morally wrong by (moral) definition. This moral claim MUST presuppose at the very least that Netanyahu CAN stop the current massacre in Gaza to make a rational (not emotional) appeal to me. Well, can he?
It seems that all that it is required for such an assessment is a credible assumption about certain Netanyahu’s rule-following abilities, like the ability to intellectually grasp moral norms, the physical ability to perform a series of bodily actions and speech acts in compliance with such norms (e.g. verbally instruct its military and political servants to withhold the Israeli war machine), and the ability to will or being disposed to act accordingly.
Such an assessment completely and arbitrarily misses the political dimension of our human condition, more specifically the POLITICAL ROLE of Netanyahu facing a HISTORICAL PREDICAMENT (the massacre of October the 7th). To simplify, the Israeli society (or an influential subgroup of such society) has POLITICALLY SELECTED Netanyahu for his specific abilities to act in accordance with certain political EXPECTATIONS in a variety of challenging historical circumstances. To my understanding, such political abilities and expectations are what allows us to assess what Netanyahu CAN do in certain historical circumstances in a more compelling way. And the same goes with ALL other politicians (including Hamas’ leaders).
Far from being presupposed by political expectations about individuals and collectives, moral norms as much as legal norms MUST presuppose political expectations about individuals and collectives to look rationally compelling to people living in society. The very idea that by following a pre-defined “universal” moral norm by my own initiative and in any circumstance (without considering how others will act and re-act, or what consequences will follow) will turn me into A PARADIGMATIC EXAMPLE of moral behaviour to others, presupposes the expectation that others (all or the absolute majority or the relative majority or the relevant minority etc.) have the ability to grasp paradigmatic moral examples and the disposition to conform to them.
If moral reasoning is grounded on a set of a-priori universal norms then it’s a-political (because it is not grounded on political expectations and the circumstances of the political struggle - btw I even find it questionable that anybody concerned with social discipline can consistently adopt such a view on morality). If moral reasoning guides political life and struggles then it can’t plausibly be grounded on a set of a-priori universal norms (at best, one can extrapolate such alleged “universal” norms a posteriori by comparison across societies and/or held in support for intersocietal institutions like “international law”). In other words, “war crimes” (as legally defined) can be morally justified if one doesn’t reason in terms of a-priori and “universal” moral norms, yet moral justification may not be enough to dissipate the controversial nature of such actions. And this observation can no be used to question a specific moral reasoning, since it can be retorted against all examples of moral reasoning. Moral reasoning can not be de-politicized if it is supposed to inform political life.

↪neomac
The imperialist interpretation I'm referring to has been mostly forwarded by ssu, which I'm replying to. I take it as a given others have read that interpretation, so I don't need to set it out. — Benkei

I challenge you to make explicit the “interpretation” of imperialism you think @“ssu” is forwarding, because maybe you are misunderstanding his claims.
Here a definition of imperialism:
Imperialism is the practice, theory or attitude of maintaining or extending power over foreign nations, particularly through expansionism, employing both hard power (military and economic power) and soft power (diplomatic power and cultural imperialism). Imperialism focuses on establishing or maintaining hegemony and a more or less formal empire. While related to the concepts of colonialism, imperialism is a distinct concept that can apply to other forms of expansion and many forms of government.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperialism
According to such definition, would you consider Putin decision to invade Ukraine and annex part of its territories, imperialist or not?
If you do not like that definition, you can propose yours.

And nowhere have I given justification, only explanation. I think most countries largely act immoral, driven by real politik considerations. I condemn Western’s needless fanning of the flames in Ukraine, increasing their own "security concerns" as a result, raising Russia's security concerns in return. — Benkei

Well, I understand “most countries largely act immoral” as equivalent to “most countries largely act in a morally unjustified way” so it’s like your explanation however includes an assessment about justification on both sides, right?
Anyways, if you explain and not justify, under what circumstances can one then switch from explanation to justification? From description to condemnation?

But I note that the facts I raised do not concern Western security at all. Only Ukraine could be affected by the "near abroad" doctrine and we can hardly complain about economic integration. So we can wonder in what sense Western security concerns were protected by expanding eastwards. — Benkei

If one includes the US and Europeans as part of “the West”, Ukraine is “the near abroad” of the West too, If Russia feels threatened by the expansion of the West in Ukraine, the West can feel threatened by Russia wanting to expand in Ukraine.
Besides if Ukraine wants to join the West through the EU and NATO, and the West would welcome Ukrainian westernisation. Russia has initiated a war in the West near abroad and hindered the Western hegemonic interest to westernise Ukraine which was reciprocated by the Ukrainians.
Russia committed two questionable moves in terms of security in this hegemonic struggles: discounted Ukrainians will despite having acknowledged its sovereignty and started an actual violent expansion in Ukraine which violates the Ukrainian territorial sovereignty.
Do you agree with such explanation?

Those considerations can only be of a geopolitical nature and not a direct military threat for which NATO is in principle the answer. For existing NATO members there never was a reason to expand NATO after the cold war when the threat had actually largely dissipated. And yet we did it any way. — Benkei

If Europe is part of the West and Europe ends in Eastern European countries, then Russia is DEFINITELY WITHOUT ANY REASONABLE DOUBT a direct military threat to the West: it has motivations (hegemonic ambitions and revanchism after the fall of Soviet Union) and it has means (including nuclear arsenal). The threat kept growing under Putin given the military build-up and the centralization of power. And since the war with Georgia, Russia has actually proven its aggressive dispositions toward neighbouring countries (and not only).
Even if, back at the end of Soviet Union, security concerns were more about anticipated than imminent military threats (which is what real politik strategic thinking in the domain of security and defence is all about), NATO was repurposed to expand the democratic and economic European institutions and Western collective in line with the US hegemonic ambitions. Also because Islamic extremism seemed the most urgent threat to deal with.
Do you agree with such explanation?

My main problem with "real politik" views towards geopolitics is that they a) ignore the international legal framework (but of course it will be whipped out when it supports an argument) and b) a predisposition towards conflict that must be won if it materialises, instead of fundamentally aiming at avoiding conflict. — Benkei

How do you explain the fact that "real politik" views ignore the international legal framework? And the “real politik" predisposition towards conflict, instead of fundamentally aiming at avoiding conflict?

But the West (particularly US) will pursue conflict if it furthers their geopolitical agenda even if facts don't support their position (Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.). — Benkei

Would you say the same for Russia, China, Iran?

If then historically we've seen the most successful roads to peace have been extensive integration and co-operation then these decisions are consequences of us-them divisions, maintaining status quos (to stay top dog, you have to kick down the competition) and projection of power. So to me, the very methodology of framing international relations in real politik terms is an important driving force towards conflict, instead of avoiding it. — Benkei

Yet, realpolitik theorists such as Mearsheimer and Walt are arguing that the idealist pursuit of “extensive integration and co-operation” and not what political realism would dictate is mistakenly driving the Western (particularly the US) in conflicts which are against the US interest (like the conflict in Ukraine and in Israel).
BTW, do you think Russia, China, and Iran are framing international relations in terms of real politik or in idealist terms ? Are they pursuing power projection, and leaning towards conflict, unlike the US? Do you think the US is the Great Satan, namely the most evil/oppressive geopolitical entity on earth or history so that the entire world (including other Western countries) wishes (or should wish) to support Russian, Chinese, and Iranian hegemonic ambitions than the US’s in lack of better alternatives?

And yes security concerns can justify some action. Not all and certainly not war crimes. But again, I think that mixes geopolitical theory and international law. — Benkei

This mixing is precisely what’s most worth to philosophically investigate, as far as I’m concerned, especially what allows one to switch from explanation to justification.

I think I've said before in this thread:

1. from a geopolitical/international relations point of view both Russia and the West are equally to blame for the war in Ukraine
2. from an international law perspective Russia is an aggressor

But since 2 is in any case an optional argument (pace every "humanitarian" intervention ever and western-led wars) it should be ignored in favour of 1 - as much as that goes against the grain of what I studied and worked for for decades as a human rights trained lawyer. 2 is more about how the world should be and could've been if international law hadn't been applied in such a double standard way — Benkei

“Ignore” in the sense that “international law” and “humanitarian intervention” do not play any explanatory role?
“could've been if” in the sense that “international law” is sort of wishful thinking? If not, what’s the difference?

But an interpretation of these actions as "imperialist" isn't necessary where Russian security interests suffice to explain their actions. — Benkei

You have to clarify what you take others to mean by "imperialist" before making objections to them.
We can quibble also over Israel committing a "genocide" if security concerns is enough to justify their actions against an actual aggression from Hamas. Russia has no equivalent justification, because there was no aggression from NATO or Ukraine against Russia proper. Besides Russia has plenty of lands where to relocate what he claims to be persecuted Russians in Ukraine.

Besides it doesn't matter how you want to call it. If Russia's security threat and sphere of influence must be taken into account in a strategic calculus, the same goes for Russia. Russia must take into account security threat and sphere of influence of all interested players. And if such concerns are inherently competitive, players will find competitive ways to settle it.

If you take seriously perceived security concerns, you MUST do the same for the US, Europe, Ukraine, Israel, not only for Russia and Palestinians. Unless you side with them, and then pretend to be impartial.

Self-determination is at the heart of Palestinian nationalism for sure and the belief that Palestinians who voted for Hamas and sided with Iran (both committed to fight Israel), have a right to do so, is a foolish way to think about international politics, people who do not have a properly functioning and acknowledged state and live next to great powers don't have the right to pursue any foreign policy they want. That's what Mearsheimer would say, wouldn't he? Best to listen to someone who’s been right for the last 30 years, right?

https://www.dw.com/en/germany-afds-krah-faces-probe-on-russia-china-payments/a-68912872
https://newrepublic.com/article/180630/russia-corruption-network-europe-buying-politicians-america

:up:

Concerning Scholz's speech, I would highlight the following claim:
“We all want peace for our time. But peace at any price – that wouldn’t be any at all.”
(https://globalhappenings.com/politics/496848.html)
which is pretty much in line with what I repeatedly said:

people may not pursue peace, if that means WHATEVER peace. — neomac

That’s a possibility, sure, but I would need a more solid argument for the likelihood of something happening in a hypothetical or counterfactual scenario. For example, if Ukraine managed to join NATO, would still Putin attack NATO out of anger? I doubt it and, as far as geopolitical actors are concerned, they seem to doubt it too:

↪neomac

People doubted he would invade a large country like Ukraine too. It’s a risk, we are talking about risks here. — Punshhh

indeed, the reason for Ukraine to join NATO was to deter Putin from attacking Ukraine, otherwise what would be the point of joining NATO if Putin would attack anyway just out of anger?

Again it’s about risks, probability. — Punshhh

Possibilities and risks are all we’ve got in a discussion like this. Yes there has been a decline in U.S. deterrence. This is probably the shift from the unipole to the competing superpowers we see now. — Punshhh

Also to assess risks on hypothetical and counterfactual scenarios you need arguments or evidences to support them.
Besides, pointing at a risk is not enough to discourage crossing alleged red lines: motivation is surely one thing, but also means and opportunities need to be taken into account. Indeed, Putin showed his anger in 2008 at the prospect that one day Ukraine would join NATO, as Georgia. But it took Putin 14 years to prepare and find the right opportunity (which include the divisions between EU and the US, with the EU and within the US, and the declining power projection of the US vis-à-vis of its challengers) to aggress Ukraine, differently from what happened to Georgia.
To my understanding, the risk you are referring to is more specifically grounded on Western divisions, decisional weakness, and military unreadiness, than on Putin’s anger. If the West showed a united front, stable resolve and readiness to make the needed military efforts, Putin could have been and could still be very much deterred from pursuing a war against the West over Ukraine. And notice Putin frames this war mainly as a war against the West, but still Western public opinions are far from getting how existential this war can be to their prosperity and security. That’s why Putin can count on the possibility that the West gets tired of supporting Ukraine.

First of all, my claim was: “the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe unexploitable to its hegemonic competitors too.”

This is a complicated claim, I’m not even sure it’s saying anything.
Surely by helping EU and forming a stronger alliance with them. the U.S. would be making Europe unexploitable to its competitors. By contrast why would U.S. make EU unexploitable to herself and her competitors? — Punshhh

The logic is analogous to the one compelling military units to destroy their own military equipment, for example during a withdrawal, out of fear it may fall in enemies’ hands. To the extent Russia comes out emboldened and empowered from this war, the West may experience a surge of anti-Americanism which could further weaken the US power projection and leadership in Europe. So the US, along with Russia, will be compelled to try to play such divisions on their favour at the expense of the rival. Europeans experienced something similar during the Cold War: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Years_of_Lead_(Italy)

I’ve already agreed that Trump is crazy and could upset the apple cart. He’s not really a representation of the U.S. position. He’s an anomaly and I doubt he will make it to the election with any chance of winning. — Punshhh

Such a claim sounds overly bold given the available polls. I get that such polls can be wrong and there is still time for Biden’s campaign, but no chance of winning looks definitely as an overkill.

If it wasn’t a controversial issue between EU and US why didn’t Ukraine join EU and NATO yet?

That’s a non sequitur, I doubt that the fact that Ukraine is not now in NATO is due to squabbling between U.S. and EU. — Punshhh

Non sequitur?! Doubt because...? These are the facts I’m referring to:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/01/nato.georgia
https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/02/09/german-chancellor-merkel-visit-obama/23115859/
https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/14/politics/ukraine-nato-joe-biden/index.html
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-01/france-and-germany-are-split-over-ukraine-s-appeal-to-join-nato
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220404-merkel-defends-2008-decision-to-block-ukraine-from-nato
https://washington.mfa.gov.hu/eng/news/why-is-hungary-blocking-ukraines-nato-accession

I think you underestimate the strategic leverages of Middle East regional powers in the international equilibria, considering also the influence they have in the once called “Third World”. And, again, the closer hegemonic powers get in terms of capacity, the greater the impact of smaller powers can be over the power struggle between hegemonic powers.

When you say hegemonic powers here, specifically, are you referring to superpowers, at any point? Or are you just referring to hegemonic power players in the Middle East? — Punshhh

To me “superpowers” is a shorthand for the US, China and Russia. While Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are regional powers in the Middle Eastern area which are engaging in a hegemonic struggle in the Middle East. They are hegemonic because they are vigorously supporting military and economic projection beyond their borders to primary control the middle-east, but also in Asia and Africa (example: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240312-turkey-iran-morocco-joust-for-greater-role-in-sahel).

Can you point to a regional power who is in a strong position to influence international equilibria, or a coalition perhaps? — Punshhh

Iran is now military supporting Russia and pressing Israel with its proxies, related to two strategic regions which have compelled, still compel, and risk to compel further the US’ intervention at the expense of pivoting to the Pacific.
https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/117148/witnesses/HHRG-118-FA13-Wstate-StroulD-20240417.pdf

The point is that the combination of persisting EU vulnerabilities plus incumbent weakening of the US leadership, will turn Europe into a more disputable area for hegemonic competition among the US and other rival hegemonic powers, and this could threaten both NATO and EU project.

You repeat this and I agree that there has been some political interference from Russia in these issues. But I don’t see this fatal weakness you keep alluding to in EU, or U.S. — Punshhh

We are talking risks, right? I argued for the risks I see through historical evidences (which you admit but downplay without any counter-evidence) and strategic reasons potentially appealing to geopolitical competitors (which you conveniently narrow down based on hopes).

It’s true there has been a complacency in Europe in becoming involved with Russia in various ways since the collapse of USSR. But the Ukraine war has been a big wake up call and this will be corrected. Likewise in U.S., although the political problems in U.S. recently are due more to populist opportunism and hopefully it will be a wake up call there too. — Punshhh

Besides “hopefully” doesn’t mean “probably”, the point is that this wake up call is too recent to have set a stable and compelling trend in Western security.
Furthermore also non-Western and anti-Western powers had a wake up call at the expense of the West: Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel are acting accordingly.

Sure that doesn’t mean they are hopeless vis-à-vis with climate change:
https://www.watermeetsmoney.com/saudi-water-investment-showcase-at-the-global-water-summit/

Desalination will never produce enough fresh water to replace depleted water tables. The quantities required are vast and desalination a trickle. — Punshhh

I didn’t reference that link to argue that desalination will produce enough fresh water to replace depleted water tables. There may be more methods available to tackle water crisis depending on available and evolving technologies. I limited myself to argue that governments in the Middle East show self-awareness wrt climate challenges (as much as geopolitical challenges) and are already making efforts to deal with them. So it’s not evident to me that in the next ten years or so the Middle East will turn into a Mad Max style location because of a water crisis, and will stop playing any significant role in international equilibria.

Besides, even though they compete for regional hegemony, yet the most acute and local problems they have to face coming from Islamism, environmental challenges, growing population

There aren’t any Middle Eastern powers competing for regional hegemony. — Punshhh

If you have evidences that support your claim, bring them up so we can compare.
I’m talking of evidences such as:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/irans-order-chaos-suzanne-maloney
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/breaking-out-its-box-washington-tehran-regional-influence
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-02-2019-0017/full/html
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/20/iran-khamenei-supreme-leader-strategy-middle-east/
https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/middle-east-news/the-new-middle-east-a-triangular-struggle-for-hegemony/
https://isdp.eu/irans-regional-proxies-reshaping-the-middle-east-and-testing-u-s-policy/
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/30/briefing/iran-proxies-israel-gaza-red-sea.html
https://epc.ae/en/details/featured-topics/navigating-the-iran-challenge-and-regional-instability-de-escalation-and-sustainable-development-strategies
https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/the-iran-factor-in-the-china-taiwan-us-triangle/
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/01/us-deterrence-against-iran-damaged-not-dead
https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/pivot-to-offense-how-iran-is-adapting-for-modern-conflict-and-warfare/

Notice that I do not need to argue for the emergence of a superpower in the Middle East. A dominating regional power can be already enough to contain the American power projection on the globe if the US' power projection is already offset by Russia and China's in Europe, Asia and in Africa.

It depends if China and Russia perceive Islam as a greater threat than the West. So far it doesn’t seem to be the case, given the support/cooperation China and Russia grant to Iran (the only country in which the islamic revolution thus far succeeded), Hezbollah, Houthi and Hamas.

I see this more as a case of “my enemies enemy is my friend”, Russia likes to engage in these ways. — Punshhh

Still that’s possible because the West is currently perceived as a greater threat than Islamism.
Besides the “my enemies’ enemy is my friend” between Russia and Iran is far from being conjunctural given the numerous treatises between them like this one
https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-irans-raisi-sign-new-interstate-treaty-soon-russia-2024-01-17/
And the fact that their strategic alliance is increasing since the end of the Cold War.

I don’t seek to downplay what you bring to the table, I just don’t find the suggestions that there are big geopolitical risks in the Middle East compelling. Or that there is not a big geopolitical risk in Ukraine compelling. — Punshhh

We didn’t agree on how to measure geopolitical risks. My arguments are based on my understanding of how threats are perceived and acted upon by the actual players. The US intervened in support of Ukraine and in support of Israel. And the latter even happened at the expense of the former. This is not what one would expect if the conflict in Ukraine was evidently of grater strategic importance.
My argument is that, even if the stakes in the Ukrainian conflict may have greater impact in the hegemonic struggle between the US and China, than Israeli-Palestinian conflict one can’t reasonable use the former to downplay the latter for, at least, two reasons: there is a link between the two, and up until now the US never managed to disengage from both areas to pivot to the Pacific (and that, to me, doesn’t depend only on domestic factors like the pro-Israel lobby or the military-industrial complex)

1. Downplaying the evidence I bring is rather pointless since what matters is to what extent geopolitical actors take such evidence seriously and act upon it. If Middle East wasn’t important to the US, the US wouldn’t engage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the expense of the conflict in Ukraine.

As I say, I don’t seek to downplay this evidence. I just don’t find it evidence of importance geopolitical developments at this time. (I’m happy to explain why if you remind me of some of it) — Punshhh

Concerning your reasoning, as long as the West and the Rest runs on oil from the Middle East, the Middle East is strategically important for geopolitical developments.
I think however that their importance goes beyond that since Middle Eastern’s power projection goes beyond the middle-east. So they can play a role on securing/controlling commercial routes (https://newsletter.macmillan.yale.edu/newsletter/fall-2010/american-grand-strategy-middle-east, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative), immigration trends and political networking (through Islamism, financial means, military aid, etc.). And not only in the Middle East.

You refer to Trump again, yes a Trump presidency might well try to go down such a course. It’s madness of course, a fools errand. Even if Trump does win a second term in office, it is an anomaly in U.S. foreign policy, which will be corrected after he has left office. — Punshhh

Some anomalies may be more than conjunctural events. See, also re-arming to face the Russian threat is an anomaly in EU foreign policy, yet it happened under the pressure of historical circumstances. And now you may wish to argue it will grow further into a stable, effective and comprehensive defence strategy. On the other side, the prospect of Trump running for a second presidential term suggests me the possibility that Trump’s political base may be wide, strong and persistent enough to survive him. As much as the burden of the imperial overstretch inducing the US to downgrade its commitments to global hegemony. Even more so, if the EU will remain structurally weak.

for a population vulnerable to populist rhetoric

This is often exaggerated and refers to a populist reaction to levels of immigration.

(and often pro-Russian)

Lol. — Punshhh

Here some more evidence for you to downplay (while you provided none as usual):
https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_putins_friends_in_europe7153/
Concerning pro-Russian populist parties also in Western Europe, Italy offers a good case:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/31/a-success-for-kremlin-propaganda-how-pro-putin-views-permeate-italian-media
https://theins.ru/en/politics/268921
https://www.euronews.com/2022/03/09/see-what-your-friend-putin-has-done-salvini-mocked-in-poland


Dude, we clarified our different positions enough. At this point we seem to disagree so much on what constitutes an interesting, if not compelling, argument in support of some claim that I really don’t see the point of dragging this exchange further.

The Russian spy network in Europe:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-spies-infiltrated-romania-disguised-230100892.html
https://apnews.com/article/poland-espinonage-ukraine-russia-zelenskyy-plot-a7e3f5944ba165dd30b271840ffa9f95
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68843541

Republicans denounce Russian propaganda within their own party:
https://www.aol.com/news/luxury-yachts-other-myths-republican-090000423.html

Let's fact-check the fact-checkers of the fact-checkers:
https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/creature-of-the-right-james-ball/
https://hopenothate.org.uk/2024/02/22/revealed-the-shocking-tweets-of-gb-news-co-owner-sir-paul-marshall/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alliance_for_Responsible_Citizenship

I’m sure that I’m “not sure if that’s relevant”.

It’s relevant if that anger goes beyond the point of rationality. — Punshhh

That’s a possibility, sure, but I would need a more solid argument for the likelihood of something happening in a hypothetical or counterfactual scenario. For example, if Ukraine managed to join NATO, would still Putin attack NATO out of anger? I doubt it and, as far as geopolitical actors are concerned, they seem to doubt it too: indeed, the reason for Ukraine to join NATO was to deter Putin from attacking Ukraine, otherwise what would be the point of joining NATO if Putin would attack anyway just out of anger? Putin may attack NATO out of a more hawkish calculus though to the extent NATO countries show lack of resolve (due to economic dependency) and/or fear for escalation (for lack of readiness and will to fight for allies).

That there are differences in foreign policy between U.S. and EU, such that U.S. would seek to keep EU down, or weak. Again I’m just not seeing it. — Punshhh

First of all, my claim was: “the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe unexploitable to its hegemonic competitors too.” Secondly, I argued that the conflict in Ukraine and in Palestine are straining Western public opinion and nurturing conflict of interests among allies, to the point that for example a US candidate for the next presidential elections like Trump dared to say “he would encourage Russia to attack Nato allies” if they do not comply with Trump’s demands.
Besides, I do not think EU governments and advisors are downplaying the gravity of such claims, or the US questionable commitment toward the Ukrainian conflict.
https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-nato-russia-attack-white-house-appalling-unhinged/32814229.html
https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-nuclear-warfare-detterence-manfred-weber-vladimir-putin-ukraine-russia-war/
Poland's foreign minister on concerns the U.S. will abandon Ukraine, Europe 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jHxjutEfhww)
If you do not see that, again do not bother answering me.

The alliance between them is strong and in lockstep. The status of Ukraine, or the expansion of EU and NATO to the east is not a controversial issue between them. — Punshhh

If it wasn’t a controversial issue between EU and US why didn’t Ukraine join EU and NATO yet?

The Middle Eastern regional powers are small fry, Turkey is not far off a failed state and the Arab states just want to hold on to their decadent lifestyles. — Punshhh

I think you underestimate the strategic leverages of Middle East regional powers in the international equilibria, considering also the influence they have in the once called “Third World”. And, again, the closer hegemonic powers get in terms of capacity, the greater the impact of smaller powers can be over the power struggles between hegemonic powers.

The point is that the combination of persisting EU vulnerabilities plus incumbent weakening of the US leadership, will turn Europe into a more disputable area for hegemonic competition among the US and other rival hegemonic powers, and this could threaten both NATO and EU project.

This is the flawed argument I was referring to.
I think the best you’ve got here is some sort of general malaise and internal collapse in the EU, or U.S. The EU is now rearming and stronger as an alliance due to the example of the U.K. (having left the EU). Also as I say if Ukraine joins, it will provide a considerable boost in numerous ways. The U.S. is in a more precarious position, (I see Trump more and more as a busted flush now) but is still strong militarily and can print money to pull itself out of the malaise. — Punshhh

You seem to be grounding your arguments mostly on possibilities, but that’s not enough to assess likelihood. Sure it could be just a malaise that the West will manage to overcome, but it is too soon to see in Western re-arming a new stable trend that will succeed in building collective strategic deterrence, despite all persisting conflict of interests. While the decline of the US deterrence and leadership has just kept notably growing since 9/11.

Yes, however there might be severe climate issues there in a few decades. Saudi has some dubious practices including building ski slopes in the desert and depleting water tables, something they’re doing to U.S. water tables too. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/07/16/fondomonte-arizona-drought-saudi-farm-water/ — Punshhh

Sure that doesn’t mean they are hopeless vis-à-vis climate change:
https://www.watermeetsmoney.com/saudi-water-investment-showcase-at-the-global-water-summit/

Besides, even though they compete for regional hegemony, yet the most acute and local problems they have to face coming from Islamism, environmental challenges, growing population (https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/why-the-world-s-fastest-growing-populations-are-in-the-middle-east-and-africa/), plus the mediation of greater powers, like China, may also solicit greater cooperation among them to face shared future challenges, including the threats of a multipolar world like hawkish non-middle eastern hegemonic powers.

Sounds more like a liability for China, Russia etc.. Also it would mean them getting into bed with these Islamists you talk about. — Punshhh

It depends if China and Russia perceive Islam as a greater threat than the West. So far it doesn’t seem to be the case, given the support/cooperation China and Russia grant to Iran (the only country in which the islamic revolution thus far succeeded), Hezbollah, Houthi and Hamas.

This is the flawed argument I was referring to. — Punshhh

Weak argument, unless we are talking of a world slipping into distopia. Climate change might deliver this though. — Punshhh

Clearly mine is just a speculation. But a principled one because I take into account strategic logic of geopolitical players and historical circumstances to assess likelihood. And the conclusion is that we have reasons to worry about how things may evolve in Ukraine but also in the Middle East given the current predicament.
Your argument seems mostly about downplaying the evidence I bring, insisting on the need for the US to have a strong EU to counter Russia and China, insisting on the fact of European re-arming, and on the incumbent crisis in the Middle East due to climate change.
What I counter is:
1. Downplaying the evidence I bring is rather pointless since what matters is to what extent geopolitical actors take such evidence seriously and act upon it. If Middle East wasn’t important to the US, the US wouldn’t engage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the expense of the conflict in Ukraine.
2. Insisting that the US needs something doesn’t imply it will get it. Besides the pivot to China, may lead the US to appease Russia’s hegemonic ambitions in Europe to turn Russia against China (which is the raising power, geographically closer to Russia than the US), as argued by various political analysts including Mearsheimer. Indeed, Trump's approach to Russia can be in line with such view (https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/24/donald-trump-s-plan-to-play-russia-against-china-is-fool-s-errand-pub-70067). Russia’s appeasement in Europe on the other side may be costly for EU/NATO/Ukraine, and also turn more destabilising than the US may tolerate (if not to Trump’s administration, to post-Trump’s administrations) , soliciting a hegemonic competition in Europe.
3. European re-arming is a recent phenomenon so it doesn't help much to assess the future and effectiveness of the collective European defence strategy (considering various strategic factors like defence industry, conscription, nuclear, etc.) given its controversial costs for a population vulnerable to populist (and often pro-Russian) rhetoric.
4. Climate change is definitely an incumbent challenge that concerns the entire world, and Middle East governments are aware of its risks and urgency, especially due to how exposed they are. That doesn’t mean they are doomed to succumb to a climate crisis or to geopolitical irrelevance, given how pro-actively and effectively they are already acting wrt climate change and evolving geopolitical challenges.

When speaking specifically about dissidents — those critical of their own countries — it’s kind of silly to ask “is there anything good about the US foreign policy?” The response, “All the countries we haven’t invaded — I like that,” and his explanation of why it’s silly is pretty obvious. In that context, it’s “not the job” of a dissident to discuss things he likes is clear. — Mikie

If that's the task of a dissident, then he can still be very misleading (because a balanced view should consider pros and cons of one country's policies and regime among existing alternatives) and exploitable by hostile and authoritarian foreign powers. But I guess it's not the job of a dissident to warn you about it, right?

Right, simple minded people admire dissidents for speaking truth against power in their own country where they have an impact, that's why rival powers support dissidents in other countries not in theirs.

Noam Chomsky, a leading American intellectual highly critical of Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians, meets Hezbollah mentor Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah in Beirut, in 2010 (credit: REUTERS)

I think here below Chomsky tells it quite clearly why this criticism against the US. — ssu

I find it rather perplexing:
1. He claims that credit is given to those who criticize their own government's foreign policies not other people's government foreign policies: so how about Palestinians criticizing Israel? Ukrainians criticizing Russia? The Rest's grievances against the West?
2. He claims at min 1:13 "to an extent I can do something about it especially in a pretty free country like this one now we understand" so despite all duping propaganda, no matter how massive, CIA conspiring, hypocritical, etc. but without considering any links between freedom and power. If authoritarian countries are insulated from internal criticism, people can't do much to change it so it will remain authoritarian. So an overwhelming foreign power is needed to contain hegemonic authoritarian regimes. While free countries are NOT insulated from internal criticism, so people can do something to change it which also includes the possibility of turning the free regime into an authoritarian regime. Besides, the free world can be infiltrated and intoxicated by foreign propaganda of authoritarian regimes to weaken the overwhelming foreign power that contains them .

What I find baffling is how certain people cling on the charicatural idea that
- the US is the world’s superpower and that is a major player in shaping world affairs, yet at the same time they keep reminding all foreign failures: Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, Palestine, etc.
- the US is the evil mastermind conspiring against states and people around the world through lies and bribes (which everybody non-brainwashed is aware of), and yet systematically failing to achieve strategic goals other than the self-defeating ones by wasting resources and reputation in failed (proxy) wars
- the US is driven by hypocritical and greedy people supported by a gullible majority (still?), lacking basic humanity principles, and which the entire world has to condemn (especially if Westerner) and to hold as the number one responsible for everything wrong there is in this world (including climate change)

What I find baffling is how certain people cling on the charicatural idea that
- the US is the world’s superpower and that is a major player in shaping world affairs, yet at the same time they keep reminding all foreign failures: Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, Palestine, etc.
- the US is the evil mastermind conspiring against states and people around the world through lies and bribes (which everybody non-brainwashed is aware of), and yet systematically failing to achieve strategic goals other than the self-defeating ones by wasting resources and reputation in failed (proxy) wars
- the US is driven by hypocritical and greedy people supported by a gullible majority (still?), lacking basic humanity principles, and which the entire world has to condemn (especially if Westerner) and to hold as the number one responsible for everything wrong there is in this world (including climate change)

https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/report-iran-begins-attack-on-israel-launching-dozens-of-drones-thatll-take-hours-to-arrive/ — neomac

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordans-air-defence-ready-shoot-down-any-iranian-aircraft-that-violate-its-2024-04-13/
https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2024/04/14/iran-threatens-to-attack-jordan-if-it-cooperates-with-israel-report

Neomac, notice what Tzeentch argued:

Russia proposed to give back all the territory they conquered during the invasion in exchange for Ukrainian neutrality. — Tzeentch


Where is this kind of argument was my question. Please read what I say. — ssu

AFAIK, there are no official documents about the negotiation proposal (which was not an agreement, of course, and far from being one) just reports, like this:

Russia would withdraw to its position on February 23, when it controlled part of the Donbas region and all of Crimea, and in exchange, Ukraine would promise not to seek NATO membership and instead receive security guarantees from a number of countries.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/world-putin-wants-fiona-hill-angela-stent

I don't recall hearing this. But please give an actual reference on it. — ssu

This is claimed to be part of the 10 points of Instambul Communque:
Proposal 1: Ukraine proclaims itself a neutral state, promising to remain nonaligned with any blocs and refrain from developing nuclear weapons — in exchange for international legal guarantees. Possible guarantor states include Russia, Great Britain, China, the United States, France, Turkey, Germany, Canada, Italy, Poland, and Israel, and other states would also be welcome to join the treaty.
https://faridaily.substack.com/p/ukraines-10-point-plan

Then confirmed by Bennett and Arestovych among others (https://www.intellinews.com/top-ukrainian-politician-oleksiy-arestovych-gives-seventh-confirmation-of-russia-ukraine-peace-deal-agreed-in-march-2022-302876/)

Do historical aspects justify more or is it the will of the people? Which justifies more?

As having studied history I understand the role of history here quite well: history is usually used to push an agenda by focusing and giving importance to the details that makes the agenda important. Thus history is usually done from a national point of view that justifies the existing state and all little details that have made it so. If history is a tool for this, it still is a tool. Existence of a state and a desire for an independent state is a lot more. — “ssu

Your question intrigues me because it’s the kind of core question where apparently meaning looks so intuitive, and yet all sorts of ambiguities show up at a second thought. The shortest answer I feel comfortable to give is that I take “justification” as a normative claim which one appeals to in order to ground beliefs so that they do not appear arbitrary. Therefore, the will of the people needs to be grounded on a justifying system of beliefs, which is what I think we normally refer to when talking about “the narrative”, in order to not appear arbitrary, especially to those who do not share such will or worse have to lose. On the other side, the justifying belief system is also what helps identify whom the people are we are referring to when talking about the will of “the people” (also across generations). And this turns particularly problematic when sovereignty over a territory and the popular representativity of political decision makers are disputed. If a specific narrative justifying the right to land is what politically qualifies Palestinians as Palestinians vs Israelis as Israelis, discounting such a narrative would make the demand for a Israeli and Palestinian nation-state arbitrary. While taking it into account would make both demands incompatible. One might wish to say that both Israelis and Palestinians may find an agreement for a peaceful however unjust resolution (since narratives remain incompatible) but, so far, they didn’t manage to. On both sides there were/are elements strong enough to boycott such a resolution again in light of incompatible narratives. Invoking third party actors as mediators, instead of fixing the conflict, may be useless or worsen the situation, since also third party actors may be in conflict among themselves also due to incompatible narratives.

Finally, if Palestinians do want an independent state from Israel while not recognising Israel, then also Palestinians don't want a two state solution. — neomac

Umm... they did recognize Israel. At least the PA did. (Do you know the Oslo peace accords?)

Following the Oslo I Accord in 1993, the Palestinian Authority and Israel conditionally recognized each other's right to govern specific areas of the country.


This is the reason why Netanyahu just loved so much Hamas that he even financially supported them. For him the Palestinian that cannot be negotiated with is the Palestinian that he wants to have. Far more easy to ethnically cleanse when the other side are "human animals".

(And naturally many Israelis want to uphold the idea that they cannot negotiate with the Palestinians, that Palestinians just want to drive them to the sea. Or something like that.) — “ssu

We have discussed that already. Whatever agreement decision makers may have found at some point, they weren’t able to enforce them on either sides. The legal implications of such failures are also disputed. What we may still do, before drawing our conclusions in light of our moral standards and political leaning, is to assess the impact of Palestine and Israeli’s approach to their strategic goals in terms of efficacy. What we are seeing is that the Palestinians are bearing the greater material and human costs wrt the Israelis so far. While Israel resisted also foreign pressure and persisting resistance (Hamas keeps firing rockets against Israel, and holding Israeli hostages), so far. Which one is getting closer to its strategic goal?

Not sure if that’s relevant: Putin may have been furious and still deterred.

↪neomac

Are you sure about that? — Punshhh

I’m sure that I’m “not sure if that’s relevant”.

Especially in the firs years of his Presidential mandate, imagine during the Chechen war.

That’s unrealistic, you’re taking it back to a point where Russia was weak compared to now. Putin has been agitating in Ukraine for a long time. If Ukraine had been fast tracked into NATO that would have blown up on the eastern front. — Punshhh

If you are reasoning in terms of counterfactuals, I can do the same. There were US political advisors pushing for NATO enlargement (including Ukraine) way before Putin (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/html/CHRG-105shrg46832.htm) and “relations between Ukraine and NATO were formally established in 1992, when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council after regaining its independence, later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations). So my counterfactual is not arbitrary.
On the other side if we are talking about starting from the current conflict, it would be certainly problematic for political and strategic reasons wrt NATO and wrt Putin, still I think Putin would have big problems to start a war against NATO if the non occupied part of Ukraine was successfully fast tracked into NATO (like Finland), as Putin is even having problems to end the conflict in South and East Ukraine.

How am I conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”, if I’m intentionally stressing their difference, and what you wrote is again a paraphrase of what I just claimed to have understood from your views?

Your whole argument about U.S. looking to weaken the EU, rather than form a constructive alliance, (apart from it being a flawed argument) only makes sense from the assumption that the U.S. is in a unipolar position and doesn’t require that alliance.

I thought it was accepted knowledge that the U.S. isn’t in a unipolar position. — Punshhh

First, I was trying to understand your views, so I made explicit what I thought it was left implicit in your argument. And the point is that if the superpower status of the US in one-to-one comparison still holds in the current non-unipolar world, I’m not sure the US will preserve its superpower status so defined in the next decades if certain strategic alliances are necessary for the US to keep its superpower status: technological gap is already decreasing, military projection is already grown unsustainable, monetary dominance is challenged or worked around, and reputational costs are mostly against the US. So the US power projection as world power can be severely damaged in the longer run.
Second, if the US needs a strong EU as an ally to sustain its power projection wrt rival alliances, I don’t think it will evidently succeed either because a strong EU will never materialise, and if it will materialise it still will at best balance not overwhelm rival alliances, even more so, if the contribution of Middle-Eastern regional powers can weigh in.
Third, to be more precise, my whole argument is “the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe unexploitable to its hegemonic competitors too.” The point is that the combination of persisting EU vulnerabilities plus incumbent weakening of the US leadership, Europe will turn into a more disputable area for hegemonic competition among the US and other rival hegemonic powers, and this could threaten both NATO and EU project.

Other than oil, money, terrorism, control over commercial routes, criminal business, immigration, exporting islamism in Asia, Africa and the West, maybe nothing. That’s however may be enough to help a Russia-China alliance against a US and EU alliance, even more so with a weak EU.

Good luck (for this alliance) in holding all that together. Just more failed states. The only reason the Gulf states have their current prosperity and security is due to implicit support from the U.S. (the West) in return for oil. That oil will shortly become less important with the transition to net zero. By the way, Russia has the same problem with oil becoming a stranded asset. — Punshhh

Concerning the Middle East, I find at least the leaderships of regional powers like Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, enough aware of their geopolitical role and strength, despite rivalries and vulnerabilities. They are open to balance the US hegemony in cooperation with Russia and China. They try to develop their sphere of influence even beyond the Middle East in Asia and Africa. And even though they will exploit their oil as a main source of revenues, they are already planning for a post-oil transition (https://www.forbesmiddleeast.com/lists/the-middle-easts-sustainable-100/, https://www.dw.com/en/how-the-gulf-region-is-planning-for-a-life-after-oil/a-67067995, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10668-021-01424-x). Besides, even though they compete for regional hegemony, yet the most acute and local problems they have to face coming from Islamism, environmental challenges, growing population (https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/why-the-world-s-fastest-growing-populations-are-in-the-middle-east-and-africa/), plus the mediation of greater powers, like China, may also solicit greater cooperation among them to face shared future challenges, including the threats of a multipolar world like hawkish non-middle eastern hegemonic powers.

Actually I’m more skeptical about the idea that whatever happens in the Middle East, it won’t play any decisive contribution in the power balance of major hegemonic powers.


So points 2 and 5, wouldn’t happen? Are you sure about that? Or that on the other side of the picture, that this could happen if Russia had lost in Ukraine and sleeked off with her tail between her legs?
(2, U.S. will be obliged to support EU, and be drawn into EU wars with Russia.)
(5, EU are vulnerable to Russia picking off states, pre-occupying EU while China can threaten U.S. play one off against the other.) — Punshhh

There is some logic into the 2 hypothetical scenarios you have described but given the current circumstances I’m less certain about their likelihood. And the end of the Ukrainian war may look more messy than an uncontroversial victory or loss.

But how much some Bohdan Khmelnytsky was an Ukrainian nationalist is an interesting question (especially when he allied with Russia). — ssu

My understanding is that back then Poland was perceived to be the oppressor and Russia the convenient protector. Unfortunately such an alliance didn’t play as expected, i.e. in favour of the Cossack state’s independence, because it lost progressively sovereignty, autonomy and then it got Russified (especially, the local elites), despite following resistance.

But here's the real question to you. The Zionist idea of Israel is very young. And so is the idea of independent Palestine. But the age of the idea doesn't matter, it's how many people genuinely believe in that cause. There is absolutely no prestige, no larger credibility or justification on this age issue. This is just the nonsensical debate that parties who want to thrash the other side in the Palestine/Israel debate. I don't understand at all the reasoning for this debate or why should it be important. The Palestinians do want an independent state from Israel. The Israelis don't want a two state solution.

We've actually seen just now a coming and going of one idea, an Islamic Caliphate in the form of ISIS/ISIL/IS/Daesh come, emerge and be squashed in the region. This isn't anything new, actually. Hence likely that the region hasn't seen the end of new nation forming. Likely in the year 2424 the map can be totally different from now. And those states will trace their glorious history back to our time and beyond to older history. — ssu

Despite your initial announcement, I don’t see any question.
Besides you are making claims that do not add up to me: if all that matters is what people believe, how is it possible that the age of certain ideas which are part of people’s belief systems and, actually, help justify and identify such belief systems doesn’t matter?
Finally, if Palestinians do want an independent state from Israel while not recognising Israel, then also Palestinians don't want a two state solution.