[reMany of my thoughts on epistemology come from Wittgenstein's last work called On Certainty. They were developed from my understanding of On Certainty, in particular Wittgenstein's bedrock propositions. However, I don't want to give the impression that what I'm putting forth in this thread is necessarily what Wittgenstein was communicating in On Certainty. I developed my own theory based on some of his thinking, and how I interpreted some of his thinking. So much of my own thinking on this subject is going beyond what's presented in On Certainty. It's my expansion of some of the ideas in On Certainty, for better or worse.
First, it seems that there are beliefs that arise apart from language, and a belief, whether linguistic or not, is simply a state-of-mind. These mind states are clearly seen in our actions. This is not to say that all actions by living organisms reflect beliefs, but simply to say that all beliefs are reflections of mind states, which in turn are shown by the things we do.
Second, not only are there beliefs that arise non-linguistically, but our thoughts are also not dependent upon linguistics. This it seems, has to be case if one is to make sense of the development of linguistics. For if there are no beliefs and no thoughts prior to the formation of linguistics (language), what would be the springboard of language? How does one get from a mind of no thoughts and no beliefs, to a mind that is able to express one's thoughts linguistically? It also seems to be the case that language is simply a tool to communicate our thoughts to one another, which also seems to lend support for the idea that thinking is prior to language.
Third, the basis for beliefs in prelinguistic man is causal in nature, not based on reasoning, reasoning is a linguistic endeavor, at least as how it is defined here. How are beliefs causally formed? It seems to be the case that beliefs arise causally within the mind based on the interactions between our sensory experiences and the world around us. The interaction between our sensory experiences and the world do not necessitate the belief, but are simply sufficient to cause the belief. One acts upon the information given through sensory impressions, which in turn has a causal relationship with the belief.
Fourth, these three previous ideas form what is bedrock to all of epistemology. For epistemology arises out of language, it is a way of expressing what we know, or what we believe we know by using ply="Sam26;d2612"]
One may be certain but still be entirely mistaken. One can be certain that which is actually is, but not should a notion for that which is exist only as a perception, such as the case with certainty.
Only primitive instinctive beliefs can arise apart from language. Beliefs are concepts, and beyond language only emotion based concepts have a construct, but having said this even wonderment is an emotion.
Beliefs are not, so to speak, a state of mind, it is only the object of one`s belief which can be reasonably
said.to be the state of mind.
Beliefs may not necessarily convert to actions for the first priority for the vast majority of us is to conform.
The springboard to communication was wonderment, and I consider a state of wonderment to be one of emotion, the emotion which is wonderment. In my view many emotional states go unrecognized.
Language both communicates our thoughts and possesses them, beyond our emotions this is. Do n`t underestimate how far reaching may be emotions though.
Beliefs do n`t form casually in the mind, they either develop as consequence to experience, one`s own or others, or are planted there, by others..
Whether there is this interaction with one`s belief, refer back, would depend upon whether that belief is held as an active belief or a non active one.
How would you argue, should you be so asked, that your reasoning has taken you on a journey? .In my view it is only representative of the average surface perception for non philosophers. It is the way at first visit the vast majority of us would already think, and in effect you are going out of your way in trying to convince of arguments for not thinking..