Compatibilists, unlike libertarians, believe even the internal constraints are deterministic. It is true that some libertarians believe that whatever someone actually does freely, he or she ought to have been able to refrain from doing it (or to do something else) in the exact same circumstances regardless of the antecedent causal constraints on the action being internal or external to the process of deliberation and decision. This is the strongest possible version of the so called 'principle of alternative possibilities' (PAP). But that is a rather minority positions among defenders of the possibility of free will. — Pierre-Normand

This is an excellent summary. What I want to add is that even if the internal deliberation was as rational and optimal as possible - completely determined by those ideal constraints - reality is still unpredictable. We can only guess that a choice is likely the best. And our own actions impact on the world in a way that produces some of that unpredictability. Stepping into a muddy river, I might step on a crocodile.

So an ideal rationalist has to second guess their own actions in terms of intended consequences. That uncertainty is a product of any decision and part of the internal milieu. It can’t be computed from some prior state of perfect knowledge, as we might argue about a best guess. It is an irreducible residue of indecision when doing our best to make a decision determined by “all the available prior information”. As a guess about a guess, it is information that only follows the action that causes it to be the case.

In short, there is an irreducible uncertainty at the heart of any model theoretic approach to reality - an observer effect that dogs all rational models. We are entangled with our environments when we make a decision. The decision that results in an interaction is the same as the act of measurement that disturbs the state of the very system it hopes to measure.

If only I had known, I wouldn’t have stepped on the crocodile. But it was only in stepping that I could have known.

The line between internal constraints and external constraints is a fuzzy boundary and not a sharp one. In the final analysis, strict determinism fails as the actor and their environment can’t be absolutely divided.

Mostly decisions can be relatively determined by internal information. A decision had only that one possible optimal outcome and so we had no real choice. However often the reality is the information is ambiguous. We can only discover the rationale after acting.

Hence Buridan’s ass. You just have to make a plunge when no choice is clear.

If you were in fact a deterministic computation, you would blue screen. Your decision making would gridlock. So a good thing we aren’t designed that way. A good thing noise still exists in the system to tilt decisions in less constrained fashion.

In summary, folk want one or other extreme to be true - absolute determinism or absolute freedom. But as you outline, a sensible position depends on zeroing in on the tricky border where both sides seem to be saying something believable. And zoom right in and the very distinction itself evaporates.

Any theory thus has to recognise the further fact that observers and their world’s can’t in the end be completely unentangled in either direction.

I think discussion of the uncertainty about what represents the 'best' choice is missing the point of the OP. The point was not to say that free-will becomes useless because we know what is best for us, it's saying that it becomes useless because we think we know what's best for us and as rational beings we would always select that option, therefore something constrains our choices. As Schopenhauer says, we can do what we will, but we cannot will what we will.

So the question really comes down to whether there exist any choices we might make where the answer is not in any way pre-determined by preferences we had before the choice. 'Mind-reading' acts rely on the fact that even something as seemingly random as picking a random number are actually influenced by pre-existing ideas. We rarely pick the lowest, middle or the highest in the specified range, we think odd numbers are more 'random' than even numbers for some reason. The numbers 3 and 7 seem to occur more often than they would if they were truly randomly selected.

If we can't even pick a random number without our pre-existing mental state influencing it towards one decision out of the supposedly 'free' choice, then I don't see much hope of demonstrating that our important choices in life are anything other than determined in advance by the dispositions we already have.

If we can't even pick a random number without our pre-existing mental state influencing it towards one decision out of the supposedly 'free' choice, then I don't see much hope of demonstrating that our important choices in life are anything other than determined in advance by the dispositions we already have. — Pseudonym

A disposition is an untroublesome form of “Determinism”. But I guess a “problem of personal inclinations” doesn’t have quite the same dramatic ring to it.

So the question is what is the use of free will when we, rational agents, can always choose the best option? — bahman

This is a very good question. I have to say I was very close to asking this question myself but it wasn't as clear to me as it is to you.

Rationality is inescapable. Homo sapiens = rational animal. It defines us.

As you say it appears that rationality makes free will redundant or something like that.

But think of rationality as a tool. We use it rather than the other way round as your post implies. An artist first chooses what his creation will be and only then does he touch his tools. Likewise, we're free to choose what we want to do but we must do so in a rational manner.

What do you think?

I think discussion of the uncertainty about what represents the 'best' choice is missing the point of the OP. The point was not to say that free-will becomes useless because we know what is best for us, it's saying that it becomes useless because we think we know what's best for us and as rational beings we would always select that option, therefore something constrains our choices. As Schopenhauer says, we can do what we will, but we cannot will what we will. — Pseudonym

You get the point. One of course can argue that one can choose worse option when he practice his freedom.

Think of the following example. You like vanilla ice cream more than chocolate one. Of course choosing vanilla ice cream is a rational choice. You buy the ice cream and decide to put it in garbage bag which is irrational. Of course you use your freedom to do this. The question is what is the point of free will when it could lead to absurdity in our decision.

One of course can argue that one can choose worse option when he practice his freedom. — bahman

Yes, but they'd still have to have some reason to do so wouldn't they? Maybe they think it would be beneficial to choose the 'worst' option just to prove a point about free will, in which case they've identified some benefit in 'proving a point about free will' and so acting to bring about that benefit is not the 'worst' choice any more is it?

I've yet to hear a convincing definition of somebody making a choice which is other than the one they have previously decided is best, for whatever convoluted, confused, sub-concious or mistaken reason.

Think of the following example. You like vanilla ice cream more than chocolate one. Of course choosing vanilla ice cream is a rational choice. You buy the ice cream and decide to put it in garbage bag which is irrational. Of course you use your freedom to do this. The question is what is the point of free will when it could lead to absurdity in our decision. — bahman

I didn't think the idea of free will consisted of having a point, but rather consisted in there being no external fact-of-the-matter that precisely determines one's choices, either because of under-determination of choices relative to external matters of fact, or because the 'externality' of the determining matters of fact in relation to one's mental state is disputed under an extended-mind thesis which renders talk of determined choices as meaningless.

The way you framed your original question implies that knowledge of one's personal preferences can play the role of such external matters-of-fact in the sense of weakly determining one's choices, whereby one still has a final say in which option to choose. Yet if I remember correctly, in another thread you disputed whether conscious choice was in fact possible on the grounds that in appraising the value of one choice, one is no longer aware of the value of the other choices. But if conscious appraisal of actions is not possible , then one doesn't have knowledge of one's personal preferences, and hence personal preferences cannot play the role of determining external matters of fact here, which as a consequence implies that one cannot conclude that one's choices are determined with respect to knowledge of one's preferences.

In summary, folk want one or other extreme to be true - absolute determinism or absolute freedom. But as you outline, a sensible position depends on zeroing in on the tricky border where both sides seem to be saying something believable. And zoom right in and the very distinction itself evaporates.

Perhaps absolute determinism primarily refers to the concrete world we experience and free will to the social reality we experience. Depending on which way you look $50 dollars can mean a little or a lot.

Think of the following example. You like vanilla ice cream more than chocolate one. Of course choosing vanilla ice cream is a rational choice. You buy the ice cream and decide to put it in garbage bag which is irrational. Of course you use your freedom to do this. The question is what is the point of free will when it could lead to absurdity in our decision. — bahman

Rationality needs motivation. You have your likes and only after do you use rationality to acquire what you like.

You liked this forum. Sure you had your reasons but then there are others who don't like this form, also with reason. So, who's right here? Rationality clearly shouldn't lead to contradictions. So, who's the culprit? Free will of course.

You get the point. One of course can argue that one can choose worse option when he practice his freedom. — bahman

Worse or better is a judgment performed after the consequences are revealed. And then it is made in comparison to some idealized possible consequence which never happened. There are no better or worse options. There are only possible choices of action which we feel may achieve some desired results, but results are always unpredictable. There is no control over outcomes. Only desires to achieve one. In Life, almost nothing turns out as expected.

Yes, but they'd still have to have some reason to do so wouldn't they? Maybe they think it would be beneficial to choose the 'worst' option just to prove a point about free will, in which case they've identified some benefit in 'proving a point about free will' and so acting to bring about that benefit is not the 'worst' choice any more is it? — Pseudonym

Well that then is a rational choice rather than free one.

I didn't think the idea of free will consisted of having a point, but rather consisted in there being no external fact-of-the-matter that precisely determines one's choices, either because of under-determination of choices relative to external matters of fact, or because the 'externality' of the determining matters of fact in relation to one's mental state is disputed under an extended-mind thesis which renders talk of determined choices as meaningless.

The way you framed your original question implies that knowledge of one's personal preferences can play the role of such external matters-of-fact in the sense of weakly determining one's choices, whereby one still has a final say in which option to choose. Yet if I remember correctly, in another thread you disputed whether conscious choice was in fact possible on the grounds that in appraising the value of one choice, one is no longer aware of the value of the other choices. But if conscious appraisal of actions is not possible , then one doesn't have knowledge of one's personal preferences, and hence personal preferences cannot play the role of determining external matters of fact here, which as a consequence implies that one cannot conclude that one's choices are determined with respect to knowledge of one's preferences. — sime

These two problems are unresolved for me: (1) What is the use of free will? and (2) Conscious decision is impossible. For example, when I talk with people about conscious choice, they deliberately say that they can do it. That is something that I cannot comprehend since I cannot consciously give weights to two subjects.

Am I addressing your post properly?

I don't understand what you are trying to say. Do you agree with my example and the fact that free decision leads to absurdity when we can make ration decision?

Worse or better is a judgment performed after the consequences are revealed. And then it is made in comparison to some idealized possible consequence which never happened. There are no better or worse options. There are only possible choices of action which we feel may achieve some desired results, but results are always unpredictable. There is no control over outcomes. Only desires to achieve one. In Life, almost nothing turns out as expected. — Rich

We are talking about immediate consequence rather than long term one.

Well that then is a rational choice rather than free one. — bahman

Yes, that's the point. The dilemma you're outlining arises because there is no such thing as free will by the definition you are using. No-one could ever possibly choose the 'worst' option because simply by doing so they have shown that it is, by some metric, the 'best' option. We cannot do other than act according to our will. The only remaining free-will question is from where do we get our will? - from some non-physical realm, or from our previous thoughts/senses.

Yes, that's the point. The dilemma you're outlining arises because there is no such thing as free will by the definition you are using. No-one could ever possibly choose the 'worst' option because simply by doing so they have shown that it is, by some metric, the 'best' option. — Pseudonym

No, worst option of course exist. The point is the worst option is not worst one if a thought, showing that we have free will for example, intervenes in our decision. A free decision is not biased or initiated by anything. It is a causal chain that we create. Needless to say that I am not here taking a position that free will exist. I am just pointing to a problem related to free will when we are dealing with rational agent. In simple world, a rational agent can function well without free will so what is the point of it if there is any.

We cannot do other than act according to our will. The only remaining free-will question is from where do we get our will? - from some non-physical realm, or from our previous thoughts/senses. — Pseudonym

That, the source of our will, I believe we can never be sure about it.

We are talking about immediate consequence rather than long term one. — bahman

Immediate consequences are always uncertain, though some more probable than others.

The only remaining free-will question is from where do we get our will? - from some non-physical realm, or from our previous thoughts/senses. — Pseudonym

Will is an energetic force just like any other force in nature. The Mind produces and stores it in the body by normal process of eating, drinking, and breathing. The body is a tool of the mind.

Will is an energetic force just like any other force in nature. The Mind produces and stores it in the body by normal process of eating, drinking, and breathing. The body is a tool of the mind.
2 hours ago ReplyShareFlag — Rich

OF what, exactly is it free?

I don't understand what you are trying to say. Do you agree with my example and the fact that free decision leads to absurdity when we can make ration decision? — bahman

Choice is prior to rationality.

Step 1: We want x
Step 2: We use rationality to acquire/achieve x

Rationality isn't against choice/free will. We use rationality to get what we want. Assuming of course that what we want is chosen by free will.

Will is an energetic force just like any other force in nature. The Mind produces and stores it in the body by normal process of eating, drinking, and breathing. The body is a tool of the mind. — Rich

And you know this how?

And you know this how? — Pseudonym

Practice. Philosophy is not arguing about what someone read in a book. Philosophy is experiencing life in all forms, having patience, and practicing. Then new knowledge comes.

OF what, exactly is it free? — charleton

I don't know how many times I've repeated on this forum that NOTHING IS FREE. Such a stance is as far from life experience as is Determinism. Both ideas are just concocted ideas for people to argue over, as a way of amusement in their lives.

Everything is entangled. There is no separation, emptiness or nothingness that can create separation, anywhere. Nothingness may exist but only in the absence of duration. Lacking separation, we have entanglement which means we have Choice in the direction we apply Will, but it cannot possibly be free of constraints or otherwise.

Choice is prior to rationality.

Step 1: We want x
Step 2: We use rationality to acquire/achieve x — TheMadFool

Yes. We don't need free will up to here. So we can make rational decision in a situation.

Rationality isn't against choice/free will. — TheMadFool

Free decision could be in favor or against rational decision.

Everything is entangled. — Rich

Then why call it free will?

We possess that freedom of will which comes with being an individual, thus, there is an individual nature to what we will. Surely, is n`t that free will enough? It more than satisfies me.

Surely, is n`t that free will enough? — celebritydiscodave

It is a problem with nomenclature.

It is clear we are not "free" to do anything we wish to do.

The nature of human nature is that we (our minds) imagine a future possibility and then we use stored energy to attempt to effect this possibility (our will) after considering possible choices of how we can might use our body mechanisms. Outcomes are always uncertain. We can only try.

Beyond this, there are habitual aspects of our nature that we learned and are effected more or less without any conscious effort by the large Mind. Smaller minds in our bodies (e.g. muscle memory) effect these motions but are in consent communication with each other via the nervous system. A healthy body must maintain a healthy nervous system which is why ancient cultures developed specific exercises to nourish and cleanse the muscles, bones, and nervous system.

This is our nature. An understanding of it can lead to a long and fruitful life. You don't learn this from logic. You learn it from experience and practice. It is the skill of observation.

I get all this, we all likely do, but everybody already knows that we are complex beings, so why not just a couple of lines which will be remembered, and will sum up and clearly define this point/progression which you are contributing, such that we can all be clear as to what it is. Multitudes of detail has little or nothing to actually say...

Applied logic can result in trusted realization, and I would definitely define this process as learning just as much, if not more so, than merely remembering that which one is told..

Applied logic can result in trusted realization, — celebritydiscodave

Not in my experience. I find it parenthetical. Observational skills are most helpful.