It is. — Rank Amateur
You use philosophical terms on this forum that the ordinary person would not understand, therefore I should conclude that you are an obscurantist because you haven't dumbed down your language and that you do not, as you claim, privilege ordinary language. I do think I have been clear in this thread though. — emancipate
Why is it that Hegel, Lacan, Derrida, etc. have been accused of obscurantism by some and yet others have found their work insightful and meaningful? — emancipate
With a little effort you could understand, but I'm afraid that would mean stepping out of your ordinary langauge cave. One man's obscurantism is another's philosophy. — emancipate
Sorry, before I could possibly address your point you will need to define potato, because there are many things that one can call potato and some may or may not be mashable, and what really is mashed? If I use a ricer is that a mashing? And if there is pulp in the juice does that help or hurt its orangeness? Is a tangarine an orange or not? — Rank Amateur
Yes as a tactic it is a game of mere one-upmanship. But, not readily accepting the traditional (or simple) understandings of language is useful to ascertain and analayze potential presuppositions. — emancipate
Sorry before I could possibly address your point you will need to define potato, because there are many things that one can call potato and some may or may not be mashable, and what really is mashed? If I use a ricer is that a mashing? And if there is pulp in the juice does that help or hurt its orangeness? Is a tangarine an orange or not? — Rank Amateur
I understand that it serves your purpose but be aware that this is a limit to philosophy's potentiality. Not only philosophy but yours also. Philosophy isn't about regurgitating what has been said before, but an exploration of concepts in novel ways that push the boundaries of our understanding. Sometimes experimental and even creative language is needed for that. Anyone who doesn't spoon-feed you with easily digestible concepts is a sophist I suppose. — emancipate
So you are content to talk about things in peculiar ways if it is through the mode of science, but not philosophy? Afterall, the ordinary way of discussing (or understanding) something is not the scientific way. And why privaledge the ordinary epistemologicaly? — emancipate
In a sense you have eaten how it appears, because it no longer appears in the same way as it did before you took a bite. You are consuming and modifing the experience and the appearance. — emancipate
Diogenes and Socrates now? I thought you were Winston from 1984? Who next? Wonderwoman? — Baden
This is a category mistake. You are confusing the stuff behind the scenes with our sensory experience of the stuff behind the scenes. — Herg
Properties of the appearance of the tabletop
1. Coloured brown
2. Size alters if we move away from or towards the table
3. Shape alters as we change the angle from which we view the table
4. Is continuous, i.e. not made up of discrete parts
Properties of the tabletop
1. Is not coloured, but rather reflects light of particular wavelengths
2. Size is fixed
3. Shape is fixed
4. Is discrete not continuous, because made of molecules.
It is evident that the corresponding properties in each list are mutually exclusive. That shows that the objects of which they are properties cannot be the same object, i.e. the appearance of the tabletop cannot be the same thing as the tabletop. Thus an appearance of a thing is not the same as the thing itself. Nor is the thing itself merely another appearance, as you suggest, because if it were, it would have properties of the sort we find in the first list, rather than, as it actually does, properties of the kind in the second list. Appearances have the sort of properties in my first list; the objects of which they are appearances have the sort of properties in the second. To take your own examples, brains and atoms have properties of the sort in my second list, and therefore are objects, not appearances.
In fact the tabletop is a hypothesised external object. The hypothesis (that there is an externally existing tabletop with the properties in the second list) is a good one, because when coupled with the fact that we experience appearances, it explains why the appearances have the properties in the first list. Without the objective existence of the tabletop, there would be no explanation for the appearance having these properties, i.e. there would be no explanation for our sensory experience being the way it is. This, of course, is the flaw in idealism; by removing the objective world, it removes the most plausible explanation for our experience being as it is.
I hope this is helpful. — Herg
Two reasons: ego and intelligence. The first for thinking I might actually understand something so incredibly convoluted, and the second for thinking it actually makes sense to me.
It’s just speculative philosophy after all, which means it’s being correct is not a consideration, whereas it’s usefulness might be. — Mww
Facts are what's the case. If you are going to claim that what's the case has a location,
— S
Just saw this response now.
"What's the case" is ambiguous to me, because people often use it to refer to, for example, stating propositions. Otherwise, what's the difference between "what's the case" and "state of affairs" a la there being some dynamic physical things in particular relations to other dynamic physical things? — Terrapin Station
Your dreams are something in a sense that they are appearances. But they came from nothing... — Nobody
Take LSD or DMT and see for yourself. — Nobody
What is the ultimate ground of reality?! — Nobody
In conscious awareness, that which appears are intuitions representing sensory impressions. — Mww
Example: if you hold an orange ..the colour..the smell..the touching is your perception which is your direct experience of a perceived object. The actual object is not any of these perceptions..it is the stuff behind the scenes which is sourcing these appearances . But of course there is no such thing as there is not a shred of evidence for an objective world. — Nobody
1.Can you teach people how to feel? Not always. Most people already feel. Humans are sentient. — Amity
I don't know why that discussion was closed but I am a Mentor over on Physics Forums and can assure anyone deciding such things is both consensus based and exceedingly difficult. Much discussion with other mentors goes into it first. I do not agree with all closures, nor do I agree with some left open. Despite being a Mentor I have had discussions started by me shut down and at first its not nice. But after a while you realize - really is it the end of the world? Nowadays I personally just shrug my shoulders and say that's just the way it is. There is always plenty of other things to discuss.
Thanks
Bill — Bill Hobba
The contentious matter is about whether or not the linguistic meaning continues to exist when the language users do not, but the writings do.
— creativesoul
Exactly. — Terrapin Station
I think the question is relevant. It's not a matter of whether we can know (in the sense of have absolute certainty) that we have deciphered an ancient text correctly, but of whether it is possible to be wrong or right about whether we have deciphered its meaning. If we accept that there can be unknown, but decipherable meaning, in other words that there can be meaning there to be deciphered, then that would seem to commit us to accepting that meaning is not merely in the human mind. — Janus
1. A reply which doesn't make proper use of the quote function.
I'm typing up these comments for a reason, and I want you to put the effort into at least making it look like you're trying to address the points I'm making. So quote me, and break what I say down into more manageable chunks so that you decrease the risk of digressing or missing something important.
This should be quid pro quo. If I do it in my reply to your comment, then I expect the same in return. — S
That wasn't what I was focusing on yet for this tangent. The point was simply to suggest that a mere correlation isn't sufficient. There needs to be a correlation, but we need more than that, too. — Terrapin Station
I'm saying that there's a correlation in dictionaries, for example, between the definition of a term and the term that follows that definition.
In other words, we have word A and definition x. Then we have word B and definition y. B follows A in alphabetical order. Well, in dictionaries, there's a correlation between x and B. B immediately follows x after all, and that's the case in multiple dictionaries. — Terrapin Station
I thought that would be clear from what I wrote. It needs to be a direct connection and not just a correlation to do the work that we want done, because if it can just be a correlation, then we get the definition of dodecaphony attached to the word "dodge," for example. — Terrapin Station
I'd add that it has to be more than a mere correlation, it has to be a "direct connection" between two things (I would say an intentional connection, but it's too your benefit for me to not use that term, because we don't have nonmental intentionality).
The problem is that when no people exist, the world that's independent of us has no means of making such direct connections.
It needs to be a direct connection and not just a correlation, because, for example, "the composition of music employing the twelve-tone scale" is correlated with "dodge" in the dictionary, because that's the definition of "dodecaphony," and dodge follows dodecaphony. (At least hypothetically--I didn't actually check a standard dictionary to check the example, but all we need is an example of the types of correlations we find--definitions of a term followed by another term.) — Terrapin Station
That's an example of self contradiction. — creativesoul
You evidently do not understand the difference between assuming and concluding. — creativesoul
Surely you're not claiming that correlations can be drawn between things without a creature capable of drawing the correlations? — creativesoul
Correlations that have been drawn between different things are themselves existentially dependent upon a creature capable of drawing them. No such creature, no such correlations. — creativesoul
All meaning consists of correlations that have been drawn between different things. — creativesoul
Whatever drawing correlations between different things is existentially dependent upon, so too is linguistic meaning. — creativesoul
All meaning consists of correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul
"Drawn" is past tense, so the pedantry is unnecessary. — creativesoul
All meaning consists of correlations drawn between different things.
Let's start there.
Do you disagree?
If so, offer me one example to the contrary. That's all it takes. — creativesoul
One person is insufficient for language. The entire scenario is ill conceived.
Linguistic meaning is existentially dependent upon language users. The meaning does not consist of language users. The meaning consists of correlations drawn between different things. The meaning lives or dies along with the users. If someone or other later finds a text, it is possible for them to decipher some of the meaning. That would require that an interpreter draw the same correlations between the marks and whatever else those marks were correlated with by the original actual users of that language... — creativesoul
Step one is for you to go back and revisit the post where I did quote you and offered relevant answers...
page 6 maybe? — creativesoul
Pointing out that the methodology(the terminological framework) you're insisting on, is inherently inadequate for the task is the wrong way to involve myself in the discussion?
How else to I tell you that the problems are the inherently inadequate conceptions, language use, and/or the terminological frameworks you're adopting and working from?
Flies and bottles... — creativesoul
