The Mashed is The Potato

There's the potato, and then there's the mashing of it. The mashing of the potato produces mashed potato. The potato isn't necessarily mashed. The mashed potato is necessarily mashed. A potato freshly plucked from a potato tree is not the mashed or the mashing of it or the mashed potato or the potato tree.

There's the orange, and then there's the expressing of it. The expressing of it produces expressed orange, otherwise known as orange juice. A glass of orange juice contains the expression of an orange. The orange isn't necessarily expressed. The expressed orange is necessarily expressed. The orange is not the expression of it. An orange freshly rooted out of the ground is not orange juice. It has yet to be expressed. It has yet to become orange juice.

There's the meaning, and then there's the expressing of it. The expressing of it produces expressed meaning in the form of language. A statement is an expression of meaning in language. The meaning isn't necessarily expressed. The expressed meaning is necessarily expressed. The meaning is different in ways to the expressed meaning, so they're not the same.

We could use the same logic with rules and the expression of rules, and a whole load of other things, but hopefully you've picked it up by now.

There's the orange, and there's the experience of it. There's the orange, and then there's how it appears. I eat the orange. Have I eaten the experience? Have I eaten how it appears?

We all know, at least deep down, that this makes perfect sense. Well, maybe except for potato trees. I'll give you that one. Like idealists, they don't know a thing, nor do they make perfect sense. So why is it right for idealists to conflate such things and turn how we ordinarily talk into a load of nonsense? According to a recent poll I conducted, shockingly, at least half of those who voted are bonkers in these sort of ways as a result of idealist logic and idealist language.

Heracloitus

There's the orange, and there's the experience of it. There's the orange, and then there's how it appears. I eat the orange. Have I eaten the experience? Have I eaten how it appears? — S

In a sense you have eaten how it appears, because it no longer appears in the same way as it did before you took a bite. You are consuming and modifing the experience and the appearance.

In a sense you have eaten how it appears, because it no longer appears in the same way as it did before you took a bite. You are consuming and modifing the experience and the appearance. — emancipate

In a sense...

And what about the ordinary sense of how we talk? Does it make sense to say that I've eaten an appearance? What makes more sense to say: that I've eaten an orange, or that I've eaten an appearance? Why should we talk in peculiar ways? Because that's the job of a philosopher? To appear to be talking utter nonsense? If so, I'm not sure I want to be a philosopher. Or, better yet, philosophy needs to be reformed. It needs to be emancipated from the scurge of so-called philosophers, and a new breed of philosopher should take the reins. Out with the old, in with the new. :ok:

Heracloitus

So you are content to talk about things in peculiar ways if it is through the mode of science, but not philosophy? Afterall, the ordinary way of discussing (or understanding) something is not the scientific way. And why privilege the ordinary epistemologicaly?

So you are content to talk about things in peculiar ways if it is through the mode of science, but not philosophy? Afterall, the ordinary way of discussing (or understanding) something is not the scientific way. And why privaledge the ordinary epistemologicaly? — emancipate

No, I am content to talk about things in the mode of science, and I am content to talk about things in the mode of philosophy, so long as it ends up making sense. I am against talking about things in a peculiar way which doesn't end up making any sense. I accept the science of particle physics, for example, but I don't say the absurdities associated with this bad sort of philosophy which uses, or rather exploits, the science to say things like, "rocks don't exist".

And I privilege ordinary language philosophy because it makes more sense and is far more useful outside of the special little context of bad philosophy, and because ordinary people don't think I'm some kind of idiot or crank, and more astute people don't think that I'm some kind of sophist.

Imagine telling people at your workplace that rocks don't exist. What would they think of you if you said that? How would they react?

You could look down your nose at them and think them unsophisticated, not like a special philosopher with special insight. Or, you could take a valuable lesson from this situation about the merits of ordinary language philosophy.

Heracloitus

And I privilege ordinary language philosophy because it makes more sense and is far more useful outside of the special little context of bad philosophy, and because ordinary people don't think I'm some kind of idiot or crank, and more astute people don't think that I'm some kind of sophist. — S

OK I understand that it serves your purpose but be aware that this is a limit to philosophy's potentiality. Not only philosophy but yours also. Philosophy isn't about regurgitating what has been said before, but an exploration of concepts in novel ways that push the boundaries of our understanding. Sometimes experimental and even creative language is needed for that. Anyone who doesn't spoon-feed you with easily digestible concepts is a sophist I suppose.

I understand that it serves your purpose but be aware that this is a limit to philosophy's potentiality. Not only philosophy but yours also. Philosophy isn't about regurgitating what has been said before, but an exploration of concepts in novel ways that push the boundaries of our understanding. Sometimes experimental and even creative language is needed for that. Anyone who doesn't spoon-feed you with easily digestible concepts is a sophist I suppose. — emancipate

Who said anything about regurgitating what has been said before? Ordinary language philosophy is a modern thing, and it might just be one of the biggest challenges that philosophy has ever had to face. It's an attack from within. It is far more novel and creative than most of what has preceded it, which is, like you say, to invent peculiar ways of speaking about things, and to foster the illusion of pushing the boundaries of our understanding. Clouding good sense is what philosophy is a great tool for. It's great for obscurantism, great for absurdity, great for feeling special and insightful without realising the rather empty and senseless nature of what you're declaring as a philosopher.

It makes me think of William Tyndale, who first translated the Bible into English. He ended up being executed. He was before he his time, and the authorities weren't too happy about that.

Rank Amateur

↪S

sorry before I could possibly address your point you will need to define potato, because there are many things that one can call potato and some may or may not be mashable, and what really is mashed? If I use a ricer is that a mashing? And if there is pulp in the juice does that help or hurt its orangeness? Is a tangarine an orange or not?

The inability on here, for no particular good reason, to not readily accept simple understandings of language, simply as tactic often drives me nuts. It is not philosophy it is debate. If such clarification is important to the concept being discussed, fine. Buy at least to my very untrained eye, that is the exception.

Heracloitus

The inability on here, for no particular good reason, to not readily accept simple understandings of language, simply as tactic often drives me nuts. — Rank Amateur

Yes as a tactic it is a game of mere one-upmanship. But, not readily accepting the traditional (or simple) understandings of language is useful to ascertain and analayze potential presuppositions.

Sorry before I could possibly address your point you will need to define potato, because there are many things that one can call potato and some may or may not be mashable, and what really is mashed? If I use a ricer is that a mashing? And if there is pulp in the juice does that help or hurt its orangeness? Is a tangarine an orange or not? — Rank Amateur

I really do hope that this is a deliberate parody from you. What's a photocopier? Also, what's a beard? What's a heap of sand?

Yes as a tactic it is a game of mere one-upmanship. But, not readily accepting the traditional (or simple) understandings of language is useful to ascertain and analayze potential presuppositions. — emancipate

You would say that, though. It's clear that you're a big fan of obscurantism from your posting history.

Heracloitus

You would say that, though. It's clear that you're a big fan of obscurantism from your posting history — S

You use philosophical terms on this forum that the ordinary person would not understand, therefore I should conclude that you are an obscurantist because you haven't dumbed down your language and that you do not, as you claim, privilege ordinary language. I do think I have been clear in this thread though.

Why is it that hegel, lacan, Derrida etc have been accused of obscurantism by some and yet others have found their work insightful and meaningful? With a little effort you could understand, but I'm afraid that would mean stepping out of your ordinary langauge cave. One man's obscurantism is another's philosophy

Rank Amateur

↪S

it is

You use philosophical terms on this forum that the ordinary person would not understand, therefore I should conclude that you are an obscurantist because you haven't dumbed down your language and that you do not, as you claim, privilege ordinary language. I do think I have been clear in this thread though. — emancipate

I make a conscious effort not to use philosophical jargon where possible, and in any case, if I use a philosophical term, I'm willing and capable of translating it into ordinary language. And I don't take ordinary language - words like "rock", "orange", and "potato" - and give it a ridiculous hidden meaning which conflicts with ordinary usage.

So no.

Why is it that Hegel, Lacan, Derrida, etc. have been accused of obscurantism by some and yet others have found their work insightful and meaningful? — emancipate

Because those others are either plain wrong, or because they took the time and effort of translating the peculiar language: which is a con, not a pro. So it's lose-lose, even if there's a decent point to be gained from the philosophy.

With a little effort you could understand, but I'm afraid that would mean stepping out of your ordinary langauge cave. One man's obscurantism is another's philosophy. — emancipate

And the predictable ad hominem. It's not about that. It's not about me. It's not about my willingness or ability to understand. It's about the language they use. That's what my criticism is regarding. It's bad for being obscurantism in the first place, even if the philosophy has some merits.

It is. — Rank Amateur

Well, it's a philosophy forum after all, so one can never be sure!

Heracloitus

And the predictable ad hominem. It's not about that. It's not about me. It's not about my willingness or ability to understand. It's about the language they use. That's what my criticism is regarding. It's bad for being obscurantism in the first place, even if the philosophy has some merits — S

I didn't mean any ad hom. Anyway, what you call obscurantist might simply be a philosophers attempt at discourse, without the associations or baggage that comes with using traditional terms. Such as heideggers dasein for example. In such cases the difficulty of their language serves a purpose. Is this OK by you?

I didn't mean any ad hom. Anyway, what you call obscurantist might simply be a philosophers attempt at discourse, without the associations or baggage that comes with using traditional terms. Such as heideggers dasein for example. In such cases the difficulty of their language serves a purpose. Is this OK by you? — emancipate

Only if I agree that it's necessary, and I don't in your example. “What can be said at all can be said clearly”.

Heracloitus

Only if I agree that it's necessary, and I don't in your example. “What can be said at all can be said clearly”. — S

"The less you understand, the better you listen."

"The less you understand, the better you listen." — emancipate

The less I understand you, the more likely I am to scold you for not being clear.

Deleteduserrc

but I don't say the absurdities associated with this bad sort of philosophy which uses, or rather exploits, the science to say things like, "rocks don't exist". — S

This doesn't evince a very good understanding of idealism.

This doesn't evince a very good understanding of idealism. — csalisbury

That one wasn't specifically about idealism, actually. It was a more general point. But that claim came from a member of this forum, and I believe the specific philosophical jargon for the position he was advocating is mereological nihilism.

But thank you for once again jumping to the conclusion that I have no idea what I'm talking about. Obviously I must not possess the intimate knowledge which you do, and have yet to earn my wryness. Please, good sir, leave me be so that I may continue this masquerade without being exposed.

Deleteduserrc

↪S

Alright,my bad.

Terrapin Station

There's the meaning, and then there's the expressing of it. The expressing of it produces expressed meaning in the form of language. A statement is an expression of meaning in language. The meaning isn't necessarily expressed. The expressed meaning is necessarily expressed. The meaning is different in ways to the expressed meaning, so they're not the same. — S

That's fine, but if so, and definitions in dictionaries, utterances about meaning, etc. are expressions of meaning and not the same as meaning,* is it possible for us to "point to" meaning (even if just indirectly or metaphorically or whatever) as we could point to a potato or orange? What would we be pointing at? Where would we be pointing?

*of course, I'd say that definitions in dictionaries, utterances about meaning, etc. are not the same as meaning, too.

That's fine, but if so, and definitions in dictionaries, utterances about meaning, etc. are expressions of meaning and not the same as meaning,* is it possible for us to "point to" meaning (even if just indirectly or metaphorically or whatever) as we could point to a potato or orange? What would we be pointing at? Where would we be pointing? — Terrapin Station

As later Wittgenstein put it, "I cannot use language to get outside language".

And as early Wittgenstein put it:

"I can only mention the objects. Signs represent them. I can only speak of them, express them in speech I cannot".

This is to run up against the limits of language.

"What if there were something outside the facts? Which our sentences are unable to express? But there we have the things, for example, and we feel no desire at all to express them in sentences".

It does not even occur to us that we should express things or objects in speech: we are quite content merely to express their names, that is, to refer to them, to name or mention them.

"There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself".

It is a layer of reality that somehow lurks beneath or behind language. But yes, we can point and gesture, of course.

Terrapin Station

It is a layer of reality that somehow lurks beneath or behind language. But yes, we can point and gesture, of course. — S

I thought that everything above this was a way of saying that you can't point at meaning, but your last sentence says otherwise. So what would we point at, where would we be pointing, etc.?

I thought that everything above this was a way of saying that you can't point at meaning, but your last sentence says otherwise. So what would we point at, where would we be pointing, etc.? — Terrapin Station

Why, at the things of course.

Terrapin Station

↪S

At what things?

At what things? — Terrapin Station

Use your noggin.

Terrapin Station

↪S

Meanings? Wouldn't that answer be kind of uninformative?

Meanings? Wouldn't that answer be kind of uninformative? — Terrapin Station

What do you want from me? I just told you of the limits of language. Aren't you listening? What's the point of naming names, which you are more than capable of doing yourself. And it's a little difficult to gesture through text, don't you think?

I'm not having you lead me down the garden path again. State your intentions. Make your point. Or don't bother.

Terrapin Station

↪S

It's okay if your answer is that we can't point at meanings contra expressions of meanings, but if so, that's one important difference between meaning and potatoes or oranges.

The Mashed is The Potato

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