• Hypothetical consent
    No, it's equally important to create joys and opportunities (though this might be expressed differently when it comes to existing people due to the fact that most individuals can live generally satisfactory lives without requiring constant intervention from others as long as they aren't harmed) whenever one can do so without incurring great cost or causing more harm than good. I suppose we have different intuitions regarding this.
  • Hypothetical consent
    Yeah, some people mistakenly think that being an antinatalist means that you should end your life/harm other people. While I have met some who did espouse such views, most proponents disagree with that. I am not sure if this has happened to you yet, but I want to apologise from other people's behalf if they ever said something to you regarding harming yourself. It's not fun stuff.
  • Hypothetical consent
    In other words, negative experiences.

    I never said that there's just joy. However, it's also true that many people can find their lives to be unfathomably meaningful even in the face of harms. If it can be bad to create a person even if not creating the person doesn't lead to greater good for the person (by fulfilling their need to not exist) either, I don't see any good reason to not create the opportunity for experiencing innumerable positives. One is going ahead and creating a benefit (that they would have probably preferred despite the harms) that could not have been asked for by the person themselves. It is ethical to procreate (but not always).
  • Hypothetical consent
    I use the term to mean the same thing: negative experiences that would affect a person. And goods/benefits/whatever one wants to call them are also pertinent, and I have been advocating for consistency for a good reason, viz., the lack of a valid justification for not doing so.
  • Hypothetical consent
    The parent who decides to create a person, whose harms/benefits were being discussed. It's truly amusing. The need to create ethereal joys does matter. I don't see why it isn't except for some pessimistic biases. Once again, if it's good to prevent experiences that are against one's interests, it can also be good to create experiences that would be in their interest. No nouns or adjectives can change this ineluctable reality.
  • Hypothetical consent
    It's true that nonexistence cannot have any value. There's no satisfaction/frustration of interests of a person when they are created. This view can be reasonable, but one must be willing to bite some bullets (which could be tempered by the fact that creating harms can also affect existing people). Nevertheless, many true ideas can be "absurd", yet they might be better than unsubstantiated claims about asymmetries and impositions.
  • Hypothetical consent
    For existing people who already have decent lives? Probably not. As for procreation, I do think it is. But as I said before, this would be true if all else was equal, but it's clear that there are personal limitations and long-term consequences of an action that have to be taken into account. Therefore, for all practical purposes, it isn't absolutely necessary, especially in a world dealing with issues such as worsening wealth disparity and climate change.

    No, creating/preserving joy matters just as removing harms does. There is nobody whose interest is fulfilled by their lack of creation either. But if it's still necessary to prevent harms sans an actual good, it cannot be acceptable to prevent all joy. Creating immensely valuable experiences is important, that's all.

    If preventing harms (something that is intrinsically negative and against one's interests) can be good, then creating happiness (something that is positive and is in one's interests) can also be obligatory, particularly if that good cannot be asked by the person themselves.
  • Hypothetical consent
    It's not necessary to not create it either. You are either creating a benefit (along with some harms) or you are not. I've already disputed the claim that it's "for someone" (there is nobody in the void whose interests are being respected/violated by their creation). But even if it is, I don't think that it's moral to not create a real good for a person on their behalf when they cannot ask for that good themselves. If it's necessary/a need to prevent the damage, it's also a necessity/a need to create a great good even if it has harms. Attempts to impose an "asymmetry" here have not been successfully defended.
  • Hypothetical consent
    "Wouldn't be a moral issue" isn't the same as a genuine good. ;)
    Moving on.

    I have always made it about the things that matter, even though there have been many attempts to divert the topic and employ unjustifiable standards in one case.

    It could lead to a bad outcome for existing people, but I shall ignore that here.

    I don't think that one is creating harm "for" someone. But it's quite important to create a genuine benefit for someone when it cannot be solicited by that individual themselves. If we have an obligation to prevent damage, I do think that we need to conserve/create good (though that also depends on practical limitations). If a bad state of affairs is required for happiness to be necessary, then I believe that it's also important to have a good state of affairs (which is what I meant by relief earlier) for the lack of harms/damage to be essential. In the end, our intuitions continue to diverge because one of us only cares about one side of the coin, which ultimately fuels their one sided "deontology" of preventing damage but not being concerned about what could be rationally considered a genuine blessing.

    I would say that I do think that mindless procreation is not a good idea in a world that already has so many issues to deal with. We surely need to ensure that people take this action seriously. Thanks for raising awareness regarding this important issue.

    As always, have a fantastic day!
  • Hypothetical consent
    Emotions don't constitute reason. Sure, just because one doesn't exist to ask for a good life, it's somehow not good to create someone in a blissful heaven wherein they could experience immense joy. Moving on.

    At this point, I think that you have decided that you want close your mind off entirely whenever things become uncomfortable for you. You're the one who keeps talking about nobody being "deprived" of happiness when they don't exist, and this is not about the parents. It's about the parents not creating any happiness. This should not be this hard to grasp.

    Yes, it is not ethical. Fortunately, happiness is not unnecessary.

    You are a selective deontologist who arbitrarily ignores the value of happiness by resorting to the claim that nobody is "deprived" of it when they don't exist, yet when one points out that if the absence of happiness isn't bad for a person because there isn't any deprivation, the lack of harms cannot be good for that person (and I hope that you don't start talking about "parents" again, because this point about nobody being deprived is about the people) since it does not relieve/fulfill them either.

    It's nice then that there isn't anybody in the void who is being put in an obstacle course against their different desires. Of course, some people think that life is nothing more than an obstacle course, but I disagree with that. If one could provide a fun puzzle that could occasionally get tricky at times, I don't think that they should decide that nobody should have it when it's likely that most people would mostly enjoy it immensely despite of the presence of some difficulties.
  • Hypothetical consent
    I am not sure about the relevance of your point. I never averred that the parents or the states of affairs aren't pertinent. But it's true that the decision is about a person. Moving on.

    In isolation, the damage is obviously unethical. However, when the act can lead to greater happiness for a person, it can be justifiable to do so. I also don't think that one is acting for "someone else" when nobody exists at the time of the act, but I shall ignore that for the sake of the argument.

    The harm might be unnecessary, but the happiness isn't. If it's necessary to prevent harms even though preventing them doesn't lead to a good for someone in an alternative state of affairs (in the form of fulfillment or relief), I think that it's also problematic to never create any joy.

    If it leads to greater happiness, it is ethical, in my view. It's definitely about the ethical act committed by the parents of creating a good.

    Benefits are also ethically relevant, particularly when one is not in an already satisfied state of affairs that they would be mostly happy with as long as serious harms are avoided.

    In one case, there won't be any positive. In the other state of affairs, there would a joyous experience for an actual person.

    It is indeed bad because it's absence does lead to harm for an actual person (such as the lack of health leading to suffering). One could claim that some goods are supererogatory as far as existing people are concerned because they don't need constant interference for living fairly happy lives as long as they can avoid serious harms. But this isn't applicable to those who don't exist.

    If the lack of happiness isn't bad because nobody is deprived of it, then neither is the lack of damage good, since the absence of the negatives does not provide someone with relief/fulfillment resulting from a satisfaction of their interests.

    If we are indebted to "them, prevent damages for "them" even though "they" did not express any interest in it and neither does the prevention ever lead to an actually better state of affairs for a person by giving them some sort of benefit/relief, then we definitely have to take the joys into account.

    In the end, you consider the damage to be unnecessary (which I also do, but in isolation of other factors) but the creation of joys not necessary. But I disagree with that because my intuitions tell me that they are quite relevant.

    Anyway, this has been repeated multiple times. I hope that you have a wonderful day!
  • Hypothetical consent
    Thankfully, that conversation wouldn't be any more necessary than "glad you could create this amazing life that I couldn't have asked for enjoying before I existed." :P
  • Hypothetical consent
    I have a feeling that arbitrary double standards will start popping up soon.

    1. For existing people, the lack of creation could certainly cause harm. As for those who are yet to exist (interestingly, we have now moved to the beings from the parents in this case), it's true that they don't experience any damage/benefit.

    2. Yes.

    Harm is a damage, so the clarification isn't that necessary.

    Having no joy is a harm. It's true that nobody experiences that when they don't exist.
  • Hypothetical consent
    You're the one who keeps missing the point.

    I like forks more.

    Yes, the parent should rationally decide whether or not it's a good idea to ignore one side of reality ;)
  • Hypothetical consent
    I haven't straw manned you (as far as I am aware). I think you're the one who keeps prevaricating in order to attempt to defend the indefensible.

    1. Creating a person leads to "collateral damage" for the person.

    2. Creating a person lead to benefits for an individual.

    You claim that (2) doesn't matter because nobody is deprived of the benefit (which assumes that the lack of a good matters only when one is deprived of). I argue for a consistent view by pointing out that the lack of damage does not provide relief to an actual person either. Therefore, if the absence of happiness isn't bad because nobody is in a harmful state, it's also not good because nobody is in a preferable state of affairs they had an interest in preserving.
  • Hypothetical consent
    It isn't, but it's fine if you wish to believe that ;)

    I did because I agreed that it can be good to not create a harmful state of affairs. Lack of understanding can lead to erroneous conclusions. One state of affairs was about a harm and joy and one was about neither. The claim was made that it's important to prevent the harms but it was fine to prevent the goods. The argument given in favour of this was the claim that nobody is deprived of happiness when they don't exist. When I pointed out that nobody in the void has the capacity to experience happiness to be deprived of it (which is why the lack of deprivation doesn't seem to have any value), it was decided that this should be ignored whilst still repeating the claims about lack of damage being good (even though there aren't any souls in the void who are relieved/saved from the damage, since there's nobody who experiences this good).

    I apologise if I made you feel like that.

    In one case, one creates benefits, in the other they don't. I would have loved to point out that there's nobody on whose "behalf" one is unethically acting when they are created, since nobody's interests are being violated. But this has already become too repetitive. Partaking in an act of genuine beneficence might be unethical for some, but in the absence of any logical reason in support of this argument, I find no good reason to accept their position.

    The question is also whether the parent is fine with eliminating the possibility of all joy and never creating any ineffably meaningful experience. Having a comprehensive approach can be useful.

    There is no "point" for me to "get" here, I am afraid. :P
  • Hypothetical consent
    Yup, there's little point in continuing when there's an obstinate refusal to be consistent.

    I don't think that the lack of harms (or happiness) necessarily means much when someone does not exist, but I granted that for the sake of the discussion.

    1. It is also the case that nobody experiences benefits in no procreation.

    2. Exactly.

    The same response predictably pops up: but nobody is deprived!

    Yet, this is an irrelevant objection. It's obvious that people who don't exist aren't derprived, but that lack of deprivation does not lead to an actual good for someone, which isn't the case with existing people who can live happier lives if happiness isn't taken away from them. Furthermore, the lack of harms can be good for an existing person who has an interest in avoiding it, but considering that their prevention satisfies nobody's desires in the void, the absence of harms cannot be good for them either, since nobody is relieved/happy from their absence. Therefore, if the lack of happiness isn't bad, then the lack of harms cannot be universally preferable either as far as potential beings are concerned.

    There is no asymmetry, and unless people renounce their arbitrary double standards, this is (mostly) an exercise in futility. Our biases can often trip us up, but we must learn to deal with the truth. Unfortunately, some people will never address the flaws in their ideas that are driven by unchallenged assumptions that ignore one side of the coin.

    Have a great day, my friend.
  • Hypothetical consent
    There's no asymmetry (lack of procreation does not lead to a tangible benefit for a person either), but thanks for the valuable contribution. There is a state of affairs wherein one experiences happiness and another wherein nobody experiences relief/fulfillment from the absence of suffering. But when that can still be preferable to a life that would be mostly harmful, I don't think that it's logically consistent to claim that the absence of joys wouldn't be bad, irrespective of whether or not someone exists to be consciously derprived of it. Creating a person does not inherently cause damage for another individual, and as far as the harms a person themselves would experience are concerned, it would be crucial for one to remember that most people cherish their lives even in the face of harms. We do not seem to possess a valid justification for choosing a universal prevention of damage at the cost of preventing all beatific moments. Also, if absolute harm isn't required for some lives to be bad, absolute joy is also not necessary for a life to be sufficiently valuable. Preventing harms and creating joys both matter as far as procreation is concerned. Therefore, it's far from a moot point. But this has been discussed ad nauseam.

    Have a nice day!
  • Hypothetical consent
    "Antecedent Nazi"—now that's a new idea :p

    No problem. Glad we sorted this out. I'll continue to excavate the different threads here in order to continue my learning process. Thank you for your reply, and I hope that you have a nice day.
  • Hypothetical consent
    Oh, I am so sorry—I didn't make myself clear enough. What I meant was that I had a similar discussion with Bartricks before, so I wanted to say that I did not wish to engage in a discussion that was essentially a photocopy of the last one. I apologise for the ambiguity.
  • Hypothetical consent
    I appreciate it.

    We discussed these issues before, so I would prefer avoiding repeating ourselves.

    Indeed. But the limitations are more severe for some than they are for others. For them, limited might be a euphemism for "severely lacking".

    I certainly think that I understand far too little. Being here has helped!
  • Hypothetical consent
    Insights from various perspectives are always useful for men with limited understanding like myself. I am grateful to every person who has taken the time to converse with me and share their thoughts. :)

    Hope you have a wonderful day!
  • Hypothetical consent
    Comprehensively inapplicable.

    Also, excellent input :ok:
  • Hypothetical consent
    I would differ with that. If we can create lives that are likely to be good at little personal cost, I believe that it would be unethical not to create them (assuming it's unethical to create mostly bad lives).
    Impositions: Unsolicited harms
    Blessings: Unsolicited benefits

    In my view, both matter.

    My point was that consent as a concept doesn't seem applicable to procreation. Your scenarios were not similar to procreation, since they involved manipulation (changing one's existing interests) and acts that one would have hypothetically opposed (such as being groped while they were unconscious). But I would imagine that a person would definitely consent to experiencing a blessing if they could do so. You also said that hypothetical consent only applies when the failure to perform an act could lead to a deprivation of good for a person. If this isn't the case with people who don't exist because they cannot experience deprivation, I hope this doesn't mean that you would be fine with an unconscious person being groped as long as they don't actually experience a harm. But also, one could also suggest that respecting one's consent only matters when it creates/preserves a real good for a person. Finally, if when cannot invoke the concept of hypothetical consent when it comes to procreation due to its absence not leading to a deprivation of benefits, I think we should also accept that we cannot say appeal to a hypothetical dissent (the idea that a person who had no prior interest would still dislike their life) in an effort to deem procreation immoral, since the act of not creating someone by assuming a hypothetical rejection of life doesn't entail a real benefit for an existing person that would lead to relief/fulfillment. If we have to prevent harms whose absence doesn't result in satisfaction for a person, I think we should also seek to create goods irrespective of whether or not they can be asked for before existence. There wouldn't be anybody who would be happy due to an absence of life either.

    A hypothetical consent that's premised upon manipulation/misunderstanding of what constitutes consent (such as harming an unconscious person when they probably would not have consented to being interfered with in such a state even if they would have been fine otherwise) or an incomplete scenario that doesn't take into account the fact that not acting due to hypothetical dissent doesn't lead to an actual benefit/relief to a person in that particular case are equally impertinent for me.

    This is why I said earlier that we have different intuitions.

    Whether or not we have an obligation to do something also depends on our own limits as sentient beings and the ultimate results of an action. Since we have already discussed much of this before, I don't think that there's any point in fruitless repetition.

    I hope that you have a great week ahead!
  • Hypothetical consent
    I already have. However, it would be a mere repeat of the previous conversation. As I said before, if life can be an "Imposition", I don't see any valid reason for thinking that it cannot be a blessing by the same token.

    Which means that the action would also lead to a benefit. But not creating a person doesn't seem to lead to an actual good for a person. Yet, if the lack of existence can sometimes be preferable, it can also be worse than a good life.

    If it can be a harm even though nobody has any needs, it can also a benefit because of the manifestation of numerous positives.

    There's nobody who's being provided tangible relief from the lack of harms. However, if it can still be good to prevent their presence, I do think that it's problematic to prevent the birth of all joys. This is why your position is ad hoc, in my view.

    I said that the concept of consent is irrelevant, which is a slightly different idea. But if it's "relevant" that harms have been "imposed", it's equally relevant that benefits that one could not have sought prior to existence have been bestowed. My view is that the former should not take universal precedence over the latter. To disregard it altogether seems inconsistent to me.
  • Hypothetical consent
    I am merely advocating for consistency. The reason it appears ad hoc is likely due to the double standards in your own position regarding happiness and suffering ;)

    Many people argue that existence is worse than nonexistence due the the presence of harms. This is a different claim than the idea that it's a harm due to life being an imposition (which would mean that all acts of procreation were unethical, even if the person had a perfectly happy life). The person could certainly be harmed due to the existence of a state of affairs that's worse than nothingness, yet that isn't the same as it being an imposition, which doesn't seem to make sense when nobody's interests are being violated. And as I said before, if one can consider life to be an imposition, it can also be a gift. A life that could not have been solicited by an individual yet one that would be permeated with joy could definitely be seen as a genuine blessing.

    Yes, one needs to exist in order to be imposed upon. Fortunately, the act of creating them is not one that is imposing something onto an existing person.

    They do, and I am glad you admitted to that by saying they need to exist ;)

    And the lack of impositions only matters if their absence leads to a genuine positive for a person via respecting their interests.
  • Hypothetical consent
    It depends. Many people argue against procreation on the basis of the idea that it leads to a mostly bad existence which would be "worse" than a lack of existence. This is more about the nature of one's life than consent or impositions. My point was that saying it's bad to create someone due to existence being an imposition is different from saying that it's bad due to the harms of life. And as I said before, I am willing to accept that life could be an imposition sometimes, but in that case, it can also be a genuine gift, since it leads to the creation of a unsolicited good that one can cherish only when they exist. Consistency is quite important.
  • Hypothetical consent
    That's a separate matter entirely. One could still consider someone's existence to be a harm in a comparative sense due to the presence of suffering without it being a harm due to an absence of "consent".

    Creating that person would certainly be unethical, just as it would be ethical to give birth to a person who could have an ineffably positive existence.
  • Hypothetical consent
    In order for an act to be an imposition, it needs to impose upon someone.

    Procreation creates a person, but it doesn't impose anything upon a person, since there is no person to begin with prior to their existence who is being "brought" (moved from one place to another) here against their will.

    I also don't understand why you always miss my point, but I guess we have different intuitions. Hopefully, other people would be able to provide more apposite points.

    No form of consent applies in this case.
  • Hypothetical consent
    The act itself is not an imposition because it in and of itself doesn't go against the interests of a person. Whether or not the person experiences future harms/benefits is another matter and not germane to the matter at hand.

    Agreed. Similarly, respecting one's autonomy can certainly be good if it is in a person's interests, which isn't the case with those who are not born.

    Neither would it lead to a good or go against their desires (prior or present) by putting them in a state of affairs they did not want to be in.

    An action is an imposition if it goes against the actual preferences of a person. Happily, procreating doesn't impose anything onto someone, since there aren't people in some pre-existence antechamber who want to avoid existence.
  • Hypothetical consent
    Possibly. But if it can be an imposition, it can also be a gift. I am not a a fan of arbitrary double standards :p
  • Hypothetical consent
    The concept of consent as a whole counts for nothing when it comes to procreation, in my view. So yes, actual and hypothetical ideas regarding consent are not pertinent, which also includes notions of impositions. However, even though "hypothetical consent/imposition" don't matter when it comes to procreation, there could be other relevant factors as far the morality of Tony's creation is concerned (the nature of his life, the intentions of the parents, and the consequences of creating him).
  • Hypothetical consent
    I don't think that any form of consent applies to procreation, so that's irrelevant for me. Again, one cannot violate someone's consent when they don't exist to have any interests (prior or present) in the first place. Hypothetical consent is about taking into account the things one would have agreed/disagreed to had their ability to consent not been negatively affected by something else (lack of knowledge or awareness). However, this isn't the case with those who don't exist.

    Regarding c, I don't think it's for you to paternalistically judge what would be petrol or gin for others. It seems "beyond reasonable doubt" to me that one wouldn't be averse to a nectar of ethereal joy. Also, it's probably a good thing that one isn't*ignorantly* brought to a worse state of affairs that they would always have avoided had they known the facts. Additionally, the fact of ineffable happiness also remains pertinent. Not letting the person drink leads to actual benefit (conserving one's health) for those who exist, but that's not the case with people who are yet to be born.

    As for d, we can certainly be happy that nobody's being altered/misled into believing something "they" otherwise would have disagreed with when they are being created ;)
  • Hypothetical consent
    They are definitely quite reasonable, so I would be inclined to say yes. Hopefully, they would only be used in applicable situations keeping potential/actual interests in mind.
  • Hypothetical consent
    I thought I already did. I assumed what you said to be true, so I didn't provide any couter-examples. I merely alluded to other things that might be relevant when thinking about actions that aren't solicited. As I said, perhaps other people could give actual disagreements. And don't worry, I'll do the necessary work concerning views I consider to have some flawed biases ;)
  • Hypothetical consent
    Supplement it. I can, in principle, agree with what you said here. Might be a bit boring lol. Perhaps other people can provide actual disagreements.
  • Hypothetical consent
    A few seconds can help prevent decades spent believing in arbitrary standards.
  • Hypothetical consent
    Real and imaginary consent/impositions can certainly be interesting ideas to consider ;)

    I hope Nozick would also agree that it's problematic to not save someone/provide a genuine gift just because one cannot ask for it themselves.

    A. Hypothetical consent seems to be about considering what a person would have agreed to had they been aware of all the facts at hand. Fortunately, we can consent to amazing things even if they have side effects.

    B. Taking unnecessary risks can certainly be problematic, especially since they aren't needed for living a fairly decent life. However, if one would have genuinely found the good to have been worthwhile, then not giving that seems to be more troublesome. I don't see why a person would ever agree to being "groped", since that seems to go against most people's preferences. However, if a person would truly have been fine with the act (which seems absurd to me), I don't think it would wrong to do so. But this could still be changed if the person would not have consented for someone to grope them if they were not able to ask for that act first. I suppose this strange desire would vary from person to person. I agree that actual consent/impositions are what ultimately matter. Also, just because someone might not ask to be helped in a precarious situation when they are awake, it doesn't seem ethical to not do so on the basis of reasonable probabilities when they are incapable for requesting support themselves.

    C. It might be good to intervene and prevent a person from being unnecessarily harmed (which is something they themselves would have avoided had they known that what they were drinking was petrol). Thankfully, we don't always have an ignorant person being thrust into sheer harm when they are created. There are innumerable joys which aren't "unnecessary" (assuming the absence of the harms is necessary), and if anything, it can be genuinely ethical to partake in the bestowal of a good that cannot be asked for before the person is capable of cherishing it. If this doesn't make sense, then neither does the idea of "imposing" existence. Hypothetical consent was assumed not just because it prevented a harm (a negative), but also because it allowed for a positive (ensuring one continues to have good health). Therefore, hypothetical consent isn't just about preventing harms; it is also about acts of genuine beneficence that lead to a positive.

    D. That could definitely be extremely unethical. Fortuitously, nobody is being misled into radically changing their views against their "real" interests when they are created.

    They are plausible, but they don't apply to every situation.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    Not so. I think that it's objectively problematic to suggest that a child in the slums who finds unfathomable joy when hugging his mother—who shares his happiness once seeing his effulgent smile—does not matter merely because one is incapable of asking for that good themselves. Lack of "deprivations" should not be mistaken for the presence of a genuine good, which doesn't exist when isn't born. But if it's still good to prevent harms, it will always be problematic to prevent all joys. If it's "objectively bad" to create a harm even though its absence doesn't benefit any actual person, then it's also objectively problematic to not create someone who could experience a good life (or a great one too), irrespective of whether or not there is a "deprivation". Nobody has a desire for prevention that's fulfilled by their nonexistence, and we don't have evidence for the idea that inexistent beings are being provided relief from the absence of suffering.. But if the absence of the harms is still a moral obligation, then the lack of good cannot be moral, though to what degree we must act to conserve and create it depends on our own capabilities as well as the consequences of all actions.

    I cannot see how the lack of someone experiencing harm is good even though there aren't any souls in the void who are in preferable state of affairs that would be disturbed from their creation, yet the lack of all experiences of love, beauty, and creativity don't matter simply because one could not have asked for those goods themselves. I am afraid I won't be able to accept arbitrary double standards.

    Sleep is not better than an enjoyable day spent with one's loved ones (especially if an unsolicited lack of waking up that leads to absolutely no gain is somehow desirable). ;) Valueless/neutral states of affairs cannot be preferred over good ones. This ineluctable fact cannot be changed, in my view. The "default" state might be the default as far as the elimination of the negatives is concerned, but it's the opposite of a default (for most people) when it comes to the preservation of the positives.

    After having had to debate multiple antinatalists across YouTube and other websites (wherein some threads have lasted for more than a 100 comments), it's definitely starting to feel like a lonely battle (and a repetitive one). :p

    For what it's worth, I also agree with much of what you say, particularly the need to not take procreation lighly in the times we live in. Thanks for being there and for sharing your sagacious thoughts.

    Have a wonderful day!

Existential Hope

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