He does say:

7. My life shows that I know or am certain ...

he goes on to say:

8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any
great importance at all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong. — Fooloso4

Yes. But he's just very confident about the chair. There isn't any sort of justification for some metaphysical position.

Right. He's not getting metaphysical. It's along the lines of phenomenology.

Perhaps. What is it about a proposition that I misunderstood? — Fooloso4

They don't have to be uttered. Propositions are the primary truth bearers.

I think what Witt is saying there is that he demonstrates confidence in the existence of a certain chair by his behavior. Isn't that what you see there?

In the end the only thing that justifies it is not a proposition but finding the key on the table. — Fooloso4

The justification is that you found the key on the table. Everything that follows the word "that" is a proposition.

It is not only that propositional justification is not necessary but that a proposition cannot serve as justification. — Fooloso4

This sounds like you're misunderstanding what a proposition is.

We can agree that the statue is beautiful for you while I find it only curious. — Banno

Aesthetics starts with the way the world makes us feel. We're capable of discussing rules of aesthetics because we tend to feel the same about lines of grace and symmetry.

The reason our little notes on perception always center around red is that it's associated with a close to universal feeling: it's hot. Red comes from mind meeting world.

Yes. And you can say the statue is beautiful while knowing that beauty is in the eye of the beholder.

Midgley's idea of differing areas of discourse. — Banno

If you squash them together you get directly opposing truths.

Well, yes. It is true that the sun rises in the East; and we say it is true that the ball is red. What is "really" doing there? Prioritising one narrative over another? — Banno

Yes. We have the common figures of speech and then the narratives that help out in the areas of science and engineering, plus aesthetics: the statue is beautiful, but beauty is in the eye of the beholder.

I guess so. We say the sun rises in the east when it's really that the earth is spinning. We say the ball is red when redness is really a product of the brain.

Isn't that like: we may talk about the sun rising, but that's a fiction?

But you’re asking how do we tell left from right, in conjunction with an overlooked philosophical problem — Mww

Actually, I was looking for a discussion in which people explored the question for themselves. I first came across the issue in a book about jewelry design of all things. That led me to ponder it on my own. I take it the issue bores you.

The central importance of seeing. — Fooloso4

Seeing as in the visual sense? Or seeing as something the mind does, as in "I see your point."

Connections often obscure differences. When differences are taken into account the problem of what this guy is saying and what it means is compounded by what that guy is saying and what it means. — Fooloso4

Yea, it's a thing to take an issue and have Quine and Heidegger discuss it. You see the things they agree on, what the bone of contention amounts to. But I wasn't talking about that. With regard to this thread: what do you think is being overlooked about Wittgenstein's thoughts? Nothing?

Do you mean by referencing Hume? No, not as it stands. — Fooloso4

No, just in general. Is there something you think is being lost?

Why can't there be other ways of clearing up philosophical confusion other than describing how words are ordinarily use. — Richard B

I think the rudder of OC is that people could walk away from Moore's work thinking that because he used the word know, that his assertion is justifiable when it's not. In other words, he's heading off more mistaken metaphysics?

I agree with this, but as part of the web the work should not get lost. — Fooloso4

Do you think that's happening here? If so, what's getting lost? I'm asking.

Dissimilar orientation: left is over here, right is over there. That’s how I tell one from the other. — Mww

Are you laying something like an x-y axis over your visual field?

I don't worry as much about "interpreting texts" as you do. I'm all up in the web of ideas the work is a part of. Every philosopher pings off others in the vast forum of discussion we call philosophy.

I know it's your thing to put a philosopher's individual words under a microscope, but I wouldn't get anything out of that. And anyway, all I did was recall that Hume said you can't prove what you can't doubt. I think that actually does bear, if obliquely, on this particular work. I'm not overly concerned if you don't see that. :up:

So?

But Wittgenstein denies that Moore does know — Fooloso4

Read aaaaaalllllll the way to the end of my huge post.

It's not insanity. According to the Palestinian cultural narrative, the Jews stole their land in '48 and they simply want it all back. Make it all Muslim land again. It's not that radical. It was Muslim land for centuries. Polls of Palestinians repeatedly reflect this attitude. The "occupation" is Israel (i.e. Jewish self-rule) itself. — BitconnectCarlos

Did you not know that Palestinians are a mix of religions? They're Greek Orthodox Christian and some were Jews, but they've been absorbed into the Jewish communities of Israel.

The UK is a neoliberal power player due to having the largest financial markets in the world. They eclipse NY. Yes, they do offer bread and circuses. That's great, but let's not confuse that with socialism.

If Moore knows, that would mean there's a sense of "know" that amounts to being unable to doubt. And per Hume, you can't prove what you can't doubt. So Moore would have some kind of unprovable knowledge, which doesn't sound right.

Interesting perspective. :up:

Well, it shows the lie of the reduction to relativism and subjectivity – a theme in this thread as well as many others. Folk see space as not absolute, and conclude that therefore it is only subjective... — Banno

If you say so.

You love that story, huh? Whoever initiated it did you a favor.

Extra dimensions are not needed. A right-handed glove can be put on a left hand if it is turned inside out. — Banno

Right. Forget about hands, you can fold a line over on itself and through that journey left has become right.

And that relation is just orientation. It is not consciousness. — Banno

If you prefer. Imagine a stone and a boulder on a far away planet. Is the stone to the left or to the right of the boulder?

That would work

For Leibniz, innateness includes abilities that are only in potential at birth, but developed through engagement with the world. Like birds can't fly at birth, but flight is still innate?

Woe, I just discovered that I can write piñon with the squiggly. Awesome.

I don't understand how this relates to left/right-handedness. I think it's only habituation, and nothing else -- nothing about space at all. — Moliere

Ok. Drop the issue of space. I only mentioned Kant and Leibniz because otherwise someone would have moved the thread to the lounge, failing to notice that this is a time honored philosophical question.

How does habituation work if a person doesn't have any innate sense of leftness vs rightness? I'm asking.

chirality gives a straightforward example from math which explains how we're able to differentiate left from right — Moliere

Could you lay that out in broad strokes? I don't think a description of chirality will distinguish right from left for you. For that, you need a reference. All reference points are chosen by us for our purposes.

I mean this pragmatic theory of directionality, and want more arguments for why it should be thought of disappearing when we all die. — Moliere

I think you'll find that once you explore the math you mentioned a little further.

I'm looking at the TLP and don't see that sentence — Moliere

"6.36111 The Kantian problem of the right and left hand which cannot be made to cover one another already exists in the plane, and even in one-dimensional space; where the two congruent figures a and b cannot be made to cover one another without moving them out of this space. The right and left hand are in fact completely congruent. And the fact that they cannot be made to cover one another has nothing to do with it.

"A right-hand glove could be put on a left hand if it could be turned round in four-dimensional space.". TLP

but chirality is the feature of the world that I wanted to point out as both a mathematical and empirical phenomenon which can account for the original question — Moliere

The question was not whether or not there is chirality. It was: how do you tell your left from your right? I don't believe that answer is found in any math, but if you think it is, could you explain how?

If directions come from the self, or cogito — Moliere

I don't think directionality comes from the cogito. I don't think anyone has ever believed that.

I gravitate towards it and would prefer the point which seems harder to prove be shown -- the idea that directionality is somehow inhering in us alone, and when we die it all goes away. — Moliere

You said this earlier, did you change your mind?

"Left" and "Right" seem very obviously conventional, just like "up" and "down" -- anything relative to a speaker. — Moliere

on the other side of the spectrum there are corporate giants like DuPont and Boeing over the pond. — Punshhh

True

What made you believe that the actual world has properties attached to space because you're the one that's in it? — Moliere

I don't think I uniquely endow space with directionality. I think directions come from the fact that each person has a POV from a body that's easily divided into quadrants. My own journey to realizing this comes from time spent trying to explain to myself what "up" means. But I wouldn't recommend my own trail. If you have a trail, I hope you'll share it. Otherwise you can enjoy what Kant, Leibniz and Witt said. Witt's thoughts are in TLP 6.3111.

So is the question more about "How do I make an inference from possibilities to actualities"? — Moliere

There are a few kinds of possibility

1. Logical possibility, which is closely kin to metaphysical possibility. You're informed about this by your innate ability to recognize contradictions.

2. Physical possibility, which we learn about in physics class.

We learn about space by hypothesizing in both domains, but thought experiments are in the first category.

We're talking about a possible world here, not a world. We're imagining possibilities with some pretty abstract concepts.

How could I differentiate an actual world? — Moliere

A possible world is an abstract object. It's stipulated.

What would make me believe that the actual world has properties attached to space because I'm the one that's in the world? — Moliere

I don't know. :grin:

You want to claim that the relation must be to an observer. — Banno

No, the relation is to a chosen reference. That requires an entity capable of choosing. Otherwise you just have points everywhere, some giving rise to a right handed glove, some to a left handed glove.

When I imagine a possible world without people with directions then there are directions in that imagined possible world, and when I imagine a possible world without people without directions then there are not directions in that imagined possible world. — Moliere

:grin: If there are no people in a world, and it has directionality, that directionality is come from you.

It's not so much individual-body, but the social-body — Moliere

Or maybe it's empathy. You put yourself in other people's shoes, but the basis is innate.

And doesn't chirality -- left and right handed objects -- still exist in their world without being able to utter it?) — Moliere

Imagine a possible world in which there are no people. Are there directions there? Only from the point of view of someone outside that world who can establish a reference.