Bye the way, my outlook owes much to John Haugeland, Hubert Dreyfus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty who themselves owe much to Heidegger. — Pierre-Normand

I think I'm starting to understand what you're saying.

It's a big one. But I'll have a look at it for sure! — Pierre-Normand

Cool. If you're cut for time, 2.4 and 2.5 are the sections where subjectivism is discussed: that tendency to oppose the subject and object.

If you get a few minutes I wonder if you could give this article a read and tell me what you think?

To me, it's just obvious that the brain is creating a unified experience out of a flood of discrete sensory input. I think for some, that's direct realism. I don't see how, but ok?

Yep. You're not less than normal, there is no normal.

I understand what you mean. Elon Musk has Asperger's. He's been my hero ever since I learned that, because I do too.

I've never seen a case of schizophrenia that wasn't heart breaking in some way. It's a terrible disease.

There's a great YouTube channel where this woman talks to her audience while she's in the hospital, having a psychotic episode. You can tell when she looks to the side that she's listening to the voices. According to her it's horrible.

The point is: she hears voices that aren't coming from an external source.

Eh, not other dimensions, no. Just the mind interacting with itself -- something the mind is trained to ignore to pay attention to the important things. (EDIT: Or, even more abstractly, it's really just a local, ontic interpretation of experience, which we have been taught to treat in a certain manner in an industrial society with a division of labor, etc.) — Moliere

We're kind of stuck with our own worldview though. They used to think it was demonic possession, our poor capitalist selves call it schizophrenia.

It's a malfunction where a person hears voices that aren't coming from an external source. It's the mind creating the experience of an audible voice.

In the case of starvation, for instance, sometimes people's experiences have been interpreted as religious visions of a truth beyond the everyday -- what is colloquially called "hallucination" can be interpreted as another layer of reality which our normal functioning has been trained to ignore (and which is why the disruption of normal functioning turns the mind on itself -- which is what I'd say hallucinations are. — Moliere

Direct realism means hallucinators are peeping into other dimensions?

For hallucinations I simply note that in every case we can find some physiological reason why they are hallucinating -- — Moliere

I don't think that undermines the point, though. Hallucinations show that the mind can create experience. Once you notice that, reality will always be taken with a grain of salt.

Is it rational to hold an incorrect belief that helps you cope with pain and suffering? — Scarecow

Rationality isn't about helpfulness. It's about fashion. It's about adhering to justifications that are deemed proper by society in general.

If property dualism is correct then qualia I suppose. Otherwise the constituents of experience just are whatever physical things mental phenomena are reducible to. — Michael

Makes sense.

What would qualify as a constituent of experience? I'm drawing a blank.

Without trying to describe or justify a whole politcal or philosophical system, I'd like to ask a question. If we could improve equality, is the question below what needs to happen?

Would you be willing to accept a set of principles that increases the prospects of others, even if it means having fewer opportunities yourself? — Rob J Kennedy

Improvement in equality can happen in many ways. The Bubonic plague brought about greater equality because it killed off so many slaves. Those who were left had an improved bargaining position. This enraged the aristocracy, but there was nothing they could do about it. They weren't willing to accept any new set of principles, but they had no choice but to pay more for labor, and money is power. Equality is about power distribution.

I mentioned before that direct realism was Aristotelian. It said that our minds directly contact the forms in the things around us. Indirect realism was a rejection of that kind of idealism.

Ironically, some in this discussion see indirect realism as a haunted scenario and reject it in favor of some kind of behaviorism in which perception plays a dubious role.

Think about what? Representationalism makes perfect sense metaphysically, which just indicates an logically necessary method describing how our intellect works. But to think about how the brain as a physical substance works, as that by which our intellect is possible, representationalism wouldn’t even be a theoretical condition, hence wouldn’t make any sense to include it in an empirical descriptive method. — Mww

I think we're just disagreeing on language. I don't think it's very likely that the brain takes in sensory input and constructs experience out of it. That was the original idea behind indirect realism.

I think there's more likely a built-in framework that takes cues from sensory data. In other words, it's a kind of tango with world and conscious entity as the dancers. Is this direct realism? Not exactly, although it's something Aristotle might accept if we made the model something cosmic, which isn't outside the bounds of reason.

a tacit admission that whatever is said from a purely speculative point of view, sufficient for us to comprehend what it is we do with our intelligence, cannot possibly be the method the brain, in and of itself, actually uses to provide it. — Mww

I'm not understanding this. Could you say more?

"Expectations" in attention are mediated by the modulation of neuronal membrane activity - where is the representation explicitly in this other than a useful metaphor? — Apustimelogist

Yes, the model wouldn't be a representation. To some extent it's probably innate, but influenced in some ways by culture and language.

This kind of thinking is probably reflective of my view that I don't think representations are inherent. — Apustimelogist

The more I think about it, the less I think representationalism makes sense. How exactly would the brain organize the massive stream of data coming into as a coherent representation, moment by moment? I'm guessing it doesn't. As Kant said, the foundations of it are a priori. I think it's a complex model, like a hardwired memory. Like read-only-memory.

I talk about neurons a lot but I think even on the level of experiences, I was convinced by the types of analyses from the likes of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations that representation cannot be pinned down here either and experience is even somewhat mechanistic as a flow of one experience to the next which can sometimes seem completely involuntary, unanticipated, inexplicable. — Apustimelogist

Exactly.

I am not exactly sure what you mean by this but the picture I was painting I wasn't necessarily implying anything about representation. I am a bit agnostic about representation in the sense that I don't think you need the concept of representation to explain how the brain works but I am not necessarily adverse to using this concept, especially as it is so intuitive. I just am not necessarily sold on the idea of some kind of inherent orintrinsic, essentialistic representations with intentionality in the brain. Neither do I think we should take it literally when neuroscientists attribute representation to the kinds of correlations that they detect in particular experiments. — Apustimelogist

I was thinking that when attention is directed outward, toward the future, expectation may play a necessary role. Attention will mainly go to whatever is unexpected or out of place, so it's efficient. This implies some sort of modeling, but it could be reflexive, hardwired, algorithmic, whatever it takes to avoid ghosts. Just a thought.

The learning of the causal connection between them is then done by the neurons in our head. — Apustimelogist

Do you think it could be that we carry around models that are populated by sensory input? Not exactly a representation.

While many elements of our perceptual capacities are indeed actualized without conscious attention or at a sub-personal level, this doesn't undermine the direct realist view. The key point is that perception is an active, embodied process that unfolds over time, not just a matter of passively receiving and internally representing sensory inputs. — Pierre-Normand

Are you saying that perception can't be passive? The hormone that deals with goal attainment is dopamine. It's probably the most powerful hormone affecting active behavior. But it goes off line and allows the body to rest and the nervous system switches to behavior that allows sleep, digestion, and healing. So what do you think happens to perception at those times? Is it just a leftover from the more active states?

Consider the example of walking in a city. As we walk, we periodically glance at the ground ahead to guide our footsteps, while also attending to the store fronts and other features of the environment. The character of our phenomenology shifts as our attention moves from one aspect of the world to another. This highlights how perception is a dynamic process of engaging with and exploring the environment, not just a static representation in the brain. — Pierre-Normand

I think it shows that perception is involved (I don't think we're going to agree on the issue of phenomenal vs functional, so I'll let that go). I don't see how it shows that perception is nothing other than a process of engaging and exploring the environment. But is that what you meant? If it is, what leads you to think so?

The brain is certainly crucial in enabling this dynamic interaction, but it is the whole brain-body-environment system that constitutes the basis of perceptual experience. The various neural subsystems - from the cerebellum to the sensory and motor cortices - work in concert with the body's sensorimotor capacities to enable us to grasp and respond to the affordances of our environment. — Pierre-Normand

The central nervous system (CNS) is separated from the rest of the body by the blood-brain barrier. It has its own immune system. We can shut down the brain's connection to motor neurons with paralytic drugs, and perception persists. Sensory nerves are just sending electrical impulses in, so it's not inconceivable that we could separate the CNS from the rest of the body. We have machines that can reproduce the functions of the lungs, heart, and kidneys. Right now it wouldn't make any sense to save a brain because there would be nowhere to put it long term. It would just be an insane experiment. But are you saying that this is inconceivable?

So while much of this process may occur without conscious attention, this doesn't mean that perception is just a matter of what's represented in the brain, as the indirect realist view suggests. The direct realist alternative is that perception is a matter of the whole embodied organism dynamically attuning to and engaging with its environment over time. — Pierre-Normand

I wasn't saying that functional consciousness (the part that goes on without any conscious awareness) proves indirect realism. I was trying to sort out the part you think conscious awareness plays in the overall functioning of the organism. I'll agree it's a component, but more in terms of higher level planning. What I was looking for was the reason to insist on embodied consciousness. As an interesting idea, it works. I'm not seeing how it goes beyond that, though.

And then, of course, there are direct realists who view experience/perception as the actualization of a capacity that persons (or animals) have to grasp the affordances of their world. Brains merely are organs that enable such capacities. — Pierre-Normand

Most of that capacity is actualized without the involvement of phenomenal consciousness, so it's not clear to me what this direct realist is saying exactly.

in these, admittedly very, very trying, circumstances. But i push forward... — AmadeusD

:lol: Life is so hard sometimes.

recognising it as a cow consists in not running for the gate because it's a bull, keeping a eye out for pats on the surrounding ground, counting how many cows there are as opposed to kangaroos, and so on. That is it consist in interacting with the cow and with other things. You know it is a cow by those interactions - indeed, knowing it is a cow is those interactions. — Banno

I think you've identified one factor. If that's all there was, the art of identification would be unlearnable. But that is about interpretation of what you sense. I told you I sensed an odor, and I know I've encountered it before, but I don't know what to call it, and I don't know where it comes from (although it may be that I know it, but the memory is unavailable for some reason).

So my phenomenology says interpretation is secondary. Language is secondary. You can recognize what you sense even though you can't identify it. I can, anyway. You may not be able to.

Well, here's the puzzle: did you recognise it, or just think you recognised it? Dejà vu?

You have no way to tell.

Hence, following a rule has to be public. — Banno

So you're looking at a cow. Do you recognize it as a cow? Or just think you recognize it? Knowing that it's called a "cow" doesn't make any difference. There is no fact about which rule you've been following all this time. Other people can't help you with that.

Therefore perception has to start with innate confidence in a world circumscribed by space and time, where you, the real you, reside in an unchanging spot as it all swirls around you, or you fly through it as it rests on arbitrary x-y-z axes. The intention is emerging from somewhere you can't detect. It rests on nothing you know of.

And you have no vantage point on it to be able to say how it works. Pretty cool, huh?

Or if you are by yourself, you might come back tomorrow and puzzle as to if the smell has changed.
. — Banno

It's puzzling that I could have recognized the smell as something I'd experienced before. It might seem that the private language argument excludes this. The trick is to see that this conclusion is based on the notion that meaning is rule following. Kripke shows that it's not.

By the way, I'm presently detecting an odor that I know I've smelled before, but I can't remember what it is or what it's called. I think it may be a flower, but I don't know. That shows that you don't have to know a name for something to recognize it and be keenly aware of it. Although I have Asperger's, so I may be wired differently.

Glad to know another user who uses Celsius like me!
When I read posts with Fahrenheit references... hmm... it is very obnoxious to me. — javi2541997

Whisper words of wisdom: let it be.

There is a "blind spot" in each local visual field where the optic nerve enters the eye. — Agree-to-Disagree

Cool. Did you know spiders don't have a blind spot because their eyes evolved in a different way.

So this is something you learned to do? You learned not to see the cow, but to see the colour, shade, shape and so on? — Banno

Yes. Anyone who learns to draw has to learn this. This is what the mind wants to do:



What's happening is that the mind has a hoard of stock images. When you go to draw something, the power of these images appears. Egyptians didn't know how to override that. That's why their figures are basically fleshy stickmen.

The next development was perspective. This was huge from the Renaissance onward. In the 20th Century, artists decided that perspective is also a stock idea rather than how visual experience really works. Cubism was one sprout from that soil.

So I'm just explaining that people focus on the nature of experience quite a bit. A lot of art is really about that rather than the object of perception: the cow.

At least some times we are incline to say we see the same cow... — Banno

True.

Is it clearer, better, to say that you see the cow, or that you see the model or image or representation of the cow that your neural network constructs? — Banno

I've been a visual artist for a long time. I can put aside mental shorthand and tune into my visual field. I see color, light, dark, and lines. I can do that so thoroughly that I forget what it is my looking at, but this is something new artists struggle with. The mind strongly insists it knows what things look like and it will override attempts to draw what's actually in the visual field. I've known about this since childhood, so it's obvious to me that a person can voluntarily shift focus depending on what their concerns are. If it's an incoming car, I probably won't dwell long on how the car is foreshortened in space as it approaches me.

By way of argument in favour of the former, we sometimes might claim that you and I are to be said to be looking at the very same cow. It seems difficult to say this if what you see is the product of your neural net, and what I see is the product of my neural net. You see the product of your neural net, I see the product of my neural net, and hence we do not see the same cow. — Banno

We say we see the same cow, yes. Our experiences are different though.

That is, saying that what you see is the model or image or representation of the cow, and not the cow, makes other things we commonly do, oddly complicated. — Banno

It depends on the situation and what point you're trying to convey.

Does that make sense to you? You experience the cow by your neural nets building some sort of model or image or representation of the cow. Add to that the smell, the feel of the hide, and so on. — Banno

Yes. That makes sense.

I don't understand why this seems so difficult to comprehend. — Banno

:grin: It's just one of those things.

Well, where are those representations? If you are interacting with them, then presumably they can be distinguished from you... hence you see them, and we havn't an explanation of what seeing consist in at all. — Banno

I would propose that instead of trying to explain sight, let's first do a quick analysis of what we do with the concept of self:

You saw a cow.
You tasted a sesame seed.
You heard a song.

The "you" in these sentences refers to a single entity who experiences a sequence of things. The self stays the same, and the things change, going by like a stream. This means the logic of these sentences rules out the self being equivalent to the things. It appears that if we do that, the self will be a fragmented, schizoid stream. If you choose to allow the self to fragment in that way, a pretty large chunk of your own speech will become nonsense.

Now lets look at what we know about what's happening when you see a cow. Our best guess, as set out by scientists, is that the brain is creating an experience of a visual field. We know your brain has to be creating this because your eyes are constantly shifting direction and focus. Somehow you put all that data together into a seamless, unified image. I would say you experience the image. It's a visual experience. Where is the experience? I don't think that question has an answer. Where is the image? I don't think that question has an answer either. I think it's an element of neural algorithms, or something like that. Could we say that you are the experience? As I mentioned before, that will slice and dice your capacity to speak coherently. Is that what you wanted to do though?

I understand the idea of seeing the tree by way of a representation, but like Michael, I would say that's indirect realism. I don't think it matters what we call it as long as we both know what we're talking about. It was this that made no sense to me:

You are not separate from that model, in such a way that the model could be said to be what you interact with. The model is you interacting with the room. — Banno

It makes sense to say that you interact with the room by way of a complex of representations, but how is the model equal to you interacting with the room?

But doesn't it strike you as odd that the "mental image" is not part of the mind doing the observation? — Banno

This comes down to the nature of the self. I think what you're trying to do is eliminate the self along with the homunculus. Is that true?

I would not take Aristotle as an idealist. Direct realism has trees and cups and stuff that we see. Indirect realism falls short of that, since we never see the tree or cup or whatever. — Banno

Aristotle thought you could directly see ideas. Trees and cups are part idea and part physical. That framework, that we're all in the mind of God, is the original basis of direct realism. Indirect realism came from the beginnings of the materialistic age. It's ironic that for some, the backgrounds have come to be switched around.

You are not seperate from that model, in such a way that the model could be said to be what you interact with. The model is you interacting with the room. — Banno

I appreciate the attempt to streamline the issue here, but that just doesn't make any sense.

@Banno

Aristotle was the first to provide a description of direct realism. In On the Soul he describes how a see-er is informed of the object itself by way of the hylomorphic form carried over the intervening material continuum with which the eye is impressed. — here

Direct realism was a resident of an idealistic world where the mind directly contacts the forms of things. Indirect realism came into existence when people started trying to become more materialistic about the mind and body. What do you think neo-directness is a response to?

That explains it. Goddamn it. — Lionino

We're switching now. This excludes you, where the weather will be similar to a sauna most of the time.

Two updates;

1. We're switching to La Nina now, so the weather will be cooler than last year.

2. The US economy isn't showing any signs of slowing, so no rate cuts and many frustrated investors. This is good for Main St and bad for Wall St., in other words the Antichrist has risen and we're all going to die.