See the
SEP article on states of affairs.
"
Thoughts can be the contents of propositional attitudes. When one says “There are three things that everyone who works on elementary physics believes”, one quantifies over things that everyone working in elementary physics believes:
thoughts (see Chisholm 1970: 19).
Thoughts are also truth-value bearers (“There are three truths that everyone who works in elementary physics believes”). How are
thoughts related to states of affairs? For instance, how is the
thought that Socrates is wise related to the state of affairs Socrates’ being wise?
"Prima facie,
thoughts are one thing, states of affairs another.
Thoughts and states of affairs differ in their individuation and existence conditions.
"Individuation-conditions:
Thoughts are supposed to be the contents of propositional attitudes like belief and desire. Let “j” be shorthand for a propositional attitude verb (“desire”, “believe” etc). If one can j that p without eo ipso j-ing that q (and vice versa), the contents that p and that q are different. Now I can believe, for instance, that Hesperus shines without believing that Phosphorus shines. Hence, if
thoughts are the contents of propositional attitudes, the
thought that Hesperus shines is different from the
thought that Phosphorus shines. If the
thought that Hesperus shines is different from the
thought that Phosphorus shines,
thoughts cannot be logical complexes whose constituents are particulars and properties. Following Frege, many philosophers therefore take
thoughts to be complexes that are built up out of modes of presentation. Here “
thoughts” only refers to such complexes. Since there are different modes of presentation of the same particular (property), there can be different
thoughts that concern or are about the same particulars and properties. In contrast, Hesperus’s shining and Phosphorus’s shining are the same state of affairs, namely the complex that contains only the planet Venus and the property of shining. We will see in section 2.4 that not all philosophers follow Frege’s lead. If one has arguments for a coarse-grained individuation of the objects of belief, states of affairs may serve as contents of propositional attitudes."
I think that rather than worry over this issue, this thread might benefit from comparing Frege's view of the world to Wittgenstein's. Or maybe that would be a different thread. But it would more interesting to me. It's a pretty fascinating topic.