I am willing to change my mind upon further evidence, but there isn’t any. I can only observe and conceive of what it is that you are talking about, and all I can see and all I can conceive of is the biology. — NOS4A2

I'm thinking you saw Pinocchio as a child and said, "This is inconceivable!"

How do you know that?

We’ve looked. — NOS4A2

Among the many accounts of gravity on the table is that our gravity is bleeding into our universe from another bigger one. Some scientists noticed that the big bang has some of the characteristics of black hole, leading them to wonder if we're actually in one.

This is the way science works. We don't settle on a conclusion because it seems like the last resort, exclaiming, "We looked."

Do you find p-zombies convincing? I don’t even find them conceivable. I can’t even think about how such a being could be possible. — NOS4A2

This is metaphysical possibility, not physical possibility. An evil demon or a god could have done it. It's just a test for conceivability. Santa Claus is conceivable, though we would all struggle to explain how reindeer could act as an engine.

For the simple reason that phenomenal consciousness is not equivalent to anything else. There is no other entity in the universe onto which we can affix the label "phenomenal consciousness" but the biology. — NOS4A2

How do you know that?

So what would you take to show that they are not equivalent? — NOS4A2

Chalmers has a couple of thought experiments that show that the two are logically distinct. One is the p-zombie. This shows that we don't know apriori that the two are equivalent. We need evidence to show that.

Take a look. That which is giving its first-person account is the exact same being to which we give a biological account. — NOS4A2

And you take this to show that phenomenal consciousness is equivalent to biological states? Could you explain how? Because I'm not seeing it.

The biological reality and the first person reality are one and the same thing. — NOS4A2

This may be, but you'd need to provide evidence for it. It's not a logical truth.

It should be highlighted that disrespectful behavior towards mods will earn you a ban. — Shawn

Oh shut up.

Right, and that is a far cry from saying "science needn't bother answering this". — hypericin

Yes, but Chalmers hasn't opined on what science should do, has he? Just on what it would have to do to address the hard problem.

There is absolutely a need for one to explain the other, if there was no need there would be no hard problem. — hypericin

Chalmers doesn't think that science, in it's present state, is capable of addressing the hard problem. He thinks it will probably take some sort of paradigm shift.

Lol. She asked me! — Baden

:grin:

I'm not looking to do a deep dive on what Isaac thinks because I'd probably bump my head on the bottom of the pool. But he said:

The use of the word 'consciousness' as it's used here and the study of neurons are not 'in the same world' they don't overlap in their activities. There's no need for one to explain the other, it wouldn't even make sense it'd be like expecting physics to explain what a googly is in cricket. — Isaac

The last sentence is not too far from Chalmers' view.

A generalised insult against the whole team by PM. — Baden

Oh shut up.

I don't see how. Chalmers famously labelled it the 'hard problem', didn't he? I'm suggesting it isn't a problem at all. I can't think of any way we could be much farther apart than that. — Isaac

Regardless, your view is similar to his.

Yes. That genius truly shines through when you're silent. — Benkei

I thought you were off grid somewhere in France.

Not me. I'm always a frickin genius!

Olivier was a little high strung (much like you). He would completely flip out sometimes, especially in private conversations.

This plague of right-wingers is very scary. They're still a problem even out of office. — Manuel

What do you think generates that kind of movement?

I've gotta good book recommendation if you're interested.
— frank

Written by a Portuguese, I am sure... — Olivier5

It's a collection of essays and excerpts published by Oxford.

The use of the word 'consciousness' as it's used here and the study of neurons are not 'in the same world' they don't overlap in their activities. There's no need for one to explain the other, it wouldn't even make sense it'd be like expecting physics to explain what a googly is in cricket. — Isaac

I think you're broadly in agreement with Chalmers here.

Every event must have a cause. If consciousness isn't supernatural, and the physical state of the brain remains constant, then the inversion would be left without any possible cause. — hypericin

Yes. This is metaphysical possibility. We can have a god do whatever we want as long as it's not a contradiction. The test is for conceivability, that's all.

Assuming you reject dualism then I don't see how that is conceivable. — hypericin

How so?

What you're saying is experience causes neural activity. — Moliere

There's no doubt that experience and neural activity go hand in hand. It could be that neural and other CNS materials give rise to experience. We don't know that, though, and we can't assume it.

The inverted spectrum argument is one of the many reasons we can't assume it.

That argument doesn't require two people. It goes:

One day you wake up and your spectrum is inverted, but no physical changes happened to your brain. Is that conceivable? Sure.

Therefore, brain function and experience are not logically identical. In order to claim that one explains the other, we'll need evidence of that.

have an understanding of the hard problem. — Moliere

This was your understanding:

So, whatever that is -- why my red is my red -- that's what the hard problem of consciousness is about. It's the feeliness of the world. And the thought, so my memory of what I was lead to believe at least, is that there is as yet no scientific explanation for why my red is my red (or, perhaps another way to put it, there's no scientific way to tell what my red is -- whether it is your blue or not -- yet I certainly see red) — Moliere

I see where these speculations are coming from, but the hard problem is more basic. It's: why do you experience orgasms? Why doesn't that neural activity happen without any associated experience of it?

It's not about why your orgasms are your own and not someone else's. See the difference?

I think? I'm fine with being quizzed, but I don't have a firm answer to your first question. — Moliere

So if you aren't sure what the hard problem is, why would you vouch for someone else's understanding? I don't understand.

So, would you believe me? I'm certain Banno understands — Moliere

From what you've said so far, I don't think you do. It's just a call a theory of consciousness that includes an explanation for phenomenal consciousness. Is that your understanding?

Actually, this gets to why I'm somewhat suspicious now... notice how close that looks to ye olde ontological argument?) — Moliere

I don't think it's an ontological argument. It's just that functionalists will have to prove that there's nothing more to phenomenal consciousness than function. We can't just assume that.

They just don't share the same worlds at all, — Isaac

What things don't share the same world? I don't know what you mean.

I was just saying this same thing. Worldview comes into play in the assumptions people make about it.
— frank

Which renders the 'hard problem' meaningless. — Isaac

Does it? Remember that when gravity was first introduced into physics as a thing to be explained, no one imagined that it's a matter of curved space. The worldview of the time wouldn't allow that.

So as we go to explain phenomenal consciousness, couldn't the same problem exist? That we don't have a worldview that allows the explanation to appear yet? Why not?

we're not 'discovering' facts about it, were determining them. — Isaac

I was just saying this same thing. Worldview comes into play in the assumptions people make about it.

This is my theory: we have a worldview that says individual humans possess qualities like creativity, initiative, depression, joy, etc. This developed out of an ancient worldview which populated the universe with living, conscious beings who expressed themselves through human action, as in the Homeric myths. It was like the psyche turned inside out

Some people have a double dose of our present worldview in which all the elements of the psyche are squashed into individual humans heads.

The fact that this worldview doesn't work in the extreme version of hyperindividualism, was pointed out by various philosophers including Wittgenstein.

Yet some people, like Dennett and Frankish, think that everyone looks at the world this way. I'm guessing that's because they look at themselves that way. They don't realize that some people don't really understand what it means to say that phenomenal consciousness is internal. It's not an object that has a location, so how could it be internal to something?

See what I mean?

And then it's interesting to compare Frankish's thinking to that of Penrose:

In case anybody's interested in illusionism:

Oh, shut up.

I seriously doubt the Portuguese were worse than the British or later the Americans in terms of how they treated slaves. — Olivier5

It was worse. I've gotta good book recommendation if you're interested.

He can be a toad sometimes. He does know a lot about hazardous waste, tho.

You’re just lucky they don’t ban for self-righteous
twat-ness. — DingoJones

I can't believe you said that about Tclark! :fire:

Chalmers has said that if there is a dissolution of the hard problem, the meta-problem of explaining why we think there's a hard problem has to first be addressed. — Marchesk

Yep.

I just don't know whether it seems like I'm phenomenally conscious is different than actually being conscious in the hard sense. — Marchesk

So he's saying there is a magic show or illusion, but it's missing something that would make it qualify as phenomenal consciousness.

I think Dennett does something similar, where he says there is experience, but it doesn't meet certain criteria often assigned to experience.

I'll check out Frankish, thanks.

If you tested pupillary response in a fully blind person you'd be doing it wrong. — Isaac

Depends on what kind of blindness they have. The GCS is a quick way to communicate clinical signs. It's not a definition of anything. There might be recommendations, like intubate if the GCS is 8 or lower, but that's not a hard rule.

In a Neuro ICU, you'll see cool attempts to rouse people. There's lots of screaming and physical assaults. For instance, I do sternal rubs to see if I can rouse people, but neuro intensivists cause bruising. They dig their thumbs into pinky nail beds and all sorts of other things in order to assess if there's withdrawal to pain.

But after that, they still don't know if the patient is conscious or not because they could be locked in.

You're pretty well versed on the topic, what would you say is the best argument against the hard problem?

It's obviously not the case if you've aware of savants or various neurological abnormalities, which you would hope educated people like philosophers and scientists would be aware of when making claims about the mind. — Marchesk

Well, yes.