That's right.

It means their will decides how lemons taste to you. It means there is a strong correlation between what they want you to experience and what you experience.

>> If I remember correctly, my example is that the teacher is an expert, and the information or evidence you have gives you reasons to believe he is an expert. So given such information, it would be unreasonable to doubt what he's telling you about the game of chess.

In other words, if you decide not to question his expertise it makes no sense to question his expertise. Great stuff.

It's not real because it is fabricated by aliens.

Lemons might not be bitter. There is a possibility. It might be the case that our perception is altered by hidden forces (e.g. aliens.) Each time we taste a lemon aliens make sure we don't perceive its real taste.

That's of no relevance. I want to understand how things work. I am not interested in value judgments. I don't care if you or someone else likes or dislikes this or that. If I want to understand something dislikable, such as atmospheric temperatures that are below what humans can tolerate, I am not going to be complaining about how much I dislike these things; instead, I am going to be focusing all of my attention on trying to understand how these things work.

Alright. So your point is that sometimes there are no reasons to doubt. I agree with that. However, how does that have any impact on what I am saying in this thread?

My statements are:

1) Nothing is immune to doubt
2) The logic of doubt, i.e. when we decide to doubt and when we decide not to doubt, is relative

Do you agree with the first? I guess you do.
Do you agree with the second? I guess you don't. If so, why?

@Banno's value judgments -- yes, they are value judgments -- are of no relevance. Calling certain patterns of doubting "irrational" changes nothing.

I am describing what is possible. I am not giving instructions on how to doubt. That's beside the point.

Well, if you're sitting with an expert chess player, and they're teaching you the game of chess, and you start doubting everything he's says, without good reason, what sense could we make of your doubts? It would seem that you don't have a good grasp on reality, or you just haven't learn to use the English words correctly, or you have a mental illness. — Sam26

You can question his expertise for a start. You can also question whether his words truly reflect his thoughts. And so on. There are many things that you can question in such a scenario. So your claim that it makes no sense to doubt in such a scenario is what truly makes no sense.

I understand that. What I don't understand is this: why do you think that in the example that you gave it makes no sense to doubt?

Remember, you said we can doubt anything we want, so I gave you an example of someone teaching the rules of chess, and the person to whom they are teaching the game is doubting the rules, doubting everything the teacher says. Does it make sense to doubt in this situation? — Sam26

It makes sense to doubt in such a situation. I gave you an example.

One doesn't doubt simply because one wants to doubt, one doubts because there are good reasons to doubt. — Sam26

Not necessarily. For example, it is possible to doubt for no reason at all.

For example, let's say that I'm teaching you the game of chess, that is, I'm explaining the rules of the game, but you are doubting everything that I tell you. Now according to you it's okay, because doubting is a relative concept, that is, one can use it any way one sees fit, but how can this be the case? Aren't there rules of correct usage, or do you apply your own rules? — Sam26

I am not following. You have a guy describing the rules of chess to you and you are doubting . . . exactly what? You say "everything he says". What does that mean?

When someone says "tomorrow it will rain" you can doubt that. It makes sense. You can say "well, maybe it won't rain". But when someone says "these are the rules of the chess" and you doubt that what does that mean? I can interpret it in a positive manner but I am not sure this is the way you are interpreting it. For example, maybe you are saying to this guy "well, these are not the standard rules of chess" where "the standard rules of chess" means "what most people understand to be the rules of chess". This makes perfect sense. You can make such objections. I don't see how such a doubt is something other than perfectly sensible. It might turn out that most people think that the rules of chess are something other than what this person is telling you the standard rules of chess are.

I don't know. Is it? It's relative. You decide whether it is reasonable to doubt (i.e. whether you *should* doubt) or not. That's my point.

The point is that nothing is immune to doubt. And what is rational and useful is relative.

I don't doubt this thread is in English. But if I wanted to, I could. That's my point. Let me restate that: I don't doubt this thread is in English because I don't *want* to doubt it and not because I cannot doubt it (i.e. not because it's indubitable.)

And yes, we doubt because we choose to do so. We choose when we're going to doubt and when we're not going to doubt and we can do so using any kind of logic.

There is nothing that is immune to doubt. We can doubt anything we want. And when we don't, it's merely because we decided not to do so.

Justification is merely about explaining why we think what we think. We already decided what to think and now what we're doing is describing our reasoning process to others.

Thinking is prior to justification.

Thought = assumption.

Assumption is a general term. Prediction is more specific and that's the reason I don't use it. It refers only to those assumptions that represent events that will happen in the future. Retrodiction is the opposite term.

Assumptions can be thought of as imaginations that represent some aspect of reality.

Thinking = the process by which we generate assumptions.

It can be any process. This would be the general form of the concept of thinking. But some people don't like general terms so if we want to talk to them we need to specify these terms further. I am personally very fond of general terms. Anyways, thinking can also be defined narrowly, as a particular mechanism by which assumptions are generated. Which one? Let's ignore that for now.

Language = events that represent some other events. You can also add "for the purpose of communication between organisms" if you don't like general terms. But again, I like to start with general terms first.

Events that represent (or symbolize) other events are usually words and speech. But they can also be pictures.

Language is not dependent on thinking. You can write and speak and draw about things that have nothing to do with thinking. For example, the things you are representing could be imaginations or things that took place in the past. None of these involve thinking and thoughts.

Similarly, thinking is not dependent on language. You can think, i.e. make assumptions, without writing, talking or drawing. Your assumptions can manifest in your actions. This is the more natural way of thinking and it is known by the name "intuition". What we call "reason" is merely thinking that can be and is, often at the same time, expressed using language.

Which one came first?
I don't know. That's an empirical question.

It could be thinking. That's what my intuition suggests. But it could also be language. Or it could be both at the same time.

And don't go whining that I'm going to deep. 100% means 100%. Can any two objects ever be 100% the same? — Harry Hindu

Let's just say you're a retard.

So you are fine to say the same object can have the two locations at the one time? — apokrisis

No problem at all.

Cool. We're making progress. — apokrisis

Well, you certainly are making progress in the sense that you are getting closer to understanding my position.

Are an object's coordinates in space-time a property of the object, or no? Is the object's position in space-time just as important to know as its size and color, yes or no? — Harry Hindu

It depends on how you define the concept of object. You can define it any way you want. It depends on your needs. Sometimes, we define it to include the coordinates; sometimes, we define it to exclude the coordinates. When we say that two balls are equal, more likely than being wrong, we are defining the concept of ball to exclude the coordinates that someone else would include in the definition of the concept of ball. You can stretch concepts any way you like. You can stretch the concept of ball to include not only the coordinates that you want to include in the concept but also portions of the environment that surrounds objects under your consideration such as for example other objects of the same kind (so that instead of speaking of single balls we are now talking about pairs of balls.) By stretching the definition of concepts, you can prove anything you want.

An object is nothing but a portion of reality. If you want to have a meaningful conversation, then parties must focus their attention on the same portion of reality. This is why definitions are important. We want to make sure we are talking about the same portion of reality.

So we can say that the same thing can exist at two different moments in time, but not that the same thing can be in two different locations at once. — apokrisis

I don't see why you shouldn't be able to say that the same thing can be in two different locations at once. Concepts are human inventions. You can create any kind of concepts you want. If you say that a thing can only be in one location at a time, then when you say that a thing is in two different locations at the same time you are contradicting yourself. This contradiction can be resolved either by saying that what is at two different locations is not one but two different things or by redefining the concept of thing so that it can be at two different locations at once.

That's exactly the point, by the law of identity, "same" refers to one thing, and one thing only. The law of identity relates that thing to itself, saying a thing is the same as itself. But there are not two things which are the same as each other, there is one thing, which related to itself, is the same as itself. This is expressed by Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. If two things are said to have 100% properties the same, then they are necessarily one and the same thing. Calling them two things is a mistake, they were only identified as two distinct things until it was determined that they are one and the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

One and the same thing can be different at different points in time. For example, a man in his 60's can be very different from the man he was in his 20's. We wouldn't say that the young version of that man is an entirely different person than the old version of that man.

Conversely, two different things can be identical at different points in time. For example, a man and his clone are two different persons that are identical. We wouldn't say that they are one and the same person simply because they are identical.

When you take a look at two different portions of reality and see that there is no difference between their contents then we say that these two portions of reality are the same.
— Magnus Anderson

This seems to be a contradiction. You are saying that they occupy two different portions of reality, therefore they can't be the same. — Harry Hindu

Does that mean that when we say that two balls are the same, in the sense that they have the same color and the same size, that we are wrong because the two balls occupy different positions in space?

I don't think so. I don't think anyone would say so. Except for the philosophers who overthought the problem.

If you think a lot that does not mean you know better than those who think less. Thinking more is not necessarily better than thinking less. He who thinks more usually thinks he knows better than those who think less (whom he considers naive) but it is not as common that he really knows better than those who think less.

You need to stick to the definition. The definition of sameness says that two portions of reality are the same only if their contents are the same. Thus, two balls can be the same even though they occupy different positions in space. This is because the position of a ball is not defined as being a part of the ball itself (in the same way that what surrounds a ball is not defined as being a part of the ball.) You can redefine the concept of ball to include position in space. Doing so, however, would change the portions of reality we are looking at. We would no longer be looking at the same objects.

Anyone interested is more than welcome to argue in defense of the claim that there is no such thing as sameness (or what @apokrisis calls "100% similarity".) If you're going to say that there is no such thing as sameness then you should be able to explain what you mean by sameness. This is in order to make sure that we're talking about the same thing. Note that I expect you not to define sameness in the way @apokrisis does i.e. as a value a sequence of similarities approaches but never attains. This is because he thinks that's the only form in which sameness exists. What I am asking you is to define the form of sameness that you, and most of all @apokrisis, claim does not exist. Once you do so, I will take a look at it, and if I think there is evidence that such a thing exists, I will show it to you. It is unfortunate that I have to do this because it is one of the most evident truths that there is such a thing as sameness. It should be something we already agree upon.

The standard definition of sameness is "lack of difference". When you take a look at two different portions of reality and see that there is no difference between their contents then we say that these two portions of reality are the same. (It apparently has to be emphasized that the fact that these two portions of reality are not one portion of reality does not determine whether they are two same or two different portions of reality. Whether they are two same or two different portions of reality is determined entirely by their contents.)

Some people in this thread are trying to argue with a definition.

I dunno. Why not check out actual set theory concepts like measure theory, almost surely and negligible sets. You might find out that this is in fact exactly how it works. — apokrisis

Sameness isn't something that can only be approached. It is something that is regularly attained. This is, in fact, why sameness is a perfectly meaningful term. The fact that we can think of infinite series where a value, such as sameness, is approached without ever being attained does not mean that every infinite series is of that kind.

As I told you, I really did not know what you meant by "100% similar". "Similar" implies necessarily, some degree of difference. Therefore 100% similar implies some difference. You only contradict yourself now, when you say that "100% similar" means a complete lack of difference. It is impossible that similarity lacks difference, by way of contradiction. As I suspected, what you mean by 100% similar is nothing but contradictory nonsense. That's why I couldn't answer that question, I was afraid that what you meant was some such contradictory nonsense. Now my fears have been confirmed, what you mean is contradictory nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

He's defining similarity to mean "the percentage of elements the two sets have in common". Thus, "100% similarity" means "the percentage of elements the two sets have in common is 100%" or in plain terms "the two sets have all of their elements in common". But that's not the standard definition. The standard definition of similarity, as Google can tell us, is "having a resemblance in appearance, character, or quantity, without being identical". Similarity, in other words, implies difference. But even if we accept his definition, it does not follow that "the same" is "the limit of the similar" or in plain terms "the value similarity can approach but never attain". The problem is created by his inability to fix his attention.

"The same" implies one thing, the same thing, that's the point of the law of identity, to ensure that we are talking about the one and only same thing, the very same thing, when we designate something as "the same". — Metaphysician Undercover

Where I might disagree with MU is with his apparent claim that "the same" means "the one". If two things are the same that does not mean they aren't two things. Sameness is a relation and as such it exists "between" two things and not within a single thing. In order to say that two things are same they must first be two things i.e. distinct things.

Where is the difficulty in recognising that "the same" is the idealised limit to "the similar"? Why are you obfuscating the matter with your unsound sophistry? — apokrisis

@Metaphysician Undercover has already answered your question. Nonetheless, I will proceed to answer it myself, and more or less repeat what MU said, because it appears to be necessary to do so.

"The same" is a relation between two sets where every element that belongs to one set also belongs to the other set. "The similar", on the other hand, is a relation between two sets where most of the elements that belong to one set also belong to the other set. If "same" means "identical" then "similar" means "nearly identical". Thus, it would be incorrect to say that 100% similar = the same. The very concept of "100% similar" makes no sense. Similarity is not a percentage of elements that two sets have in common. However, you can redefine the word to mean precisely that. Defined in this way, you would be right to say that 100% similar = the same. Still, it makes no sense to say that "the same" is the idealized limit to "the similar". The concept of limit, as defined in mathematical analysis, refers to a value that is approached but never reached. Sameness isn't something that is only approached.

Hilarious. If you are going to invoke set theory formalism, then you have to stick to its rules, not just make up any old shit. — apokrisis

You still have to demonstrate that there is no such thing as absolute difference.

So you describe the naive realist position and then accuse me of oversimplifying. — apokrisis

You rely too much on "ism"s.

Sure, but the issue is to answer this question of whether or not it is. If something appears to us as disordered, this does not mean that it necessarily is disordered, because it may be the case that we just haven't developed the means for figuring out the order. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's true. Similarly, if we have no evidence that God exists that does not mean that God does not exist. Nonetheless, in the absence of evidence that God exists, we have no choice, if we have some intellectual integrity, but to act as if God does not exist.

No. You concede that what the sets have in common is the claim of being elements of the set of all sets that have no elements in common. — apokrisis

No. I said the opposite. I said that sets A = {1, 2, 3} and B = {4, 5, 6} do not have "belongs to some other set" in common. Rather, it is your sets, let us call them sets X = {1, 2, 3, belongs to some other set} and Y = {1, 2, 3, belongs to some other set}, that have this element in common. What you're doing here is you are saying that A equals to X and that B equals to Y and that because X and Y are not absolutely different that it follows that A and B are also not absolutely different. This is false because your starting premise, that A is equal to X and B is equal to Y, is false. I have to repeat, once again, that your argument is nothing but sophistry.

All elements are really just sets of elements. — apokrisis

They aren't. Some elements are sets of elements. Some elements are not sets of elements. What you're doing here is called reductionism. But I don't think you can see it.

But there is then your implied promise of being able to cash out the "elemental" at some ground zero level. And that becomes logical atomism. We already know that to be a busted flush. — apokrisis

I don't really think you understand my position. I don't know much about logical atomism but I can't help but have the impression that you do not understand that position either. You are criticizing other people's positions without properly understanding them.

The fact remains that you have yet to demonstrate that there is no such thing as absolute difference or that there are no such things as concrete particulars. You've done nothing so far.

You already concede the principle of indifference as your basis for trying to contest it. — apokrisis

The principle of indifference is common-sense. It does not state anything groundbreaking. It is well known that whenever we look in front of us we do not see what is behind us.

You go well beyond this. Your claim is that if we are not aware of some portion of reality that whatever portion of reality we are aware of is not reality itself. That's nonsense.

It comes down to a judgement that works, not a judgement that is based on some objective "fact of the matter". — apokrisis

We look at objective facts in order to figure out a more effective way to attain our subjective goals. We choose what portion of reality we are going to focus on but we do not choose the content of that portion of reality. You are trying to oversimplify this process by reducing it to "it's all about what works".

Great. You concede the point. We're getting somewhere. — apokrisis

That's not true. I do not concede that sets A = {1, 2, 3} and B = {4, 5, 6} have an element in common.

Now if we are talking about some set of elements - actual baskets of fruit - then how do we know that the apple in one is actually an "apple"? It could be a rather unripe and round pear. — apokrisis

Noone cares whether the fruit is ripe or unripe. In fact, noone cares whether what appears to be a fruit is a real fruit or just a toy that looks like a fruit. That's your problem. You are not focusing your attention on a clearly defined portion of reality.

Pragmatism rules. As it ought. — apokrisis

I think that obscurantism is a more fitting name for your position.

↪Magnus Anderson So you run away from the question? You don't want to risk saying your sets are the same in this regard? You pretend instead that this would be irrelevant?

Cool. ;) — apokrisis

If you want to say that my sets A = {1, 2, 3} and B = {4, 5, 6} are the same, when in reality they are not, you do not have to say that they both belong to some other set (i.e. have "belong to some other set" in common) or that they are both sets (i.e. have "being a set" in common.) You can simply say that they both contain numbers. You can also say that they have the same number of elements. I understand this very well. I think that I have demonstrated that I do in my previous posts. The problem is that you do not understand that this is sophistry. What you're doing here is you are pretending you are comparing sets A and B when in reality you are comparing sets that are not A and B but that are sufficiently similar to A and B. Properly speaking, you are comparing sets {1, 2, 3, belongs to some other set} and {4, 5, 6, belongs to some other set}. These two sets, you are right, are not absolutely different. However, they are not sets A and B. They are sets that are different from but similar to sets A and B.

I believe that the uncertainty is due to the deficiencies of the minds and the methods being used in the attempt to understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

You don't decide what the universe is. The universe is either ordered in certain aspects or it is not.

But these two sets do not have "being a set" as an element.
— Magnus Anderson

Do these two sets belong to the set of all sets that have no elements in common? — apokrisis

How is this a relevant question? Why does it matter whether the two sets belong to some other set or not?

So far, the argument has been: two sets A = {1,2,3} and B = {4,5,6} are not absolutely different because they have "being a set" in common. But these two sets do not have "being a set" as an element. This is sophistry because it is pretending to be comparing sets A and B when in reality it is comparing sets that are not A and B but that are similar to A and B. That's @apokrisis's argument in a nutshell. He has done nothing to support his claim. All he's done ever since is claim that physics, QM in particular, shows that there is no such thing as absolute difference. Of course, without ever showing how. I have a strong impression that these people do not know what they are talking about. Whenever you ask them to show that they know what they are talking about, they back off.

The issue that QM made inescapable was that reality could not be that well-defined; — Wayfarer

Which means exactly what? What does it mean that reality is "well-defined"?

when you get down to the nitty-gritty, the uncertainty principle comes into play. So the more minutely you define it, the less certain it becomes.

How is this relevant to what I am saying? Did I ever say that the universe is necessarily predictable? I don't ever remember saying that.

Classical realism? What exactly is that? Google gives me a theory of interpersonal relations. Is that what you mean? I think you're not paying enough attention to what is being said. Einstein was a realist and I don't agree with Einstein's approach to doing science. Among other things, Einstein hated randomness. I don't. I am more of a Heisenberg type of a guy. Just stick to the facts.

I am silent on issues that are irrelevant. I don't care about QM. It's irrelevant. As for well-defined portions of reality that share nothing in common, any pair of sets that have no elements in common would do. I already gave you an example with baskets and fruits.

My position is closer to that of Ernst Mach.

Physics keeps finding that "everything" is only relative. Absolutism keeps melting away and proving only to be an emergent limit. And so I adopt a metaphysics that accounts for that kind of reality. — apokrisis

You have yet to show to me how two well-defined portions of reality that are evidently different in all regards are in fact not different in all regards. Your approach so far has been to look for portions of reality that have something in common so that you can create an appearance that I am wrong by tricking me into thinking that these portions of reality that do have something in common are the portions of reality I am talking about. That's sophistry.

Things can be absolutely the same, or absolutely different, in the simple-minded fashion you try to demonstrate with set theory. The axiom of choice just applies, no problems.

But the physical facts don't support such a view. — apokrisis

You have yet to show that.