Right. So as I was saying about the principle of indifference.... — apokrisis
Reality appears composed of concrete particulars. But the emphasis is on appears. It isn’t really. — apokrisis
Could you elaborate on the use of "care" in this context? — Wayfarer
Your ontological vagueness merely introduces vagueness. It makes things unnecessarily complicated. I see no reason for it. — Magnus Anderson
So you are arguing against the principle of indifference by telling me all about how you personally choose to apply it. Congrats. — apokrisis
Just because we are only ever aware of a portion of reality does not mean that what we are aware of is not reality itself. — Magnus Anderson
It allows me to distinguish between accidents and necessities for a start. — apokrisis
So the genome stands for what is necessary. And then that defines what are merely accidents that particularise oak trees - the differences in form that make this one distinct from that one. It is a matter of indifference if one oak tree has a broken limb, or a different pattern of branching, or whatever. — apokrisis
So my approach introduces a sound basis for separating reality into its formal necessities and accidental differences. — apokrisis
There is a fundamental sense in which reality is constructed by the brain/mind on the basis of sense data, but also on the basis of our intellectual and even biological faculties. — Wayfarer
What does it mean that reality one's perception of reality is constructed by the brain on the basis of sense data? — Magnus Anderson
I am not arguing against what you call "the principle of indifference". I am arguing against your claim that there is no such thing as absolute difference. — Magnus Anderson
I also disagree with your claim that reality is not composed of concrete particulars. I have to note that this claim does not follow from "the principle of indifference" either. — Magnus Anderson
It means what it says. — Wayfarer
We distinguish necessities from accidents based on our purpose or intent. — Metaphysician Undercover
Oh come on, you cannot distinguish what is necessary from what is accidental by reference to the genome. That's nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover
I much prefer it when people honestly say "I don't know" — Magnus Anderson
My view is that reality is a mass of particulars (i.e. facts, events, sensations, etc.) — Magnus Anderson
Physics keeps finding that "everything" is only relative. Absolutism keeps melting away and proving only to be an emergent limit. And so I adopt a metaphysics that accounts for that kind of reality. — apokrisis
Things can be absolutely the same, or absolutely different, in the simple-minded fashion you try to demonstrate with set theory. The axiom of choice just applies, no problems.
But the physical facts don't support such a view. — apokrisis
You have yet to show to me how two well-defined portions of reality that are evidently different in all regards are in fact not different in all regards. — Magnus Anderson
Why are you so violently opposed to an immanent naturalist metaphysics? — apokrisis
well-defined portions of reality — Magnus Anderson
I am more of a Heisenberg type of a guy — Magnus Anderson
the inherent difficulties of the materialist theory of the atom, which had become apparent even in the ancient discussions about smallest particles, have also appeared very clearly in the development of physics during the present (20th) century.
This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers. Here, the development of quantum theory some forty years ago has created a complete change in the situation. The mathematically formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use then of elementary particles. I cannot enter here into the details of this problem, which has been discussed so frequently in recent years. But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.
During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles. But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problems will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?
I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or—in Plato's sense—Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics.
Natural science does not simply describe and explain nature; it is part of the interplay between nature and ourselves; it describes nature as exposed to our method of questioning. This was a possibility of which Descartes could not have imagined, but it makes a sharp separation between the world and the 'I' impossible. [this is a crucial insight, IMO]
If one follows the great difficulty which even eminent scientists like Einstein had in understanding and accepting the Copenhagen interpretation... one can trace the roots... to the Cartesian partition....it will take a long time for it [this partition] to be replaced by a really different attitude toward the problem of reality.
The issue that QM made inescapable was that reality could not be that well-defined; — Wayfarer
when you get down to the nitty-gritty, the uncertainty principle comes into play. So the more minutely you define it, the less certain it becomes.
There is a fundamental sense in which reality is constructed by the brain/mind on the basis of sense data, but also on the basis of our intellectual and even biological faculties. — Wayfarer
Got it, thanks. In other words, it could be there is no such thing as an absolute cartesian coordinate system for space. I am okay with this theory for space, but it cannot work for time. Time is a function of causality, whereby an effect cannot logically exist before its cause, and so at the very least, the "direction" of time is an absolute.To each other object. Space is, in such a metaphysic, composed entirely of relations between objects. Therefore, it could be argued that the objectual properties refering to space are not "of the object", but "of the world". Time could be seen in a similar way, replacing objects with events. — Akanthinos
I see your point, that the second statement gives more info than the first one. But as you said before, this results in having an infinite amount of negative properties like "A triangle has the property of not being compatible with figures with 4, 5, 6, ... sides"; which is absurd. [Absurd for a philosopher; not for common people who would not give two craps about such a discussion :D ].But that's not the same thing. "A triangle doesn't have the property of compatibility with circularity" states nothing about the potential compatibility of triangularity and circularity, which is exactly what we are trying to get at here. "A triangle has the property of not being compatible with circularity" is already closer to the mark. The first one doesn't have the causal relevance necessary the full phenomena. — Akanthinos
I think I understand; but these spaces seem merely accidental, and not essential to the process of understanding, like a particular triangle will always have a particular size and location, even though size and location are not essential properties. Even if it is not actual, telepathy as a process of transferring info seems logically possible, and would not require these spaces, although time is still inevitably present.One could argue that there are at least two spaces for each act of understanding : the space occupied by the information itself, and the space occupied by the information necessary to interpret the object of understanding. As such, understanding, as a stand-in for information processing, would be distributed. — Akanthinos
But these two sets do not have "being a set" as an element. — Magnus Anderson
I'm curious as to how both of you think that what Aaron says here would differ from what naturalism allows. Or to put it another why I wonder whether both of you agree that naturalism would not allow mathematical objects to exist "as a nexus of relations etc...". I would also like to hear exactly why Wayfarer thinks that, and why Aaron does, if he does. Also I would like to know whether you think this applies to all possible forms of naturalism, or only to specific forms. — Janus
The common thread running through most versions of Naturalism is the denial of transcendence, and often the word "natural" is cashed out in reference to the natural sciences. In that case, you end up with claims such as "nothing exists beyond what is posited by the natural sciences". But there's often disagreement regarding even what is and is not to be considered "officially" posited by the sciences. — Aaron R
There is an inherent contradiction here, because the argument that what we experience is not reality because it is constructed by the brain/mind depends on the assumption that our understanding of the brain/mind corresponds to how things are (reality). the argument thus refutes itself because it is not only circular but contradictory. — Janus
As I asked Wayfarer earlier, how does considering God to be transcendent and supernatural (meaning radically separate and independent) help with explaining its role in creating and/or sustaining the world? — Janus
The common thread running through most versions of Naturalism is the denial of transcendence, — Aaron R
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