Written language is different from spoken language. I don't see anything interesting about Derrida's observation.

On the other hand, it makes excellent sense in the limited Saussurian context. A — igjugarjuk

I don't think Saussure was referring only to spoken language.

But I am very open to the idea that Derrida whipped up a boogeyman or sniffed out a conspiracy. That he projected his private concerns on the tradition. — igjugarjuk

Derrida's idea that "presence" is the prevailing idea in Western philosophy is false. It barely makes sense.

And, Socrates says speech is superior to the written word...but it is Plato the writer giving Socrates these words.

Phonocentrism privileges speech over writing. Speech is (or was said to be) the proper example of a sign system — igjugarjuk

That is not true. One of the weaker claims by Derrida.

Derrida, in his concern with 'the proper,' is surprisingly adjacent to Brandom, however different their styles and influences. — igjugarjuk

How is it similar to Brandom?

I might add that usage doesn’t only become metaphorical. For Derrida there is no non-metaphorical usage. Also, one would not be able to separate ‘mind’ from ‘matter’ , form from content , the transcendental from the empirical, presence from absence except as poles of a singular event. — Joshs

Sounds right.

Perhaps Jackson should have said that , despite the fact that Kant’s idealism was intended to avoid Humean skepticism , Kant’s split between our representations of the world and the thing in itself leads inevitably to its own form of skepticism. The veil that remains in place between subject and world is deconstructed by Derrida. — Joshs

Already done by Hume, who I said, was not a skeptic in the contemporary sense.

Teach them tech and finance. — Moses

And plumbing

You are the only one making personal attacks on this thread. I will not reply to another ad hominem attack.

Fake news. — Streetlight

Don't be rude.

It's quite in line with say, the Kantian emancipatory project which of course Derrida claims fidelity to. — Streetlight

Kant is a sceptic. The thing in itself is the structure of scepticism.

I'm a stickler. Again, just one quote from Derrida about his supposed skepticism would be nice. — Streetlight

Yes.

I don't need anyone to explain it to me because I know it very well. I just find it interesting that many who like to talk about deconstruction can't substantiate much of what they say. Very often it seems to me they simply make things up. Pretty cynical if you ask me. Skeptical, even. — Streetlight

I have seen many informed discussions about Derrida on this thread.

So you are not a skeptic, right? — Joshs

Correct.

we ‘ produce’ worlds with knowledge, — Joshs

That is what I think, yes.

Derrida would agree with you that there are better and worse readings of texts. — Joshs

Makes sense to me.

"But here it may be objected,that the imagination, according to my own confession, being the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy," Hume, Treatise

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm#link2H_4_0041


Judged by imagination, not reason.

Heh. Funnily enough, at least with where I'm at now with Derrida, I'd still agree that he's a skeptic here :D -- at least, because of my understanding of having knowledge. — Moliere

Okay, then.

'Here is what I think. Here are the reasons.'

Basically what philosophy is.

My definition of skepticism: The knowledge we seek cannot be had.

I think this is a different sort of reading than what I'm giving. Can you see the difference? Or is there a real reading to which you're referring, a reading of Hume that is the right reading of Hume? — Moliere

I read philosophy to maximize the meaning of the text, and to see how it helps my own understanding.

To me--and it is in the Treatise--Hume solves the problem of the inner world, outer world dichotomy. What does that have to do with skepticism? There is no world other than the one we think about and experience; there is no true world. This is why I think Kant ends up with a problem Hume already showed how to solve.

Perhaps for Hume there isn't really that necessity — Moliere

The irony is that Hume calls himself a skeptic but I think he is providing a solution to skepticism. Hume is critical of the later Kantian "thing in itself."

and through habit we assign said necessity, but it is nowhere to be found in experience, ala Hume's argument. — Moliere

I think for Hume there really is not that necessity. It is not just about human experience.

Is it not a fact that you experience? A little simpler than The World of Facts or something phenomenological, just the world I experience, and "I experience the world" is a fact. — Moliere

Okay, I experience the world. Good so far.

I read it as "the world experienced" -- as in, the world I experience, in fact. — Moliere

Okay. I never experienced the world as a fact. Not even sure what it means.
Reminds me of the 'myth of the given,' by Sellars.

factually experienced world — Joshs

This needs to be explained. I do not know what this means.

How would you interpret the Husserl quotation? Is it just wrong? — Moliere

I do not know why you're asking me about Husserl, nor do I know what quote you're referring to. But, okay, I'm game.

What made sense to me was Hume's arguments regarding causation -- on the conceptual side you have the necessary connection between events, and on the experiential side you have habituation and the belief that what we experience is necessary, but only because of human habit. So necessity, at least, must be conceptually distinguishable from the world we experience. — Moliere

Hume refers to causation as "constant correspondence." He denies the concept of necessary connection.

In the early 1970's it was common to teach critical thinking. It seems that concept was dropped.

it's not a Humean construct of the mind where one can separate the experienced world from the concepts. — Moliere

Hume says the opposite.

From this vantage , talking about the ‘nothing’ as a lack of identity is incoherent. — Joshs

I don't conceive of 'nothing' as lack. Nor would I say Hegel does.

Doesn’t Hegel post a totalization of differences in Absolute Subjectivity? — Joshs

I do not read it that way. "Absolute Knowing" is more a criticism of Kant's subjective idealism.

that he prioritizes unity and identity — Joshs

That would be Kant.

Added: I do not read Hegel as saying the dialectic ends.

Hegel didn't say that being and nothing unite in time to form the universe, — Gregory

I certainly did not allege that.

Because I perceive the concept of ‘outside of spacetime,’ fallacious. — universeness

I see.

guess my vocabulary needs some update. What’s the difference between the two ? — Hello Human

Subjectivism is that the thinker determines what is real. Idealism is actually quite a rare philosophy, which is like Berkeley's claim that the physical world is just a thought in the mind of God.

Instead, they claim that conscious beings and their experiences are the basis on which existence itself lies. — Hello Human

That's subjectivism, not idealism.

I don’t think it is meaningful to try to objectify ‘outside’ of everything that exists. — universeness

I think it does. Why do you think otherwise?

Even the Penrose bounce does not suggest a previous Universe becomes nothing before a new ‘Big Bang.’ — universeness

Fine. But I do not consider science to tell philosophy what is real.

Unfortunately, this is quite common. Again, I wonder why ... — Alkis Piskas

Some think philosophy is just stating opinions. They would not think that of physics, but think there is nothing to learn about philosophy.