As Zahavi puts it, phenomenology and deconstruction “dismiss the kind of skepticism that would argue that the way the world appears to us is compatible with the world really being completely different.” — Joshs
What made sense to me was Hume's arguments regarding causation -- on the conceptual side you have the necessary connection between events, and on the experiential side you have habituation and the belief that what we experience is necessary, but only because of human habit. So necessity, at least, must be conceptually distinguishable from the world we experience. — Moliere
I think this is a different sort of reading than what I'm giving. Can you see the difference? Or is there a real reading to which you're referring, a reading of Hume that is the right reading of Hume? — Moliere
I don't think there's a correct reading of a text, there are just correct readings. There are erroneous readings of various degrees or kinds, and then there's some good readings -- some more creative than others, but mostly good and within bounds of the texts I read. — Moliere
My definition of skepticism: The knowledge we seek cannot be had. — Jackson
His deconstruction theory alone is a poster child for this. So don't ask for a passage -- ask someone to explain the deconstruction theory and you get your answers. — L'éléphant
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