Being is becoming... overcoming... over man. Joy is the feeling of 'increase' in power, — ChatteringMonkey

it's the journey not the destination that matters. — ChatteringMonkey

There are certainly plenty of Nietzsche interpreters who give it this existential spin. I prefer the poststructutalist readings. From that vantage , the increase in power belongs to the period within a particular value system, but Will to power as self-overcoming means that the basis of any ‘increase in power’ as defined by a particular value system must be overcome along with that value system. Put differently , life isnt an endless increase in power, it is power constantly overcoming its basis and therefore power starting anew with every shift in value system. So the journey isn’t the unfolding of variations on a theme , or an endless increasing of something, but an endless return of the ‘same’ unrepeatable values, goals , basis of power).
What one seems desirable changes along with changing values, so no criterion of power or its increase survives this becoming.

he is showing us that we do (together/each) have interests and desires. In seeing that now (reflected in our moralism), I/we aim to do/be better. This is beyond the argument of grounded or not grounded; absolute or relative; goals, utility, ought. — Antony Nickles

Maybe you could elaborate what doing or being better means in the context of the contingency of values. What is an aim to do better outside of goals, utility, ought? What is an interest or desire if not normative , goal-oriented , anticipatory? Aren’t interests and desires the very essence of normativity? Is there
anything that thwarts our interests and desires? Could it be that time and history themselves thwart our desires and interests by transforming the basis of what we find interesting and desirable? In other words , isnt it presupposed in the very structure of interest and desire that we inevitably desire other than what we desire? That we aim for other than what we aim for? And how does this transform the meaning of ‘better’? Doesn’t betterment become otherwise than better?

Why the allergy to the word truth? — Protagoras

Maybe this will help. Rorty explains why the notion of truth needs to be jettisoned.

http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/download/696/668/

“Rorty wishes to undermine modern philosophers' conception of philosophy and its place in culture, as did his philosophical heroes, Dewey, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. Yet his argument owes most to Sellars attack on the 'myth of the given' and to Quine's attack on the analytic/synthetic, necessary/contingent, a priorila posteriori distinc- tions. Their joint insight (suitably purified by Rorty) that is truth, justifica- tion, and knowledge are nothing 'more than what Dewey caled "war- ranted assertability" ... what our peers will, ceteris paribus, let us get away with saying (176). Rorty labels this insight 'epistemological behaviourism.

Well the gods eye view has always been nonsense,so of heidegger says that,I agree. — Protagoras

What’s the difference between the god’s eye view and justified true belief?

I know Rorty does, but he probably got booted out of the club for that. What about Putnam, Sellers or Davidson? Maybe even Quine?

Did they both reject platos justified true belief? — Protagoras

Here’s a very partial list of philosophers who reject platos justified true belief:

george Kelly
Derrida
Heidegger
Husserl
Gene Gendlin
Merleau-Ponty
Nancy
Zahavi
Gallagher
Ratcliffe
T. Fuchs
Varela
Thompson
Noe
Lyotard
Piaget
Deleuze
Protevi
Massumi
Foucault
William Connolly
Manuel Delanda
Bernard Stiegler
Bennington
Joseph Rouse
John Shotter
Ken Gergen
Jan Slaby
Arthur Fine
Gadamer
Rorty
LaClau
Colombetti
William James
John Dewey
G H Meade

But the bottom line is the myth of rationality is still adhered to.

Any philosophers claiming intuition or beliefs are primary yet? — Protagoras

Husserl made intuition ( the primal impression ) fundamental. Heidegger defined truth as disclosure. What he meant was that what appears in every single
moment of experience is truth. He rejected the idea of truth as correctness

Yet the entire critique is still based on the primacy of "rationality". — Protagoras

I wouldn’t say that the trajectory of continental philosophy over the past 100 years has been a matter of leaving traditional concepts of rationality intact and simply qualifying or limiting them. Instead rationality has been thought differently. The very notion of critique as understood by Kant has also been transformed.

All nietzsches works are fuelled from resentiment,it's obvious from his writings,especially from zarathustra onwards.

But a lot of his psychological insights are correct. — Protagoras

Again, what does ‘fueled’ mean here? Certainly you don’t mean that all one needs is a feeling of resentment in order to churn out a world-changing new philosophy. Do you mean that Nietzsche experienced an inordinate amount of things to be resentful of in his life, and that’s why the centerpiece of his work is resentment? If that the case , then given Freud’s observation of the uncanny resemblance between Nietzsche’s ideas and his own, would you surmise that Freud also experienced a lot of resentment in his personal dealings?
Here’s an alternative explanation. Readers of Nietzsche’s work like to focus on resentment at the expensive of , and in isolation from , the overall arc of his ideas because they seem more easy to grasp and are more dramatic to read. Nietzsche scholars , on the other hand , see how each aspect of his work fits into and implies the whole. And they understand this whole to be an extraordinarily complex and sophisticated construction that cannot possibly be reduced to , or even anticipated on the basis of , the ordinary everyday notionof resentment.

. I thought the definition of philosophy was supposed to be logical or rational argument. — Ross Campbell

Your notion of philosophy is out of date by at least 100 years. So is your notion of empiricism. Philosophy has spent most of the latter half of the 20th century up till now critiquing ideas of truth as logic and rationality.

it is hard not to speculate that resentment fueled many of his ideas. — Tom Storm

What do you mean by ‘fueled’? As in ‘Einstein’s craving for fame fueled his discovery of relativity’? Or as in ‘I find many of Nietzsche’s ideas to be so superficial and unimpressive that I can reduce them to an arbitrary and simplistic causal motive’?

Modernist versions of constructivism believe that there is a real world that we only have indirect access to via our constructions of it. Postmodern constructivism, also known as radical constructivism( see Maturana, Von Glasersfeld, and Varela) believe that our constructions of the world don’t represent a reality supposedly existing independently of us , but enact a world partly determined by our constructions.

I am bewildered by the fact that on many philosophy channels on the internet and YouTube there seems to be more material on Nietzsche than almost any other thinker and he's had an enormous influence also on writers, artists and psychology. — Ross Campbell

Maybe you should investigate the ideas of some of these writers, artists and psychologists. Let’s
start with Keiji Nishitani, a Japanese philosopher who integrated Buddhist and Western thought.

“Nishitani distinguishes between these two kinds of groundlessness because his fundamental point is that
European thought in its largely successful critique of objectivism has become trapped in nihilism. Here
Nishitani's assessment of our situation actually follows Nietzsche's. As we mentioned in chapter 6, nihilism
arises for Nietzsche when we realize that our most cherished beliefs are untenable and yet we are
incapable of living without them. Nietzsche devoted considerable attention to the manifestation of
nihilism in our discovery that we do not stand on solid ground, that what we take to be an absolute
reference point is really an interpretation foisted on an ever-shifting impersonal process. Nishitani deeply admires Nietzsche's attempt but claims that it actually perpetuates the nihilistic
predicament by not letting go of the grasping mind that lies at the souce of both objectivism and nihlism.
Nishitani's argument is that nihilism cannot be overcome by assimilating groundlessness to a notion of the
will-no matter how decentered and impersonal. Nishitani's diagnosis is even more radical than Nietzsche's, for he claims that the real problem with Western nihilism is that it is halfhearted: it does not consistently follow through its own inner logic and motivation and so stops short of transforming its partial realization of groundlessness into the philosophical and experiential possiblities of sunyata.” (The Embodied Mind)

Nietzsche was not a very happy man, so what wisdom did he possess? — Tzeentch

He wasn’t wise enough to know that all unhappy people are stupid.

Our desire for the ideal, kills us. We set aside the thing-in-itself because we can not have it on our terms. In our weakness we destroy our world because we can't know it with certainty, and give ourselves the pity of our own reason. It is the humanization of epistimology. — Antony Nickles

When our desire is for the ideal , even when we set aside aside the thing-in-itself we are still presupposing it. It is our belief in the ideal that kills us. As Nietzsche argued , the ascetic ideal, which motivates scientific truth as well as moral values as striving toward the good and the perfect, is a kind of death in that it is a desire for sameness , changelessness ,perfect self-presence.

If our guidance is changing, in flux, and becoming, then we are getting near and approximating; bettering, perfecting. Maybe this time with a greater attention to observation, and with this knowledge that we will never be perfect and timeless. — Antony Nickles

Are you talking about perfection as the thing in itself , as an asymptotic ideal? The thing about notions of progress and approximation toward a telos is that , while we may never ‘be’ perfect’ , the reality of the perfect and the timeless is presupposed. Perfecting, approximating, developing, evolving all imply a telos or center that defines the movement. There must always be a basis on which the evolution unfolds , a basis which stands outside of the contingent and relative history that is organized around the basis. The unfolding moments of the progress are variations of a theme, and the theme (the good, god, the divine, the moral) is protected in its sense from contamination and alteration. Thus, the notion of progress and the divine are indissociable.

Nietzsche and writers like Heidegger, Deleuze and Derrida asked how the good, the perfect, the telos of a progress , are able to reside outside time and history. Their conclusion was that nothing can reside outside time and history, and that the belief in the stability of the telos of perfecting is the result of an idealizing tendency in human thought.

is pulling out the carpet really the point?So are we left without 'forms' or 'things'? without morals, rules, words? — Antony Nickles

The point isnt pulling out the carpet. Post -structuralism , deconstruction and Will to Power don’t eliminate structures, they reveal the movement within and between structures that prevents the justification of the basis of a progress. There is always a carpet ( value posturing) underneath, which emerges non-deductively and non-causally from a previous carpet. It provides the temporary and relative stability of cultural, ethical and scientific norms, as well as the sense of a progress according to the normative values it lays down. It is then succeeded by a new carpet , with new and different moral values, and this process is endless, an eternal return of the same contingent, relative carpet in a new guise. If there is a moral impetus here , it is in the celebration of the movement itself , the imperative not to let oneself fall prey to any particular value system or notion of ‘perfection’ but to delight-suffer in the process of endless carpet installation. As Derrida says, ther is always an other heading, installed in and intrinsic the the present heading. This is an absolute other , beyond calculation and beyond all thought of perfection.

I think Van Gogh poisoned him.

He had syphilis,
— frank
Maybe not. — tim wood

This was discussed a bit earlier in the thread.

https://www.smh.com.au/world/nietzsche-died-of-brain-cancer-20030506-gdgprc.html?js-chunk-not-found-refresh=t — Joshs

without Nietszche you don't have Wittgenstein; the idea of looking at a fictitious history as a case to learn the ins-and-outs of something; the idea of the ordinariness of our concepts, that they come from a place in our lives; that our concepts are not precise and fixed... — Antony Nickles

I certainly agree with this , but I think Nietzsche went where Wittgenstein was unable to go. Witt remainded a deeply moralistic person his whole life, not in a traditional religious sense, but in a Kierkegaardian sense.

I think it's too simplistic to say Nietszche is doing away with it or replacing it; he finds there is no "human" history or recognition of our part in the creation or our misuse of morals to judge people. If he is taking it apart, it is to see our part in it. — Antony Nickles

If you substitute ‘grounding moral values’ for truth in the passages below, you arrive at my interpretation of Nietzsche’s deconstruction of morality.

“The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not fact but fable and approximation on the basis of a meager sum of observations; it is "in flux," as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for--there is no "truth" (Nietzsche 1901/1967 Will to Power)

“…the origin of the emergence of a thing and its ultimate usefulness, its practical application and incorporation into a system of ends, are toto coelo separate; that anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it; that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former ‘meaning' [Sinn] and ‘purpose' must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated.

No matter how perfectly you have understood the usefulness of any physiological organ (or legal institution, social custom, political usage, art form or religious rite), you have not yet thereby grasped how it emerged: uncomfortable and unpleasant as this may sound to more elderly ears,– for people down the ages have believed that the obvious purpose of a thing, its utility, form and shape, are its reason for existence, the eye is made to see, the hand to grasp. So people think punishment has evolved for the purpose of punishing. But every purpose and use is just a sign that the will to power has achieved mastery over something less powerful, and has impressed upon it its own idea [Sinn] of a use function; and the whole history of a ‘thing', an organ, a tradition can to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretations and adaptations, the causes of which need not be connected even amongst themselves, but rather sometimes just follow and replace one another at random.” (Genealogy of Morality)

What is left of the coherence of the concept of god , the good, or morality if such values are mere contingent and relative moments in a genealogical history utterly without ultimate propose or aim , whose successive phases and eras ‘just follow and replace one another at random’?

I'm not sure this is such a black-n-white fight. — Antony Nickles

I agree with this too. I’m just declaring my support for post structuralist readings of Nietzsche ( Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida) as opposed to existential interpretations.

If you 'aspire' to a specific idea of what it is to be virtuous, you are abdicating the opportunity and responsibility to be a better you. Also a moral moment may be lost on you if you feel you are a good person because you have done what has been decided beforehand by others long ago. — Antony Nickles

This sounds consistent with the moral perspectives of Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and Levinas (and Caputo, Critchley and Sheehan) , because it still makes the idea of
god coherent. I read Nietzsche as deconstructing this thinking.

Martin Luther King was a pretty squeaky wheel. [gratuitously provocative] I also don't remember that the suffragettes burned down any buildings[/gratuitously provocative]. — T Clark

MLK’s political movement was based on enlightenment individualistic liberalism, which assumed that one must appeal to the reason of each individual, rather than assuming a socially based shaping of subjective views. But this appeal to reason only went so far. Specifically, it preached mostly to the choir and those on the fence , convincing those already inclined to be sympathetic to such values. Note that it did not convince most who were opposed to the civil rights movement , which is why it took the ‘incivility’ of the national guard to end segregation. I suppose the incivil wokists would point to this hypocrisy , appealing to individualist reason but using miltancy to enforce it.
If the success of MLK’s movement is to be judged by its popularity, then by that standard blm and crt are wildly successful , given that only 30 years ago a tiny handful of scholars were advocating its theoretical foundations and now it has become standard rhetoric in most universities and in many large corporations . I don’t think its languaged of incivility will persuade the opposition any more than MLK’s appeal to reason , but like that prior movement , it will grow. of its own accord among the like-minded. You may despise it, but your children will likely be more disposed toward it. Why? Because despite its excesses , it captures truths missing from MLK’s approach.

Calls for civility seek to evade our calls for change. The accusation of incivility is a technique of depoliticization aimed at undoing collectivity. We do not need to debate civility; we need to clarify, expand, and intensify our demands.

I'd like some more examples from mainstream political discourse. — Tom Storm

Here’s my take. There are two routes to follow in countering this ‘incivility as radicalism’ thinking. The first is to reject it and simply stick with traditional individualism. I don’t think this is a good choice for two reasons. First, there are certain valuable insights about the limits of individualism imbedded within wokeness perspectives. Second, it is not going to go away by itself and will instead eventually become assimilated widely within the culture. The best way to counter it is to go beyond it , to take what is valuable in it and move further.
It is still too closely tied to the Marxist critique of individualist moralism , which manages to replicate it by substituting for it a collectivist moralism( implicit bias, privilege, etc). To move beyond it is to no longer accept either individualist imperialism or the tyranny of dominating (economic) social structures. Instead one can recognize that we all are shaped by social structures but interpret these influences via a point of view.

In the article, incivility is firstly defined as anger, as an act of outrage. https://socialtextjournal.org/eleven-theses-on-civility/
"Incivility is anger directed at unjust civil ordering. — Number2018

Where do you think blame and moralism fit into this act of ‘outrage’ against ‘ injustice’?

Specifically , do you think it is what Ken Gergen is critiquing as the moralistic blamefulness and indignation of identity politics? Would anger, outrage and condemnation apply if one throughly rejects the ethical foundationalism on which rightness and justice are grounded?

Why can’t we follow Gergen’s lead and jettison the outrage in favor of a throughly relativistic approach to societal transformation?

“By and large identity politics has depended on a rhetoric of blame, the illocutionary effects of which are designed to chastise the target (for being unjust, prejudiced, inhumane, selfish, oppressive, and/or violent). In western culture we essentially inherit two conversational responses to such forms of chastisement - incorporation or antagonism. The incorporative mode ("Yes, now I see the error of my ways") requires an extended forestructure of understandings (i.e. a history which legitimates the critic's authority and judgment, and which renders the target of critique answerable). However, because in the case of identity politics, there is no preestablished context to situate the target in just these ways, the invited response to critique is more typically one of hostility, defense and counter-charge.

In its critical moment, social constructionism is a means of bracketing or suspending any pronouncement of the real, the reasonable, or the right. In its generative moment, constructionism offers an orientation toward creating new futures, an impetus to societal transformation. Constructionist thought militates against the claims to ethical foundations implicit in much identity politics - that higher ground from which others can so confidently be condemned as inhumane, self-serving, prejudiced, and unjust. Constructionist thought painfully reminds us that we have no transcendent rationale upon which to rest such accusations, and that our sense of moral indignation is itself a product of historically and culturally situated traditions. And the constructionist intones, is it not possible that those we excoriate are but living also within traditions that are, for them, suffused with a sense of ethical primacy? As we find, then, social constructionism is a two edged sword in the political arena, potentially as damaging to the wielding hand as to the opposition.”(Social Construction and the Transformation of Identity Politics)

Pop music may be different from classical in that pop trends change rapidly with the social zeitgeist. It seems a large percentage of pop artists lose team by the time they reach 40, and I think this may be due to two factors. First, the r aeros are carrying forward a sensibility, attitude and approach to the world that remains relevant and edgy up to the point where a younger generation of musicians more effectively taps into the new zeitgeist. Thus the Beatles(as a group and then as solo artists) Stones and Dylan remained relevant as they continually reinvented themselves , up until the point where they couldn’t keep up with the new trends. But this doesn’t explain why they cannot keep churning out highest quality ‘classic rock’ that their older fans would still find great, instead of sounding increasingly derivative and bland. I think this may be because certain creative fields are more suited to younger than to older artists. That is , the ‘has-been’ older pop musician continues to evolve as a person , but it becomes more and more difficult to convey this personal growth in terms of powerful sounding music. (They say that mathematics is is a young person’s field also. )
Philosophy , on the other hand , privileges those who are in their 30’s and 40’s. In Kant’s case, it was his 7th decade. A common. trajectory for at least some philosophical writers is to move from the more concrete and systematic style in the early years to the more ‘spiritual’ and poetic in the later years. Perhaps pop music doesn’t lend itself to the more murky and abstractive modes of thought that comes with older age.

I hold a relativistic outlook, and I see my positions as being products of my psychology, personality, experiences, education, culture and so on. — Judaka

I don't agree with why they say civility is no longer appropriate. — Judaka

As I suggested earlier in this thread, I suspect that it may not be possible to locate the way in which incivility is being intended in the op unless one connects it with a series of discourses that run through neo-Marxism, critical theory and post-structuralist writing. Put differently, it would be a question of differentiating between your brand of relativism and understanding of the role of social influence , and what I suspect is a more radical shift away from individualism toward a thoroughgoing socially constructed notion of subjectivity that the op is pointing to.

Translation: it pisses people off when their good intentions are being attacked and condemned on the basis of accusations of agendas of hegemony , privilege, domination and bias that is supposedly hidden and implicit in the idea of individualistic civility.

I’ll say

The way I read the op, the incivility that is in contention is a product of the discourse being advocated , which takes subjectivity to be a product of sociallly constituted dynamics. Thus terms like privilege, hegemony, oppression and colonization are deemed appropriate to describe behaviors and thoughts which are otherwise assumed to be the product of individual understanding. So the ‘ ‘ ‘incivility’ is to dare to accuse the individual
of unknowingly being in thrall to dominating powers

"liberals individuate; radicals collectivize" — StreetlightX

I would like to point to two types of ‘radicalized’ or collectivized thinking. The first hews closer to Marx than to Foucault and even maintains remnants of Christian moralism. It does so by seeing power as held by certain collectives. Foucault, instead, sees only differentials of force that flow though , form and reform subjectiviities as a social process, but are never merely possessed by individuals or collectives. Why is this difference important for the political understanding of incivility? I think the Marxist-inspired radicalism relies on a blameful finger-pointing moralism. If power can be invested i. groups , then those groups can be seems morally culpable band treated as such. This is the condemnation and accusation that those accused of injustice perceive as incivility.

An example of the non-moralizing radical alternative that comes to mind is Ken Gergen’s socialconstructivist approach.

In 1999 he penned an article about identity politics:.

“By and large identity politics has depended on a rhetoric of blame, the illocutionary effects of which are designed to chastise the target (for being unjust, prejudiced, inhumane, selfish, oppressive, and/or violent). In western culture we essentially inherit two conversational responses to such forms of chastisement - incorporation or antagonism. The incorporative mode ("Yes, now I see the error of my ways") requires an extended forestructure of understandings (i.e. a history which legitimates the critic's authority and judgment, and which renders the target of critique answerable). However, because in the case of identity politics, there is no preestablished context to situate the target in just these ways, the invited response to critique is more typically one of hostility, defense and counter-charge.

In its critical moment, social constructionism is a means of bracketing or suspending any pronouncement of the real, the reasonable, or the right. In its generative moment, constructionism offers an orientation toward creating new futures, an impetus to societal transformation. Constructionist thought militates against the claims to ethical foundations implicit in much identity politics - that higher ground from which others can so confidently be condemned as inhumane, self-serving, prejudiced, and unjust. Constructionist thought painfully reminds us that we have no transcendent rationale upon which to rest such accusations, and that our sense of moral indignation is itself a product of historically and culturally situated traditions. And the constructionist intones, is it not possible that those we excoriate are but living also within traditions that are, for them, suffused with a sense of ethical primacy? As we find, then, social constructionism is a two edged sword in the political arena, potentially as damaging to the wielding hand as to the opposition.”(Social Construction and the Transformation of Identity Politics)

“For are we not all, in a Bakhtinian sense, akin to polyphonic novels, speaking in multiple voices, reflecting multiple traditions? If we inherit a pluralism of moral intelligibilities, on what grounds could we select among them - save from the standpoint of yet another inherited intelligibility? And, finally, if moral deliberation is inherently cultural, then in what sense are we justified in holding individuals responsible for the humane society? Isn't individual blame thus a mystification of our condition of interdependence?

“If we do envision the impulse toward action as a byproduct of relational engagement, we may also refigure the institutions of blame and responsibility. For if we hold single individuals responsible for their actions, we again position ourselves symbolically as God - here the supreme judge of good and evil. And in our godlike form, we effectively deny our participation in the culture, treating ourselves as the overseeing eye, suspended above the acts of mortals. In contrast, if we envision action as a relational outcome, our sensibilities are horizontally recast. Specifically, a stance of relational responsibility is invited, one in which we approach heinous and egregious action with a curiosity of context. That is, we broaden the network of participation, to consider how the relationships in which the erring individual was involved (personal, mediated, and environmental) have brought about such an end. And, as we broaden the relational context so as to include multiple others, so should we consider their relationships and how they impinge on the actions in question. And if our concern is sufficiently great, we may eventually reach the point in which we realize our own complicity in the action. Blame and responsibility are thus distributed within the community, and indeed the culture. We are all invited thereby to join together in actions that would establish more promising future. (Here, for example, we might consider our own participation in the problem of drugs, rape, homicide, and joblessness).”(Relational Humanism)

Thanks This piece should be trotted out every time someone begins a thread about the primacy of physicalism.

I highly recommend this recent book by Thompson. In it he shows the relevance of phenomenology for the understanding of organismic functioning as well as cognition.

https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/610970/mod_resource/content/1/09%20-%20Evan_Thompson_-_Mind_in_Life~_Biology%2C_Phenomenology%2C_and_the_Sciences_of_Mind.pdf

In my view no foundation exists, only positivistic evolution (hopefully progress), so the question of grounding is moot. — Enrique

What they are arguing is that empirical nature is based on mathematicized objectivity, a concoction of Descartes and Galileo that amounts to a restricted view , a view with blinders on. It is an idealized scheme that doesn’t know it is a scheme, and instead thinks that it is without foundation. The fact that many scientists now say that they reject naive , metaphysical realism in favor of a representational realism indicates that they acknowledge science operates with foundational presuppositions which change over time. A number of social and psychological scientists are taking one step further and moving beyond the foundations guiding most in the hard sciences. The changes in philosophy of science over the centuries reflects changes in foundational scientific assumptions about objectivity , reality , subjectivity and their relations.

If you roll it up into a ball, you'll find that it bounces (if you've kept it chloral hydrated). — frank

I gave it to the kid at the 7-11 by mistake instead of my debit card. He asked me why I was giving him Nietzsche’s brain. I apologized profusely. Fortunately it turns out they honor it there. I even got a free Slurpee.

That's interesting, but we need a different source. Two of Dr Sax's books have been criticized for inaccurate information, misrepresentation, and distortion. — frank

I keep a slice of Nietzsche’s brain in my wallet, and it looks tumory to me.

“I think they should be confused”. A bit of poetic license here. I was trying to ward off attempts to distinguish between the two ( or between philosophy and literature , science, politics or religion) in rigidly categorical ways, as I’ve seem done often. But certainly all the writers I mentioned make a fundamental distinction between their philosophies and their psychologies. Husserl allows us to bracket off empirical psychology along with the physical body and the natural world, yet leave the philosophical grounding intact. The same is true of Heidegger. Their psychologies are relative and contingent derivations of their philosophies , but the reverse is not the case.

What is the relationship between perception and reason, how do these facets of the mind influence will and action? It has been shown that both can be explained in materialistic terms — Enrique

“Husserl showed that in order to reach the transcendental or foundational level, one must not rely on any of the areas of being or experience that one is trying to found or ground.

These areas that are founded but not foundational include psychology, anthropology, and the natural sciences, physics in a broad sense. Heidegger says the same thing in his Introduction to Being and Time. Therefore, if one claims that naturalism is foundational, then one is taking one of the founded areas of experience and making it foundational. But this move begs the question. It is a vicious circle. Naturalism refers to one region of being, the region of nature. As one region among many, like the human and the animate,
the ontological region of nature requires grounding. When one uses one of the things requiring grounding to be the ground, you are basically copying the foundation off the
founded. I have already alluded to this circular reasoning when we were discussing immanence and materialism.”
Leonard Lawler

https://www.smh.com.au/world/nietzsche-died-of-brain-cancer-20030506-gdgprc.html?js-chunk-not-found-refresh=true

He had syphilis, which is neurologically devastating. — frank

The new thinking is that he had a slow growing brain tumor.

“ A study of medical records has found that, far from suffering a sexually transmitted disease that drove him mad, Nietzsche almost certainly died of brain cancer.

The doctor who carried out the study claims that the universally accepted story of Nietzsche having caught syphilis from prostitutes was concocted after World War II by Wilhelm Lange-Eichbaum, an academic who was one of Nietzsche's most vociferous critics. It was then adopted as fact by intellectuals who were keen to demolish the reputation of Nietzsche, whose idea of a "superman" was used to underpin Nazism.”

https://www.smh.com.au/world/nietzsche-died-of-brain-cancer-20030506-gdgprc.html?js-chunk-not-found-refresh=true

why do you think he is neglected as a thinker? — Protagoras

Freud was and still is an important figure within continental philosophy. You’ll find mention of Freud or Freudian concepts built into the theoretical underpinnings of Woke political discourse. And of course , critical race theory is partly based on crucial theory , which incorporates elements of Freud.

The American psychological and psychiatric communities tend to be interested only in the narrowly clinical aspects of Freud’s writings. This tendency goes back to the first translations in English of his work, which shows the American bias for empiricism over the humanistic elements. For instance , ich was translated as ego esther than ‘I’.

Psychology and philosophy - as I am sure you realize - not to be confused. If science is about the how of things and philosophy about the truth of things, then what is psychology about? — tim wood

I think they should be confused, since there is so much overlap between them. Nietzsche called himself a psychologist , Husserl showed the close relationship
between his phenomenology and intentional psychology (calling his transcendental phenomenology the truely grounding science), psychologists like Gendlin and Kelly were also philosophers, using philosophical explication to make explicit what was implicit in their psychologies. To me making an inquiry more philosophical is just the process of turning what has been tacitly assumed into an articulated presupposition. Thus there are more and less ‘philosophical’ psychologies.