He had syphilis,
— frank
Maybe not. — tim wood

This was discussed a bit earlier in the thread.

https://www.smh.com.au/world/nietzsche-died-of-brain-cancer-20030506-gdgprc.html?js-chunk-not-found-refresh=t — Joshs

Migraine is a vascular problem, not cancer.

Point is, he went nuts.

I think Van Gogh poisoned him.

Lead paint. Damn!

The Antichrist comes across as psychology. Proto-Jungian. He wants to analyze the Savior type. He's not psychoanalyzing Jesus, but a type of idealism. He's explaining how idealism emerges out of human life. — frank

But this is philosophy, just maybe not a form (of argument?) we are used to seeing. Why must it take the form it does? If we can agree that he is analyzing idealism (whose? what form?), than what is it that goes wrong with this "emergence"?

If we can agree that he is analyzing idealism (whose? what form? — Antony Nickles

The whole idealistic spectrum, I think: subjective and objective. He's saying idealism is part of a large scale turn away from reality.

than what is it that goes wrong with this "emergence"? — Antony Nickles

He's saying it becomes a sort of cultural suicidal state.

Nietzsches prime benefit is that he umasks the psychology of the priestly type.

This type being a malevolent duplicitous class whose aim
Is political power over the masses. By using general morality and law as a cover for their machievellian statecraft.

His best books are twilight of the idols,beyond good and evil and the genealogy of morality.

His will to power notes are also very good,but seem to be unedited or not fully completed for publication.

In the anti christ are many good insights,but his reading of Christianity,buddhism, and jesus are nonsense.

He gets way too shrill and distorts his good work.

Some bits of the antichrist are hilarious.

Nietzeche was an aristocratic Elitist who wanted some kind of new rule by purposely breed ubermensch.

Did he not know that this has always been the case anyway and royalty even now rules politics?

Nietzsche for all his great psychological insights and insight into language is very naive and idealistic.

The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not fact but fable and approximation on the basis of a meager sum of observations; it is "in flux," as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for--there is no "truth" (Nietzsche 1901/1967 Will to Power) — Joshs

We could simply take away, 'there is no truth', but then why are 'we concerned'? maybe this is not a dismissal, but an observation and critique. If our guidance is changing, in flux, and becoming, then we are getting near and approximating; bettering, perfecting. Maybe this time with a greater attention to observation, and with this knowledge that we will never be perfect and timeless.

“…the origin of the emergence of a thing and its ultimate usefulness, its practical application and incorporation into a system of ends, are toto coelo separate; that anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it; that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former ‘meaning' and ‘purpose' must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated. — Joshs

And if we must 'interpret' again, there is no place outside of standing for a conclusion or description, though 'adjusted' and 'transformed'. So it can be a +/- determination about grounding moral values, but I only urge that is the first, not the last, of him. Yes, he is hammering away at the fixed, certain nature of Kant and Plato, but is that the conclusion?

people down the ages have believed that the obvious purpose of a thing, its utility, form and shape, are its reason for existence, the eye is made to see, the hand to grasp. So people think punishment has evolved for the purpose of punishing. But every purpose and use is just a sign that the will to power has achieved mastery over something less powerful, and has impressed upon it its own idea [Sinn] of a use function; and the whole history of a ‘thing', an organ, a tradition can to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretation and adaptations, the causes of which need not be connected even amongst themselves, but rather sometimes just follow and replace one another at random.” (Genealogy of Morality) — Joshs

And I know, 'at random' jumps out here, but before that is a restructuring of classical epistimology. A thing's rationality ('utility, form and shape') tells us it's 'purpose' (essence). And we take this as 'obvious' because we want everything to be certain and timeless and predetermined. So we skip over, as Wittgenstein notes as well, looking closely to investigate what the actual logic of a thing is, what sense does it make apart from our desires (which Heidegger picks up on). So, again, is pulling out the carpet really the point?

So are we left without 'forms' or 'things'? without morals, rules, words? No. But Nietszche shows us their history, their perspective, that they are used as much as essential. He does what another philosopher suggested, turn and see yourself reflected in the thing. But the clarion call is not kill God, but, do better! less seriously (seeking reason) and more joyously.

"than what is it that goes wrong with [human life such that idealism emerges]?"
— Antony Nickles

He's saying it becomes a sort of cultural suicidal state. — frank

We die by our own hand. Our desire for the ideal, kills us. We set aside the thing-in-itself because we can not have it on our terms. In our weakness we destroy our world because we can't know it with certainty, and give ourselves the pity of our own reason. It is the humanization of epistimology.

Cool post, thanks.

In the Antichrist, N treats a god as a sign of how people see themselves.

The issue about the weak is like:. two kids are playing in a playground, being watched by parents.

Both kids fall and stub their knees. One mom doesn't respond, so the kid gets up after crying for a while and moves on. The other mom exclaims and runs over to comfort her child.

N would say the second child has become the victim of pity. Instead of seeing injury and pain as part of life, he picks up on his mother's angst and comes to fear and condemn injury. — frank

That means, our esteemed Buddhist brothers and...er...sisters have got the wrong end of the stick for the past 2 millennia. That means, not only did someone 2000 years ago get it wrong, that someone's son, grandson, great grandson,...,present descendants who are Buddhists have all been living a lie. Someone should tell them!

On a more serious note, speaking for myself that is, Nietzsche's views seem rather computerish it feels too rational.

My logic is undeniable. — V.I.K.I (I, Robot)

In other words, a top of the line AI would've said the same thing Nietzsche said almost a century or so ago. I'm not certain though it sure feels that way.

I may be off-topic here but revisiting Buddhism - Nietzsche, I heard had a bone to pick with the deceased Gautama Buddha. Nothing unusual since the Buddha was, I fear, obsessing over suffering. Your tale of the mother, child, and pain fits like a glove with Siddhartha's own life if Buddhist history is even half-true. The mother's role though was played by the father, Suddhodhana if memory serves. In Nietzsche's eyes then Gautama Buddha was a sad figure - he was indeed truly suffering but not because, as he thought, life is suffering but simply due to the fact that his father was a Nietzschean fool who induced allodynia & hyperalgesia in the young impressionable prince. A case of the blind leading the blind! "Cura te ipsum" is probably the phrase Nietzsche would've chosen for The Enlightened One.

That said, I still feel Nietzsche is just a tad bit too similar to a machine than a human. We might have to, intriguingly, consider him a rogue AI like V.I.K.I in the movie I, Robot. Odd that! The AI takeover of the world seems to be well in progress instead of being, as believed, some time in the coming centuries. Just saying. Grain of sodium chloride recommended. I'm not sure anyway. G'day!

Another insight that Nietszsche had that was exceptional was in the small book after this one, "nietzsche contra Wagner.

In this book he explain Artists can be of two types.

Those who create from resentiment and those who create
From an excess of Joy.

Now this is a phenomenol and true insight.

But herr Nietzsche himself is writing from resentiment,so he fucks that one up.!

His division of noble and slave morality is also bogus and idealistic. What he called noble morality is still based on resentiment and lack.

If our guidance is changing, in flux, and becoming, then we are getting near and approximating; bettering, perfecting. Maybe this time with a greater attention to observation, and with this knowledge that we will never be perfect and timeless. — Antony Nickles

Are you talking about perfection as the thing in itself , as an asymptotic ideal? The thing about notions of progress and approximation toward a telos is that , while we may never ‘be’ perfect’ , the reality of the perfect and the timeless is presupposed. Perfecting, approximating, developing, evolving all imply a telos or center that defines the movement. There must always be a basis on which the evolution unfolds , a basis which stands outside of the contingent and relative history that is organized around the basis. The unfolding moments of the progress are variations of a theme, and the theme (the good, god, the divine, the moral) is protected in its sense from contamination and alteration. Thus, the notion of progress and the divine are indissociable.

Nietzsche and writers like Heidegger, Deleuze and Derrida asked how the good, the perfect, the telos of a progress , are able to reside outside time and history. Their conclusion was that nothing can reside outside time and history, and that the belief in the stability of the telos of perfecting is the result of an idealizing tendency in human thought.

is pulling out the carpet really the point?So are we left without 'forms' or 'things'? without morals, rules, words? — Antony Nickles

The point isnt pulling out the carpet. Post -structuralism , deconstruction and Will to Power don’t eliminate structures, they reveal the movement within and between structures that prevents the justification of the basis of a progress. There is always a carpet ( value posturing) underneath, which emerges non-deductively and non-causally from a previous carpet. It provides the temporary and relative stability of cultural, ethical and scientific norms, as well as the sense of a progress according to the normative values it lays down. It is then succeeded by a new carpet , with new and different moral values, and this process is endless, an eternal return of the same contingent, relative carpet in a new guise. If there is a moral impetus here , it is in the celebration of the movement itself , the imperative not to let oneself fall prey to any particular value system or notion of ‘perfection’ but to delight-suffer in the process of endless carpet installation. As Derrida says, ther is always an other heading, installed in and intrinsic the the present heading. This is an absolute other , beyond calculation and beyond all thought of perfection.

Our desire for the ideal, kills us. We set aside the thing-in-itself because we can not have it on our terms. In our weakness we destroy our world because we can't know it with certainty, and give ourselves the pity of our own reason. It is the humanization of epistimology. — Antony Nickles

When our desire is for the ideal , even when we set aside aside the thing-in-itself we are still presupposing it. It is our belief in the ideal that kills us. As Nietzsche argued , the ascetic ideal, which motivates scientific truth as well as moral values as striving toward the good and the perfect, is a kind of death in that it is a desire for sameness , changelessness ,perfect self-presence.

Are you talking about perfection as the thing in itself , as an asymptotic ideal? — Joshs

My point was, similar to when you say that "nothing can reside outside time and history", that we can not reside outside institutions, rules, words (our culture). But, with Nietszche, our culture as it stands needs to be transfigured (not abandoned). That is not teleological (you seem to see an inevitable tipping point here, "Perfecting, approximating, developing, evolving all imply a telos or center that defines the movement.") I frame it as perfectionism only as change and progress. The imagery (of the sun, of moving upward) and the enthusiasm he advises is not to a certain goal (Emerson would say we should live fuzzy in front). We join or re-write the social contract; we aspire to our (next) better self. I only wanted to try to show that he is not doing social commentary of our culture (except as an example); that he is writing in analytical contrast to Kant and Plato. He is humanizing that morality by introducing the context of the history of our interests and desires. The example is our desire for rationality to remove our responsibility, but he is showing us that we do (together/each) have interests and desires. In seeing that now (reflected in our moralism), I/we aim to do/be better. This is beyond the argument of grounded or not grounded; absolute or relative; goals, utility, ought.

Post-structuralism , deconstruction and Will to Power don’t eliminate structures — Joshs

Well there are a lot of people who take Nietszche to propose an individual (seen as selfish--"pitiless"--"dominating", "powerful") who is beyond morals (not just beyond good and evil); to imply that my instinct matters even if that means a zero-sum game. That a "new human" stands apart from (above) culture. I believe the interpretation comes from a desire to not be subject to society and the need to feel special, important (an excuse to hold their (internal) experience paramount).

When our desire is for the ideal , even when we set aside aside the thing-in-itself we are still presupposing it. — Joshs

I agree, that was my initial point. I would only say that this shows the importance of Wittgenstein's realization that in looking at everything individually on its own terms, in each case--not AN essence (universally)--we can recapture what we want from the thing-in-itself: what is important to us about something, how it matters, which we see in looking at its regular ordinary criteria (not abstracted or imposed). He could been seen as continuing this from Nietszche unearthing our unexamined purpose/desire in the creation and use of our morals.

he is showing us that we do (together/each) have interests and desires. In seeing that now (reflected in our moralism), I/we aim to do/be better. This is beyond the argument of grounded or not grounded; absolute or relative; goals, utility, ought. — Antony Nickles

Maybe you could elaborate what doing or being better means in the context of the contingency of values. What is an aim to do better outside of goals, utility, ought? What is an interest or desire if not normative , goal-oriented , anticipatory? Aren’t interests and desires the very essence of normativity? Is there
anything that thwarts our interests and desires? Could it be that time and history themselves thwart our desires and interests by transforming the basis of what we find interesting and desirable? In other words , isnt it presupposed in the very structure of interest and desire that we inevitably desire other than what we desire? That we aim for other than what we aim for? And how does this transform the meaning of ‘better’? Doesn’t betterment become otherwise than better?

Maybe you could elaborate what doing or being better means in the context of the contingency of values. What is an aim to do better outside of goals, utility, ought? What is an interest or desire if not normative , goal-oriented , anticipatory? — Joshs

Well this is a necessary demand for clarification, so thank you; these are the questions. If we do not give in to the weakness of abdicating our desire to the desire for certainty--a predetermined, timeless, universal; if we don't sublimate our attraction to the essence of a thing to a fixed, external explanation, then what are our interests, our desires?

It should be noted it is no small thing that Nietszche gets us to this point; and our anxiety to jump to an answer is what requires courage and joy to overcome. If we are now turned and see our reflection in our world, we can then consider our real need, what interests us (draws us, Heidegger will say). So our goal could be put as knowledge of ourselves, in the life we are a part of (Wittgenstein will call it Grammar). We could say: the difference between a value, and what we value; between what is the meaning, and what is meaningful. This is not a goal as an end or answer, it is a reoccurring question (for each type of thing) for which we are answerable--there is what is normal, and what we are prepared to stand apart for (even if seen as mad). Nietszche makes us see our part in our bankrupt morals and rallies us to revitalize them, fill them with us, rather than with our lack (pity) of what we wish we were.

I like that interpretation.

Being is becoming... overcoming... over man. Joy is the feeling of 'increase' in power, not the feeling of power itself. The point of the continually changing, non-fixed contingent values and goals, is the overcoming... or put in another, maybe somewhat cliche, way, it's the journey not the destination that matters.

Maybe you could elaborate what doing or being better means in the context of the contingency of values. — Joshs

For Freud, the goal is better functionality. We aren't trying to cure the psyche into a perfected state. There is no innocent angel down in there waiting to come out.

It's just the suicidal gorilla who needs to learn to accept what she is.

So was there a benefit to the Christian phase? Or was it just pointless?

Being is becoming... overcoming... over man. Joy is the feeling of 'increase' in power, — ChatteringMonkey

it's the journey not the destination that matters. — ChatteringMonkey

There are certainly plenty of Nietzsche interpreters who give it this existential spin. I prefer the poststructutalist readings. From that vantage , the increase in power belongs to the period within a particular value system, but Will to power as self-overcoming means that the basis of any ‘increase in power’ as defined by a particular value system must be overcome along with that value system. Put differently , life isnt an endless increase in power, it is power constantly overcoming its basis and therefore power starting anew with every shift in value system. So the journey isn’t the unfolding of variations on a theme , or an endless increasing of something, but an endless return of the ‘same’ unrepeatable values, goals , basis of power).
What one seems desirable changes along with changing values, so no criterion of power or its increase survives this becoming.

Nietzsche makes a crucial distinction between belief and the necessity of belief as such. When belief becomes necessary above all else:

then one has to bring reason, knowledge, inquiry into disrepute. (Anti-Christ 23)