I appreciate that this is a hypothetical, so it's not entirely right to question the premises that you've asserted as given, but we do need to consider the reality that Donald Trump (as an example) is not a reliable means for dispensing and withholding information based upon his reasonable assessment of what information can be handled by the populace.

And where I use "Donald Trump," I really mean anybody. This suggestion that information is controllable, and even if it were, that those controlling it have any idea what to do with it is a dubious notion. At the microcosm level of an office environment, for example, it seems impossible to control gossip, and those in charge of controlling it are particuarly bad at it. It's for that reason I find it hard to fathom how these alien beings have been able to surgically reveal their identity to the earthling leaders without tipping off any random jogger or pigeon feeder and those leaders then kept the information under wraps.

If that could happen, I would have much more trust in my government officials and I would likely be willing to submit to whatever gradual ontological shock process they thought was best because clearly they're playing 4-D chess that I cannot understand.

On the other hand, assuming most people are playing tic-tac-toe and sometimes even checkers, I would rather they just tell me everything at once because as they tried to control the information, all they would actually do is leak things they weren't supposed to and bring about confusion.

I'll go back to quaint adage of "thou shallt not lie," and just expect the people installed to represent the people to tell us the truth. It creates an interesting game to lie and dance around the truth, but the shit is going to hit the fan eventually, so maybe do it in a way that will maintain one's credibility once that happens. That is, I use ancient wisdom to answer your questions about futuristic dilemmas.

you are claiming that under Popper's thesis "that a scientific theory is one that can be falsified by empirical evidence," Logical Positivism and its Verification Principle meet the criteria required to be counted as a scientific theory? How so? How is the Verification Principle able to be falsified by empirical evidence? — Leontiskos

I wasn't arguing that Positivism meets the claim of a scientific theory in fact. I was saying it could in theory. This is a distinction between necessity and contingency.

The argument of the OP was that Positivism fails by necessity. It holds that it must be proved valid by empirical means to be sustained, and since it's lacking, it must fail.

My position is that Pooper's revision allows Positivism to be sustained until falsified, meaning it will survive contingent upon there being no facts falsifying it.

What makes it fail, as I alluded to, might be the lack of predictive value in such things as economic and psychological theories. That is the blow to Positivism I'd think meaningful, less so internal inconsistencies in its logic. That is, the proof is in the pudding of how it works.

I'd suggest, from what you've written, that positivism does not fail under the Popper revision of falsifiability you've described.

In other words, I followed positivism's failure to prove itself positively and affirmatively which was its internal definitional self destruction, but if you alter that to require that you must show where positivism fails to offer acceptable answers to our problems, then it is sustainable under Popper's revision, if the proper evidence can be shown.

What this means to me is that positivism's failure must be tied to its utilitarian failure to yield useful results as opoosed to just a devestating internal logical inconsistency in its basis.

That is, if you can show how psychological or economic models (for example) fail to offer consistently, predictable results, then that counts for me as a substantive blow against positivism as opposed to just an analytic attack on the self consistency of the theory.

agree, that counterfactuals are useful in some circumstances. Probably their usefulness is not as substantial as many people believe, because examples like yours, and Banno's, are pretty much useless examples, where counterfactual use just plunges us into imaginary worlds, with imaginary principles of connectedness, fantasy having no bearing on reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm going to end the conversation here because you're shifting to an allowance for modal logic, but now asserting just pragmatic irrelevance.

I simply disagree with this assessment, and I question the thoughtfulness of the comment. If you think classic logic has relevance, then you simply can't dispense with modal logic because modal logic opens itself to logical issues beyond what can be handled in classic logic. Hypothetical counterfactuals result in vacuous truths in classic logic, and that is why modal logic is needed.

I dont pretend there isn't nuance in these positions, but you don't elicit that nuance with your comments. You just hazard objections and see where they land, stubbornly insist upon the validity of your objections, and then eventually concede something or another to keep the conversation meandering.

With Wiiki, Google, the SEP, countless other online resources, and even ChapGpt to sort through all this, we should be able to engage in this conversation at a more elevated level and share among ourselves areas of real confusion. So maybe spend a few days on your own with an open mind toward understanding the basis of the modal logic enterprise before critiquing it.

But, I still don't see how you claim the nature of time is irrelevant to the application and interpretation of modal logic. Logic is useless if not applied to the real world, therefore the real nature of time is highly relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

What of the question: if I'd have missed the train, I'd have never met my future wife.

Do you not see how we might wish to assess that claim, despite it being temporally impossible for me to go back in time and miss the train, but it not being metaphysically impossible? That is, a possible world exists where I missed the train, but I actually caught it in the actual world.

We are assessing a real world concern - what might have been, despite that event not having happened. We call that a counterfactual. Where do counterfactuals occur? In possible worlds. Ta da!

You present me with two senses of "necessity" then you limit yourself to one. I accept temporal necessity, past things are fixed, but I reject metaphysical necessity. I accept that things could have been otherwise. How do you conclude that this means I reject modal logic? — Metaphysician Undercover

There was no ambiguity on my part, and no introduction by me of temporal necessity. That was your doing, and I indicated it had no bearing on our conversation.

My specific question was:

"@Metaphysician Undercover, do you agree p(x)⊃□p(x) (if something is true, it must necessarily be true)?"

This question is precise. The symbolic form cannot be interpreted as anything other than me asking your view on metaphysical necessity.

If you disagree with the proposition in the question, you allow for possible other worlds. If not, then not. If you think there can't be other worlds even if there are other possible outcomes in any given situation, then you make zero sense because that's what an other world is.

If the rigid designator signifies "the same object", when you are talking about two different objects (in different worlds or whatever) then the law of identity, is violated — Metaphysician Undercover

You're just showing the consequences of pure hard determinism. That is, If I would have worn a blue shirt and not the red one I actually wore, I would not be me because I am the thing that was to wear a red shirt. That's who I am. All properties in your analysis are essential, and there is no rigid me, so loss of the shirt I was to wear creates a whole new identity.

You're just performing a reductio of your own position and spelling out the consequences. If you're arguing against free will, then just be clear about it.

I agree that what is true is necessarily true, that is due to the nature of time, what has been done cannot be undone. And that's what I told Banno above, at the beginning of this post where I discuss "could have been different". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, you don't agree with the question I posed due to the nature of time because the nature of time has nothing to do with the question i asked.

Metaphysical necessity means things could not have been different -- full stop -- period. Temporal necessity means things are fixed once done.

So, standing at the Rubicon, must Cesaer cross? Just yes or no.

And of course that event is now in the past, but that doesn't change the analysis. Metaphysical necessity would mean it could not have been but the way it was. If that's what you're saying, you're speaking deterministic/ fatalistic language.

But, if you do agree with the statement p(x)⊃□p(x), even if it's for an invalid reason, you reject modal logic and you accept fatalism. That's just the necessary consequence.

I'm extremely aggressive with AI. That includes even when I ask for directions in my car. ChatGpt apologizes when I tell it t's a fucking moron, but Google Assistant chastises me.

I've found no long term repercussions, like neither hold a grudge nor act timid later They are both even tempered and emotionally well adjusted.

On the other hand, if I bump into my dog, I do apologize, although I'm not sure he understands manners like that.

If I bump a door, I never apologize, and I might even curse it, which I think is a good comparison to AI. There is a chance that one day the door will become conscious and it will slam the shit out of me in payback, but I find that probably unlikely.

Once, I kicked the door and I yelled "MOTHER" but I stopped myself because my then 2 year old was there, but he finished with his little kid voice and said "fucker." That just shows that how you treat others, including the inanimate, can reverberate throughout the world, including the corruption of an upcoming generation. Hopefully my son can break the cycle and not damage his children when he has them, but I'm not hopeful.

So his system is consistent, but useless for any sort of modal reasoning, and leads directly to fatalism. — Banno

Well, that frames the issue and maybe it's been asked before, but if not, allow me:

@Metaphysician Undercover, do you agree p(x)⊃□p(x) (if something is true, it must necessarily be true)?

If not, fill in the blank. if something is true, then _________.

Then it's not a true "rigid designator", if this means "the same individual". By the law of identity, "same" means having all the same properties, essential and accidental. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, here we just must agree to disagree. This is not what. I take as identity. Me in a red shirt is the me in a blue shirt. If you require this sort of identity, then we can't initiate a conversation of possible worlds for analysis of hypothetical claims.

Saying that they are "the same" when there is differences would be a violation of the law of identity, so the "rigid designator" violates the law of identity i it defines "the same" individual. — Metaphysician Undercover

You don't have two yous simultaneously in a given world. You're comparing separate workds.

If we let go of this idea, that the imaginary thing has an identity, — Metaphysician Undercover

The fictionalization of the multiple worlds is assumed for the purposes of performing the logic (except by some who take rather extreme untenable views), meaning you're attempting to impose far too much ontological status on the worlds .

Let's forget this possible worlds interpretation of modal logic for the moment, — Metaphysician Undercover

Well sure, you can dispense with all formal logic and still make decisions, argue, and philosophize fully. The point of symbologic logic is to create a methodology to test your reasoning, but if we forget the whole rigamarole, I agree, that does simplify our discussion about whether to grab an umbrella.

Maybe this will help:

It is necessarily true that if someone is a person, then they are a physicist.
Einstein is a person.
It is necessarily true that Einstein is a physicist.

This is modal logic. See what just happened? If we necessitate a rigid designator across all worlds onto a non-essential trait, we elevate a contigent statement into a necessitated one and we destroy modal logic by eliminating hypothesizing what Einstein might have been in another world.

What this means is that the law of non-contradiction is not violated when you have an Einstein across different worlds because the entire modal structure demands he be different across differing worlds in non-essential ways.

And you guys feel free to disagree with me as well. I'm sorting it out in real time too.

If we interpret two possible worlds, one with rain, and one without rain, with "I" as a rigid designator, then the law of noncontradiction is violated, because "I" gets wet and does not get wet, at the same time. The qualification of "different worlds" is just a facade to hide the contradiction. If we look at what Banno called "counterpart theory", then we have no continuity of the object "I", from the present time into the future, only possible similar objects in the future, therefore the law of identity is not applicable. — Metaphysician Undercover

The claim that "I get wet and do not get wet" violates the law of noncontradiction misunderstands how modal logic works. These are not simultaneous truths in a single world, but distinct evaluations across possible worlds, which is actually the reason modal logic exists. The law of noncontradiction applies within worlds, not between them.

Additionally, the entirety of the "different worlds" enterprise must be jettisoned and the resultant collapse of modal logic as well if we follow out your logic. The term "different" as applied here by you includes any dissimilarity whatsoever, even the simple fact they are in different locations. That is, it is impossible under your reasoning to have any metaphysically related universes because everything within each one would be relevantly different.

To make my point clearer: Suppose you had Universe #1, and within it you get wet and in Universe #2, you also get wet. In fact, every single thing within #1 and #2 are the "same," they would still not bear any metaphysical relationship to each other because they are all necessarily different since they occupy different time and space. That is, #1 and #2 do not collapse into being the same thing because they are not identical under your view. They are just curiously similar.

When we chart out all possible worlds, under your reasoning, an infinite number could be the same in every apparent regard because you deny the concept of rigid designation in theory.

This is to say that if you deny a rigid designation for "I," you must do it for all things. That means that not only does the fact that you're not the same you in #1 and #2, the rain isn't the same in #1 and #2. They must be different. You can't have a different you in #1 and #2 and share the same rain. When we say it will rain in #1, while that sounds like any old generic rain will do, if we were being more precise, we'd describe the exact identity of the rain that would strike you in #1 versus #2.

This I suggest is the logical consequence of demanding cross universe consistency.

This is why @Banno brings in counterpart theory, which holds there is a similar counterpart in another universe that satisfies the conditions needed to perform the modal logic. It dispenses with the impossible mental gymnastics needed to comprehend what it could possibly mean to have identical entities in different locations at the same time, when location is a component of identity. This concept of possible worlds is injected to expand our epistimological understanding of the hypothetical, but, if taken literally, it cannot be sustained because there really aren't multiverses outside of science fiction.

All of this is just to say:even if we allow for a rigid designator of "I" across multiverses, that does not create a contradiction as long as we assume contradiction applies only intra-universe and not inter-universe.

But back to the classic versus modal logic discussion:

If in classic logic I say:

All glurgs are glogs
I am a glurg
Therefore I am a glog

That is true, despite the fact there is no referent for any of this gibberish. That is why we can use symbols to represent these entities because their existence is irrelevant for the analysis.

Under modal logic we say:

It is necessary all glurgs are glogs
It is possible I am a glurg
It is therefore possible I am a glog

This is true as well, purely from a formal level, despite there are no glogs here, there, are anywhere.

The issue then becomes providing a definition of "possible," as you allow for pure meaningless formality under classic logic but not under modal logic. Since "possible" is the only new thing inserted, that must be the reason you treat these two systems different. What you then do is require metaphysical grounding in order for the possible to occur, but that I challenge. You no more need semantical validity for modal logic to work than classic. It's good to have semantically meaningful statements, but not required.

That is, the same tension occurs in classic logic. Typically those syllogisms do more than just mindlessly maintain truth value through vacuous symbols. Typically they have semantical truth, but not always. I would say the same of modal logic as well. But to demand that modal logic always be semantical results in its collapse, despite its pragmatic value. I think the discussion of impossible worlds makes that clear. You can use modal logic to consider events that did not and cannot occur.

My position is that we must fictionalize the idea of multiverses for the purposes of gaining epistimological clarity, without regard to whether they really exist. Maybe explain what is gained or lost by this approach.

Then that's well clarified. I balk though at condemning my Christian brethren who adhere to a theology that includes a belief in eternal punishment under certain conditions.

As long as we agree that it is the act that defines the person, it hardly matters what supernatural belief motivates it.

They sacrificed them to the gods?

Seems we have broad agreement. — Banno

Since your gold standard is how one acts and we both advocate for the same acts, what else can you do to sustain the tension between religion and secular beliefs other than to (1) insist my religious beliefs are founded upon an overly benevolent misunderstanding of my own theology or (2) just declare me an abberation, an oddly secularly moral theist, a diamond in the rough

It is possible you know that its simply that religion isn't a malevolent force.

It's interesting, as I'd think on a religious forum there's probably an atheist right now who just can't get any theist to accept that his atheism doesn't make him a bad person.

Then continue your conversation with ChatGPT and ask it for Jewish interpretations that it stands for repudiation of human sacrifice and then have it compare that to your other post. Then argue with it and have it change its mind.

It has such poor resolve I find

But then ask it whether the Abrahamic religions prohibit human sacrifice and have it compare those views to secular views over time and see whose history is more admiral.

My point will remain: no strranger in the midst of an Abrahamic community need worry about their kinfolk being burned to the gods. How the Jews in particular might fair in the midst of strangers on the other hand, not always so well.

But I'm not presenting any of this claiming superiority of culture or belief. We all have the same potential for kindness. I'm just trying to make that point, and that intolerance of religion based upon special fear of its brand of evil isn't justified

I'm not sure why you would disregard authorial intent. — BitconnectCarlos

We don't know who the author was. I look at the interpretation of those who've used the document. I'm not discarding historical analysis. I'm relying upon it heavily.

This is a political question, but my answer would be no. Admittedly, my perspective is shaped by my theology, and I can understand how others might disagree. — BitconnectCarlos

Here's my question. If Abraham would have killed Isaac and burned him as an offering to God and that account was consistly interpreted as a prohibition against child sacrifice, resulting in the end of that practice for good, would it matter what other literal translations could have been made?

Meaning is use. And it's for that reason all this contemporary interpretation that decontextualizes the thousands of years preceding say nothing other than if we were the interpreters, we would have come up with pretty evil conclusions.

The interpreters did not do that. They looked for meaning, purpose, and morality. If someone wishes to say they shouldn't have falsely attributed their wisdom to a self-declared holy book in order to provide their wisdom divine status, then I wish that would just be said as opposed to explaining what the right way of interpreting should have been had the interpreters just have been better literalists.

Nuh. Instead of worrying about meaning, worry about what folk do. I'm not asking folk to burn their book, just that they not to use it as an excuse for abominations. — Banno

Nuh, instead of worrying about using a book as an excuse for abominations, worry about what folk do. I'm not asking folk to use anything as an excuse for abominations, just that they not commit abominations.

(Cleaned it up to avoid special pleading, so as to remove the suggestion that there's some rule particular to the Bible that doesn't apply universally).

Is wisdom found in the book, — Banno

Meaning is in your head. Squiggly symbols are the book. Authorial intent is irrelevant.

Let us suppose you read a book, used it to form moral analysis, to form charitable works, used it to form community, used it to form positive identity, do you destroy all that you created if you later learn it was meant as nothing more than a book of humorous tales?

And you needn't point out all could have been done without it because that doesn't justify removing it.

Agree, although Dan McClellan argues that the earliest layers of the Hebrew Bible are supportive of human sacrifice. I mention this because McClellan is prominent in biblical scholarship today. — BitconnectCarlos

Interesting, but not surprising. In the earliest passages, it wasn't monotheistic and gods procreated with humans to form monsters, so God wiped out the planet with a flood.

So you could have written the Bible in a way that better represented God, a blown opportunity by the author to have described God as a testing being, teaching by temptation. I'm not sure that's consistent with the greater story line of our sometimes flawed protaganist Yahweh.

I don't take the Bible as the inerrant word of God, and so pointing out better ways it could say things doesn't prove much other than we don't have a divine document.

As to the question of whether it is the source or horrors, less so than other laws documents, maybe more so than others. What is the bigger point you wish to make? Do I discard the wisdom extracted over the millenia because you can show me it's not the perfect book?

No, I am merely distinguishing between murder and the institution of sacrifice. God lets us know very early on that murder (including the murder of animals) is wrong. Yet animal sacrifices were offered throughout the Second Temple era and were offered by many of the forefathers. Giving an animal as a sacrifice is not the same as murdering it, even though the animal is slaughtered in both. — BitconnectCarlos

This is just legalistic stuff, but for what it's worth, retzach is the type of killing forbidden in the Torah. It is not a universal prohibition against killing humans (as killing in war and self defense are examples of lawful killing). That word does not relate to the killing of animals. That is, you can't "murder" an animal, but it is forbidden to kill an animal for the purposes of causing it suffering.

There are laws against sacrifice (referred to as "passing through fire"), but I'd think sacrifice would be a form of retzach, but also a particularly forbidden type. I'm not saying the distinction isn't relevant, but I do think that human sacrifice is a form of retzach, among other things.

The Isaac story is generally viewed by Jews as further support that human sacrifice is forbidden. There are other passages that forbid human sacrifice. There is not a reasonable interpretation that it is supportive of human sacrifice.

Christians see it similarly, but also as foreshadowing Jesus's life, death, and ressurection, a human sacrifice of a child directly of God, brought to earth to purge humanity of its sins. A metaphorical sacrificial lamb.

This strengthens the idea that Isaac was a willing participant. — BitconnectCarlos

Kierkegaard's focus wasn't as much on Isaac's acceptance of his fate as it was on Abraham's pure faith in not resisting or questioning God. Since I see the story as metaphor, what is it that is added by concentrating on Isaac's complicity? There is no evidence Isaac knew the sacrifice was God's will, so what do we say about Isaac that he did whatever his father asked without question? Abraham was over 100 years old at the time. Isaac would have easilly taken him.

It's not murder, it's ritual sacrifice. Nothing in the text suggests Isaac resisted or didn't cooperate. Many interpretations portray him as a willing participant. — BitconnectCarlos

I don't understand this comment. Are you suggesting that ritual sacrifice by wililng participants is ok? Seems like something we would want to eliminate. Whether it falls within the purview of "murder" is a very legalistic concern that ignores the fact that it's highly immoral regardless of how we pedantically classify the act.

If, though, you want to go down the path of drawing factual distinctions (as in Isaac might have wanted his throat slit), there's also good argument Isaac was in his 30s at the time, meaning he wasn't even a child.

Notwithstanding all of this, the best argument is that under no hermeneutic has any Abrahamic religion used the binding story to suggest infanticide or sacrificial killing was morally justified. In fact the story is typically used as the opposite, which explains why Abrahamic religions prohibit human sacrifice clearly and historically, without exception. Infanticide has been more common in secular societies (although still largely forbidden), particularly Victorian Britain in the 1800s and China very recently, meaning we as a people have found all sorts of ways to do horrible things. In this instance of infanticide and ritualistic killing, the Abrahamic religions happen to have a much more admirable history though.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infanticide

But generally I read the comment your responded to more innocuously, as in it was indicating that child murder is condemnable under any scenario, which I'd agree to.

It appears like you understand this quite well, now try to convince Banno of this. Banno does not admit that incompatibility, and this is what supports fatalism. Yet Banno also denies fatalism, and that is a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Alright, I'll set out the basics and tell me where we disagree:

The fatalism issue arises in classic logic and is cured by modal logic. As in:

Classic Logic:

1. If it rains tomorrow, I will get wet
2. It rains tomorrow
I get wet

The fatalistic issue arises from fixing #2 as certain

Modal Logic (assuming both premises apply within the same possible world):

1. It is necessary that if it rains tomorrow, I will get wet
2. It is possible that it will rain tomorrow
It is possible I will get wet.

There is no fatalism because #2 is possible, not necessary.

Modal logic adds in two new qualifiers ((1) it is necessary, and (2) it is possible) that allows for the avoidance of fatalism. This cures the limitation of classic logic.

Are you saying that Banno is denying fatalism within classic or modal logic? I'm just trying to figure this out because you referenced Banno's other comments generally and I have no way of really figuring out what that refences because I've been bouncing in and out of this thread.

Let's say you were up with Moses on Mount Sinai. What would need to transpire for you to become a believer? — BitconnectCarlos

This conflates two sorts of faith: (1) faith in God's existence and (2) faith in God's guidance.

Recall the biblical account. The Israelites were present at Mt. Sinai, and they had seen the miracle of the plagues, water from rocks, bushes burning unconsumed, manna from heaven, and seas parting. Despite this evidence, they became restless at Moses' absence while in the process of receiving the 10 Commandments and built a golden calf.

They lacked "faith," but they never questioned God's existence. How could they? He was as obvious as anything before them.

They lacked faith in his guidance and so they disobeyed.

Today's lack of faith, doubting the very existence of God, would be absurdly anachronistic in a biblical setting.

My point is asking why faith #1 is at all worth having without #2? What do you do with this cosmic discovery? You've found a new planet, you've found God, and you found your missing keys. Seems like there's a whole lot more to this faith thing that has us all talking about it.

If you insist that modal logic fails because of its failure to adhere to classical logic standards related to ontological status, then you will be de facto rejecting modal logic. Modal logic admits to the incompatibility noted by Aristotle and responds to it, so I don't know how to respond other than to say if you want modal logic to act like classic logic you can't have model logic.

In any event, give me a syllogism in modal logic you feel fails by giving an illogical result due to its adherence to modal logic standards and not classical so I can see concretely why you object.

How are you finding The Lonely Man of Faith? Would you recommend it? — BitconnectCarlos

It's good. It's heavy on Western philosophy which is unusual for a head of an Orthodox yeshiva. It also relies upon biblical metaphor, which gives it greater appeal than more strict literal readings would (although no doubt the Rav is a strict believer).

In sum, the two creation stories reveal two different Adams, the first a scientific acheiver and builder, the second an internally driven person seeking meaning. Man is both Adams, but society values only the former, resulting in lonliness, with meaning given no value.

David Lewis appears to argue differently than me in my response to @Metaphysician Undercover above, where Lewis asserts that modal possibilities are real. Do you take this position or do you accept the position I've submitted where they are just abstractions (which seems to the be predominate view from what I've seen). I can't see what Lewis' approach adds by creating these empirically unprovable extra worlds.

I'd also wonder what Lewis' response would be to counterpossible worlds, as in are there ontologically real impossibilities? Not only are there worlds where I wear a green hat, but there are worlds where I wear a green hat and not a green hat.

I think this kind of thinking does a disservice to the enterprise by inserting hopelessly confusing notions, but maybe it can be explained to me why modal realism beats modal abstractions.

I think musical forms represent a people's history. Like let's say things are tough, then their music might be melancholic, but then once they get drunk, they start singing along nonsense lyrics at bars.

The question is less about why the Egyptians don't sing like us than it is why we don't walk like them.

This future scenario, of me carrying an umbrella at 7AM tomorrow morning, is neither true nor false, and Aristotle described it as a violation of the law of excluded middle. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is classic logic, not modal logic, though, correct? I understand that if we're referrring to what might be we can't set it out in terms of what it currently is. The antecedent is conditional, and it is useful to logically determine an outcome on a possible world because we require that sort of logic to make our decisions.

I believe this is because the object, as thing spoken about, has no temporal extension into the future, and therefore has no identity in that direction beyond the present. To say that there is an object, with an identity, in the future, is a false proposition due to the reality of future possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your objection is that the hypothetical possibility is not ontological in existence and so you therefore cannot logically consider it? This I don't follow. Why can't we logically assess possible worlds that aren't actual worlds? This is the point of modal logic.

I have no problem with modal logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

You say this, but your objections are directed straight at it. You demand ontological reality upon your propositions prior to performing logical functions on them, which is an outright rejection of modal logic. You have a metaphysical demand you're placing upon a linguistic/logical function. You're playing the language game of classic logic and refusing to speak modal logic. That's fine, but it's not an objection about anything inconsistent with modal logic. It's just a refusal to accept it as a mode of reasoning.

This is just to say that if you insist upon actual worlds for the conditions to exist in to perform logic upon them, then you're refusing to consider possible worlds, which is what distinguishes classical and modal logic from one another.

My thoughts on this have returned to our A -> ~ A discussion, distinguishing the vacuous from the semantically meaningful.

One example I came across was Goldbach's Conjecture, which states " that every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of two prime numbers." This theory is not proven, thus a "conjecture."

So, consider this statement, "if Goldbach's theory is false, there is an even integer greater than 2 that cannot be expressed as the sum of two prime numbers."

This is a potentially impossible antecedent that offers a logical piece of information in the consequent.

It is modal in the hypothetical form, yet an impossible antecedent, yet not a vacously true consequent.

To the extent it might be suggested that an impossible world antecedent renders a meaningless or a vacuous consequent, I think has to be reconsidered.

The counter to this is perhaps these impossible antecedents are only resulting in definitional consequents and are obscured tautolgies, but, honestly I haven't thought long enough on it. But that feels like a possible lurking response and goes back to my prior comment about the seeming analytic quality of these statements.

That is, is the Goldbach consequent stated above synthetic or just analytically derived from the antecedent?

I'm sure someone has hashed this out somewhere.

An unusual phrasing, but I supose modal logic apples to impossible worlds and is what shows them to contain the contradictions that render them impossible. — Banno

There's an article on everything:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/impossible-worlds/#CouRea

Well it's not my original thinking. I got this from a Catholic Priest friend of mine and it sounded reasonable. I can't do much about your seemingly sour reaction to it. — Tom Storm

OK, then the Priest provided an ad hom, and you responded to my comment about an ad hom with another ad hom, suggesting it wasn't that it was an ad hom, but that i was just sour. Like I'm at all upset.

I actually think if theists feel this way, it is entirely understandable. No irony. — Tom Storm

The irony is that theists justify their judgment upon others based upon concern for their souls. You offered a similar concern for the souls of theists but from an atheist perspective.

My suggestion is that we stop being so concerned for each other's differing views. I trust wholly in the sincerity of your atheism, have no desire to modify it, and don't believe that but for some unfortunate circumstance you'd be different. Different strokes.

Speculating: I think some theists believe they have read all the right philosophy and theology and have many of the answers and that modern secular culture is debased and decadent. They're probably angry about the state of the world, and when they encounter people with views they've identified as the cause of contemporary troubles, they lash out. — Tom Storm

Explain how this isn't pure ad hom.

I say this because even if you're entirely right, it might be they're theists because theism is true.

It'd be like me opining that atheism is borne from trauma and alienation and whatever else sounds right. Wouldn't your response simply be, sure, all of that, but that you're atheist because that position is correct.

Not to mention it sounds like you care for the souls of the misguided. Ironic.

that was pornography — frank

You saw it too?

Who in their right mind would want to be a plumber? — frank

They make really good money and according to some videos I saw online, women really enjoy when they come over, but something seemed off about it.