but I find myself wondering why you would need to. — Jamal

Well now, curiosity killed the cat didn't it?

Actually, I could see no need for the entire database. There've just been times when I enter a thread and it's on page 12 or so and I'm Johnny come lately and I'd like to review it, and I hate to say, then maybe I could use AI to summarize where we are so that I could pick up and enter the fray without being repetitive to what's already been said.

So I was more envisioning an individual thread data download feature.

Will the old data be downloadable and searchable off line? I always thought that would be a cool feature.

Otherwise, I'd like to know precisely what "lounge-like and not chat-like" means. — Jamal

I really don't know yet, so I think we probably just have to let things develop and see. I guess what I think of when I think of a chatbox is an ongoing text group conversation, where the comments are brief and move back and forth quickly. That does describe the Shoutbox as it currently exists, although the comments can become longer and more involved, sometimes being used as a place to test out discussions as opposed to starting a thread. It's the longer conversations I wonder if will get lost under a chatbox feature. But, as you're describing the chatbox, it sounds like it might not have the limitations I've brought up.

The role of the Shoutbox has been discussed in the past (as in putting it on the main page versus relegating it to the Lounge where it had to be searched out), with some seeing it as an important feature to build and maintain community and others maybe seeing it as too much a diversion from real philosophy. I fall obviously into the former group, and so as long as the new site maintains that, it's really not that important how it looks and feels.

I also know that nothing is ever set in stone and that if something isn't working we can always discuss it later and figure it out. The Shoutbox as it currently exists was actually a work around after we lost the chatbox feature available under the old software. Click on the Shoutbox and go to the first page and you'll see a discussion of how we were trying to create what we lost.

I also thought the layout from the old site was better in certain ways (although it had countless bugs and unreliability problems) because it showed the categories and the posts by recency by each category and not just everything at once. What happens under our current system is that if 10 people come up with new religion posts (for example), the main board is overwhelmed with that and it looks like that's the ony thing being discussed. If posts are divided by category, that doesn't happen because you can just not pay attention to those categories you're not interested in. I don't know if the new software addresses that or not though.

It sounds like there is not anything our current software can do that the new software cannot do. If that's correct, then we can not only fully replicate what we had, but we can also add to it.

I say this in response to @Outlander, who is concerned that the Shoutbox as we know it will necessarily disappear with the introduction of a live chatbox. I would think (or suggest) that if there were a desire to start a thread that was lounge-like and not chat-like, that could be done?

If the two turned out the same, there'd be no need for both, but if there were an important difference, maybe have both, but that to be determined as we go along.

We'd have married had we met.

What is your worldview? How do you justify your worldview? — Truth Seeker

Assuming the following to be true, "Man's search for meaning is the primary motivation in his life and not a "secondary rationalization" of instinctual drives.” ― Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning.

My worldview seeks to address that primary motivation. How is a microscope a better tool for that than religion?

Yeah. Granted, I think a society does value citizens who care about truth, but I don't think care for truth is incentivized in overtly material ways, such as by giving out money. — Leontiskos

I actually think that those whose driver is truth aren't incentivized by money anyway, or at least not to the point where that will keep them interested. Managers love those who work for the good of the world because their fulfillment comes from within and they're less interested in keeping score in terms of salaries, bonuses, job titles, corner offices, or whatever. The danger these people pose is that they end up with a disproportionate amount of responsibility and they'll be intolerant of a work environment that lacks respect or otherwise violates some value of theirs, which means they'll be needed but they'll have no loyalty to something perceived lacking virtue and there will be no way to keep them once those values no longer exist at the company.

A company built around those folks will take a massive hit when new management arrives and they'll start filing out the door.

The problem is who or what decides what we need? Do we need more content managers? Do we need more diversity officers? Do we need more oil drillers, do we need more art historians? The need for X is defined by the institutional structure of society. — Tobias

The invisible hand decides and provides.

In the US, do we have such a deficiency in academics and artists that we need to subsidize these industries in order to obtain more? My understanding is that we get far more philsophers (for example) than we need each year, leaving many highly qualified people without work.

So, setting aside the question of what a good capitalistic, socialistic, or even communistic country ideologically might be inclined to do, shouldn't we first decide if need more of X before we produce more of X?

But, if the question is whether I think we ought all get paid for what we do here (research, discuss, learn), then of course. I've been here like 10 years, and still no paycheck. The problem of course is that I keep showing up, and they won't pay me if I'm going to show up anyway. My guess though is that if I said I needed to get paid in order to keep showing up, I'd still not get paid.

Sorry for the late response. I overlooked this. I saw it and then read on where everyone is now trying to decide who's the better bigot.

My view of "rights" is that the word means something important and just reducing them to regular law loses an important distinction. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a law, but even if it weren't, we still understand the right to be treated equally predates 1964. We don't say the same thing regarding the Trump tax changes, as if the right to certain write offs existed before they were passed.

We (the US and it's ilk) have a hybrid church/state system, which is an Enlightenment contrivance, designed to end theocracratic rule but to otherwise compromise by allowing continued appeals to heaven. You either look at this compromise as protecting the sacred or just a pragmatic annoyance to appease those still clinging to their Bibles.

My point: The rights you shun are those remnants of theocratic rule, where the distinction between law and morality didn't exist. All came from God. Your position is the final cleansing of the divine from the system, leaving us with nothing but laws, written declarations of men and women.

My position is the full collapse into the secular isn't in order, but there is something morally commanded, and should the lawmakers legislate its opposite, the positive law will violate the natural law and should not stand.

Intertwining the moral with the law is not just a bothersome vestige from our past, but exists because it retains independent value worth preserving.

Why do you think prioritizing belief over science in this situation is rational? — ucarr

Vaccine avoidance isn't typically based upon religious objection, but upon a misunderstanding of science. That is, they think they are being scientific, but they're not.

But there are real examples of true foolishness, like those who would die instead of getting a transfusion. That is a matter of choice in the sense they're living up to their ideals, but I can't accept any moral system that allows for unnecessary death.

My view is that there are many instances where belief in God offers greater meaning than without and there will be no negative consequences as might exist at extremes.

But there is a flip side to this. Religion can be therapeutic, meaning it could save lives (particularly addicts), which would suggest truth can be an impediment to happiness.

In the above, are you articulating a type of pragmatism? — ucarr

I am.

If you are linking religious value with practical results, is it not necessary for you to embrace truth value propositions pertinent to achieving goals systematically by rational means? — ucarr

You'll have objectively measurable results to determine if you've met your subjective goals, which would not necessarily mean accepting truths (particularly those with weaker levels of proof) damaging to your personal well being.

For example, if evolutionary theory leaves me in a state of despair by relegating me to the level of ordinary animal and its rejection offers me greater meaning in my life, I am rational to reject it.


It would not be rational if my values require acceptance of scientific truth no matter what, but we have to accept our values are choices. If I were an evolutionary biologist, my rejection of evolution's truth becomes more complex, but if I'm satisfied maintaining dissonance, and compartmentalizing my beliefs leads to my happiness, then that is a rational decision by me.

Subordinating truth to value is a valid worldview and is no less rational than a scientific one that does the opposite.

Objectively judged"? What is that?
A "positive lifestyle"? What is that? It really depends on whom you ask. The various religions do not agree on what exactly a "positive lifestyle" is. Nor on what makes for "objective judgment". — baker

It's the basis for all social decisions we make. Why do we pass some laws and not others? Why do we build some buildings and not others?

Your asking how we decide (as in what is our specific calculus) to live a preferred life misses the point. My point is that we decide whether to be religious for the same reasons we decide to do anything that achieves our goals. Choosing to live in a way that accepts a reduced significance for human value is a choice, even if it's justified upon valid scientific grounds. Doing what is most consistent with scientific grounds is a choice and is not a requirement. That goes to my original statement. The value of religion is not rooted in the scientifically arrived at truth values of its claims.

One thing I've consistently observed in religions, theistic and atheistic ones, and especially in the ones that aim to make adult converts, is that they operate by the motto, "Talk the talk and walk the walk", whereby the talk and the walk are usually two very different things. — baker

I don't follow the relevance. There are some horrible religions, horrible governments, and horrible people. Let's even assume every religion bar none is horrible, leading to misery and sadness. That still has zero impact on my position, which is that the value of religion is based upon its outward manifestations. As in, does it lead to a happier more productive person and society. If it does not, it should be rejected. If you can show that the religious life is empty and sad, then let's rid ourselves of it. If you can't, then don't.

What this means is simply that if Joe Blow finds great meaning and value in his religion and he has a community and friends he has built around it, all to their mutual satisfaction and happiness, it would not be a valid basis to dismantle it due to the fact it's claims are false. That is, whether there is a god up high as Joe Blow preaches is wholly irrelevant to whether the religion is of value.

My comments are responsive to the general atheistic claim that projects the idea upon the religious that the primary purpose of sacred text and religious life is at all the same as science, which is as a tool to study the mundane. Religion does delve obviously into origin stories, but those must be judged (again) on how well they provide for a meaningful life by their sanctification of humanity, not by their propositional truth value.

And just because his books were banned doesn't mean anything. The RCC also opposed general literacy and reading the Bible for a long time because it thought that the ordinary people could not properly understand it without proper guidance. — baker

His books were not generally banned due to concerns about limited literacy. They were officially and specifically banned for all readers because they were considered heretical. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Index_Librorum_Prohibitorum

Also, the Catholic Church never banned the Bible for anyone. They banned certain translations they thought inaccurate.

Descartes wasn't banned because Catholics just didn't like books generally. They chose him and others to ban, but still let people read other works.

He and his followers are responsible for the quasi-rationalistic approach to questions of faith and God. This man who made a point of inventing arguments through which atheists and Protestants were supposed to be convinced that the RCC is the only true church and religion. And somehow, the history of philosophy ate it all up, this Trojan horse. — baker

Maimonides attempted to offer a philosophicaly rational basis for specific religious revealed beliefs centuries earlier. Descartes' required a rational God who guaranteed rationality without reference to revelation. Making an argument that Descartes' writings were particularized to specific Catholic dogma presents him a priest of some sort. His comments were generalized, not the sort of thing you could claim of Maimonides, which were directed at presenting a rational basis for revelation.

Describing Descartes as a shill for the Catholic Church isn't historically correct either. He was at best guarded so as to not offend the Church, particularly being a contemporary of Galileo. Descartes' books were later banned and burned by the Church.

There is a modern annoyance among analytics with Descartes related to his metaphysical framings, but that's not a church/reason dispute.

Yet when theism is preached, it is always preached as a proposition with a truth value.


As a Jew, you don't relate to that, because Jews normally don't preach. But Christians and Muslims do preach. They make claims that they expect (demand!) that the people they are preaching to will accept as true. — baker

You can't acknowledge an exception and say "always." The best you can say is "mostly , " but then you'll have to start counting. Maybe we can say "sometimes." But a rabbi certainly believes he speaks absolute truth, so I don't see your distinction. I'll agree Jews and Christians prostelisze differently, but so do Baptists and modern Catholics. Jews do reach out to unaffiliated Jews, but only some (compare Chabad to Litvak).

Regardless, it misses my point. I described how religion is to be objectively judged for its value. That is, even if it fails a correspondence theory of truth, if it advances a positive lifestyle, then it can have positive value.

You might say it fails in that regard as well, which also would miss my point, and it would be agreeing with me. It'd be agreeing that the way religion is judged is by use, not upon its metaphysical correspondence.

Sad Socrates thrives (reason) whereas a Satisfied Swine merely survives (faith). — 180 Proof

Yeah, that's not at all how Mill seperated the higher and lower pleasures. It had nothing (as in zero) to do with epistemic methods. Moral concern was specifically among the higher. The virtue of religious practice would be measured by utility.

I agree with you. Religion should be a practice, a life-enhancing practice, and not a set of propositional metaphysical beliefs. If people look at belief in God and all its trappings as truth-apt propositions then the dangerous road to fundamentalism opens up. — Janus

Yes. Theism is not of the same category as science. The latter is but an empirical gathering tool, occasionally at odds with religious claims. The former an entire way of life.

There's no such thing. — 180 Proof

So atheism is no belief, just an empty set?

Also, whereas theism is a belief (either noncognitive or cognitive), religion is an institutional practice; and 'false hope to pacify false fear' (e.g. E. Becker's terror management) seems, as far as I can tell, the primary motivation for most persons throughout recorded history comforming to either or both of these complementary forms of life (i.e. traditions). — 180 Proof

Assuming that's a correct bit of psychoanalysis, how does it change what I said? A belief is not to be measured in terms of its truth value but in terms of whether it's a preferable form of life.

I'll accept the condescending. If Billy and the rest the world is happier by all measure in belief in Santa Claus, why tell them otherwise unless you think scientific truth adherence has inherent value? And this is a hypothetical, so you can't change the antecedent. It is assumed. That is, he and the world will not mysteriously be unhappier for some reason.

Unless you're willing to commit to my reasoning and thereby claim happiness is advanced by atheism and therefore preferable, then we'll be speaking past each other. So, if the real reason atheism is the best belief is because it makes us most happy, then let's stop submitting all these other reasons and instead advocate it in the market of ideas just like any other, showing how following your belief brings the joy unbeknown to the theist.

It's possible that the better part of the life of the theist isn't spent fretting over the epistemological differences between scientism and the various secular definitions of faith, but instead in practices and perspectives.

That is to say, the rationality of theism, like any behavior, is judged by the objectives it achieves. If your highest objective is to live your life according to the implications of science, even if that should mean accepting a certain level of meaninglessness foreign to a theist, then do that. It's not irrational to do otherwise though.

The atheistic belief that belief is the primary reason for religion and not behavior leads you guys down interesting little paths.

Theism is to be judged as a form of life, not as a proposition with a true value.

I read a good portion of it many years ago when I had access to a theological library. — Leontiskos

Amazon is my theological library.

They must have really small mountains where you live. They're just bumps. — frank

I live at the foothills of Mt. Everest and I'm going to level that fucker with a shovel. That is true faith. Belief in yourself.

Good memory. Actually I don't know what caused me to buy the Buber book, but maybe it was implanted long ago by you. Have you read it?

A guy at work just handed me The Crisis of Narration by Byung-Chul Han. It looks like the sort of shit @Baden might read.

"Faith will move mountains if you bring a shovel." Hanover 1:1.

That's the Jewish one, and a Jewish guy just said it.

Two Types of Faith by Martin Buber. He describes the difference between the Christian concept of faith and the Jewish one. The topic of "what is faith" comes up here often, so it's responsive to those discussions, and, while it doesn't discuss it, it would make sense that there is also probably a distinct definition of faith for Islam, Buddhism, and the secular as well as others I'm sure. For example, what sort of faith was relied upon by Abraham when asked to sacrifice Isaac: God is to be trusted as a leader (Jewish), God is to be trusted as the source of goodness (Christian), God is to obeyed mindlessly (secular).

Why does any major philosopher need to hold some position for it to be true? I never said words can't exist without referent - just that they lack meaning when not used as a referent. If you aren't referring to anything with your scribbles, then what are you talking about? What knowledge am I suppose to glean from your use of scribbles? What use would your scribbles be to me? — Harry Hindu

My point was that your position is not tenable, evidenced by the fact that it is not held by anyone who has critically looked at the matter. It's just a naive sort of view that all words have a refererent to have meaning. If there is someone who holds it (maybe Aquinas, but not really), then let's elevate the conversation by borrowing their arguments and starting from there as opposed to your just insisting it must. Consider this sentence: "I am in the house." What does "house" refer to? My house? Your house? A Platonic house form? The image of the house in my head? Suppose I have no such image (and I don't)? So the referent is my understanding of the sentence? It refers to electrical activity in my brain? How do I know that my electrical activity is the same as your electrical activity when we say the word "house"? Do we compare electrical wave activity? Suppose the wave activity is different, but we use the term the same, do we ignore the electrical wave activity and admit it's use that determines meaning?

Take a look at my first sentence as well, "My point was that your position is not tenable, evidenced by the fact that it is not held by anyone who has critically looked at the matter," break this down word by word into referrents for me.

What of words of different meaning yet the same referrent as in "the morning star" and the "evening star," having different meanings, but are of the same planet.?

I’m not at all sure what issue you mean to discuss. But I’ve been addressing the ways that while LLMs can plausibly pass for cunning linguists, they fail any more general test of being alive and mindful. Which brings us to biosemiosis and how the human mind is a nested hierarchy of semiotic levels. — apokrisis

Ok. But I never disputed the distinction between bots and people. People have souls (or "being alive and mindful" if that's your preferred phrase). I was discussing whether one needs a soul to fully communicate. I don't think they do. I only want to debate with humans because I'm openly hostile to bots, thinking them second class citizens, devoid of rights, and not worthy of our exclusive country club. I can play with my ChatGPT software when I'm not logged in here.

Fair enough. So my argument simply stands for those that recently made the argument that AI's responses are not valid responses while also having taken the position is meaning is use. I'm fine with that. — Harry Hindu

There are plenty of reasons not to engage a bot even if the bot fully passed the Turing test.

Metaphysical talk is simply patterns of scribbles on the screen if there is no referent. — Harry Hindu

Which major philosopher holds to the position that every word has a referent? Are we about to start arguing theology or something? The position that words can exist without referents is widely held across the board, not just some odd Wittgensteinian result.

But if a cat is in my box and a beetle in yours, then how exactly are we playing the same game? — Harry Hindu

Because it's a language game, not a metaphysical game.

Cats are much larger and differently shaped than beetles, so if what you said is possible then it would be impossible to be playing the same language game as the boundaries of the object in my box do not align with the boundaries of the object in yours, so I might be pointing to a space that you are not with my use. — Harry Hindu

The box is a thought experiment. We're not talking about actual boxes. You can neither see the box nor the beetle. The box represents your mind and the beetle the contents of your mind. But I'll concede the point, if your Christmas present were a cat, it would come in a box bigger than if I were giving you a beetle.

You sound like Banno now. — apokrisis

How dare you insult @Banno that way!

You seem to completely not see that I just said Peirce went well beyond language games to cover semiosis as logic itself and phenomenology itself. — apokrisis

No, that's exactly what I understood you to say and thought I acknowledged that. My point was that I saw their objectives as being different, not in competition with one another.

One can buy fully into Pierce's theory of symbolic origins and continue to hold to Wittgenstein's insistence that meaning is fixed from use without reference to the mental contents. I just don't see the overlap of the two as you suggest, one constructing a metaphysical origin of symbolic thought and the other describing how language publicly functions.

But you say I misunderstand, so break it down where you think I do because I might not see what you're getting at.

The spirit of their enterprises may be at odds while their contributions aren't. Here is how I put it in a query to GPT-5 about your last response to apokrisis — Pierre-Normand

This is precisely the objectionable use of AI in my opinion. It sets AI as the expert, it provides no source references, the poster adds no value but to have typed in a question, and it imposes upon others a demand they retreat to their corner and argue with the bot.

Consider my response just dropping its comments back into AI and asking how it responds, literally allowing it to debate itself.

Semiosis hinges on counterfactuality. Once semiosis runs out of counterfactuals, it lapses back into the vagueness from which it was boot-strapping its own existence.

So Wittgenstein was pointing out something correct. But he had no idea of the more generic metaphysical claim that could make it correct in the limited domain he was operating in. The domain that is socio-semiosis.

Peirce came up with the generic metaphysical claim. The one we can usefully apply to all levels of semiotic endeavour. — apokrisis

I don't see where Pierce and Wittgenstein are at odds or where Pierce advanced upon Wittgenstein"s ideas. Pierce offers an explanation of how we might use ordinary events as symbolic and describes how we might derive meaning of our world without the necessity of language, but Wittgenstein doesn't deny this (or really address it). It's not his goal to explain how language comes to be, but just to say linguistic expression cannot occur absent social use.

That you see a fire and have associated that with danger and you now consider fire a symbol for danger, says nothing about speaking about fire. We'd expect deer to do the same, but that's doesn't bear on Wittgenstein.

My argument is that they cannot because they are different things, have different structures, and so act differently. — NOS4A2

We're referencing the output, not the internal variations leading up to those outputs.

Following your logic, suppose text on a screen results from X or Y, a machine and a human. We generate text on a screen by typing. Machines using AI generate text on a screen by using algorithms on user prompts, and performing a vast array of mechanical actions that results in legible text on a screen. Is the machine typing? — NOS4A2

The question isn't whether the machine is typing, but it's whether the final product is the same. But, if you want to focus on the typing itself (and not the characters that arise) as the end product, then if you have a machine that presses the keys on a keyboard randomly, then it is typing.

I wasn't trying to disprove Witt here - just point at the contradiction of those on this forum that align with "meaning-is-use" and also claim that AI's responses are not as valid as a human's. AND if the forum's official position is that the output of AI is not valid content on the forums then the owners of the forum have officially taken a stance that meaning is not use. — Harry Hindu

That's a silly conclusion. Wittgensteinian principles aren't a driver for the decisions we reach, and it's entirely possible that one can believe meaning is use, or that AI is fully cognizant and aware as humans, but we still don't allow AI on the forum. If we can ban a person who is fully aware, we can ban a bot. Given that bots don't have civil rights, we can ban a bot just for being a bot. Computers can also be banned from chess websites as well, just because they want room for humans and humans alone to interact.

Even if you think this all inconsistent, the best you can conclude is that it is all inconsistent, but not that entails some other official declaration.

Science starts with hypothesizing and theorizing. If we only ever start with a limited framework for explaining reality, then how is it that we humans have become the shaper of the landscape rather than just a fixture in it? — Harry Hindu

The limitation imposed by Witt is to knowledge of the metaphysical, not the physical. Some words have referrants. I'm not arguing idealisim.

I think that such an argument just opens another can of worms because now you'd have to explain why our beetles would be so different given the similarities of our physiology and having developed within a similar culture. Similar causes lead to similar effects. There is no reason to believe that my beetle is different than yours given the similarities between us, just as there is no reason for me not to believe you have a mind because of our similarities, but is my beetle the same as my cat's or a bat's? — Harry Hindu

We can assume that our perceptions are similar for all the reasons you say. That doesn't mean we need refer to the private state for our use of language. What fixes language under his theory is the publicly available. That is, even if my beetle isn't your beetle, our use of "beetle" is what determines what beetle means. However, if a beetle is running around on the ground and you call it a cat and I call it a beetle, then we're not engaging in the same language game, because the public confirmation is different.

So:
Example A: I see an object on the ground and my internal perception of it is what you see as a cat, but I see it as what you would see as a beetle.
Example B: I see an object on the ground (that has the publicly observed structure of a beetle) and you call it a cat and I call it a beetle.

In example A, if we consistently call this object a beetle, it is irrelevant what my internal state is. We live our lives never knowing what goes on in our heads, but we engage in the same language game. What happens in my head is irrelevant for this analysis. It does not suggest I don't have things going on in my head. It just says for the purposes of language it is irrelevant.

In example B, if you call that object scampering across the floor a cat and me a beetle, we are not engaging in the same langauge game. When I say I petted my cat, you would wonder why someone would pet an object that you observe as a beetle.

The point is that the private is irrelevant, not whether it might happen to be the same.

Either we hold that meaning is use, and therefore AI genuinely uses language meaningfully within our shared form of life (albeit as a new kind of participant) or we insist that meaning requires some inner mental correlate — in which case we’ve abandoned the pure Wittgensteinian stance and re-entered the metaphysical terrain of intentionality and private experience. — Harry Hindu

I think that's right, and it may be AI truly engages in a language game in the Wittgensteinian analysis. There is the pesky question of what is meant by "form of life," which is subject to debate. I do think though that Witt could not possibly have suggested in order to share a form of life we must have the same mental states because that would entirely collapse the meaning is use into meaning is attached to internal mental states. So, to your claim whether AI genuinely uses language, the answer is probably that it does under a meaning is use analysis, but of what damage does that do to Witt's theory generally? I think nothing largely because I do not think the purpose of his project was to describe what true human interaction consists of, but he looked upon his project as an attempt to deliniate the boundaries of legitimate philosophical exploration. It is his position that metaphysical questions cannot be addressed through language because of the limitations inherent in the enterprise.

Take it another step. One could say (and I'd suggest incorrectly) that Witt's reference to the box itself is a metaphysical claim. Witt says you have a box and I have a box and we both say we have beetles, but the inability to reveal the contents eliminates our ability to argue we have the same referent. My box might contain a chicken and yours a hammer, but as long as we both refer consistently to whatever we internally perceive, then our language game holds. We make the beetle superfluous. You would then say "Ha! I caught you! You reference a mystery box for your theory and a mystery is a mystery, so you have a metaphysical anchor to your whole theory." That is, AI differs from human language because humans have a box, albeit containing something we can't prove to the other person, we still have a box, and that distinguishes us from AI and we therefore have a different "form of life."

I think that's an under-read of Witt and literalizes the abstract box he references. It might be that we have a box and AI has no box, but the key is that the box, existent or not within humans, is irrelevant for the entirety of the analysis to the "what is language" question. The point, again, is to show the limits of philosophy, which is that we cannot talk about the box, the beetle, or the metaphysical underpinnings through the use of language. It's not to admit or deny we have mental states.

And I'll say this to all who may come and read the above, I find Witt extremely unclear in his original text and can't keep straight the multitude of interterpretations I've encountered, so if I've said something confused, please feel free to correct me. I have no purpose in discussing this than in trying to figure out what he means.

It's an interesting question (although not really asked) whether a perfect god entails that ought and is be the same.

Your error is conflating behavior and consciousness. Your argument is that if a machine acts like a human, it thinks like a human. The pragmatic Turing argument. — apokrisis

Not really. I'm only saying that it seems possible to create a an AI system that works within a complex environment such that it must anticipate next events and therefore react as if human. I'm not suggesting its methods for acheiving the human like conduct would be anything close to the methods used by actual humans. I accept it's entirely mimickry. I just don't see why it can't be done, and would be interested in some citations to that limitation based upon your comment that this limitation is well known in the AI industry. I'm not claiming you're wrong, but that seems an important limitation and I was interested in where that might be discussed in more detail.

The things involved and the movements they make are different. It’s like saying submarines swim. — NOS4A2

No it's not. The example I provided had dissimilar methods for acheiving the same result. The submarine example has dissimilar methods for acheiving dissimilar results.

The question is whether Z can result from method X or Y. Your argument is that it cannot because Z will necessarily be different if from X as opposed to Y. That doesn't follow. The same thing can arise from different processes.

But we’ve been at AI for 70 years now and LLMs are as far as we have got. That should also tell you something. — apokrisis

It seems like in the past few months we've gotten very far, but I realize things were happening in the background before I became aware of them. But I see our progress as tremendous, not minimal as maybe you're suggesting.

So the AI community knows the architecture it would want to copy. — apokrisis

This surprises me, although my knowledge of the subject is limited to your last 2 posts, so there's that. That is, you described how certain information needs to be ignored and that can be based upon past experience and statistical models. Why wouldn't an LLM do well at that and how is that not already occurring in self-driving vehicles? They are responding to real world situations without being overwhelmed with irrelevant data and I would assume being able to anticipate based upon statistical models.

So, where you say the AI community knows that LLMs can't do what they need it to, where is this documented? What is the cite for that?