He concludes that metaphysics are "ticklish". By that he means that a person whose metaphysics are challenged would typically become rather aggressive towards the challenger.
I found his analysis convincing, and believe it does explain why there tends to be some aggressiveness in philosophy, contrary to a naïve cliché of the serene philosopher. Philosophy cuts deep, and it hurts. A philosopher is only serene to the extent that his or her metaphysics remains unchallenged. — Olivier5

We can no longer use language to talk about the world if it is the world. Mention and use collapse into one (another), together with language and the world. — Luke

Can the word ‘axe’ be used to chop down a tree? Or are ‘trees’ nothing more than unchoppable words? If sentences in use are the world, then there is no use-mention distinction. — Luke

In response to the claim that there is more to reality than what we talk about, you ask for more talk, for me to tell you what is. — Fooloso4

What then is required for knowledge of our own inner, private episodes, say knowledge that I’m having a sensation of a red triangle, if it isn’t just that I am sensing a red triangle? What else is required besides the actual sensation? In short, knowledge requires concepts, and since concepts are linguistic entities, we can say that knowledge requires a language. To know something as simple as that the patch is red requires an ability to classify that patch, and Sellars thinks the only resource for such rich categorization as adult humans are capable of comes from a public language. — link

We can no longer talk of things at all,i.e.,of something that would be for consciousness merely the negative of itself.
...

Thought is always in its own sphere; its relations are with itself, and it is its own object.
...

...it takes for granted that the Absolute stands on one side, and that knowledge on the other side, by itself and cut off from the Absolute, is still something real; in other words, that knowledge, which, by being outside the Absolute, is certainly also outside truth, is nevertheless true — a position which, while calling itself fear of error, makes itself known rather as fear of the truth.
— Hegel

And so on. — bongo fury

Of course. And variables to values (which are things out there, not more language).

And so on. — bongo fury

Which I'm quite sure none of us ever would... — bongo fury

Same difference. In Quine, Goodman, Elgin. — bongo fury

And, "true" denotes "snow is white" iff "white" denotes snow. — bongo fury

Dasein's self-belonging is not a retreat from the immediate contingency of world-exposure, not the choosing of an idealist self-actualization at the expense of robust being with others. — Joshs

what I perceive as socially `permitted' rhetorical argumentation is already stylistically distinctive in relation to what other participants perceive as permitted. Each individual who feels belonging to an extent in a larger ethico-political collectivity perceives that collectivity's functions in a unique, but peculiarly coherent way relative to their own history, even when they believe that in moving forward in life their strategic language moves are guided by the constraints imposed by essentially the `same' discursive conventions as the others in their speech community. — Joshs

For are we not all...akin to polyphonic novels, speaking in multiple voices, reflecting multiple traditions? — Joshs

And, "true" denotes "snow is white" iff "white" denotes snow. — bongo fury

I actually think some authors are trying to trick their readers, even beyond death! — Olivier5

all the more so when such metaphysics and its motivators remain unconscious to us, outside any possible examination, while framing all our thoughts. — Olivier5

I am not totally convinced that the approach would work any better than 'combativeness' in a philosophic debate. — Olivier5

But P talks about truth, as well. — bongo fury

This should be quite obvious to anyone not seduced by philosophy. — Fooloso4

Again with the ineffable? My view is not Kantian. Let me try again: — Fooloso4

... what I talk about and what is are not the same. — Fooloso4

I said nothing about the priority of feeling and sensation. — Fooloso4

Rather, so long as we continue the normal process of creating consensus around what is real and good, classes of the undesirable are under construction. — Joshs

So, I take it that you agree that "is true" adds nothing meaningful to a sincere belief statement? That truth is presupposed within belief statements? — creativesoul

Heidegger, for instance, makes the
average everyday ness of idle talk derivative of a more primary self-understanding of Dasein. — Joshs

Thanks for the aphorism! — Olivier5

Is that the only two options? — creativesoul

Do you mean that while chatting with the living, we ought to care for their feelings, understanding and impressions a great deal more than when chatting with the dead? — Olivier5

I am beyond myself, exposes to an outside , before and beyond extant cultural
formations. This isnt a retreat back to a form of subject-centered solipsism , but a more radical notion of the social than between person dynamics. — Joshs

pplauding the social constructionists, post-structuralists and post-analytic types for exploding the myth of the autonomous subject in favor of the socially embedded and linguistically-saturated actor. — Joshs

Nietzsche wasn't the last one to draw his blade, and there was something healthy, combative, almost vital in his lack of patience, I think. Life is short. — Olivier5

He attributes most ethical arguments to rely on what he calls the assumption of the bounded self, which holds individuals morally responsible for their actions. — Joshs

How could the morally advanced individual generate a set of personal moral principles, except from the repository of cultural intelligibilities at his/her disposal? — Joshs

Psycho analysis ‘links’ motivation and cognition by treating the former as a mechanism imposing itself on cognition from without. — Joshs

Affectively negative
experience ( anxiety, fear, hostility, joy, guilt) IS the relative incoherence of a situation for us. — Joshs

I mean that every time you blame someone , including yourself , you are failing to see the contextual validity in the course of action that you condemn or judge. — Joshs

What I say about reality is tautologically linguistic, but what I talk about and what is are not the same. — Fooloso4

Further, our way of being in the world is not limited to the linguistic, to what we say or think or talk about or conceptualize. — Fooloso4

The dogma of the linguistic keeps some in their slumber. — Fooloso4

Men are admitted into heaven, not because they have curbed and governed their passions, or have no passions, but because they have cultivated their understandings. The treasures of heaven are not negations of passion, but realities of intellect, from which all the passions emanate, uncurbed in their eternal glory. The fool shall not enter into heaven, let him be ever so holy: holiness is not the price of entrance into heaven. Those who are cast out are all those who, having no passions of their own, because no intellect, have spent their lives in curbing and governing other people's by the various arts of poverty, and cruelty of all kinds.

It is not that reality is linguistic, but that we are; and so it follows that the reality we talk about is linguistic. — Fooloso4

I try to be clear and concise, in general, but often come across as inarticulate and condescending. — Olivier5

It's been argued -- by a certain Comte-Sponville, specialist of Spinoza -- that one's moral sense is like one's sense of equilibrium: you can apply it to yourself, but not to others. — Olivier5