But P talks about truth, as well. — bongo fury
:up:all the more so when such metaphysics and its motivators remain unconscious to us, outside any possible examination, while framing all our thoughts. — Olivier5
I am not totally convinced that the approach would work any better than 'combativeness' in a philosophic debate. — Olivier5
I actually think some authors are trying to trick their readers, even beyond death! — Olivier5
And, "true" denotes "snow is white" iff "white" denotes snow. — bongo fury
Could you elaborate ? I tend to model the situation in terms of the social as the bottom most layer. I am fundamentally one of or a piece of us. The tribal language and form of life is my operating system, deeper than the performance of individuality that it makes possible. (Descartes was a shallow thinker from this perspective, taking the top layer for granted, ignoring that it's language that cannot be doubted intelligibly, not some mere ideological product thereof like the self. — Pie
Is this a Fregean idea ? — Pie
Woodger's term, p.17, is 'shared name'. Martin, in Truth and Denotation, Ch. IV, speaks of divided reference as multiple denotation. I applaud that use of 'denote', having so used the word myself until deflected to 'true of' by readers' misunderstanding; and Martin's 'multiple' obviates the misunderstanding. — Quine: Word and Object, p 90n.
Truth for singular sentences, consisting of a name and an arbitrarily complex predicate, is defined thus: A singular sentence is true iff the object denoted by the name satisfies the predicate. Logical machinery provided by Tarski (1935) can be used to turn this simplified sketch into a more general definition of truth—a definition that handles sentences containing relational predicates and quantifiers and covers molecular sentences as well. Whether Tarski’s own definition of truth can be regarded as a correspondence definition, even in this modified sense, is under debate (cf. Popper 1972; Field 1972, 1986; Kirkham 1992, chaps. 5-6; Soames 1999; Künne 2003, chap. 4; Patterson 2008.) — SEP
:up:Dasein's self-belonging is not a retreat from the immediate contingency of world-exposure, not the choosing of an idealist self-actualization at the expense of robust being with others. — Joshs
:up:what I perceive as socially `permitted' rhetorical argumentation is already stylistically distinctive in relation to what other participants perceive as permitted. Each individual who feels belonging to an extent in a larger ethico-political collectivity perceives that collectivity's functions in a unique, but peculiarly coherent way relative to their own history, even when they believe that in moving forward in life their strategic language moves are guided by the constraints imposed by essentially the `same' discursive conventions as the others in their speech community. — Joshs
And, "true" denotes "snow is white" iff "white" denotes snow. — bongo fury
My intuition would be that 'true' would merely describe and not denote in that case. — Pie
Same difference. In Quine, Goodman, Elgin. — bongo fury
I'd just say that "snow is white" is true if snow is white. — Pie
Which I'm quite sure none of us ever would... — bongo fury
And, "true" denotes "snow is white" iff "white" denotes snow. — bongo fury
Is this a Fregean idea ? — Pie
Not that I recall. — bongo fury
The extension of a predicate – a truth-valued function – is the set of tuples of values that, used as arguments, satisfy the predicate. Such a set of tuples is a relation.
For example, the statement "d2 is the weekday following d1" can be seen as a truth function associating to each tuple (d2, d1) the value true or false. The extension of this truth function is, by convention, the set of all such tuples associated with the value true, i.e.
{(Monday, Sunday),
(Tuesday, Monday),
(Wednesday, Tuesday),
(Thursday, Wednesday),
(Friday, Thursday),
(Saturday, Friday),
(Sunday, Saturday)}
By examining this extension we can conclude that "Tuesday is the weekday following Saturday" (for example) is false. — Wiki:Extension (predicate logic)
I think we use 'true' and 'truth' to carry an awful lot more meaning that T-sentences encompass. — Isaac
Of course it is, as the pomos will and ought tell us. But equally, it only has this power of persuasion because of it's logical implications. So getting those right is where one might best start.It's used to persuade, not identify. — Isaac
Of course. And variables to values (which are things out there, not more language).
And so on. — bongo fury
And so on. — bongo fury
what is needed is an account of falsehood, which is parasitic on a community of truth tellers. — unenlightened
destructive of meaning of society and of our world. — unenlightened
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