I still have to consent to one among this other in order to act and MAKE the choice — Fire Ologist

what if i dont feel forced, just scared? — Kizzy


That’s why I think it would take courage to do the truly moral thing on the trolley and not participate at all. I guess fear is a kind of force that might also diminish the ability to consent and therefore the ability to commit a moral act. — Fire Ologist

Maybe I did over simplify. Well, I see there is a choice between 1 and 5, “I can save or kill five or one” and in that sense am not forced. And after giving me the instructions about the pulling the lever or not, no one forced anything further to happen, the rest is up to me. And that’s where the trolly case starts.

But isn’t there still a third element in any situation like the trolly vital to the conversation? There is also my willing participation in the choice and its effect enacted (as with the one person being hit by the trolley). The choosing act, about which we say “I am responsible.” And it is in that willingness, that consent, that we find something vital to ethics, but greatly diminished in the trolley case.

The trolly has clarified for me that, my consent, and my choice are two different pieces; I can choose to kill the five or kill the 1, and we can debate goodness among those choices, but to do either, to act, to kill 5 for instance, I must consent to the choice as I act. That consent, can only be freely given. Home of radical freedom. Maybe?

Only in a world of willing consent, (better, a world of many willing consenting ones), can there emerge an ethics. Not just a world of choices and options like one and five.

Now we look for freedom in this, freedom versus forcing a choice (by controlling the options) or forcing your consent (by commanding participation). — Fire Ologist

The trolley example has to judge what the person is consenting to in their act — Fire Ologist

↪Apustimelogist


The heart of the trolley problem is this:
“Without any context or explanation, if you were forced to kill either 1 person or 5 people with no other options, which would you do?”

Everything else is a distraction. Trolleys, levers, instructions given to force you to make a decision, no brakes or time for brakes, etc) allow you to start to picture the scene, but these facts introduce the real world, which introduces many new questions. These questions influence what the basic hypo actually is, so they have to be answered before one could say whether they killed 1 or 5 people was right or wrong.

So to avoid the creeping presence of real world questions, and stick to the hypo, the question becomes: is it worse to kill one person or five people.

Depends on what you think of people. If it’s bad to kill a person, then, since you are forced to kill either one person or five people, it seems a no brainer. And since you are FORCED to kill one or five, neither choice is immoral or moral for you. One might be better or more practical, but it’s not your fault someone has to die.

Who is forcing the choice?
— Fire Ologist

Essential to the trolley problem is the possible distinction between an act and an omission, and ↪Fire Ologist
excluded that distinction from the problem. Regardless of what the trolley problem was to begin with, it has now become a stock argument for consequentialism. It is essentially the cultural reaction to deontology. — Leontiskos

The trolley problem is a thought experiment where you’re asked to either watch five people be killed or pull a lever so that only one person gets killed.

In this hypothetical scenario which choice would you make?

For those who would let the five people die by not pulling the lever to kill one person is there a minimum number of people on the track that would make you choose to kill the one person?

50? 100? 1,000? 10,000?

What is your reasoning? — Captain Homicide

I will mostly deal with the second argument since the issues with first one would be better dealt with as its own thread. Suffice to say, I don't think it makes sense to speak of "innate" human qualities as somehow being those qualities that rely on "no context at all." Human beings never exist outside a context. Indeed, they can only survive in a quite narrow range of environments. If the type of enviornment that allows a human being to survive (or perhaps "develop normally") is of the type that it always produces certain ideas, then it would seem fair to call those ideas innate. That is, if any context that produces a healthy human adult also produces x idea in that adult, then x idea is innate. — Count Timothy von Icarus

However, recall that Locke's project here is really a sort of philosophical anthropology tied to epistemology. If we're talking about the "innate properties of human beings" we have speak to something that can reasonably be called a human being, as opposed to say, "a mass of liver tissue." Organisms' potential to develop into the mature form of the organism is special in terms of potential. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Organisms' potential to develop into the mature form of the organism is special in terms of potential. It differs from their ability to be heated, dissolved, etc. This seems like it has to be the case if we're to speak meaningfully about the properties belonging to organisms at all. If we just speak in terms of the potential related to the matter that makes up an organism, then it seems like we should be able to say something like "any animal has the potential to become any other animal." After all, if you rearrange all the constituent matter in a cat's body "just so," it seems you should be able to make a mouse or two (more realistically, matter is recycled through ecosystems in this way). Yet clearly caterpillars have the potential for wings in a way cats do not. To say otherwise in an appeal to reduction seems to bring up a host of issues. And where is this difference in potential located? If would seem to be in the form as best I can tell. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And where is this difference in potential located? If would seem to be in the form as best I can tell. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That it exists doesn't contradict the idea that the rest of existence shouldn't exist. That would only be so if it were the creator, as the 'Gnostic' example I gave shows. According to that account the Good is a transcendent God, not the deluded demiurge who created this world. — Janus

If we realize that all existence is good when compared to nothing, then we have an objective base to build off of. — Philosophim

An objective morality cannot be based on emotions, nor can it only appeal to normal or good people. — Philosophim

That's not coherent to my claim. I already mentioned if both could co-exist then both should as that's more existence. The only case in which we decide one over the other is if both cannot co-exist, or we only have the capacity to choose one over the other.


You sidestepped what I said: mentioning that both co-existing would be better doesn’t address the hypothetical I gave you. ‘What should be’ is a final consideration: it leaves out any discussion of a hierarchy of good things that never make the cut for being things which should exist. — Bob Ross

There is no question that we all suffer. You view morality as a methodology of easing human suffering and providing benefits to humanity. But that's not objective. — Philosophim

But if you cannot raise it to the level of possibility or impossibility, then cogently, we can dismiss the argument as a thought that cannot be elevated enough to be a serious consideration in the argument — Philosophim

Ha ha! No worry. It needs to be challenged in every way. A claim to objectivity requires it. — Philosophim

The morality I'm looking at is the deeper morality that would give us an objective justification for concluding that humanity should flourish. The morality I'm asking would exist even if humans didn't. Its a morality that can be applied to animals, and even the non-conscious universe itself. It does not care about our personal benefit, or our cultural subjective viewpoints. — Philosophim

You might be missing context as the important factor. Within the context in which both can co-exist,it is good for both to co-exist. In the context in which only one can exist, it will be a greater good for one of them to exist over the other. But this second context does not universalize that the one which will not exist wouldn't be good if they could both exist.

Lets use people. An 80 year old man is out with their 5 year old grandson. As they pass by a building, an explosion happens. The still spry grandfather can leap out of the way, but his grandson will die. If he stays, he will die, but his grandson will live.

Ideally both should be able to live. But given the situation, only one can. In the situation between the grandfather and grandchild its not that the grandfather shouldn't exist, its that the best outcome within this specific situation is that the grandfather dies protecting the grandson. A moral outcome based on a limitation does not mean that we will have the same moral outcome with that limitation removed. — Philosophim

Now, it is the case that if nothing exists, then no standard of goodness can exist. If that's what you're getting at, that seems fine. But here, the term "exists" seems like it could also be equivocal. Do facts like 1+1=2 exist outside of created existence? Do they exist necessarily?

Well, if they do exist in a way different from how chairs and tables exist, and the standard of good exists in the way necessary facts exist, then it seems possible for it to exist while also stating that created existence "ought not exist." — Count Timothy von Icarus

My question to you now is if the initial logic I've noted above seems sound. If I can get a general consensus that this seems like a logical start, I can build from here. Yes, your initial impression might be an emotional rejection or not understanding what the point is. But ignoring that, does the logic hold? — Philosophim

No objective conclusion that I know of leads to a contradiction of itself, therefore anything which is a contradiction cannot be objective. Ergo, "Existence ought to be" is the only conclusion which an objective morality could conclude. — Philosophim

b. This leaves two answers to the question, "Should there be existence?". They are, "Yes", or "No". — Philosophim


Why would moral theories be required to answer this question? I think most moral theories simply do not answer the question at all. — Leontiskos

Is there an objective morality? If there is, it hasn't been found yet. But maybe we don't need to have found it to determine fundamental claims it would necessarily make. — Philosophim

It is about finding the fundamentals of morality, then working up to examples of generally understood morality. — Philosophim

If it is the case that there is something objective which concludes there should be no existence, that objectivity must exist.

f. But if it exists, then according to itself, it shouldn't exist. — Philosophim

b. This leaves two answers to the question, "Should there be existence?". They are, "Yes", or "No". — Philosophim

While AI functions well att writing, the problem is that you lose or never challenge your own process of thought as writing isn't just outward communication, it's part of your internal processing of ideas. — Christoffer

I basically agree with your "move forward peacefully" but I also don't mind a bit of conflict and confrontation and challenge in the process of examining one another's ideas. — Janus

I don't know, perhaps I didn't read you closely enough, but to the extent that it seemed to me that you were indulging what I see as Chet's self-indulgent grandiosity it seemed to me a "wankfest" I don't know if you agreed with him or if you were just being polite to him, but if I misunderstood you, then I in turn apologize. — Janus

When I spoke of it being boring, tedious, vacuous I was referring specifically to Chet's unargued pontifications, not the whole thread — Janus

things get a bit muddled. — Sam26

Because the reasoning you're using is based on the idea that life has to make sense, — Echogem222

↪Echogem222I don't need to believe anything when I can simply see what the case is. I don't say all knowledge is not reliant on belief. So-called propositional knowledge is defined as justified true belief, and I have no problem with that because I think, under a certain interpretation, that we can be said to know things we are not certain about. — Janus

↪Kizzy
This continues to be a pointless exchange. — Janus

It's tedious and boring stuff, totally vacuous, and you haven't helped make it any more interesting...to me at least. — Janus

You present a whole paragraph of seemingly irrelevant or incoherent questions, and then when I ask what you think the relevance to the issue is in what you wrote, you respond by saying there is no issue, and then asking how that seems like trolling? — Janus

The issue from the start is that Chet Hawkins claims we do not know anything, and yet provides no argument for that claim, while speaking dogmatically in a way that suggests he think he knows a whole lot. — Janus

you respond by saying there is no issue, and then asking how that seems like trolling? — Janus

No. I'm not thinking in terms of justification. I just see my hands, feel them, use them, so I know I have hands. Doubt about it is impossible unless I buy into some silly artificial possibility like "brain in a vat" or " evil demon.

.↪Bylaw
I agree with you that eliminating the word 'know' from the lexicon would make no difference. That said, I do think that people often take themselves to know things which they really don't.

My issue is that we do know many things, so eliminating the word 'know' would be impossible in any case, because then we could no longer speak accurately about our experiences. — Janus

My issue is that we do know many things, so eliminating the word 'know' would be impossible in any case, because thenwe could no longer speak accurately about our experiences. — Janus

Now we move on to a separate matter:
Second assertion: We cannot be certain of any justification applied to a belief that 'makes' it or transforms it into knowledge. — Chet Hawkins

I like this — Kizzy

There is no epistemological justification for the belief that you have hands. To know this is the case ask yourself if there is any good justification for doubting the belief that you have hands. If there are good reasons to doubt, then justification makes sense, but if there are no good reasons to doubt, then justification doesn't make sense. The connection between knowledge and doubting is an important epistemological connection — Sam26

Are you saying that looking at your hands (sensory observation) provides a justification for the belief that you have hands? — Sam26

Are you saying that looking at your hands (sensory observation) provides a justification for the belief that you have hands? — Sam26


No. I'm not thinking in terms of justification. I just see my hands, feel them, use them, so I know I have hands. Doubt about it is impossible unless I buy into some silly artificial possibility like "brain in a vat" or " evil demon. — Janus

But is this telling of ANY nature of the Universe? I dont think so.....you cant force the awareness you are not bound to obtain, thats your BLOOD...blame your ancestors for that lack or accept self in its own nature. Where do we belong to judge from rightfully? — Kizzy

Being in the universe you assert that your experience shows nothing of it? That is comically wrong. — Chet Hawkins

You might argue that the new category of "amoral" act I am talking about above could still be good or bad based on whether it violates some arbitrary set of rules. I admit that it could be. What if it doesn't break any rules? — ToothyMaw

Lazy e.g.s: this topic deserves much more elegant, microscopic ones, but in 1100 CE they "knew" the earth was central etc. After Newton and before Einstein we "knew" what gravity was. — ENOAH