Any moral theory is ultimately going to have to pass some realworld tests, and since there's never a universal consensus on morality, like there is in math, all we can do is point to our intuitions that such-and-such is wrong. For example, is it immoral to walk past a drowning child when all you need to do to save them is get your arm wet? Yes. Is it immoral in trolley car to run over the person tied to the tracks if you can save a school bus full of kids, and the person on the tracks is one day away from dying of terminal cancer? No. What about a bombing raid that ends WW2 with the death of only one civilian? I would argue that all of the answers to these questions are obvious and not really disputable, and if a moral theory gives the wrong answer, it's in serious trouble.

It's 50 years since I read Kant, so I am horribly rusty. — Herg

Okay, fair enough.

I take (1) to be complete as it stands, and (2) to be entailed by (1). Because (1) is complete and is not dependent on (2) — Herg

I have never seen a translation imply this, including the quick Google translation that you provided. You could interpret the Google English that way, but it does not require that interpretation. For example, the Cambridge Groundwork gives, "For, all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as ends in themselves" (4:433). See also SEP, "This formulation states that we should never act in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an end in itself."

I question your statement that "the separate principle that we must always treat everyone as an end... is not a commonly accepted moral principle," because that is in fact (1). — Herg

I don't think it makes sense to say that we must always treat everyone as an end. Are you currently treating everyone in the world as an end? How about the 235 million people in Pakistan? Surely not. But even if you walk down the street and there are, say, 15 people within your eyeshot, are you positively treating each of the 15 people as an end? I don't think so. To divorce, "Treat everyone as an end. . ." from the rest, ". . . , never as a mere means," does not seem to be a reasonable principle. The second formulation is a limiting principle, primarily specifying how we cannot treat others. It is not a requirement about how we must positively treat each person at each moment of their existence.

You could also think about Kant's formulation this way: "When you are interacting with someone, [insert second formulation here]." If we are not interacting with someone then we are not bound to treat them as an end. Treating someone as an end requires an interaction, and obviously we cannot interact with everyone.

Whatever Kant meant by what he wrote, the emboldened rendering above is what I was aiming for — Herg

Then to expand, all of the following are examples of failing to treat others as ends (the first two are your own examples):

• If you kill someone, then you are not treating them as an end.
• If you let someone die when you could save them, the same is true.
• If you sit down next to someone on the train without interacting with them, the same is true.
• If you see a street performer and you do not pay attention to them, the same is true.

The problem here is that anyone who you do not positively interact with or engage is necessarily not being treated as an end. In fact they are not being treated in any particular way at all.

I'm sorry, I don't know what you are getting at in your second sentence here. Can you put it another way? — Herg

I am morally perplexed when I find myself in a situation in which I cannot fulfill all of my duties, and I must therefore choose between them. The received understanding of Kant's second formulation does not result in moral perplexity because it is a negative duty, not a positive duty. Your dilemma with Hitler and the janitor relies on perplexity and this positive construal of EP.

I don't see the EP as a subordinate end, and I apologise if I gave the impression that I did. It's rather the other way round: I see the EP (in my two-part formulation) as primary, and the hedonic calculus, if we need it all, as secondary. — Herg

Ah, okay. I had it backwards, then.

In fact I am no longer sure whether we need the hedonic calculus. I am a hedonist, and so I think that treating people as ends must in the end be a matter of trying to give them more net pleasure: but I don't think this necessarily commits us to the traditional utilitarian hedonic calculus. But I must confess that I only recently stopped being a utilitarian, and my ideas in this area are still somewhat in flux. — Herg

Yes, well, to give EP priority over the hedonic calculus is a departure from classical utilitarianism, especially in its non-rule-based varieties. It makes sense that you are in a transitional phase away from utilitarianism, and are trying out some new approaches.

To put it starkly, 'intend' is a verb whereas 'ideal' is a noun.

I am not entirely understanding your critique for this part. Here’s a basic google definition: “have (a course of action) as one's purpose or objective; plan.”.

As far as I can tell, all I have to do to avoid this critique is refurbish my definition to “to have an ideal of which one is planning or trying to actualize”—now it is a verb, and is still closely connected to ideality.

If you are just noting that I was using ideal somewhat interchangeably with intention; then you are correct: that was a mistake on my end.

An intention of the end can be more or less essential depending on how it relates to my telos and my will; an intention of the means can be more or less essential depending on how it relates to my intended end, etc

I think we are just analyzing the essentiality (or lack thereof) of different aspects of the examples. I agree with you that a means may be essential to actualizing my intention; but that’s NOT what I was distinguishing with per se vs. per accidens intentions.

You are determining what is essential to actualizing an intention; whereas I am determine what is essential to the intention. E.g., if my intention is to get groceries and the only means of doing so is using my car, then my car is essential to actualizing the intention but unessential to the intention which I have (viz., if the car wasn’t essential towards my intentions, I would still have that intention and it would be unaltered by the omission of the car as a means—so the intention to use the car as a means towards my intention here would be a per accidens intention).

I would say a means is NOT an intention; but means can be intentional. — Bob Ross

So if you intend to quench your thirst and you begin filling your glass at the faucet, you would say that you did not intend to fill your glass? Filling your glass is a means.

You have to be careful with what one is analyzing. Filling your glass is a means and an intention in your example here; and not in the sense you would like it to be (viz., that a means is itself an intention): the ‘entity’ is separately attributed both.

The intention is to quench one’s thirst.
The means towards that intention is filling up your glass.
The intention to quench one’s thirst requires another intention to fill up your glass.
Filling up your glass is a means, and it is intended (with an intention separate from the other intention, but closely connected).

This is not a gradient of intention: they are separate intentions (but closely related).

Colloquial we use "means" in two related senses: actual means and potential means.

This is a fair assessment; and, yes, I was referring to one sometimes and the other sometimes. E.g., pulling the lever is a means towards killing the one, but if I intend to save the five then pulling the lever is not an actual (albeit potential) means for killing the one because it is not a means towards my actual intention.

I would be wary to call it potential vs. actual; because some means towards one’s intentions aren’t necessary “used”. It seems cleaner to distinguish between means for this vs. means for that. Potential means for this do not relate to potential means for that; and potential means for this are means for this, but not necessary utilized (actualized) means towards this.

Walking into the kitchen is an actual means, and quenching your thirst is an end, and both are intended. I was asking about the relation between the actual means and the foreseen effect, not the relation between the end and the actual means.

The foreseen effect(s) are always intentional, because they, even if they are not means towards one’s intended end, are enveloped into the original intention as per accidens intentions. E.g., if I pull the the lever, which is a means towards my intention to save the five, knowing that it will also result in the effect of killing another person; then I am intending to kill that other person, per accidens, to achieve my, per se, intention of saving the five.

The problem is that you are falsely implying that A is an actual means to Q. I would rather say, "a foreseen effect of a chosen act is indirectly intentional."

Although I see your point, it could be an actual means towards Q; but the intention here (stipulated) is towards P; so A is not a means towards Q when working towards P.

Nevertheless, Q falls under the agent's intention because it is accepted as a known consequence of his action. But sticking with Brock's language, we can simply say that Q is indirectly intended.

This “indirect intention” is what I mean by “per accidens intention”.

We agree that Q is indirectly intended, but I would not say that he means to bring about Q, nor that he is required to achieve Q. I would not say the first because A is not an (actual) means to Q, and I would not say the second because it is not an accurate use of the word 'achieve'. I would say that he is required to accept Q, not achieve Q

This is just because “he means to” is being used vaguely: we have circled back to using “intention” vaguely. I would say, more precisely, that he per accidens intends Q (viz., he indirectly intends Q), and this is a form of intention—i.e., it is intentional. All we are disagreeing about is what kind or type of intention is at play.

I think that any intentional killing of an innocent human being is immoral; whereas you seem to disagree with that in the case that it is “indirectly intended”.

Indirect intention does involve a kind of absence of intention. Involuntary manslaughter does work that way. Negligence is a form of indirect intention. The trolley lever-puller might be charged with involuntary manslaughter, but they would not be charged with murder.

NOOOOO. I see now why we are disagreeing. The indirect intention you previously described is not accidental in the sense that the person doesn’t know what they are doing (i.e., that it is not intentional). Now you are using the term “intention” is weird ways and incoherent ways.

If a person intends to do P by way of A and they know A also results in Q; then they thereby intend Q. Either you have to reject that Q is intentional (and thusly is not a form of indirect intention) or you have to agree that the person is at least intended Q. You can’t turn around and treat intentions as if they AREN’T intentions.

Manslaughter is unintentional: that’s its defining feature in contrast to murder. No court would ever agree with you that manslaughter is a form of intention.

I think what you are trying to convey is the following:

if a person intends to drive while texting and they know that there is a chance that they might be too distracted by it and kill someone, then they have not thereby intended to kill someone in the event that they do become too distracted and kill someone—and this you are trying to describe as “indirectly intended”. Notwithstanding the previous problems I outlined with your use of “intention” here, another problem is that, even by both our analysis of indirect intention, knowing there is a chance of killing someone is not enough to implicate someone, in itself, in intending (even indirectly) to kill someone. Instead, a better example would be:

if a person intends to drive while texting, and they know this will result in them getting too distracted, crashing, and killing an innocent bystander, then they have thereby intended to kill someone—albeit an per accidens (indirect) intention. THIS IS MURDER, although perhaps not in the first degree.

So the first wall of your castle was the idea that a necessary condition indicates a means, and we have overcome that wall. The second wall is the idea that A is a means to Q, and I think we are close to overcoming that wall. The third wall is now in play, which is the idea that A is impermissible because Q is indirectly intended.

:up:

I think a moral compass is the most vital and important aspect of normative ethics--it is the kernel so to speak. Being a moral agent, in the sense of embodying what is good and not what is bad (by doing at least morally permissible and obligatory actions), is of central and paramount importance. Any theory that posits otherwise seems to be missing the point of normative ethics entirely (IMHO). — Bob Ross

Fully agree. All of that is true. It is our duty to find the moral rule, to develop our own consciences, and then live accordingly.

But the moral compass is off if you think that, all other things being equal, you must sit idly by when you could save some people from dying. Inaction isn’t the cure all for moral agency, and action isn’t the immediate imposition of responsibility for breaking particular moral rule. You need to include intent to find something to judge morally.

You are intending to uphold the moral law, but destroying the reason the moral law is good, which is that moral law promotes life.

An act doesn’t immediately correlate to any specific intent, and it is intention that most of all makes one a moral agent, not the act.

One guy says “I don’t care who lives or dies, I’m not turning the wheel.” Another guy says “I’m not defying the moral rule not to intentionally kill, so I have thoughtfully decided I’m not turning the wheel.” These are two different acts because of the intent alone.

A third guy says, “I want to kill Dora” and turns the wheel to kill Dora. A fourth guy says “people are going to die, but I can at least avoid some of their deaths and turns the wheel.” These are two more different acts, different because of the intent.

The moral compass is there to uphold the lives of the moral agents, not to merely forbid acts like some sort of bureaucratic check-box. Our actions can’t contradict the moral laws, but our moral laws can’t cause actions that contradict the purpose and use of moral laws and being moral. Morals are for the good of human lives. They aren’t in themselves the goal. We are the goal. We don’t live for the sake of morals. Morals are for the sake of human lives. So, in some circumstances, the moral thing to do is to grab the wheel and point the vehicle where less people will die, and only kill those fewer people. The intent here is to reduce the number of deaths - in this circumstance you aren’t intending anyone die.

What you are saying is that, under my view, saving Charles and Dora is less important than not doing immmoral acts; and that I certainly agree with (and I think so should you). — Bob Ross

This begs the question between us, which is whether killing Alan and Betty is an immoral act if it is the only way of saving the lives of Charles and Dora.

I am a virtue ethicist, so I think a moral compass is the most vital and important aspect of normative ethics--it is the kernel so to speak. Being a moral agent, in the sense of embodying what is good and not what is bad (by doing at least morally permissible and obligatory actions), is of central and paramount importance. Any theory that posits otherwise seems to be missing the point of normative ethics entirely (IMHO). — Bob Ross

How do you know which actions, on the one hand, are immoral, and which, on the other, are permissible or obligatory? You need to work that out first, and then that will tell you whether someone is a moral agent or not. So actions are more central to normative ethics than being a moral agent.

Then to expand, all of the following are examples of failing to treat others as ends (the first two are your own examples):

If you kill someone, then you are not treating them as an end.
If you let someone die when you could save them, the same is true.
If you sit down next to someone on the train without interacting with them, the same is true.
If you see a street performer and you do not pay attention to them, the same is true. — Leontiskos

I think your third example is not necessarily correct. Suppose I sit next to a guy on a train and I see that he is listening to music on his headphones with his eyes shut. He's clearly enjoying the music, tapping his feet, smiling, and so on. I've had a shitty day, and I really want to talk to someone, I have left my phone in the office, and we are the only two people on the train, so he's the only person available. But if I interrupt the guy's listening, I am being selfish, so I decide to leave him alone. Eventually I get off the train. He's still listening with his eyes shut. We never interacted, I don't even know if he knew I was there, and yet I treated him as an end by not spoiling his enjoyment of the music.

Interaction is not a necessary condition for treating someone as an end. If I give a donation to a charity that works to help people in Gaza or Ukraine, I am treating those people as ends, but it can't be said that I interact with them: I don't even know who they are.

The second formulation is a limiting principle, primarily specifying how we cannot treat others. It is not a requirement about how we must positively treat each person at each moment of their existence. — Leontiskos

That is where I disagree. And perhaps, if Kant understood his second formulation the way you understand it and not the way I understand it, I am disagreeing with Kant. But in the end I don't think that is what really matters..

This begs the question between us, which is whether killing Alan and Betty is an immoral act if it is the only way of saving the lives of Charles and Dora.

I was just answering your question.

How do you know which actions, on the one hand, are immoral, and which, on the other, are permissible or obligatory?

Ultimately based off of what is Good; and how best to progress towards and preserve it.

You need to work that out first, and then that will tell you whether someone is a moral agent or not. So actions are more central to normative ethics than being a moral agent.

Actions are a part of being a moral agent; and what one needs to “work out first” is knowledge of The Good.

In terms of what I think the highest good is, and why I think it is immoral to intentionally kill an innocent human being, I have already explicated this to you—but you never responded to them. I would suggest you reread them and respond if you want to engage in that aspect of the conversation.

But the moral compass is off if you think that, all other things being equal, you must sit idly by when you could save some people from dying

I never suggested otherwise.

it is intention that most of all makes one a moral agent, not the act.

Correct; but they are closely connected.

Interaction is not a necessary condition for treating someone as an end. — Herg

I would class the counterexamples you are presenting as examples of interaction. You are consciously interacting with someone. It makes no difference that they are not consciously interacting with you. In the cases you present you interact with someone in a conscious way who is interacting with you in a non-conscious way (by their demeanor, or their need of a charitable donation, etc.).

The point here is that we can easily broaden the concept of "interaction" that you are presupposing, and even then the problem that I posed to you does not go away. You are still not interacting with the 235 million people in Pakistan even on this broader notion of interaction, and therefore you are failing to treat them as an end. I think interaction is the right word, but we could rephrase it as follows: "If you are not engaging in an activity (in the philosophical sense) towards someone, then you are not treating them as an end. Therefore in order to treat each person as an end we must be engaged in an activity towards each person."

What about child laborers in the supply chain of our favorite products (and other workers who work in awful and dangerous conditions)? We are obviously treating them as means, but what is the solution? Live like a monk? Donate to charities to ameliorate some of the wrongness?

You have to be careful with what one is analyzing. Filling your glass is a means and an intention in your example here; and not in the sense you would like it to be (viz., that a means is itself an intention): the ‘entity’ is separately attributed both.

The intention is to quench one’s thirst.
The means towards that intention is filling up your glass.
The intention to quench one’s thirst requires another intention to fill up your glass.
Filling up your glass is a means, and it is intended (with an intention separate from the other intention, but closely connected).

This is not a gradient of intention: they are separate intentions (but closely related). — Bob Ross

I was traveling today and so I listened to a recent talk by a good philosopher, Kevin Flannery (who is not the best public speaker). He talks about the way that Aquinas views the relation of the means and the end at 18:08-22:19, which is what you are speaking about. (For the whole section on Aquinas' view of intention, see 17:41.)

The idea is that the intention of the means and the intention of the end are both separable and inseparable. We can view them under different aspects, but to say they are entirely separate is not correct.

Flannery speaks of the means as, "The things [the agent] believes or hopes will lead to [his] end."

I would be wary to call it potential vs. actual; because some means towards one’s intentions aren’t necessary “used”. — Bob Ross

You have missed the distinction between a potential means and an actual means. Go back to my tennis racquet example. Before I begin playing the three racquets are each a potential means to playing tennis. Once I choose the Wilson racquet and begin playing, the Wilson racquet is an actual means to playing tennis. A potential means is that which can be used to realize some end. An actual means is that which is used in order to realize some end.

Potential means for this do not relate to potential means for that; and potential means for this are means for this, but not necessary utilized (actualized) means towards this. — Bob Ross

A scissors is a potential means to cutting my hair, and a saw is a potential means for cutting down a tree. Obviously this does not mean that a scissors is a potential means for cutting down a tree and a saw is a potential means for cutting my hair. As I said in my last, a means involves a relation to an end. There are no free-standing means. If I have a hand saw and a chainsaw, and I use the chainsaw to cut down the tree, then the chainsaw is an actual means to cutting down the tree whereas the saw is only a potential means to cutting down the tree.

What you tend to keep doing is dallying in ambiguities, and this prevents the conversation from moving forward. Simple distinctions and clarifications would solve most of our problems. For example:

The foreseen effect(s) are always intentional, because they, even if they are not means towards one’s intended end, are enveloped into the original intention as per accidens intentions. E.g., if I pull the the lever, which is a means towards my intention to save the five, knowing that it will also result in the effect of killing another person; then I am intending to kill that other person, per accidens, to achieve my, per se, intention of saving the five. — Bob Ross

Our whole proximate goal is to distinguish a means from a foreseen effect. I think I have demonstrated that this distinction is necessary, for example by pointing to the fact that the car's polluting emissions are not a means to getting groceries, but they are a foreseen effect. So then you tried to make a distinction on intention to clear this up, with "essential intention" and "accidental intention." But now you say that both a means and a foreseen effect are intended per accidens, thus failing to distinguish a means from a foreseen effect in the way that the essential/accidental distinction was meant to do in the first place. You have sabotaged your own project, or else provided us with analytic tools that are inadequate for the job at hand. I have been trying to get you to distinguish a means from a foreseen effect, but you are reluctant to do this on a number of levels. If you can't make that distinction or find the tools to make that distinction, then obviously the conversation cannot move forward. You will then just keep asserting that they are the same without being able to account in any way for their obvious differences.

The reason I distinguish potential means from actual means is because we have been talking past each other by using different definitions of what a means is.

E.g., if my intention is to get groceries and the only means of doing so is using my car, then my car is essential to actualizing the intention but unessential to the intention which I have (viz., if the car wasn’t essential towards my intentions,... — Bob Ross

But note your very next clause, "if the car wasn't essential." If your car is essential to actualizing the intention (i.e. it is an essential means) then it is not right to say that the car is "unessential to the intention which I have." If a car is the only way to achieve some end, then the car will be necessarily connected to the end, and in the absence of a car the end will not even be able arise as a possible end.

I am not entirely understanding your critique for this part. Here’s a basic google definition: “have (a course of action) as one's purpose or objective; plan.”.

As far as I can tell, all I have to do to avoid this critique is refurbish my definition to “to have an ideal of which one is planning or trying to actualize”—now it is a verb, and is still closely connected to ideality.

If you are just noting that I was using ideal somewhat interchangeably with intention; then you are correct: that was a mistake on my end. — Bob Ross

Well this may be too subtle, but the "mistake on your end" flows from the questionable definition. You are building your definition around a noun, 'ideal.' Even on your redaction, the Google definition is still built around something that directly refers to the verb of acting, "a course of action." The genus of intention is acts, whereas the genus of ideals is ideas. An intention is some kind of act, not some kind of idea or ideal. This may seem like a quibble, but it's really not, as many people make this mistake about intention. They think that when we intend something we are basically positing some kind of idea. But to intend is not to posit an idea or a plan, it is an act in which we apply our will to an end. It is a bit like committing ourselves to some goal. It is a dynamic reality, not a static reality. It centrally involves setting ourselves in motion towards some end.

Although I see your point, it could be an actual means towards Q; but the intention here (stipulated) is towards P; so A is not a means towards Q when working towards P. — Bob Ross

To say that "it could be an actual means towards Q [but in this case it is not]" is just to say that it is a potential means towards Q. That's what a potential means is.

This “indirect intention” is what I mean by “per accidens intention”. — Bob Ross

No it's not, because for Brock an actual means is directly intended. An indirect intention is what distinguishes a foreseen effect from an actual means, and you are insistent that your "per accidens intention" is not capable of this act of distinguishing. You are insistent that both a foreseen effect and an actual means are intended per accidens. This is why I was trying to get you to think about the nuance of the way that Aristotle employs the concept of per accidens.

This is just because “he means to” is being used vaguely: we have circled back to using “intention” vaguely. I would say, more precisely, that he per accidens intends Q (viz., he indirectly intends Q), and this is a form of intention—i.e., it is intentional. All we are disagreeing about is what kind or type of intention is at play. — Bob Ross

Hopefully what I've already said clears up some of the confusion here.

I think that any intentional killing of an innocent human being is immoral; whereas you seem to disagree with that in the case that it is “indirectly intended”. — Bob Ross

Right, and you don't yet have the tools to even see the difference between a means and a foreseen effect. At this point it is invisible to you, and as long as it stays invisible you will necessarily be able to maintain your assumption that any form of killing which involves any kind of intention is immoral.

If a person intends to do P by way of A and they know A also results in Q; then they thereby intend Q. — Bob Ross

This is the sort of ambiguity that your whole position depends on. We did all this work to distinguish different kinds of intention, and then you forget all of it immediately and talk about "intending Q" in an entirely unnuanced way. Your sentence here simply ignores the last two or three exchanges we have had in this thread.

if a person intends to drive while texting and they know that there is a chance that they might be too distracted by it and kill someone, then they have not thereby intended to kill someone in the event that they do become too distracted and kill someone — Bob Ross

No, this is a case of negligence, and is quite different from what we are considering. As I said earlier:

Is it always wrong to accidentally-intentionally kill innocent people? More precisely, is it always wrong to indirectly intend to kill innocent people? Is voluntary "manslaughter" always negligent? Those are the questions that need to be answered. — Leontiskos

Here is an edit from my last which you may have missed:

Regarding this third wall, suppose there is an evil and it is morally impermissible to directly intend this evil. Does it follow that it is impermissible to indirectly intend this evil?

I think not. Take the matter of the especially bad car emissions due to a faulty exhaust system. Is it impermissible to directly intend those emissions? For example, to allow your car to idle for the sake of the emissions? I think so. Does it follow that it is impermissible to get groceries in the car, even when you know it will produce those emissions? No, I don't think so. — Leontiskos

What about child laborers in the supply chain of our favorite products (and other workers who work in awful and dangerous conditions)? We are obviously treating them as means, but what is the solution? — RogueAI

One simple solution would be to refuse to buy products from companies who use children in that way.

Interaction is not a necessary condition for treating someone as an end. If I give a donation to a charity that works to help people in Gaza or Ukraine, I am treating those people as ends, but it can't be said that I interact with them: I don't even know who they are. — Herg

Nice....

Whatever Kant meant by what he wrote, the emboldened rendering above is what I was aiming for (except that I think all beings capable of pain and/or pleasure should be treated as ends, not just humans: "The question is not, Can they reason nor Can they talk, but, Can they suffer?" ). — Herg

I might still just watch the 20 get hit. Depends how they beg I guess....thats so disturbing that I went there but am I surprised? Cant say I am. Am I enjoying myself? Not pleased to admit my truth but willing to accept the reality of it. — Kizzy

thats what i was saying...kinda. Suffering part, particularly... (minus what was mentioned in your parenthesis-my opinion differs [good thing that is a non-factor) BUT nonetheless, progress is made.

I'm starting to see your point and/or others with similar stances and points (all whom agree, with their own takes though -- alike) from a different ground...or in a new light, whatever works for YOU...I am seeing now, as I wasnt before, why treating people like ends are understood or believed to be acceptable or moral in this case.... Its the interaction and relationship connections...they are clearly different as far as the connection between the two, or what comes from the connections, what emotions are expressed based on this connections...the strength of interactions is tested and more prominently measured, but those values are weighed differently because it is closed off to a stronger connection.

It is clear who is initiating and maintaining interactions more heavily than the other...so we have two different feelings about the interactions, but with no connection it can stay one-sided... While the strength of relationships are literally a balancing act between subjects not just as interactions or ends but as a person/people too. Bad relationships, bad judgements, bad rats of course make things interesting....but its measurable in behavior, observed and verified...love? I guess the stronger the connection the stronger a relationship stands, sustains, and if lucky thrives through any test of time... good stuff!!! The interaction is where the ground is laid, can we see each other or not? Doesnt matter, you will see some thing and some thing will see you.

Always good work from Bob, I have been able to grasp my own thoughts a bit better through your exchange with Herg in here. Thanks for all the work and intel you share consistently, it is appreciated. Many others to be thanked in this from me as well, good stuff all around. Cool.

One simple solution would be to refuse to buy products from companies who use children in that way. — Leontiskos

That would probably end up being most of the stuff we buy.
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2016/nov/24/child-labour-what-can-we-do-africa-modern-slavery

But this is a digression.

The answer is clearly to pull the lever, if you value all humans equally.

The idea of killing vs letting die is a silly distinction, the value of our actions can only derive from their consequences.

The idea that a doctor can kill 1 to save 5 is a completely different situation since it is not an isolated insident. People would stop going to the doctors, our medical institution would lose all trust and collapse, and more people will thus die. People who can only see moral choices through actions themselves and not the consequences of such actions, do not understand long term effects.

The idea of killing vs letting die is a silly distinction, the value of our actions can only derive from their consequences. — Ourora Aureis

I think it's a crucial distinction, and also a more accurate representation of cause and effect.

If one refuses to involve themselves in the dilemma, the deaths are not a consequence of one's actions. They're a consequence of the actions of whoever put the people on the track.

At any given moment we are choosing inaction towards countless situations which are in dire need of a hero. Equating action and inaction would make one morally responsible for neglecting every single one of them.

It's the inaccurate representation of cause and effect which leads to absurd conclusions.

Our individual action is the only factor we get to influence, hence this is the sole cause. Any cause outside of us is essentially already determined since we cant influence it, so referring to it as a cause is meaningless since it cannot change and so isn't relevent to the situation. What matters is your potential actions and the assumed effects of those actions. In this scenario being to pull a lever and let 1 die, or not pull the lever and let 5 die.

Time doesn't allow for no action to take place, to stand still, to watch, to walk away, to continue breathing, or continue standing; these are all actions, and any suggestion otherwise must argue why we make such a strange distinction and define what it means to not act.

Yes, you are morally responsible for the money you spend on your entertainment which you could use to fund malaria nets and save lives, to suggest otherwise is (for a lack of a better term) cope. If you dont give to them regardless, then you simply dont value their lives over your entertainment, which I think is fine as an egoist, but if you're not an egoist then you need to justify that.

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To formalise, this appears to be your argument:

P1: No distinction between killing and letting die would mean we are morally responsible for many situations where people require help.
P2: We are not responsible for situations where people require help.
C: There is a distinction between killing and letting die.

I disagree with premise 2, it must be justified.
(I also disagree with premise 1 since we dont neccesarily have to value the lives of others, but its not that interesting of a line since its based on subjective value).

I think it's a crucial distinction, and also a more accurate representation of cause and effect. — Tzeentch

Right. :up:
There is no legal system in the world that does not recognize a difference between a commission and an omission.

So are you some kind of saint that spends their entire life helping others?

The discussion is about ethics, not legality. Clearly you cannot force everyone to give all their money to charity as the economy would collapse, but this isn't an argument for such a distinction in ethics but one in law.

A distinction made in one domain does not neccesarily transfer to another. Anyone can create a distinction between 2 concepts, but it doesnt give that distinction any true weight in terms of action, what we're concerned about in ethics.

If you merely believe in the distinction but believe it holds no weight in your decision making then its meaningless. If you believe it does hold weight then it must be justified with an argument.

No, and such a question proves you havent read my response.

How do you justify not being a saint?

I am an ethical egoist, I believe an action is good if it supports my self-interest. I value my own entertainment above people I have no connection to.

The discussion is about ethics, not legality. — Ourora Aureis

The distinction between commissions and omissions is a distinction on the causality of human acts, which pertains to both ethics and law (indeed, law is a subset of ethics).

So you believe you have a responsibility to help others, and not doing so requires a justification, and what you just posted is your justification? :chin:

Just read what I wrote. You havent justified why the distinction has weight. Aka, why it has influence over ones actions.

I don't believe I have a responsibility to help others. I am an ethical egoist. If you dont understand what that means then read up on it or read what I've written and use some inference.

P2: We are not responsible for situations where people require help. — Ourora Aureis

I disagree with premise 2, it must be justified. — Ourora Aureis

?

- Your 19 posts have been of very low quality, and I do not plan on responding to you further in this thread or in any other. I am letting you know for your own sake, and I would suggest putting a bit more effort into your posts rather than shooting them off in a few seconds.

I've made my posts perfect and you've barely responded to them. It's clear to anyone sensible that you read the first line I wrote and responded before even understanding my argument and why I said this discussion is about ethics and not law.

You clearly have no interest in an actual discussion and your being hostile now, bye.