Yes I think the politics threads are a loss anyway. — fishfry

Test. Political discussion so often turns into Punch and Judy. There are several reasons for that. But it is often not helpful but actually harmful.

Real discussion is not possible unless one is willing to endanger oneself, by allowing one's own position (and self-esteem) to be on the table. That applies to all philosophy and possibly even more widely.

OK. I don't feel entirely comfortable about private threads. It's just that I've picked up references and deduced that some people take their discussions to private threads to avoid intrusive or annoying comments, which you can get on public threads.

I found this thread in "All discussions". But it says the last post was 24 days ago. It's way down on page 2. But when I look at your last post in the thread, it says you posted it 11 hours ago. Whatever the reason, pushing it down the list means that fewer people are likely to visit it.

Can Nature be actually indeterminate and not just always determinate? Is there a state where there is no fact of the matter, and thus not even properly any "state"? — apokrisis

These questions don't help me much. What is Nature? What does "actually" mean in the phrase "actually indeterminate"? Where there is no fact of the matter, there is no state. By definition. Assuming conventional views about how language works.

We shift from talking about yes or no absolutes – such as determinism – to graded relativities. That gives us more options that might better fit what we see. — apokrisis

I'm sympatheric. But I'm not sure that "graded" necessarily implies "relativities". The colour spectrum is a series of graded stages in a continuum, all of which is, in a sense, deterministic (definite). To say that "exist" can always be something implies by the same token that it can always be something else.

To exist can always be some mix of the definitely constrained and the radically free. As in chance and necessity. — apokrisis

This doesn't convey any clear meaning to me. Perhaps I'm just being dense.

There is no "One True Feature," to point to for defining life, but we generally don't have much disagreement over whether prions or self-replicating silicon crystals are alive. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's true. Family resemblances don't necessarily result in disagreement. It's just that decisions are made, not on the basis of a single, conclusive, criterion, but on various criteria, different in different cases. Think of how we talk about the resemblances between member of a family.

Is a fossil alive? Does it have the right sort of family resemblance? Obviously, to answer the second question means being a specific about what might constitute such a resemblance. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Pedantically, I think you must mean "was a fossil alive". You are right. We can be (but may not be) quite specific about the criteria that determine each case. It's just that different critieria apply in different cases.

Fair enough. I don't view Wittgenstein in terms of relativism. — Apustimelogist

My problem is that I don't understand exactly what cognitive relativism is - the usual problem with an "-ism". I woud like to know what the alternative might be - cognitive absolutism?

To take a hackneyed example, an extreme metaphysics might hold that we can say nothing about things outside of our perception. So they can say nothing about the cup when it is put in the cupboard - not even that the cup is in the cupboard. But if, when you ask them for the cup, they open the cupboard and retrieve it, they put the lie to their metaphysics by their acts. — Banno

You draw that conlusion. I draw that conclusion. But do they drawn that conclusion? No. What follows?

Forms of life cannot be incommensurable because they must all occur embedded in our activities in the world. So despite not being able to speak Chinese (an increasingly inappropriate example for all sorts of reasons) we will recognise a Chinese builder or grocer by their activities. — Banno

The tricky bit is that divining a form of life may be, in many cases, a question of interpretation. As in anthropomorphization and personification.

Is there not a sense in which worlds are intersubjectively constructed through forms of life? — Joshs

I would rather have said that forms of life are intersubjectively worked out in the world.

I can think of no better example of this than John Searle's analysis of "Proper Names." In his analysis, he asks if proper names are just a set of descriptions. What follows in his conclusion is that proper names perform a great function in language by not being precise descriptions. — Richard B

I didn't know that's where it came from. Isn't it also relied on by Kripke? It seems to me a most plausible idea.

Epistemic vagueness is not really much of an issue. What becomes the interesting issue is whether it is meaningful to describe reality itself as being ontically vague in any proper or useful sense. And a Peircean might rather think it does. — apokrisis

"ontically" confuses me. It seems to me fairly obvious that "vague" is often a classification derived from the interaction of standards of clarify with the facts.

Do you not trust yours that we shouldn't kill someone healthy to save 9 who are dying? — Lionino

Yes. But I'm open to argument.

Should the state consider you an organ donor unless you notify them otherwise (presumed consent)? — RogueAI

I think this is a situation in which silence should not be taken as consent. However, presumed consent might be better than the current situation (as I understand it), which is that if you don't express a view, your nearest and (possibly) dearest will be asked to decide for you. Are you sure that they will decide as you would have decided or, perhaps, that they will decide correctly?

I believe there is a moral imperative to be an organ donour. — Lionino

Yes. But that doesn't mean it should become a legal imperative.

The issue is that, in some cases, once someone is known to be an organ donour, less efforts will be made to save the person in critical condition, so you are basically being mainslaughtered for being altruistic. — Lionino

It is a worry, I suppose. I think the possibility that efforts to save me will be pushed too far is much more likely. There comes a point when continued efforts amount to torture.
The real difficulty is that there may be no right answer.

If I had to guess, both Kant (I am confident about this one) and John S. Mill had autism, much stronger than mine at least. — Lionino

That's not something you should guess about. However, it is true that autism is a spectrum and mild autism may be much more common than we suppose. But whatever your opinion, it should not interfere with proper, serious, consideration of your philosophy. Dismissing your view just because your mental health is less than perfect is simply prejudice.
However, I share your suspicion of normative theories of the conventtional kind. They seem to me to be rather unhelpful - even distracting.

The entire premise that folks are obligated to donate to a charity misunderstands the meaning of "donate". — LuckyR

Quite so.

We're having an interesting discussion, but I prefer for such discussions to be in the public space. — fishfry

I have no objection to the public space. But it seems that this is no longer really a public space.

On the other hand, our convo is helping me to at least articulate some of my thoughts. Especially about J6. J6 is an article of faith for the True Believers. That's why I reacted as I did. — fishfry

Yes, it's helping me in the same way. It's rare to find people who are willing to emerge from their bunkers and actually discuss things. If it has to be in private, so be it.

You may well be right. I couldn't possibly tell.

How is all this relevant for defining philosophy? How is this the relevant to philosophy in any way?

As other users pointed and me initially, the concept he is describing is already perfectly called 'metalanguage'. If his redefinition is adopted, we lose the word 'philosophy' and 'metalanguage' becomes redundant. — Lionino

I agree with that.

If I were to say "'Democrazia' non è una parola italiana.", every awake person in Italy who finished school would know what I am talking about. I don't think it is the case that you are half-asleep right now or that the average Italian is much smarter than you, so I think you know very well what I meant by my statement. — Lionino

Whether I'm asleep or not is not the issue. It I did have ideas about why you are saying what you are saying, it is reasonable to confirm whether they are right before I start criticizing them. But apparently you don't want to do that. But, in general terms, my issue is whether you are wearing blinkers or not. This is a trivial issue about how "same word" is applied. it's not sufficiently interesting to bother with.

A computable definition for philosophy would allow us to pick philosophical statements out of their textual environment. — Tarskian

The only problem we have with picking philosophical statements out of their textual environment is that we don't agree what philosophy is. The machine will not help with that.
Indeed, the project itself will very likely throw up problems of its own. The difference between a sentence and a statement is precisely the environment (textual and otherwise). To extract a sentence from its textual environment would effectively prevent identifying philosophical statements.

They would obviously not use automated translation. But then again, automated translation can still speed up the work of a human translator. In the 10% of the time that it is inadequate, he will correct the output. — Tarskian

Doing a job badly, so that someone else has to check and correct the result is normally regarded as little better than not doing the job. But it the machine can do donkey-work and so help us out, that may be worth having. But it contributes nothing at all to defining philosophy.

A computer vision system for the evaluation of the behaviour and the well-being of the dogs housed in the shelter

Who decides what behaviour is problematic or when the dog's well-being is undermined? Not the machine, that's for sure. It may save donkey-work, but it isn't capable of telling us anything we don't know.

The need to adjust things to changing definitions is a good problem to have. It means that the system already works for the existing situation. That is not necessarily future-proof, but that is rather a problem to fix if and when it occurs. — Tarskian

My point is that the machine has to be adjusted to conform with human definitions. The machine does not define anything, but extrapolates something from whatever samples we offer it. The selection of the samples is, effectively, a definition.

I think you might find Wikipedia - Motte and Bailey Fallacy helpful.

But I can't understand why you think it isn't an English word.
— Ludwig V
You can. — Lionino

Sorry. Let me put it a different way. Why do you think that "philosophy" isn't an English word?

Refining definitions is okay if done in an educated fashion, many scientific and philosophical terms out there would benefit from refinement; but changing definitions altogether is sophomoric unless you are Terence Tao or Stephen Hawking. — Lionino

I agree that refining definitions can be useful, though much depends on whether the refined definition is useful or helpful in some way, in the context in which is to be applied. Even changing definitions for terms that are to be used in a specific context may be acceptable. But it turns out that this definition has an agenda - as many other proferred definitions of philosophy do. But they at least have a philosophical agenda. This definition is not in pursuit of a project that I would consider philosophical.

Not only that problem, but also the word 'philosophy' doesn't exist only in English; in fact, it is not even an English word. — Lionino

You are right that philosophy doesn't exist only in English. One assumes that the term has a recognizably similar meaning at least in other European languages. But I can't understand why you think it isn't an English word. The fact that it was originally a compound word in ancient Greek seems to me to be irrelevant. The fact that it may overlap to a greater or lesser extent with parallel words in other languages is more relevant, but doesn't mean it is not an English word. Though, perhaps, it depends on you criterion for which are to count as English.

there now exist ways to describe similarities in languages and codes with much more rigor." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, that may be so. I wouldn't want to comment on what linguistics does any more than I want to comment on what mathematics does. But if you are claiming that what linguistics has done replaces what philosophers do, that demands a different kind of consideration. I would expect to find that the agenda of linguistics is different from the agenda of philosophy. How far the ideas of one impact on the ideas of the other is a tricky question.

The question is not: "is it wrong " but "is it so broad as to be trivial," i.e. "all languages must share some things, but I shall not identify any," is a claim that really doesn't say anything of substance, (nor is it a novel claim). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think that's quite fair to Wittgenstein.

In the first place, I don't think the idea of language-games is an analysis of language. He uses it and intends to use it, as a tactic or approach to high-light specific features of languages. In the second place, he doesn't apply this idea only to language. For example, he argues that all games must share some things. On the contrary, as he compares specific games, he can point out specific things that they share and other things that they don't share, case by case. There's not even any need for a comprehensive list of all the things that any two games might share; the concept is dynamic and new cases can come up at any time.

But there are cases where a similar vagueness suits the particular needs of other sciences. For example, the biological definition of life lists certain characteristics which are important to consider, without committing all of them being instantiated in any particular case. Or again, lists of symptoms in medicine are not always offered on the basis that all of them will be instantiated in every case. On the contrary, the symptoms are a range of considerations which it is relevant to consider when making a diagnosis. In the case of COVID there seems to be no expectation that the list will ever be closed.

Hence the reference to information theory. It turns out there do seems to be things all physical systems of communication must share if they are to communicate at all. And there are lots of things we can say about the throughput of codes, redundancy, etc. and these do indeed seem to explain a good deal about human language and its structure. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This suggests to me that language is being seen as an abstract structure. Which I don't object to. It can be very useful. But it is not the only approach and not always useful. The big differences between TLP and PI is that language is regarded as an abstract structure, subject to logical analysis. In the PI it is regarded as a collection of practices which are part of all the other practices that go to make up a life. True, there are departments of linguistics that are more like this, but you don't seem to be talking about them. But they stand a much better chance of producing more rigorous versions of Wittgenstein's idea.

I am interested in a computable predicate, i.e. a computer program or a function, that will be able to distinguish between statements that are philosophical and statements that are not. Therefore, the most important requirement is that it can be implemented as source code. — Tarskian

I wish you luck with your project. But I can't help feeling that that your project would be more relevant if the most important requirement was that the definition was correct. It would be handy if it could be implemented as source code, but that's definitely a secondary consideration.

We do not require that ("right all the time") from Google Translate either. It just needs to be correct "most of the time" or "substantially more often than not". — Tarskian

Who's we? Lawyers translating international treaties are not going to settle for "right most of the time". Nor engineers translating engineering manuals. Mind you, they can expect to be disappointed, since often no translation is correct. Translators of literature and poetry - and philosophy - frequently wrestle with this.

It is actually possible to detect if any particular sound is music or not, with a tool such as Spleeter from Deezer research: — Tarskian

The models available are:
Vocals (singing voice) / accompaniment separation (2 stems)
Vocals / drums / bass / other separation (4 stems)
Vocals / drums / bass / piano / other separation (5 stems) — Deezer Research - Sleeter

What a disappointment!
Tchaikovsky uses cannon-fire in the 1812 overture. Music? Not Music? Depends on the use the sound is put to.
If you tap a glass tumbler with a hard object, it makes a ringing sound. Whether that is music or not depends on what you do next.
It is quite usual for new forms of music to be rejected by many existing practitioners but to be accepted as time goes by. Jazz, is, of course, the classic example.

This approach will undoubtedly still require an underlying notion of what exactly to extract and summarize from the sample ("machine learning"), and therefore, what exactly matters when trying to distinguish philosophy from the alternative. — Tarskian

Yes, and no doubt they will produce excellent summaries of existing practice. Your sample will be, effectively the definition of philosophy of the person or people who collect and identify the sample. So a machine trained on philosophy up to 1900 may or may not correctly identify philosophy written a hundred years later. Any definition that catches existing practice is likely to fail in the face of new practices, so this approach needs constant updating by people who have classified the new material.

That would be compatible with the ChatGPT approach. — Tarskian

I have heard - perhaps I'm wrong - that there is a nasty problem lurking in ChatGPT. It picks up on racist or sexist language in its sample - and there's plenty of that, apparently - and adopts it as normal, since no-one has told it any different. But what makes language racist or sexist is not just a matter of vocabulary, but of use - even intent.

My understanding of a definition is that it explains the use of a word or term. As it happens, that roughly corresponds to what the dictionaries say, but obviously we can't necessarily rely on them. Nevertheless, I think that approach is helpful here. Let's call it a working definition.
We need to remember that not all definitions are linguistic. Ostensive definitions need not employ any words at all, although they do presuppose a basic understanding of language - except when we are training animals.
I suggest two basic varieties of definition which need to be taken into consideration here. One is the attempt to capture (perhaps codify) the use of an existing word or term. One might call these empirical definitions, paradoxical as it may seem. The other lays down a rule; this is commonest when a new term is being created (or a new use of an existing term, perhaps in a specific context, as in technical terms). One might call these stipulative definitions.

Cutting to the chase, I suggest that you need to clarify in your own mind whether you wish to capture the existing use of the term "philosophy" or stipulate a definition to be used in a specific context.

The origin for what I write, is of course, the foundational crisis in mathematics. I believe that it sheds new light not just on metaphysics but also on metaphilosophy. — Tarskian

This suggests that your definition is formulated in a specific context, but that you think it has consequences for philosophy more widely. I'm not clear whether you consider the possibility of that extension to be a philosophical thesis or not.

BTW, is meta-philosophy philosophy or not? - is that a philosophical question? It seems to be an extension of a concept that is used (and therefore defined) within a specific context, which may or may not be considered to be philosophical.

Precise definitions are often only accepted by theorists belonging to a certain philosophical movement and are revisionistic according to Søren Overgaard et al. in that many presumed parts of philosophy would not deserve the title "philosophy" if they were true. — Wikipedia

Wikipedia is not wrong, especially in this observation. I would question "often" unless someone can come up with a definition of philosophy that is universally accepted by philosophers. Your definition is no exception - it has a philosophical agenda and is constructed in the pursuit of that agenda. That's fair enough, until you claim that it is a definition of philosophy.

Dogmatically, I would start by saying that philosophy is a practice (or a family of inter-related practices), the scope of which is effectively defined by what its practitioners do when they are philosophizing. One may compare music or the visual or performance arts, or even science itself.

The moral obligation certainly exists in Islam in the form of zakaat, i.e. the mandatory charity levy. — Tarskian

Thanks for the reminder. But I think that "charity levy" is self-contradictory. A levy for charitable purposes is possible, but the justification for it would be justice, not charity. And so, I am not opposed to "charity" in the name of justice - for example, as an intervention when authorities refuse to implement justice. Food banks, for example - or indeed, a charity for famine relief. Come to think of it, if we interpret Singer's argument as about justice, it would have considerably more traction.

Suppose we have a crystal ball and we know that one kid will grow up to cure a kind of cancer and another kid will grow up to become a drug addict and die of an OD at a young age, and we have to save one or the other. — RogueAI

I'm not very interested in this possibility, but in this one:- "Suppose we don't have a crystal ball. Should we prioritize one over the other?" Since that one is where we are, let's have the answer. Considering the other possibility is just messing about.
OK. Messing about can be fun.
If someone claimed to have a crystal ball, would I go along with it? No. Because there will be many other consequences of my action and I couldn't possibly make that decision unless I know them all. My bet is that when I do, there will be so many factors on each side that no rational decision is possible.
What would convince you, beyond rational doubt, that a proffered crystal ball is always correct in its predictions? What would persuade you to trust your own life to it? (After all, the crystal ball might finger you for the chop.)

The problem in the ethical theories created by many self-regarded saints is that they end up in the logical conclusion that we should kill a person (or ourselves) to harvest organs to save many others. That however does not align with our moral intuition, so it is safe to discard the theory. — Lionino

I have heard that a healthy, fresh, corpse can save nine lives. Not bad for one death.
I don't trust "intuition", except as a starting-point for evaluation.

My opinion is that even coming up with a normative ethical theory is already missing the point of what ethics is supposed to be. — Lionino

I don't disagree with you. But I'm not sure I know what the point of ethics is supposed to be.

Re PI 65, I think this has simply been proven wrong by advances in linguistics and information theory. We can identify similarities. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But Wittgenstein doesn't argue that we can't identify similarities. He just argues that we do not need to identify a single similarity as the basis for every characteristic.

And the upshot of these considerations is: we see a complicated net-work of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small — Phil. Inv. 66

Similarities are the elements of family resemblances.

Was Hitler as morally valuable (and what does that mean, exactly?) as Jonas Salk? — RogueAI

I agree that the meaning of "morally valuable" is unclear. But I also think that Jonas Salk was a morally better person than Hitler. But I also think that both of them and John Doe are all equally human persons and therefore have exactly the same moral claims on the rest of us. That's what human rights are all about.

Suppose I'm faced with a choice of saving my child or a stranger's child. Am I wrong for prioritizing my kid? — RogueAI

No, of course not. But I would be wrong for prioritizing your kid over someone else's kid. (Given that we have no social connection beyond this forum.)

I do not believe everyone is equally morally valuable and so his conclusions dont apply to me — Ourora Aureis

I think I can understand what you're saying. But you need to say that you don't believe that everyone is equally valuable and consequently that Singer's argument is invalid, and so his conclusions don't apply to you. But it would be inconsistent to admit that his argument is valid and deny the obligation that follows from it.

I agree that we would not want to call that practice paying for goods. What else we might say might depend on further information. For example, are gold and silver rare or common in their environment? Do they appear to value it? And so forth.

In short this money, or what looks like money, has among them a quite different role from among us. — Wittgenstein RFM

Certainly, I would agree with that. Further investigation required. On the other hand, I wouldn't dream of calling them insane. This practice is incomprehensible but there's no need - yet - to dismiss it as insanity. After all, there's a preliminary investigation needed to work out whether insanity is a concept that can be applied to them at all.

And yet this thesis seems entirely implausible. For instance, I have never heard of a culture who does arithmetic completely different from any other culture. Where is the arithmetic that is untranslatable? — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is where this issue began. I think what I was trying to say that a concept of arithmetic that was incommensurable with our arithmetic seems to me incoherent. I can imagine a practice that appears to be like arithmetic, but isn't. But I can't imagine a practice of arithmetic that couldn't be translated into our arithmetic. The possibility of translation is a criterion for classifying a practice as arithmetic. I suppose we might find, as it were, fragments of arithmetic in various practices, but not a coherent single system. Or there might be parts of our arithmetic discernible in their practice and other parts missing.

However, it is not impossible for the observing community who can see these differences to carry on conversation among themselves since there is agreement in use and judgment in their language. — Richard B

Yes. But that would exclude the possibility of the kinds of interaction that would allow us to say that these people are people, or possibly even that they are alive.

And what is this amount when shared among the non-poor people of the world? 23000000000/(8000000000-700000000)=3.15dollars per year to donate (!) — LFranc

Very interesting. But it ain't going to happen, so how is it relevant?

If charity were obligatory, it just leads to this nonsensical moral theory of Singer's. — QuixoticAgnostic

That's a very interesting point.

Singer wants to generalize the obligation to help someone in imminent danger of death, in whatever way we are able, even at some cost to ourselves, to donating to a charity that serves that same purpose. There are complications, but I think most people will go along with that obligation. Walking on by when you could help is less bad than standing around watching, but still, one would feel guilty, and, IMO, justifiably so.

For people who don't live in the UK, I should explain that in the UK, the national lifeboat service is a charity, not funded or organized by any state institution, but by the Royal National Lifeboat Institute.

So, does donating to the lifeboats equate to saving the child drowning in the pond? Or is donating money to enable a hospital to buy a life-saving scanner morally equivalent to the actions of the people who operate it? I think not, because the connection between my action and the life saved is indirect, in the sense that although I am enabling someone else to save lives, I am not saving them myself. Consequently, the donation is, let us say, recommended, but not obligatory.

On the other hand, I'm not al all sure that charity in general is not obligatory. In one way, if charity is obligatory, it becomes a tax, or a question of justice. A different kind of case is the expectation that in time of, for example, famine, food must be shared equally. Again, that's a question of justice, not charity.

But there is a tradition in the West that one should donate 10% of one's income to charity (the tithe). However, that doesn't specify what the objects of one's charity should be. So I'm inclined to think that while donating to charity in general is morally obligatory, what charity one should donate to is a matter of choice, depending on one's own values.

I'm aware that I am positing that there is a moral difference between face-to-face situations like the drowning child and remote situations. It's not just moral weakness to give more generously to one's family and friends than to distant unknown people. On the contrary, that's what love and friendship mean. Whether love and friendship are morally obligatory, I'm not sure. But I am sure that I'm not morally required to love specific individuals (except, perhaps, my children) even though to love someone and be friends with others are good things. (That's not well formulated, I know.)

I can't find what category this thread is in. It says .999... = 1 but I can't find this on the main page or in the Lounge. — fishfry

We have been pushing the boundaries for a long time. I'm finding the thread via the list of "mentions". I think they are trying to persuade us to move to private discussion or stop. I'll send you my response to this post in that way. If you really want to stop, just tell me. But I think we've just opened up another layer of discussion.

OK. I didn't grasp the significance of J6 until later. I'm sorry I upset you. It wasn't in any way intended as baiting, or even provocation.

Thanks for explaining. It would be absurd for me to argue with you. I don't know anything like enough. It is indeed to be hoped that (more of) the truth, or, maybe a better balanced account, will emerge one day. I accept that Trump did not intend to overturn the whole constitution, so calling it a coup, in the normal sense, is an exaggeration. But it does seem inescapable that he was not prepared to accept the election result until he had tried everything possible to overturn it.

But, if I may, my perspective is that all politicians will play dirty when push comes to shove and the opportunity arises. There's no point in moralizing about it, that's how the world is. So there's no reason to think that Trump (or his supporters) are an exception. That's not an unreasonable view, is it?

You are both rushing ahead far too quickly. We'll get into trouble if we get too far ahead of ourselves.

I think these sorts of biological constants (constant across diverse historical/cultural variances) is what Wittgenstein is sometimes pointing to with the "form of life." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not at all sure the biological is what W meant by "forms of life". It is, indeed, something that all human beings share. However, some people talk of "a common humanity", which is also hard to interpret, but seems to be related more to the possibility of what we might call a personal relationship. But we are also quite ready to classify some human beings as inhuman or subhuman or animal - mainly on moral grounds, but sometimes in reference to the breakdown of social structures.
Two points about these issues make them special. In this context, we are dealing with ourselves. This makes the issues very different. So far, science has proceeded on the basis that the scientist is an observer who can observe without (normally) affecting what is observed. That has already broken down in sub-atomic physics and breaks down even more dramatically in psychology and neurology. (I'm simplifying here, of course. Some relatively independent observation is possible.)
But in these context, understanding people, the subject of observation is also observing the observer. This sets up a different level of interaction between observer and observed.

But this is cultural relativism, not cognitive relativism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So we have three levels - at least - of forms of life. Biological, cultural, cognitive. How many more? In any case, all these are intertwined and inseparable in practice. I mean that what we actually have to deal with is the combination of all the levels in action.

We would share with extraterrestrials all that is common to all corners of the universe, limits on the information carrying capacity of various media, ratios, etc. And this might profitably be thought of as an even broader "form of life," the form of life common to all organisms living in our universe. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It would indeed. But we would face the problem of detecting life before we could progress to detecting conscious "rational" life. No doubt we would be "limited" by comparisons with what we acknowledge as life on this planet. But a form of life that can thrive on Venus would, surely have to be rather different from the forms of life that thrive on Earth. No matter, the comparison with Earth is a starting-point and that's all we really need.

On this view, if one reads Aristotle's Organon, it might seem that Aristotle is discussing a logic quite similar to our own (and to "common sense") but really there is no way for us to know if we mean the same thing. Being separated by vast cultural differences, it rather seems we should not mean the same things when we refer to syllogisms, premises, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Your discussion is really very ambitious. If we consider all the possible problems at once, they will be overwhelming. We need to deal with each problem as it comes up, with the tools (intellectual and technological) we have at hand. If you had asked Aristotle to build a nuclear collider, it would have been an overwhelming, impossible problem. Now look at us!

Now the cognitive relativist can always claims that different forms of arithmetic and logic only seem translatable—that we don't really understand Aristotle or Shankara at all. However, this seems pretty far fetched. And aside from that, it seems to leave the door open on an all encompassing skepticism, for on this account how can anyone be sure that they truly share a form of life with anyone else? — Count Timothy von Icarus

The underlined phrases are the give-away that something is being smuggled in to the argument. Those nebulous doubts are the essence of scepticism. But the desire for perfection is the enemy of progress. So it is best to do what we can and progress as we can, without being put off by the destuctive fears and ambitions of the sceptic.

Wittgenstein's point that any set of actions is still consistent with an infinite number of rules still holds. This holds with the study of nature as well. Any sort of "natural law," based solely on past observations seems doomed to underdetermination. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Underdetermination is another bogey-man. If we have a rule that works, we use until it doesn't - then we come up with another one. We can't possibly deal with all the possibilities at once, so we deal with what we have to hand.

But has not history shown that what intelligent people called “reasonable” and “unreasonable” has changed from time to time. — Richard B

Of course it has, and that's a good thing. On this planet, the common tradition gives a reasonable basis for making reasonable translations from one epoch to another.

Yep, and this was my point, if they are completely different in action/ judgement, why call it arithmetic at all. — Richard B

The supposition is not really specific enough to sensibly answer the question. We have to make decisions step by step, acknowledging mis-steps as we discover them

Well it will not be from some self evident absolute certain proposition. But that we act and judge similarly in most case to sustain the form of life. — Richard B

That I can agree with.

Spirituality can help you deal with stress by giving you a sense of peace, purpose, and forgiveness. It often becomes more important in times of emotional stress or illness.
You may feel a higher sense of purpose, peace, hope, and meaning.
Mental health disorders may be treated with the help of spirituality ...
Mental issues like depression and substance abuse can be a sign of a spiritual void in your life.
Your mental health plays a huge role in your general well-being. Being in a good mental state can keep you healthy and help prevent serious health conditions. A study found that positive psychological l well-being can reduce the risks of heart attacks and strokes.
Mental health conditions can also make dealing with a chronic illness more difficult. The mortality rate from cancer and heart disease is higher among people with depression or other mental health conditions. — webmed.com

That's better. It does not blame the patient and makes more modest claims. However, I would distinguish sharply between "spirituality" and mental health. They are far from synonymous and both are distinct from religious belief. Can the doctor sensibly advise patients to believe in a religion or some form of spirituality in order to get better faster? I don't think so. So this advice is a bit like advice to make sure one has inherited a good set of genes in order to get better.

I also don't think that it is possible to objectively measure faith, hope, or the will to survive. So, I do not trust any figures on the subject. — Tarskian

That's something we can agree on.

True, but what I would ultimately say is that sapere aude is a dead end. It is premised on the false idea that individuals have wisdom/knowledge independent of and even in opposition to traditions. On my view human progress will happen through traditions or not at all. Individuals thinking for themselves will not achieve collective progress.* Collective progress will only occur when individuals act and think cooperatively, and this is not a bad definition of tradition. (I.e. we could think of tradition as cooperative engagement with those who came before us, and thereby with those around us.) — Leontiskos

I agree with almost all of that. The mythic image of the hero in solitary confrontation with the oppressive dead hand of the past is seriously damaging.

They realized that the call to "sapere aude" was premature, and required a more educated populus before it would be able to be implemented. — Leontiskos

I agree you need people trained the right way before encouraging them to heed the motto. But given the number of academics who seem remarkably unenlightened, perhaps it is not normal academic education that is required.

The main threat to good healthcare is the lack of religion. — Tarskian

Can you back that up, with a proper study. I simply don't believe it. The main threat to good healthcare is lack of money and education.

The doctor will simply say, "The patient is not fighting. He has given up already." — Tarskian

It is true that there are powerful psychological effects that can help medical treatment. But the idea that it is all a matter of grit and determination and will-power is bunkum. It's more complicated than that, and not well understood. Some doctors may make that remark to the punters, but they know better. it is just an excuse to avoid getting sued. If your doctor tries it on with you, I recommend you find another doctor - fast.

Good healthcare is simply wasted on people who actually don't want to live. — Tarskian

Well, then, why not just offer them a merciful end instead of forcing them to endure the disease pointlessly?

For testing religions for truth. For following a religious path at all. I was just listing some benefits of this. — Igitur

It may be, of course, that the point of religion is not whether it is true or false, but whether it enables a good (eudaimon) life, or at least a life as good as it can be in the circumstances.

There are different family structures, there are half siblings, step siblings, etc. Yet, what culture believes in people who do not have biological mothers or fathers? Outside of miracles or myth, where do people accept: "that person was never in the womb?" or "oh yes, Jessie over there is another immaculate conception?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm sorry. I was careless. I'm would not dream of contesting the point that the way we reproduce, biologically and culturally (because reproduction happens at both levels) is bound to be important in any human form of life and any human practices.

Absolutely nowhere is the answer. It is truly miraculous for there to be a human being without a biological father or biological mother. A cloned human being would still have a "parent" who had two biological parents and they would still (barring astounding scientific progress) need to be born. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. Huxley imagines the culmination in "Brave New World". It's hard not to think that being born from a jar and raised in a baby factory would have a profound influence on subsequent culture. Huxley doesn't follow through on that. Also, as it happens, the animals that we feel closest to reproduce much as we do.

If someone told you they had no father and had never been born of a woman would your reaction be a shrug and the thought: "why yes, people of some cultures aren't born, I suppose they spring forth from rocks fully formed? There is no truth about biological parentage in these parts." You have to be on a severe overdose of pomo to believe it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. Christianity seems to have latched on to the sales technique that rests on making a big attention-getting claim, even it is wildly improbable and most likely false, or, charitably, metaphorical.

And to be honest, I think the continual contrasting of pernicious forms of relativism with "Final Answers" (capitalized of course), "One True Canonical Descriptions," "The Only Right Way," and the like, is a strawman/false dichotomy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There are people around who think that is the choice. But I misjudged you it seems. "False dichotomy" must be the answer. I'm not sure I could prove it to a determined sceptic. But empirically, our language supports both doctrines, so it must be horses for courses - in other words, a matter decided for each practice. Is that the way you would go?

if these concepts are used is such dramatically different ways in which humans act and judge in entirely different ways, why should we even talk as if they had some relationship that deserve to fall under the banner of "truth". — Richard B

Would it not be a pragmatic decision? Not that I could articulate what the criteria might be for making such a decision - whether to see all the practices linked or "truth" as multiply ambiguous. One might also go back to consider what motivates absolutism/relativism. It's a question that Cavell might ask.

You J6'd me? Are you kidding? — fishfry

Had enough. J6 was the end. — fishfry

J6. Jeez man that's all you got? — fishfry

I can see you are serious. But I have no idea what you are talking about.

The Dems refused to accept the result of the 2016 election and have been causing mischief since then, with Russiagate, two fake impeachments, lawfare, and then weakening Trump's Secret Service protection to the degree that he almost got killed. I doubt they're done yet. — fishfry

I'm not going to argue the rights and wrongs of all of that. I don't know enough. But I don't believe that Trump's hands are clean, either. Even if Trump himself didn't intend to encourage them, which is very hard indeed to believe, his supporters invaded the Capitol on Jan 6 2021.

I hope these court cases will deter some of the vandalism. — fishfry

I don't think the courts will deter anyone. The protesters are getting what they wanted. Publicity, fuss, arguments.

Many of those projects should be abolished, for good and sound reasons. — fishfry

Maybe so. But not because a single blade on a single tower snapped off.

Point being, EV's are a disaster. Green energy is a disaster. If the eco measures actually worked, I'd support them. They don't. They're a scam, and their negative impact falls mostly on the poor of the world, so that the upscale can feel better about themselves. — fishfry

Well, I'm not keen on any of it. Not least because I'm not anywhere near wealthy enough to avoid the negative economic impacts - and you are right, it will not be the wealthy who bear the brunt of them. On the contrary, they are quite likely to make money out of it. But I don't see any evidence that the whole thing is a scam. True, we're not having much effect yet. But we are nowhere near the level where we might actually slow climate change down. All I see is oil companies defending their profits and nuclear companies returning to profitability by polluting the planet for the next 100,000 years.

Bird stew? — fishfry

That made me laugh. A lot of those birds taste and smell very strongly of fish. Not surprising. They mostly eat fish and that makes them very unappetizing. They reckon that painting one of the blades black, instead of white, makes them flicker, which is enough to deter them.

You're halfway to my point of view. And now that Germany, for one, is starting to see the economic downsides of their green energy programs, the tide is turning. — fishfry

China has invested a great deal of money and years of effort in cornering the market for rare metals. They must be very confident about where we are going in the long run.

Well, herein lies the difficulty of relying too heavily on metaphors. When it comes to family relations, it seems that they can exist even if no one believes they do. For example, if Ajax is the biological father of Ophelia, this relation of paternity exists even if neither Ajax nor Ophelia (nor any of their family members) are aware of it. And not only that, but evidence of the paternity relationship is "out there" to be discovered. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, metaphors (and analogies) have to be interpreted and are all too easily misinterpreted. When it comes to family relations, for example. There are also what are sometimes called mixed families, in which the "normal" biological relations do not hold. There is an awkward question about adopted and step- children, isn't there. Is the biological or social relationship the "real" parent? Opinions differ. Which illustrates my point.

I should say that I feel more inclined to just say that their concept of "truth" no longer resembles mine; so sooner or later they are not part of the family but mere strangers. — Richard B

My comment was in relation to this. But I took it, in context, to be about our social relationships - forms of life, practices, etc. So my comment was intended to refer to the social family, rather than the biological one.

Yet because this holds for families does it mean it holds for notions o f the True or the Good? — Count Timothy von Icarus

But perhaps you knew that and were pointing out the alternative conception of the family and applying the point to suggest that the True and the Good might exist "out there" whatever our relationship or non-relationship with it happens to be - and why not add Beauty to the list?
The quotation from Grayling explains well what is troubling about relativism, and there is much in our forms of life and practices that seems to point in the other direction. But Final Answers are more elusive than we might have expected and there is also much in our forms of life and practices that presents us with relative and pragmatic truths. I don't subscribe to either, or, rather, I think that both have a place in our lives. Roughly, perhaps, Absolutes are an ideal, but what we have to live with and by is lesser, in some way, but does have the virtue of being within our reach.

I am going to start a read-though of The Blue Book soon, but the Anscombe sounds interesting. — Antony Nickles

I think so. Perhaps a read-through of that might be worth while - but let's do the Blue Book first.

Also, because we have a practice is why and how it can be rational to question, push back, live differently, etc. — Antony Nickles

Yes. Existing practices and forms of life are a starting-point, and one cannot start without one. There's a paradox, then, that our existing practices are a basis for questioning practices. But a paradoxical conclusion is just "contrary to or surprising" our existing beliefs and expectations - that's not necessarily a problem.

As well, the part people skip over is that his examples (rule-following, pointing, “seeing”, etc.) are practices that everyone can weigh in on (we each have an equal right to claims/there is no privileged position), so the proposed criteria we use, and the “grammar” of how they work, have to be accepted (by you) for it to be philosophical worth drawing conclusions from (as evidence). — Antony Nickles

Good point. It perhaps justifies the practice of letting the readers draw their own conclusions. Risky, though.

I guess there is a lot of "trouble" to go around when it comes to this thesis. — Richard B

Quite so. But perhaps it is a bit of a bogeyman. After all the trouble that goes with absolutism might be even greater. The key problem there is establishing that one has actually got hold of the absolute truth. All too often, one has not. It would be better if people were much more cautious and sceptical of such temptations.

I should say that I feel more inclined to just say that their concept of "truth" no longer resembles mine; so sooner or later they are not part of the family but mere strangers. — Richard B

Oh, surely, members of the same family can disagree without ceasing to be members of the family. There's no black-and-white rule here - just shades of grey.

But the metaphysical problem is generalized and abstracted out of time, place, actors, i.e. anything we would call “a context”. — Antony Nickles

Well, yes. I was thinking that the same is true for mathematics; but mathematics is set up to exist in that "context". The "metaphysics" that I've seen tries to do the same with ideas that are not designed in the same way. Fish out of water. Mathematics as a whale or a dolphin. Or Wittgenstein's

We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction, and so, in a certain sense, the conditions are ideal; but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground! — PI 107

Yes, a “form of life” is not a conclusion or argued, etc (though “acquiesce” implies choice; we are indoctrinated, assimilated—Rousseau’s “consent” unconsciously.) That is not to say we don’t have forms of argument or refutation, means of judging loyalty and fairness (“you picked last time”). — Antony Nickles

"Consent" would do. Perhaps we need a specialized term for these situations. The thing is, in these radical situations, we are learning skills. That's not a context in which you can give "informed consent" and once you've learnt the skill, it's too late to ask questions. I didn't ask to learn English and wondering whether English is correct or adequate or whatever is meaningless - because I can only do it in English (and, possibly one or two other languages).

But the point is that that frailty is only a possible occurrence, and so should not be interpreted into a systemic problem (concluding that there is no “rationality”, intelligibility). — Antony Nickles

That's true. But I think there's another sense in which frailty is systemic. I'm referring to Nussbaum's Fragility of Goodness. But we don't need to discuss that here.

He wanted something that would be an uncontroversial “very general fact of nature” (PI #143 and p. 230) that he presumes would be accepted as a fact, such as: parrots don’t talk to themselves (#344). — Antony Nickles

OK. I think I get that. I have been known to throw off an example only to find later that it completely back-fires.

And Witt’s idea of a moral dilemma is not like a clash of interests about a certain type of topic (say about abortion), but when everyone is at a loss as to what to do, how to go on—which is an event (and could involve any of our practices). — Antony Nickles

There are such dilemmas. But there are also dilemmas where the problem is precisely that everyone "knows" what to do, but can't agree with each other, because they insist on framing the problem differently. I'm afraid abortion, in my book, is one such case.

I would say he choose poorly (though perhaps, as worse with Nietzsche, he can’t help poking people in the eye). — Antony Nickles

"Even Homer nods" and the temptation is very hard to resist, sometimes.

This is Witt’s arrogant style on full display, as he will even state without argument the implications he posits for, say, “believing”, as if everyone would agree. — Antony Nickles

I'm not sure "arrogant" quite captures it. I prefer to think that the modesty he expresses in the Preface to PI is sincere. But it can come over as arrogant. But, by the same token, I do find other philosophers to be arrogant, though perhaps not quite in the same way. It's the idea that you can (should) present examples and observations and leave the reader to work out their significance. That may be over-confident, but it's not stupid. (I read somewhere that the practice of his parents when he was a child, when he needed telling off, was to leave appropriate books by his bedside. If true, that would explain it.)

J.L. Austin’s A Plea for Excuses is a work about ethics in that way. — Antony Nickles

Yes, and much more interesting that trudging round and round the same few dogmas. I've just re-read, after several decades, Anscombe's "Intention", which is similar. But then, real ethics is not about quasi-legal rules, but, arguably, about forms of life.

“Agreement” is here not the same either. We come to an agreement on some criteria—like how long one foot will be—but we do not agree “to” our practices (it is “agree” in the sense more of aligning, over our entire history of doing things). Still, we do judge whether, say, an apology, is correct or incorrect, but the criteria for that are different than true and false, as I can accept an apology that you do poorly (“accepting” is part of how it works differently, its “rationality” or “grammar” as Witt calls it). — Antony Nickles

I don't disagree with you. I would go further. There is a difference between agree what the criteria are to be, e.g. on what the defining example on 1 foot is to be; that is not a question of truth and falsity or correct and incorrect. (How they decide to change the standard metre in Paris is way beyond me.) Agreeing that this path is 3 feet wide is different, and true/false and correct/incorrect do apply.
Agreeing to a practice is certainly different from signing up to (learning) it, though we can sweep it under the umbrella for our present purposes. But perhaps "acquiesce" would be a more accurate term for agreeing "to" a (pre-existing) practice. But that agreement is different from agreeing with someone else where we shall go for lunch. And so on. Differences multiply. Your example of apology is a very interesting one, that I would love to discuss separately; it is very relevant to ethics.

It is exactly this framework that interprets skepticism as a theoretical “problem”, rather than the discovery that there is no fact that will ensure resolution of our moral conflicts, thus we are responsible for solving our ongoing disagreements, because we do have the means. — Antony Nickles

I certainly wasn't intending to endorse moral scepticism. I'm sorry I wasn't more explicit. However, it is true that, if we regard moral debate as a practice, we have to recognize both that facts play a part in those debates and that it is not possible to deduce any moral proposition from factual propositions alone. Hence I said that moral statements "sit awkwardly" between those two (admittedly very simple-minded) categories.
On the other hand, I'm not sure about the idea that we have the means to solve all our ongoing disagreements. In the first place, I'm not sure that all moral disagreements can be resolved. I don't think there's any guarantee of that, is there? Not that we shouldn't keep trying, at least to live peaceably with each other. In the second place, it takes two to make a deal. So, in a sense, it isn't up to "us" to solve the problems, because the community of "us" breaks down.

All criteria reflect our interests in our lives (what and how we value something), it’s only metaphysical criteria that wish to step outside of any particular practice or situation. — Antony Nickles

I have no problem whatever with this. I would add that the wish to step outside any particular practice, however, is incoherent. Any attempt to do simply generates a new context.

Sorry, it is not that we cannot understand lions, just not talking ones; it is meant to be the statement of a fact, not a scientific claim (which I try to explain here), because it is said in contrast to when we CAN work out other cultural practices, to show that we sometimes just choose not to. — Antony Nickles

I have looked at your big discussion. It needs a bit of time. For the moment, I'm really quite confused here.
1. Are you saying that we can understand lions, but that if a lion could speak to us, we would not be able to understand what was said? Of course, communication would not be instant, but Wittgenstein seems to be suggesting that there is some insoluble problem. I can't see why he would think so.
2. Are you suggesting that we could work out the common ground with a lion, but that we choose not to? Which suggests that we could if we wanted to.

However, as Hume pointed out, perceived constant conjunction of events in the world may be as much accidental as a rule. — RussellA

Yes. I believe that this issue has been much discussed in relation to Wittgenstein, though I believe it is normally framed as the difference between a regularity and a rule. There is room for some argument about exactly what Hume said or believed, but I think it would be a distraction to pursue that here.

Even if within the community that B lives in there are public rules, B will only know about them from what she perceives through her senses. But as before, what she perceives through her senses to be a rule may in fact be accidental, meaning that if she does live her life following a rule, she must have made it herself. IE, B also lives by private rules. — RussellA

IE, if individuals live by rules, as Hume's principle of constant conjunction shows, the individual cannot have discovered them through their senses, but must have made them, and in this sense are private rules. If an individual has made the rule, then they must know how to correctly apply it. However, even if the individual has made the rule, they may or may not decide to be bound by it. — RussellA

You are right to point out that each individual in a community needs to learn the rules for themselves It follows, therefore, that each of us must formulate the rules on the basis of our experience and apply them for themselves. What you seem to neglect is the point that our formulation and application of the rules is corrected by further experience. (Hume doesn't say that, but it is implicit in Hume's argument. Moreover, it is how we can distinguish between mere regularities and rules.)

An individual sees the sun rise in the east on 100 consecutive days. They become aware of the rule that the sun rises in the east, and then live by the rule that the sun rises in the east. — RussellA

But as before, what she perceives through her senses to be a rule may in fact be accidental, meaning that if she does live her life following a rule, she must have made it herself. — RussellA

I guess you mean when she makes a "leap" from the limited sample to a generalization and then treats that generalization as a rule, she has made the rule for herself. I also guess that the rule takes the form of "when the clock shows that it is morning, you can expect the sun to rise."

If an individual has made the rule, then they must know how to correctly apply it. — RussellA

Well, let's suppose that's correct. Then, in this case, what she knows is that she does not determine what is correct or incorrect. The sun does. That is, if the sun doesn't rise, she will need to abandon or modify the rule.

You have not recognized the paradox implicit in the idea that I am the final authority over my own rules. If it is true, it means that nothing that I do can conflict with the rule. Which means that the rule is empty, has no force.

There is quite a lot of stage setting that would occur to understand if such an individual had such a rule. — Richard B

Yes. Hume's version of this seems to me to be that it is a brute fact of human nature that we build up expectations as a result of constant conjunctions. I'm not sure how far Wittgenstein would disagree.

Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do". — Phil. Inv. 217

Hume is very clear that the we will not abandon our process of formulating generalizations from individual cases, no matter how persuasive the sceptic's arguments. Indeed, he recommends a month in the country as the appropriate cure for radical scepticism. The more I think about it, the less I understand why he has the reputation of being a sceptical philosopher - though he does recommend what he calls "judicious" scepticism; he's probably right about that.

As rules are private, a rule-based language must also be private — RussellA

It depends what you mean by "private".

For an individual, all the rules that they are aware of must be of their own invention, even if based on information received through their senses. As the tortoise said to Achilles, how can an individual discover just from the information received through their senses that a rule is a rule. Where is the rule that determines whether something is a rule or not, a problem of infinite regression. — RussellA

Dodgson's dialogue between Achilles and the tortoise makes a good point, but I'm not sure that your point is the same one. However, your concluding question is a good one. I assume you would not disagree that Wittgenstein's point is that no rule can determine its own application. I think that, for similar reason, no rule can determine application of another rule. We do make play with attempts to formulate such rules. But in the end, it is a matter of our agreement with each other; there is nothing else.

Can I make a rule for myself, privately? Here "privately" means "not subject to enforcement by anything else (human or otherwise)". In other words, is it possible for the correct application of my rule to be solely determined by my application of it? In yet other words, if I make my rule and determine what is the correct application of it, is it meaningful to say that I am bound by it? Consider sections 268 (Left hand giving right hand money), 270 (the diary thought experiment), 271, (remembering what "pain" means). The self-reference in the proposition makes that any such limitation empty. (I am reminded of the ancient problem whether a monarch (as law-giver and law-interpreter) is bound by the law.) Yes, I'm saying that whatever Wittgenstein's argument says or doesn't say, the idea has wider application. That's not a criticism, because Wittgenstein is preoccupied with the dualism of his day.

We imagine chaos because we want to only accept undeniable certainty and agreement (as “knowledge”), and cast everything else as “belief” or emotion or persuasion. But Witt shows is that the world has endless ways of being “rational” (having ways to account, though different), and so we can disagree intelligibly in relation from those practices. Ultimately we may not come to resolution, but that does not lead to the categorical failure of rationality, because a dispute also only happens at a time, in a context (which also gives our differences traction). — Antony Nickles

I don't disagree with this. But I think that our practices are a bit more complicated than this seems to propose. If we say that rationality is a question of our agreement in ways of life, we seem to eliminate the distinction between those agreements that we call "correct" or "incorrect" by some standard that is not set by our agreement and those agreements that are simply a matter of making a deal, so that "correct" and "incorrect" do not apply. You will understand, I suppose, that I think that agreements that are correct or incorrect are, by and large, rational agreements and the other kind are, roughly, matters of taste or convenience or pragmatics. (The difficulty of agreements about values sits awkwardly between the two.)

That may well be true. Most people choose the news that suits them.

Modern affairs and lived experience are telling me that people are broadly still sheep that need herding. — Lionino

That's odd. Many people think that trying to organize people is like trying to organize ferrets - very difficult and any organization you do achieve rapidly disintegrates. That fits better with my lived experience. But maybe you live in a different world from me.

Ok. Well I'm all talked out here. I think we've long forgotten the topic. — fishfry

Let's agree to disagree. Sorry I brought it up. No wait, you brought it up and I let you bait me for a while. — fishfry

I agree. But I would like a better mutual understanding before we move on. I don't know for sure about you, but my comments were intended to provoke a reply, but only in the interests of a discussion. I thought you were doing the same. I didn't realize that you thought I was baiting you, which is a different kettle of fish. So I apologize.

Sorry I mentioned it. — fishfry

I wasn't complaining that you did. In fact, in our disagreement, the vagueness of meaning enables a diagnosis of what we disagree about, so it was actually useful. (I'm not sure whether the same applies to the concept of metaphysics.)

Oh please. He left as gracefully as Caesar did. — fishfry

Quite so. I'm afraid I was guilty of irony, which is always dangerous. His inability to recognize when the game is up is not particularly unusual. I can think of other examples.

The Dem hysteria that started on election night of 2016 has been extremely damaging to the country. — fishfry

I agree with you that the hysteria around everything is very damaging. But I think both sides are to blame. Each side thinks that it can win by escalating the emotional temperature; the media feeds on that and joins in. The question who started it is a good one - unless the answer is to be used as a weapon of further escalation.
But neither side is really to blame. There can be little doubt that a large part of the problem is systemic - the whole set-up encourages escalation and the desire to win, rather than compromise. Again, it's not unique to the US. It's not difficult to think of other examples.

Well toss a can of soup on a painting then. You lost me here. — fishfry

Couple of soup throwers were convicted, they're going to jail. So never mind on the soup. Looks like England has had enough of the eco-loons. — fishfry

At least they threw tomato soup, which is easier to clean than pain. — Ludwig V

I see from the reports that the soup did actually damage the paint of the frame, so I was wrong about that.

Responding to those protests with outrage and attempts to suppress is exactly what they want - to attract attention and controversy. Difficult as it may be, the only thing that would persuade them to stop is ignoring them. But it is also important to reward them when they do the right thing, there should be a reasonable response to civilized and legal protests.
Failure to recognize when one is being baited is very common and failure to deal with it rationally - by not rising to the bait - frequently underlies escalation.

Did you hear about that windmill that fell apart, closing a beach during the height of tourist season? Fiberglass shards everywhere. — fishfry

I'm not sure what you expect me to say. It's definitely a bad thing. Needs to be checked out and any problems resolved - and any parties who haven't been doing their job properly held to account.

But does it show that wind farms should be abolished? I don't think so. The fact that so many people dislike them is much more relevant and it's right to be cautious about setting them up. Off-shore farms seem to be more acceptable, so it's better to be content with them. (There's the question of bird strikes as well, though I've heard that they may have found a solution to that.) I think it's unlikely that that on-shore farms can be a major contributor to the project of finding renewable sources of energy. For on-shore generation, solar farms may be more appropriate.

Fictionalism is a useful point of view. Avoids having to defend what math "means." — fishfry

Yes, Meaning is as ill-defined as metaphysics. It's usually easier not to mention it.

I hope things don't get too much worse. At the moment nobody knows if we have a president. — fishfry

It is ironical that his most Presidential act has been not to stand for his second term. He'll be a lame duck until January, but that's normal. I expect the system will survive.
There's a paradox about democracy which "of the people, for the people, by the people" misses. It is crucial that the people who lose the election accept the result. That means that the process has to be very carefully organized so that there's as little excuse for contesting it as possible. So the events in January 2021 are a concern. I've also heard that some Trump supporters have said that they will refuse to accept the result if they lose; (I assume they will accept it if they win!). That's absurd. It puts Trump in the same territory as Putin and Xi Jinping. Bluntly, hypocrites.

I support free speech. Blocking roads is not speech. — fishfry

The people who were jailed were convicted under existing laws. The new law is an opportunistic grab by those who want to ensure that free speech is allowed, so long as it cannot be heard. It's a difficult balance to strike. My complaint about those protests is that they were too effective because they produced more opposition without taking their campaign forward. Protest needs to attract attention - especially media attention, of course - without creating more opposition for the cause.

The fission waste is a problem, but you can't run the world on windmills. — fishfry

Probably not. There's also solar panels, hydro-electric, tidal, wave, and volcanic. Still, it's pretty clear that lots of batteries will be needed. China has quietly cornered the market in the rare earths that are needed for them. Now, that's a sensible way to approach the issues. The rest of us will have to pay their prices or find alternatives.

We'll all toil in the windmill factories? I think I better quit while I'm behind here. Eco hysteria is a luxury belief. Green policy hurt third world is one random link I found. — fishfry

There are two distinct problems. One is enabling as many people as possible to find decent jobs. That's a problem anyway. The other is enabling people whose jobs are phasing out to find alternative employment. That's more difficult. There have been many cases in the past (like phasing out coal) which have not been well managed. But it doesn't seem impossible. At least we could try harder.
It quite likely that third world countries will suffer more. There's a lot of talk about providing additional help to them. That seems like a no-brainer, since unless they join in it will be hard to restore stability. But, curiously, it seems to be very difficult to make progress. Why? Who could possibly be opposing that?
Does your link compare the damage to third world countries with the damage that will be caused by climate change? Or perhaps with the damage caused by existing free trade treaties?

I'm all for clean air and water. I'm also for modern civilization. The point is to strike a sensible balance, not to throw tomato soup on paintings. — fishfry

Clean air means less carbon dioxide and methane. Clean water means less plastic. Amongst other things.
Sensible balance is good. But big corporations always end up defending their shareholders' interests and fail in the end. They just waste time and money.
At least they threw tomato soup, which is easier to clean than pain. Paint has been used in the past for similar escapades. It can be cleaned off, but it is much more difficult to do so.

True. I would say that communication just generalizes language. — Apustimelogist

I wouldn't disagree with that. But, having thought about it, I want to emphasize the multifarious uses of language, many, but not all, of which involve communication in one form or another.

Similarly, what an animal communicates about is different to their actual perceptual/cognitive/physical engagement with what they are communicating about. — Apustimelogist

I'm really sorry, but I can't get my head around what you're saying here. Could you break it down for me?

What are we communicating to ourselves? — Lionino

It's a good question and I agree that communication with others and with oneself (insofar as it happens) are different.
Two different examples of communication with oneself. I make a shopping list, to communicate with my future self so's I don't forget anything. When I have gathered some of the items, I may recite the list to myself, looking at or laying my hand on, each item as I name it, so as to make sure I don't forget anything.
When I get my receipt, with each item listed, I may keep it so's I can communicate with the manager or someone at home if there is a dispute.

This is likely true. Maybe the best path is to merge the most valuable ideals. Don’t confine yourself to one set of concepts. — Igitur

That's a good recommendation. One should be sensitive to differences as well as similarities.
I think you'll find common elements, but also incommensurable ones and incompatible ones. Ideally such ideals should be tailored to one's practical and social environment?
There is much in common across the Abrahamic religions, for example, but also quite serious differences. The Tao Te Ching, however, seems to me to be almost completely incommensurable with Christianity, though I'm sure that others will disagree with me.