He does not take up the influential arguments for the appetites associated with reason, but simply declares they cannot exist. But I consider the phenomenological and psychological arguments made for such appetites to be quite strong, and Hume's declarations to be quite destructive, so I have no idea why we should take them seriously. — Count Timothy von Icarus

OK. Would you mind explaining what the arguments are that you consider to be quite strong? I’m intrigued by the idea of appetites associated with reason.

The fact/value distinction in Hume (see Book II) is justified in a circular fashion from this premise. — "Count

Hume’s wraps up his premiss in some rather confusing flourishes, but he realizes that no set of facts can provide a deductive proof of any statement of value and sets out to provide an alternative explanation. Are you saying that he is wrong about that?

We experience obscenity, depravity, cruelty, etc. — "Count

Hume doesn’t disagree with you. On the contrary, he argues that morality is based on our responses to those experiences – on how we feel about them. He realizes that those responses can’t be validated by deductive reasoning, but believes that, nonetheless, they are the basis of morality. I think that’s an over-simplification, but not unreasonable as part of a more comprehensive theory.
The biggest weakness in his argument, in my view, is that he seems to think of experience and our reactions to it as something given. He doesn’t distinguish between what our experience is and how we have learnt to interpret it. That knocks a big hole in the idea that experience is the foundation of knowledge – and, indeed, or morality. That doesn’t rule it out as a contribution to or a factor in our knowledge and morality.

Hume's argument, that "virtue and vice" don't show up in our "sense data" is extended into the seeming reductio claims of later empiricists and phenomenologists, that we also don't experience cats, trees, the sun, etc., — "Count

`
Yes. Actually, it was Berkeley that first articulated that argument and critics made the same criticism. It didn’t impress Berkeley and it doesn’t seem to impress modern idealists either. I don’t know why Hume is not also subjected to it.

what we are given to understand is a contextual sense of an object that cannot be swallowed up within a more general categorical definition on it. — Joshs

Broadly, that's ok with me.

The particular givenness doesn’t imply the more general concept. On the contrary, the general meaning is secondary to and derivative of the particular sense. — Joshs

I'm a bit puzzled about what "swallowed up" means here. We only ever encounter particular houses and particular people. Even though they are particular, they can be described in terms of generalities.

we are only aware of the need to explain or clarify before or after the expression. Sometimes there is no “understanding”; we don’t speak of it when I ask you to pass the salt, as you say, “trading on shared assumptions and attitudes.” — Antony Nickles

Yes. There's an interplay between what we are aware of, what W calls a mechanism of the mind - I think of it as the unconscious. Understanding seems to occur in both ways. But perhaps we need a third category - our ability to explain ourselves, to answer questions. A disposition is odd. It manifests in certain circumstances and not in others. In between manifestations, there's nothing - except counter-factuals about what I would do or what might manifest itself in a different context.

I'm not denying a difference between commands and recommendations and descriptions, just the idea that so descriptions involving values are actually commands or expressions of emotion. Such theories do violence to language. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I wasn’t suggesting that descriptions involving values are actually commands. I was pointing out that descriptions involving values are also commands, or, more accurately, have the force of commands, etc.

The idea that "good" always refers to something like "thou shalt" is a product of Reformation volanturist theology, the tradition that shapes Hume. To say that all value claims are about "thou shalt" isn't to observer an ironclad law of philosophy or language. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I didn’t limit that list to commands, or recommendations, but was gesturing towards a connection between certain descriptions and action (or inaction).

It's just the (originally explicitly theological) premise that shaped Hume's context, i.e., "there is no intrinsic value (teloi) because intrinsic value would be a constraint on the divine will. Thus, value must be about divine command." — Count Timothy von Icarus

The theological premiss may have been the first version of the idea. But, given that he does not mention it, I think we can be reasonably sure that it was not Hume’s premiss.

"This is a great car," does not mean "thou shalt drive my car," or even "I should drive my car," just as "this is good (healthy) food" does not directly convert to "thou shalt eat this food," or even "you ought to eat this food." This is even more obvious when we move to the beings that most properly possess goodness. "Peter is a good man," need not mean "thou shalt choose Peter," or "I recommend Peter." It can, but it needn't; it can be merely descriptive. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I’m sorry, I seem to have misled you. I was not saying that any description was synonymous with any command, in the sense that one “directly converts” to the other. I was saying that many descriptions have the force of commands, or recommendations, or (Hume’s favourite) approbations or even expressions of emotion. (I’m assuming that you are reasonably familiar with the concept of speech acts.)

Centuries of war waged against intrinsic value in the language haven't been able to paper over these issues. While "that's a good tiger," might seem a bit odd in English, descriptive value statements made in a slightly different ways are still common and natural. Hence, "that tiger is a perfect specimen," or "that is a perfect tiger," is generally about the tiger as tiger, not recommending the tiger or commanding us to do anything vis-á-vis the tiger. So too, "that is a pathetic, miserable bush," isn't telling us to do anything vis-á-vis the bush, but is normally telling us something about the bush as a bush. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There are cases where it doesn’t make sense to describe them as “good”, such as, “This is a good disease”. I surmise that’s because their badness is built in to the concept. In other cases, like “tiger”, it may be because they have been known to kill us, and are dangerous. They are very good at hunting; the catch is that they are perfectly capable of applying those skills to hunting human beings. In yet other cases, the oddity may be because there are no criteria for evaluating them. I suspect “planet” may be such a concept; “oxygen” may be another.
Let’s think about dog shows. The rules for these competitions include descriptions of the various breeds. The rules for a Shih Tzu and for an Old English Sheep Dog are different, but they specify what makes one competitor better than another in each class. To evaluate a Shih Tzu by the criteria for an Old English sheep dog is a solecism or a misunderstanding or nonsense.
The project here is to specify criteria for the evaluation of each competitor. Identifying a dog as a Shih Tzu tells us that specimen conforms to the criteria, to a greater or lesser extent, and so justifies the classification; but the rules also justify evaluating specimen as better or worse than another. It is essential to the project that description and evaluation are distinct activities, linked by the rules. This is a formalization of a conceptual structure that is very common in our language, and which presupposes that description and evaluation are distinct. Another field with a similar, but different, structure is the legal definition of a crime – murder, say, or theft.

So let me ask a pointed question: does the descriptive statement "x is y" essentially mean "you ought to affirm that x is y is true?" If not, then why, if y is "good" would it automatically change to "you ought to do y." — Count Timothy von Icarus

1) No. 2) Because “good” is an evaluation and “x is y” is a description.

To be sure, we ought to choose the good and avoid the bad. But we also want to affirm truth and reject falsity. And yet we don't say that "x is true" becomes equivalent with "affirm x," and so "x is good" shouldn't be subject to this sort of transformation either. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The whole point of the distinction is that a (pure) description is not equivalent to an evaluation. But some concepts have both descriptive and evaluative components; sometimes, in specific context, a description may be treated as an evaluation.
I don’t think that “x is y”, of itself, suggests that we should affirm it or should not affirm it, except in specific contexts. Sometimes we should and sometimes we should not. (Cf. Kant on truth-telling)

More later…

The separation of practical and theoretical reason was centuries old. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, indeed - even millennia old. So why do you think that the fact/value distinction is a distinctive error of empiricism - or even an error at all?
(As I remember it, Aristotle even asserts that "Reason, by itself, moves nothing". That's what motivates his construction of the practical syllogism.)

It's precisely the assumption that there are no final causes (and perhaps, no facts about goodness) that allows for a novel move here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you are over-simplifying here. That decision was a re-configuration of the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, not, or at least not necessarily, an abandonment of the ideas of purposes and values. Oversimplifying again, final causes are not the province of science, that's all.

Prior thinkers hadn't missed the difference between "ought" and "is;" yet they thought there could be descriptive statements about the good and beautiful (just as we can speak about what "ought to happen" given purely descriptive predictive models"). — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is true that the interface between fact and value, or between theoretical and practical reason, is more complicated than is usually recognized. We do not always draw a clear distinction between the two, so one can always turn an evaluative statement into a factual statement - and there are many concepts that combine the two. Yet we can also to disentangle them. "Murder" combines fact and value, but I think everyone understands how to distinguish between the two aspects. "Abortion is illegal" is, in one way, a statement of fact and not of value (unless one is arguing that one ought to obey the law). But we can also ask whether abortion ought to be illegal. We can also, I think, see the difference between "ought" of expectation and prediction ("we ought to get home in three hours") and "ought" of moral or ethical principles ("you ought to be on time for this appointment"). The factor that can create confusion is that we usually expect people to meet their moral and ethical obligations.

You can see this in the fact that if you replace "good" in the second statement with "common" you get a straightforwardly descriptive statement: "It is common for people to be kind to their mothers." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Surely you can see that those two statements have very different force? One implies an instruction or command, or recommendation. The other doesn't. "`It is common for people to take a summer vacation" is an observation which does not have the force of a recommendation or instruction, while "It is good for people to take a summer vacation" does not imply that it is common and is compatible with it being rare to do so, but it does imply that one should. When the surgeon holds out his hand and calls "scalpel", it's an instruction and the surgeon expects the nurse to put one in his hand; when the nurse holds up a scalpel and asks what it is, the same word is a description - there is no expectation that the nurse will put it in his hand.

It seems to me to be akin to demanding that every logical argument include the additional premise that: "we ought affirm the true over the false" tacked on to it. Granted, I see no problem in adding either since they seem obviously true. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, a logical argument does not require that premiss. If the argument is sound, it is sound whether or not people affirm the conclusion. It is true that when we are trying to explain the force of these arguments, we try to explain that, and why, we ought to affirm the conclusion. It's a knotty problem.

Sometimes I feel like his examples here are just terrible. I mean is it just me or waaaaay too unnecessarily esoteric for the point he is trying to make, except that he seems to feel he needs to chase the rabbit all the way down the hole to cover as many senses/analogies in which philosophy might frame our thinking as objects, etc. — Antony Nickles

I'm glad you mention that. I agree with you, and there should not be a problem about recognizing that Homer sometimes nods. I still have no way of shifting my feeling that something has gone wrong in the discussion of imagination and the question whether we can imagine the abolition of redness.

Most importantly, understanding is not “present” during communication. Understanding happens after expression, in coming back to it, .... — Antony Nickles

Yes. I think that W is right to point to the importance of explanations after the event. But it seems odd to say that understanding is not "present" during communication. Surely understanding is expressed in communication and in even in non-communicative action. In any normal action, there is a huge amount of complexity and we may be unable to resolve various ambiguities simply of the basis of a single action. Then we need to clarify after the event. But a great deal of that complexity can be expressed in the processes of planning and preparation, before the action.

philosophy interprets the sheer possibility of disconnection, and the difficulty of reconnecting, as if the “problem” is in the activity of (always) connecting which is then just a puzzle to “know”, like a “a queer mechanism” (cue some neuroscience). — Antony Nickles

Philosophy wants to construct a logical structure of the action and then turn it into an actual structure "in the mind". It's like insisting that all arguments be expressed in formal logical format, even when we actually utter a short version, trading on shared assumptions and attitudes.

But I think this leads to an unfortunate and common conflation where the second sort of "empiricism" is appealed to in order to justify the first sort, such that all scientific progress is called on as evidence for the superiority of the first sort of empiricism, and a rejection of empiricism is said to be a rejection of science. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. It is odd that those theories are often classified as idealist.

Yet to my point in the OP, if our epistemology leads us to this—to dismiss claims as seemingly obvious as "it is bad to have my arm broken," or "it is bad for children to be poisoned at school" as lacking any epistemic grounding (i.e., not possibly being facts)—then I'd say this is an indication that we simply have a bad epistemology. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I can see your point. But it's only an over-view. It needs a slightly more detailed argument.

I think this is especially actue in metaethics, where empiricsts epistemic presuppositions essentially amount to metaphysical presuppositions. "Examine the sense data; there are no values (or universals, or facts about meaning, etc.) to be found." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Oh, I think that Hume's argument is a bit better than that. There is some value to recognizing that statements of value (evaluations) are not in the same logical category as statements of fact.

The same sort of thing that happens with "empiricism" happens with "naturalism." Both have been equated with accepting or rejecting science to such a degree that virtually no one says that they aren't an naturalist. Yet this just leads to a huge amount of equivocation, where "naturalism" can be either extremely expensive, or "only reductive, mechanistic materialism." I think it is, in general, an increasingly useless term. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The problem is that if one gives up using all those terms, and tries to concentrate on the issues rather than the labels, other people will pin them on us according to their needs.

I do think that solution is better, but the point isn't to highlight that specific solution, but rather the genealogy of the "problem" and how it arises as a means of elucidating ways it might be resolved or else simply understanding it better." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not sure whether you mean the Aristotelian solution or the Neoplatonist one. Either way, I don't think we can assume that we can lift one part of a coherent system of thought and make it work in our context. More than that, there are, in my book, two versions of empiricism. One of them has been popular in philosophy and leads to the empiricism of appearances, ideas or sense-data. The other is mostly unspoken but is the foundation of science; this version understands experience in a common-sense way and doesn't posit theoretical objects that boast of being irrefutable and turn out to prevent us from understanding the stars or anything else.

Thus, we should not be surprised that borrowing their epistemology leads to skeptical conclusions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

A fair point. It looks as if we need to be a bit careful what we take from those times if we want to avoid the same sceptical conclusions.

You speak as if “the color system” guarantees a metaphysical space for redness, as though the system enforces an ontological necessity. But the necessity is grammatical, not metaphysical. It comes from how we use color words, not from a hidden structure of reality. — Joshs

I get your point. But eventually realized that the peculiarity of this discussion is precisely that it is conducted, to put it this way, de re and not de dicto. If he asked whether we could abolish the concept of redness, that would have been one question. But he doesn't. He asks whether we could abolish redness, and compares it to destroying a watch. That comparison is a nonsense, to start with.

I keeping reaching for a key that will make all this fall in to place. But it still elude me. The discussion later on page 38 is all very well, but I don't see it clarifies this passage.

Wittgenstein returns to the question. "What is the object of a thought?" (e.g. when we say, "I think that King's College is on fire"). (Page 34)
This is, he says, typically metaphysical, because “an unclarity about the grammar of words” is expressed “in the form of a scientific (he has physics in mind) question”.

He identifies four “origins” of the question, which I think are intended to be confusions expressed in it. (Page 35)

1.. ‘One of the origins of our question is the use of "I think/expect" and “I think/expect” in two distinct ways. “I expect him” and “I expect that he will come”. We then compare “I expect him” to “I shoot him”.
He turns his attention to the shadows:-
2 a) Two different sentences can have the same sense, which becomes a shadowy being (unless perhaps it is a material object).
2 b) Shadowy sense to “be a picture” that “cannot be questioned”; it doesn’t need any interpretation.
3) Sometimes a sentence brings images before our mind's eye. These images are “translations” into pictorial language. But they must be similar to, copies of, what they are pictures of.

i) A map of all or part of our planet, he says, is not a picture by similarity or a copy in this sense. (Page 36)
ii) A picture of someone’s face projected it “in such a way that no one would normally call the projection ‘a good portrait of so-and-so’ because it would not look a bit like him”. This is, let us say, a bit complicated.

This gets him to where he wants to be. The sentence itself can do the work of the shadow, and so no shadow is needed. We can explain what the sentence means, perhaps, by an ostensive definition. That’s how words and things can be connected.

He can now go back and correct the path that he started down. (Page 37) The idea of the shadow is deeply rooted, but it is not what we really want to say. What we want to say is that “the fact which we wish for must be present in our wish”. Well, the answer just above cited ostensive definition to explain what “King’s College is on fire”. That works for expectation and wishing, too – after the event. But I could have given a similar explanation before it, as well.

At this point, a summary. How do our thoughts “connect” with the things they are about? The connection is made by means of ostensive definition. Ordinary language makes it seem that the connection must have been made during the act of thinking. But that’s not the case.
He gives us examples that could be taken to mean that thinking or meaning can be regarded as a mental activity, and so leading us to feel that something has been explained and no further questions are appropriate.

Now he returns to imagining and King’s College (Page 38) and subjects this to a cross-examination. I take it that links back to the rather unsatisfactory discussion of imagining earlier. But here, he concludes that our mistake is to think that images and experiences of all sorts, must be present in our mind at the same time.

Finally, a metaphor (Page 39) , - pulling a string of beads being pulled out of a box through a hole in the lid, to persuade us that “We easily overlook the distinction between stating a conscious mental event, and making a hypothesis about what one might call the mechanism of the mind.”

You suggest Wittgenstein’s “pressing the eyeball” example is irrelevant because color concepts are socially learned. — Joshs

Well, yes. Pressing one's eyeball and noticing a new colour is not enough. We have to see how other people describe the phenomenon. So I'm very puzzled, except that, perhaps, he hasn't yet constructed the private language argument. BTW, I pressed my own eyeball to see what would happen. Nothing - only darkness and the usual display from my retina. As I pressed harder, I experienced pain. Not that it matters.

He isn’t denying the biological basis of vision; he’s showing that philosophy generates pseudo-problems by treating “redness” as if it were an inner object. — Joshs

Yes, that's the general context. The specific context is the question how we can think of something that does not exist, and he is considering the answer that we just imagine it. But if imagination is just combining elements that do exist in new ways, imagination cannot play the role of shadow facts. Yet he presses the argument further, and seems to want to find a way of saying that we can imagine something that does not exist.

Wittgenstein might say “abolishing redness” looks nonsensical not because of biology but because of how the grammar of color words works in our language. — Joshs

What puzzles me is that he seems to conclude that abolishing redness is not nonsensical. He seems to be grasping for a sense in which it can make sense.

Suppose I said "Exerting a pressure on your eye-ball produces a red image". Couldn't the way by which you first became acquainted with red have been this?
And why shouldn't it have been just imagining a red patch?

I think he also acknowledges that this does not resolve the problem, because he promises to deal with the "reservations" we "may be feeling here at a later occasion."

I'm finding this point very confusing.

I'd favour the more humble point, that cause is overrated if it is considered to be the only, or even the most important, explanation. — Banno

OK. It's just that causal explanation, along with the metaphor of the machine, has been such an icon of what science is about that I find it hard to grasp the alternatives (apart from statistical explanations).

That willingness to live with and investigate the precariousness inherent in the absence of deductive certainty is more than just science; it's the human condition — Banno

That sounds good. Actually, there are reasons for thinking that deductive certainty is not all that it is cracked up to be.

we've seemingly, as has been made clear too many times with recent posts, made the case that realism/anti-realism distinction has sort of killed itself. — substantivalism

I would be inclined to agree with you. But then I find that it is still alive and kicking.

You can still play a make-believe game of REALISM if it. . . to you. . . feels more intellectually useful in deriving the results you desire for whatever means. — substantivalism

If you want to argue with someone, it is best to start from where they are at.

BECAUSE THESE DEBATES DO NOT DIE and they probably just transfer themselves to the new popular domain of philosophical discussion — substantivalism

Too right. That creates an interesting, and difficult, field of understanding what's really going on.

Some folk tend to think of F=ma as setting out how the force causes the acceleration. — Banno

Yes, I get that point. Are you saying that we should stop talking about causes altogether, or that we need to re-think the concept of causation?

That underdetermination stuff is a feature, not a problem. It's about being unhappy with a determinate causal answer such as "God willed it" and looking for more, doing the experiments, using your imagination, seeing what happens when you do this or that... — Banno

Setting aside the local issue about God, I understand you to be saying that underdetermination is the space for research and discovery, rather than a prison of doubt and uncertainty. Is that fair?

He’s not a mainstream philosopher, — Wayfarer

Yes. That's part of his appeal.

The equation, in philosophy, of the self with the ego is a specialized locution. It doesn't reflect how the word is used in general discourse. For example, here's what Merriam-Webster says:-

(1): an individual's typical character or behavior (e.g. her true self was revealed)
(2): an individual's temporary behavior or character (e.g. his better self)
(3) a person in prime condition (e.g. I feel like my old self today)
(4) the union of elements (such as body, emotions, thoughts, and sensations) that constitute the individuality and identity of a person)
(5) personal interest or advantage
(6) the entire person of an individual
(7) the realization or embodiment of an abstraction
(8) material that is part of an individual organism (e.g.ability of the immune system to distinguish self from nonself)

I like the equation with both one's typical character and some temporary behaviour.
Think too, about "losing oneself" in philosophy or music, not to mention identifying oneself with the car one is driving.
Anyway, I have to confess that I think that the attempt to identify the self with the ego, or with anything else, never mind the attempt to locate it (self/ego) somewhere, are chasing the end of the rainbow.

Ever run across Douglas Harding 'On Having no Head'? He hasn't been mentioned much on this forum, but he was quite a popular spiritual teacher a generation ago. — Wayfarer

I came across that about a year ago on another forum. I could see how he got there but was not sure how seriously to take it. It just goes to show that phenomenology can take you to some unexpected places.

Thanks. That's clear enough. I'll pick up from where you left off and go to p. 40.

I don't think I have much to say about pp 32 - 35.

The page numbering problem is a nuisance. But I'll work out what's going on quite soon.

I don't remember that, but it is quite possible. I seem to remember that there was also a theory that the mind resided in the stomach.

He went straight at tearing done the house of cards and is never seen as building it back up from the rubble that still remained, I would say because he turns to why we (he did) fight so hard against it. — Antony Nickles

Yes. It seems to me that Descartes and Hume both receive similar treatment - they are known as sceptical philosophers, when actually, the point of their work was to deal with scepticism.

I've got a bit confused about where we are. It doesn't help that the page numbering in my copy (from Gutenberg Press) seems not to have a page 33!

I shall go from p. 32/33

Then if this scheme is to serve our purpose at all, it must show us which of the three levels is the level of meaning. I can, e.g., make a scheme with three levels, the bottom level always being the level of meaning. But adopt whatever model or scheme you may, it will have a bottom level, and there will be no such thing as an interpretation of that. To say in this case that every arrow can still be interpreted would only mean that I could always make a different model of saying and meaning which had one more level than the one I am using.

to p.36/35

Another source of the idea of a shadow being the object of our thought is this: We imagine the shadow to be a picture the intention of which cannot be questioned, that is, a picture which we don't interpret in order to understand it, but which we understand without interpreting it.

Tomorrow.

Perhaps the ancients were not as much "in their heads" and language oriented as we are today. — Janus

I think that's very likely.

Our organs of sight, hearing, smelling and tasting are all located in the head, and that may contribute to making it seems as thought the mind is located there. — Janus

That's true. Though I think the most influential point is that we see from a definite point of view, which just happens to be where our eyes are. Since we can locate the source of sounds, we can become aware of where our ears are, so there's that.

The more I think about this, the more complicated it gets. I just wanted to draw attention to that. The results of introspection are not necessarily correct. But it is a bit of a rabbit-hole. I'm not sure how much hangs on it, though it would obviously suit some forms of materialism quite well.

"Every event has a cause" is one of Watkins' "haunted universes" doctrines, neither provable nor disprovable. — Banno

It seems to me that "neither provable nor disprovable" is the beginning of the story, rather than the end. I mean that proof of the kind we require for specific causal explanations is inapplicable. The proposition is not in the business of asserting truths, but of articulating the conceptual structure in which specific causal connections are discovered and asserted. If you are looking for some sort of justification, that lies in the success of our attempts to find causes - and more than that, our determination to find what order we can in the world, so that when full causal explanations are not available, we wring from the data whatever order we can. So we switch models and go for statistical explanations.

Science doesn't look to causes so much as to predictability. — Banno

There is a reservation here, because statistical laws don't really predict anything about individual cases. I've never quite worked out what probability statements say about them. It certainly isn't what I would call a prediction. However, they do come in very handy when it is a case of making decisions in a risk/reward context. Betting may be a bit iffy, but insurance is perfectly rational.
But perhaps more important in a philosophical context is that predictability is not enough. Plato, at least, would insist that the goal is understanding, not mere prediction. I think he has a point.

It's not about event A causing event B but about the relation between a's and B's, especially when that relation is expressed in an equation. — Banno

I hadn't thought that the move to equations amounted to actually abandoning causal explanations. But I can see that it is a very different model from the Aristotelian model.

That the coin we flip comes up heads is supposedly explained as "the will of God"; but that explanation will work equally well if the coin had come up tails. Regardless of what happens, the explanation is "God caused it to happen that way", and so we never learn why this happened and not that; this is no explanation at all. — Banno

There's no doubt that "God wanted it to happen" is empty, as it stands. But if our framework is that God controls everything, we can produce different explanations according to what happens. If the coin lands tails and I lose the bet, I can say "God is punishing me for my sins". If the coin lands heads and I win the bet, I can say "God is rewarding me for my virtues". My reason for rejecting these explanations as empty is that neither explanation will stand up to standard scientific experimental scrutiny.

If presenting a cause is to function as an explanation, it must say why this even happened and not some other event. Saying that "Things/events have causes" is trivial, indeed frivolous. — Banno

I don't think it is as bad as that. Surely "every event has a cause" is not really an assertion. It is a methodological decision. It is not that we can always identify the cause of an event, but that we will approach every event on the basis that there is a cause to be found. It is a presupposition that the world is not disorderly. If we do not find one, we attribute that to our failure, not the failure of the principle. We would file such a case in the "pending" tray.

some positions that appeal to Wittgenstein, such as the cognitive relativism thesis, lead to a sort of broad skepticism about our ability to understand others (outside our own time and culture, or even tout court). This is a misreading of Wittgenstein to the extent it is attributed to him I think, but I think most advocates don't say this; rather they claim that if you follow out Wittgenstein's insights, with their own additions, you get cognitive relativism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't get this. I think there must be a typo or something here. ?
Broadly speaking, I see a tempting reading of the PI that is relativistic. But I don't think it what he intended. If he had, he would, surely, have not talked about our form of life, but about our forms of life. To put it another way, there are many differences between practices and forms of life which are more or less difficult to understand and communicate between. But, if we are all human beings, it is possible to grasp the other's form of life or practice. If it is really not possible (and how would one prove that?), then the other is not a human being. That's what lies behind his extraordinary remark that "if a lion could talk we could not understand him." The twist in this story is, of course, that there is a good deal of mutual understanding between humans and lions even in the context of an extreme language barrier and I see that as based on a shared form of life.

Funny, this is generally precisely how I've seen his approach to skepticism described. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Perhaps this is more a labelling problem than an actual disagreement. But his position is scepticism de-fanged, if it is scepticism at all. The implication of what he says, to my mind, is a rejection of the doctrine. But I can see that others might not see it that way. Mind you, I'm not even sure that Descartes was really a sceptic.

I would think Hume's approach actually isn't that different from the ancient skeptics however. Their skepticism is also largely pragmatic. What do you think makes them radically different? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Perhaps I wasn't clear. The distinction I'm focusing on is the one that he himself adopts - between what he calls pyrrhonism, but which is probably actually closer to Cartesianism. (Given the history of philosophy taught in Philosophy 101, it seems very odd that he doesn't mention Descartes.) I think that he is really quite close to the old tradition, without the Stoicism (so far as I can discern). (I owe that understanding to you.)

If you think I am calling Wittgenstein himself a sceptic then this is incautious reading. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That reading is a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. I do not think you include Wittgenstein among the incautious sceptics.

Presumably, it would remove some of our warrant for thinking things will continue on as they have in the past, seeing as how there is no past. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I classify the expectation that things will continue as they have in past as a default position, in the absence of positive evidence for anything else. We don't need a warrant.

Thanks for cracking this, well done; — Antony Nickles

I was at a loss (and maybe still am) as to why we imagine a difficulty in picturing what is not. ….I take the confusion that follows to be that: if we are thinking of the absence of something, than how can there then be an object that is the thought. — Antony Nickles

I think you are right. I think that Wittgenstein must have recognized this. That’s why I emphasized the way the problem is presented. It seems to me to be quite carefully set up so as to make the problem clear.
There’s room here for a discussion of how philosophical problems arise. We don’t just stumble onto or into them. So Descartes initial reflections in the Meditations are not just an ancillary to the project. Nor, to be fair, does he present them as such. The difference is that Descartes thinks that he is recognizing the problem. We (or at least I) think that he is creating it.)

Asking "How can one...?" (p. 30, 1965 Harper's Ed.) “beautifully” plays right into his method of drawing out the means for doing a practice—its workings (grammar), how we can…. i.e., the “grammar” of thinking, facts, and "existing", etc. — Antony Nickles

Yes. That’s not an accident, of course. It’s part of the project.

If a watch is seen to "exist" because, say, it is completely put together, or functioning, then we might let go of identification by correspondence with an internal object. — Antony Nickles

Yes. Or rather, it should. It does rather raise questions about what it means to say that something exists, since the broken or toy watch does, nonetheless, exist - it's just that the description "watch" doesn't apply.
I’m always a bit saddened by the persistence of mental or internal objects in philosophical discourse. Many people don’t seem to be impressed by or don’t understand the private language argument. It’s not easy.

The feeling of difficulty in first identifying red I would think comes from the desire to identify color by equating that color, as a “quality”, with an internal “object” of our vision, say, an “appearance” as part of “perception”, which philosophy would ask: “how could we have that object of red before encountering it?” But I take it the way color works (it’s grammar) is like a pain (PI #235) In saying “it is not the fact we think”, I would offer that he is showing that, though something is a fact, like a house is on fire, its “fact-ness” is not an object (of thought, always there), because its expression may not be used as a fact. — Antony Nickles

Yes, I found this part very difficult. I’m not sure I really understand what he was getting at. The business about seeing redness when one presses one’s own eyeball didn’t impress me. The need to learn from others what redness is makes this possibility dubiously relevant – unless everyone has the same experience, which is, I suppose, possible.
But the idea that one could somehow abolish redness, I think, is based on a misunderstanding of how colour works. Colour words are a system; they segment the colour spectrum, so abolishing redness sounds as if it would leave a gap in the spectrum, which is hard to understand, or just restrict the spectrum. That is possible. Dogs, for example, can’t see red. As I understand it, they see red objects as black, so the abolition is a substitution. But the ability to see red is, for us, a physiological capacity – are we to imagine some feat of genetic engineering?
I think you may be right in comparing colour with pain – in the sense that W is thinking of redness as (grammatically) like pain. Perhaps this is possible if one doesn’t understand the colour spectrum, but we do. That makes a huge difference, because if there is a spectrum of pain, it is a spectrum of intensity, not of quality. We do have qualities of pain – stabbing, aching, throbbing etc. – but they are not on a spectrum.
The question is “what do you mean by ‘redness exists’? I’m wondering whether this may not be about the limits of thought as compared with the limits of the imagination and the distinction between meaningful and meaningless sentences/thoughts. After all, one of the classic tests of meaningfulness is whether one can imagine – the sun not rising tomorrow morning, for example, or a round square. I’m not all sure that the non-existence of redness, as opposed to red things, is conceivable, whereas the non-existence of red things is. The reason is that colours are a system, and the space for redness is guaranteed by the system.
If that’s what he’s getting at, thinking what is not is not necessarily imagining what is not.

I am at a bit of a loss on the “shadow fact”, but I imagine it plays the same role as “appearance” or “impression”; inserted in between the ordinary process of vision and identification, etc. in order to mitigate all our statements in order to explain (and control) the possibility of error. — Antony Nickles

You are right about the role of the shadow fact. It does indeed fit with “proposition” and sense of a sentence”. Appearances and impressions are tangled up with experiences, so he may have wished to set them aside.
In a sense these terms do explain the possibility of error. But in another sense, they do less and more than that. They articulate the possibility of error. The essence of a hallucination is that Macbeth is acting as if there was a dagger before him, but there isn’t. To describe the situation in that way (Macbeth is acting as if ... but there isn't) has a sharp edge of paradox about it. The concept of a hallucination enables us to get through that. Perhaps it includes the idea of a visual image. That may seem to help, but doesn’t really add anything.

David Hume’s argument against causal inferences and explanations, as well as his hugely influential “Problem of Induction;”

For some reason, a little while ago, I re-read Hume's Enquiry, and realized that he is not at all the sceptic that he is painted to be. His rejection of what he calls pyrrhonism is emphatic. (He does not believe that it can be refuted but argues that it is inconsequential, and recommends a stiff dose of everyday life as a remedy.) He distinguishes between pyrrhonism and "judicious" or "mitigated" scepticism, which he thinks is an essential part of dealing with life. See Enquiry XII, esp. part 3.
PS I read the conclusion of this section (book-burning) is a rhetorical trope, designed to show how extreme views can lead one into absurdity. That fits better with his actual analysis.

So why would it be any more or less likely that a universe just "happens to be" with a first state something that looks something like cosmic inflation rather than a first state full of memories and people? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think that a meaningful estimate of that is possible, unless we know the range of other possibilities. In any case, as every lottery winner knows, extremely unlikely or improbable events occur all the time. In the end, though, one has to consider whether it is more plausible (not likely or probable) that all our memories are false, and that no evidence actually points to a real past, or that at least some memories are true and some evidence is good. In any case, what difference would it make if it were true that the first state was full of memories and people? This is a blank space, which can only be filled up with fantasies and dreams.

But if we assert, to the contrary, that the cosmos had a determining cause, then presumably this is a realist claim. In which case, maybe an inability to dismiss anti-realism will bother us. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, yes and no. If we think that we have to dismiss this anti-realism by means of argumentation in the traditional fashion, we have a problem. But if we analyse the terms and context of debate, we may not be so bothered. However, these arguments can have an effect on how we perceive the world. Many people find the vision of the world proposed since the 17th century extremely depressing and can get quite miserable about it. Others find it full of wonders and possibilities and find it extremely exciting. Neither view will be much affected by traditional argumentation.

That said from a phenomenological perspective, it does seem to me that my thoughts are going on inside my head, not in my torso, arms or legs or even neck. I mean it just feels that way. So while we cannot be directly aware of neuronal activity, that activity seems to generate sensations that make it seem like thought is in the head (to me anyway). — Janus

I'm pretty sure that our phenomenological perspective on mental phenomena is heavily conditioned by our culture. For example, it is very difficult to answer the question where (in the body) the mind is to be found in ancient greek (or roman) culture. There are good grounds for answering that it is a distinct entity - a ghost - that survives death. There are also grounds for saying that it is the breath - an interesting choice, since it isn't quite clear where the breath is. I think the best answer is that the question where the mind is was not even formulated in that culture. It requires, I would say, a culture that has already problematized mental/physical relations, as happened in Western Europe in the 17th century or so.

Have you encountered Alva Noë ‘Out of Our Heads’? ‘Noë’s contention is that you are not your brain – rather, that “consciousness is an achievement of the whole animal in its environmental context”. — Wayfarer

That is an idea that makes complete sense to me. I've even wondered how to make a case for it.

I'll have to work out a way of getting hold of it.

Thank very much for that.

My belief is also that the existence of the mind depends on the existence of the brain, and the nature of this dependency is still in doubt, as you say. — RussellA

This seems to me to contradict what you were telling me about the nature of the sun..


I'm completely bewildered.

I'm sorry I shan't have time to respond to this until tomorrow. :sad:

From the appearance of something bright and yellow and the experience of something hot in my senses I can infer the existence of the sun. — RussellA

But

I simply name the unknown cause of my appearances and experiences after the appearances and experiences themselves, such that I name the set {appearance of a circular shape, experience of seeing the colour yellow, experience of hotness} as "sun". — RussellA

I see a broken window and can infer what broke it. — RussellA

But

How can you know the cause of an appearance or experience in the senses when no one cause is necessary but many possible causes are contingent? — RussellA

Today, the prevailing view is that the mind is really a physical phenomenon going on inside the brain.

It may prevail in the circles that Peter Lloyd moves in. But it is very rash to generalize from that to the world-wide community of philosophers, never mind to the entire population of the world, - unless one has a solid backing from properly organized surveys.
I did say earlier that there are good grounds for saying that the mind is existentially dependent on the brain etc., but that nature of this dependence is not yet clarified.

It's a spatial metaphor in which brain/body is a container and the mind is something inside it. But from another perspective, the body exists 'within awareness'. — Wayfarer

Does the mind, as an activity say rather than an object, not reside within the brain/body? — Janus

Well, there are good grounds for saying that the mind is existentially dependent on the brain etc.. The nature of this dependence is not yet clarified, but I doubt if it will qualify as "resident". On the other hand, if you open up a normal head, you do not find the mind. Worse than that, we cannot even imagine what it might be like to accidentally tread on an experience or trip over a concept.

The other requisite for any such theory is a belief that there are such things as brains.

Plus, historians of science were quick to point out that, pace Popper, theories, and particularly paradigms, are often falsified and rather than being challenged post hoc explanations are offered. For example, Newton's physics was falsified almost immediately when applied to astronomy. But rather than reject it, astronomers posited unobserved, more distant planets to explain the irregular orbits of visible planets. These were eventually identified with improvements in telescope technology, but were originally unobservable ad hoc posits. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So the system worked, in the end. True, one has to be patient. True also that there is no time limit on such waiting. In the mean time, opinions will differ and arguments will rage. Nothing wrong with that.

Right, and those "other criteria" are what are often used to suggest a fairly robust anti-realism, i.e., "sociology all the way down (with the world merely offering some "constraints"). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. But I don't see that anti-realism is a necessary consequence of the applicability of these criteria.

implausible reductions and eliminations (e.g. eliminating consciousness or all mental causality) are often justified in terms of "parsimony " paired with the claim that any difference between reduction/elimination and its opponent theories must be "underdetermined by empirical evidence." This is precisely why "parsimony" wins the day. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I can't see that the consequence is inevitable. Surely, it will depend on the details of the case.

Literally any observation of human behavior is easily rendered explicable by the theory itself, and challenges to the theory can be explained by the theory (just as challenges to Freudianism was a sign of a "complex"). — Count Timothy von Icarus

This could mean that the theory is underspecified couldn't it? Or not even suitable for assessment as though it were a "scientific" theory?

your current experiences are consistent with the world, and all of our memories, having been created 5 seconds ago, no? And they are consistent with all other human beings being clever robots, and your living in an alien or AI "zoo" of sorts. But surely there is a metaphysical and ethically relevant difference. — Count Timothy von Icarus

One difference is that there is not the slightest reason to take any of those possibilities seriously. They are all fantasies. "Here be dragons".

My interest though lay more in the use of underdetermination to support radical theses in philosophy, not so much basic model underdetermination. In part, this is because the historical comparison isn't that illuminative here. The ancients and medievals knew about and accepted model underdetermination ("saving appearances"), but the more interesting thing is that they didn't think this general form of argument led to much wider forms of underdetermination as respects rules, causation, induction, word meaning, free will, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Speaking of the general form of argument, these arguments look to me very much like re-heated old-fashioned scepticism. What's new about it?

Where is this reality? — RussellA

This is not a proper question, because there is insufficient context to define a correct answer. It's like asking where space is.

Our five sense are between our minds and a reality the other side. — RussellA

That presupposes that our minds and reality exist in the same space. Since our minds are not physical objects, that cannot be the case.

As you say, we accept that our concept of the sun is not identical with its object, in that our mind, contained within our brain, being of the order 30cm diameter, is less than the 1.39 million km diameter of the sun. — RussellA

Mental objects such as appearances, experiences, concepts are not physical objects, so do not occupy space.

As you also say, our concept of the sun is existentially dependent on its object. — RussellA

I don't see how that can be true. There are many concepts of things that do not exist.

The question is, where is this object? Where is this sun? — RussellA

You need to explain this question. In a normal context, the answer would be 93 million miles from the earth. No doubt there is an astronomical location within a wider context.

As an Indirect Realist, from appearances and experiences in my senses I can infer that their cause was the fact of there being a sun in reality. But this can only be an inference. — RussellA

With reservations, OK.

But how can we know without doubt the cause of the appearances and experiences in our senses? — RussellA

It depends what you mean by doubt. There is not a shred of evidence - apart from these philosophical arguments - that would make such a doubt less than idle speculation.

As an Indirect Realist, this is not a problem. I simply name the unknown cause of my appearances and experiences after the appearances and experiences themselves, such that I name the set {appearance of a circular shape, experience of seeing the colour yellow, experience of hotness} as "sun". — RussellA

So you form a collection of all the evidence that the sun exists, etc. and call that set the sun? That's like holding all the evidence that P implies Q and refusing to assert Q. That's not an inference of any kind. And how can you assert that this set is 1.39 million miles in diameter? Appearances and experience do not occupy space, so no collection of them can have a diameter.

Backwards in time, how can anyone know that the cause of a broken window was a stone or a bird when the observer was not present when the window broke? — RussellA

You must be using the words in unusual ways. From the fact that I am here, I can reliably infer that I was born. I can also infer reliably that I will die.

How can you know the cause of an appearance or experience in the senses when no one cause is necessary but many possible causes are contingent? — RussellA

You must be using the words in unusual ways. It is precisely experience in the senses that enable us to infer causation. If you think those inferences are wrong, I would be glad to see the evidence.

But for the Indirect Realist, they only have the map. They cannot directly look at the actual world to compare it to the map. — RussellA

What earthly use is a map if you cannot relate it to what it is a map of? Is it perhaps possible to look at the world indirectly?

The topic opens on p. 30. “How can one think what it is not the case?” The discussion of this will go on for the next 9 pages. This is too big a chunk for us, now. I shall cover what might be seen as the first phase, and identify the main stages in the argument after that.

There is “nothing easier” than to think what is not the case. In a sense, Wittgenstein needs not merely to announce his problem, but also to get us to see it as a problem He reminds of the the problem about measuring time, which he discussed earlier. (Ref. needed)

Wittgenstein comments that this is a “beautiful” example of a philosophical question. It is also a beautiful example of his method. It wanders through allied topics as it goes along and ends up with a different view of our starting-point, rather than unveiling a Solution.

His first diagnosis (p.31) is that we are misled by "object of thought", "fact", “and by the different meanings of the word "exist". His response is a discussion of imagining something and a critique of the idea that one can only reconstitute existing elements in a new configuration. I think this is because we can think something that doesn’t exist (such as a ‘false fact’) by imagining it. His critique of this is not fully developed, as he admits. He promises to return to it, but announces, in a sense, his first target. - “it is not the fact which we think". He points out that this depends on how one uses the word “fact”. I think he means that one could use the word fact in such a way that what I wish for is the fact of Mr. Smith arriving. That would evade, rather than resolve, the problem.

His next step (p. 32) introduces the familiar notion of propositions – “the sense of a the sentence” but presents them as “shadows” of facts. This presents the concept in an entirely new context, in which they can be treated as problems in a way that orthodox philosophy doesn’t. So a wholly new critique of the concept can be developed. It is not as if the concept of a proposition is not problematic, but this approach takes us out of the box.

Two transformations of the issue follow rapidly (still p. 32). "How can we know what the shadow is a shadow of?"-- "What makes a portrait a portrait of Mr. N?" and there’s a first answer "The similarity between the portrait and Mr. N". He rejects this answer “for it is in the essence of this idea that it should make sense to talk of a good or a bad portrait” The shadow cannot be treated in this way because, to put it this way, there is no Mr. N to compare it to. This is the essence of the problem, not a solution.

And he wanders off into a discussion of meaning, returning on p. 35, where we find a helpful diagnosis. Hie identifies two different uses of “I think x”. We have "I think that so-and-so will happen" or "that so-and-so is the case", but also "I think just the same thing as he". He also cites "I expect him", and "I expect that he will come" and compares "I shoot him".

This is followed by a discussion of shadows, pictures, and similarity. He is seeking to establish the paradoxical idea that a correct picture of something need have no similarity with its object. (I’m reminded of the picture theory of meaning.) On that basis, positing a shadow between “the sentence and reality” loses all point. The sentence itself can play the required role. (p. 37).

The topic seems to be finally closed when, on p. 38, he reminds us that the connection between thinking about a man and the man himself is established by an ordinary ostensive definition.

I am tempted to skip the discussion “what is not the case” and shadows, etc., and move to the mention of “intention” on p. 32, but if anyone else wants to take up or comment on that section, please do (as anyone can lead the charge at any time). — Antony Nickles

|I'll do something on that.

There's an awful lot going on here. I have to be selective. I don't think swopping assertions about tables and chairs, or relations is going to help much. I think of this debate as not about some fact of the matter, but an interpretation, a way of understanding some things about how we relate to the world, how we fit in to it.

I'm further confused by the presence of concepts, experiences, appearances all playing a similar role - that of getting between us and reality and preventing us from grasping it. In my book, those are the ways in which we grasp reality and distinguish what's real from what is not.

If we know that we don't know reality, we know it from our concepts, experiences, and what appears to us. Yet that's not what they tell us. All three of these concepts announce, quite clearly that they are about something. We have a concept of tables, our experience are experiences of chairs, and what appears in the morning is the sun. They are not identical with their objects, but they are existentially dependent on them. So denying the reality of those objects, or claiming that we don't know those objects, denies their reality. In other words, I can have no idea of these things without the idea of whatever the object is of the concept, experience or appearance they are linked to. Even the idea of perceptions as representations sends the same message.

Yes, of course we know that our senses are limited and appearances can be misleading. But we gain that knowledge from our senses and experiences. More important, when things have gone wrong, it is our senses and experiences that enable us to "see through" the misleadings and misdirections to what is actually real.

Let's think about representations.
If I want to find my way from A to B, I can use a map - a representation of the terrain. But it is no use to me unless I can read the map, and identify what point on the map represents where I am - I have to link the representation to what it is a representation of. That applies to a physical map, and, presumably, to a mental map.
But I don't have to use a map. I can follow a set of directions, such as the directions that a route-finder app will give you. Again, those directions are no use to me unless I can understand them and apply them in the actual world.
But I can actually find my way without either a map or directions. I can follow the sign-posts, for example. But again, I have to be able to interpret them and apply them.
Or, I may memorize a set of cues - turn left by the church, then right by the lake, and so forth. Again, implementing the cues is essential.

What I'm trying to point out is that, whatever mental object you posit in my head, the actual work is done by my mind, interpreting, applying and so forth. Those activities - skills - are what matters. The mental object doesn't actually do anything.

I think also that we are talking past each other most of the time. Perhaps the most radical example is that every time I read that the mind does this and that, what I hear is that people do this and that. We couldn't even have this debate if the question was whether people create the world or whether the world could exist without people in it.

This seems to assume this is about justification, and not an investigation of other examples to see why we insist on certain prerequisites (and what we miss in requiring them), instead of just taking them as just different answers to the same issue. — Antony Nickles

I'm not at all sure that historicism etc. are about justification, though I suppose it might be. That is, sosmeone might take a historical account of our form of life to be a justification. But if what Wittgenstein is interested in clarifying what our justification practices are, how we justify ourselves, then, in this context that is inappropriate. The attempt to justify our justification practices inevitably begs the question. Just as, in the end, there can't be an argument to the conclusion that logic justifies our arguments. That sets up an infinite regress or a circle of arguments. In the end, one simply has to "get" the point - a bit like a joke.

I only wanted to head off the presumption that this was about individuals, and not a matter, as you say, of our (people’s) culture (our language) coming before us. — Antony Nickles

No, no, I wasn't going there. Though, as individuals, we are deeply embedded in our culture and history. We are, in a sense, our culture and history -- to the point where our sense of our individuality is itself the product of them.

In the Investigations, “forms of life” are the background practices that make language intelligible. Witt insists they are not grounded in theory, but in “what we do.”
At first glance this sounds close to historicism or relativism (since forms of life can differ). But Wittgenstein doesn’t historicize them in Nietzsche’s or Foucault’s sense (as contingent, power-saturated events in a genealogy). — Joshs

I've always been a bit puzzled why he didn't take the obvious step from forms or life to historicism, relativism, or even perhaps naturalism. It's always been obvious to me that this was aching to be explored and developed. I just assumed that it was just where he stopped, leaving further development to the next generation. It sorted of fitted with how he does philosophy and he would have been justified in feeling that he had achieved his aims. There could have been plans that were never fulfilled.

It is clear from remarks he wrote elsewhere, that he thought that if he could come to believe in God and the Resurrection - if he could even come to attach some meaning to the expression of those beliefs - then it would not be because he had found any evidence, but rather because he had been redeemed.” — Joshs

I don't know if we are allowed to feel sorry for him. It seems somehow impertinent. Now I'm even more puzzled about his "wonderful life".

If ethical desire can transcend historical contingency, then perhaps this is why for Witt other kinds of desires as well (desire for certainty, generality, completeness) are not simply ‘what we do’ in the historical sense of contingent discursive practices, but confused expressions of a transcendent feeling. — Joshs

If he stuck with ethics as transcendent, is it possible that his ahistorical "form of life" was actually some sort of transcendent idea? One might feel that he doesn't seem to regard language as defined in the TLP as transcendent, but if the truths of logic cannot be said, but only shown, then it looks as if logic is also transcendent.

And, when I saw this part, I immediately thought the “someone” in this situation should be our culture, or the whole of human history, which would be the “us” or “we” like, humanity, from which meaning is not given independently. — Antony Nickles

In my book, culture and history come back to people, so, while I wouldn't disagree with you, I don't feel that there's a significant difference between us.

You are setting quite an agenda here.

For the Indirect Realist, objects such as tables and chairs only exist in the mind and not the world. The Indirect Realist believes that they don't experience the world as it really is, but only through representations of it. — RussellA

We don't experience tables and chairs through representations of them. If we can't compare a representation with the original, there is no way to know whether it is truth or illusion.

For the Indirect Realist, relations exist in the mind otherwise they would not have the concept of table, but relations between the parts in the world are unnecessary. There need be no ontological relations between parts in the world in order for the Indirect Realist to have the concept of tables and chairs. — RussellA

The concept of a table is not a table. Having a concept of a table does not mean that tables exist in your mind. Appropriate relations between the legs and top of a table are critical to its functioning.

For the Direct Realist, the experience of tables and chairs in the mind is a direct experience of the same tables and chairs that exist in the world. The Direct Realist believes they experience the world directly, and there is a direct correspondence between their concept of a table and the table in the world. — RussellA

I have never managed to work out what "direct experience" means. But I do think that thinking of our senses as if they were a biological kind of telescope or microscope or microphone is very misleading - and I think that's one mistake that being made here. I suspect that the model of direct experience is introspection and it is a truism to say that we do not experience the world by introspection. I don't see how it helps. (There is the further point that it turns out that we only "introspect" because we are physiologically equipped to do so and introspection is no more reliable that perception. )

For the Direct Realist, if the table exists as an ontological object in the world, then the relations between the parts that make up the table must also ontologically exist in the world. If ontological relations did not exist in the world then neither would the table ontologically exist in the world. — RussellA

I can buy this, I think. But I don't think I'm a Direct Realist, because I have no idea what "direct" means here.

If relations existed in the world but not in the mind, as with Kant's things-in-themselves, we would not be able to discuss them, as we would not know about them. — RussellA

I'm not sure about that. That we can perceive objects-in-the-world, and how they are related does not mean that they exist in the mind. An analogy. A machine can recognize a face from an image, or from the face itself. It does not need to form an image of the face in order to recognize it. The machine relates the face (or the image of it, as appropriate) to what needs to be done. An image in the machine would just get in the way. Why do you suppose that we need an image in our mind (apart from memory)?

An object such as a table exists as a relation between the parts that make it up. — RussellA

That's a bit convoluted. A table consists of various parts, suitably organized. In the real world, the organization is called a design. In our minds, the organization is called a Gestalt.

As you say "Counting relations is not as straightforward as it looks." A relation suggest two things. There is the relation between a table and a chair. But there is also a relation between the table top and its legs. But then again there is a relation between the atoms that make up the table top. And there is a relation between the elementary particles and forces that make up an atom. There is an "overpopulation" of relations. — RussellA

Not all relations are the same. There are transitive and intransitive relations. But I won't pick at the bulk of this. What matters is the "over-population". I don't see why "over-population" is a problem. Where does anything say what number of relations there should be in the world? The "overpopulation" is, so to say, mathematical, not a feature that can be dispensed with. Are you thinking of relations as objects alongside all the physical constituents of the table? That's a mistake. Relations do not occupy space, any more than boundaries do. Why are you not concerned about the overpopulation of points in space and time, since there are an infinite n umber of them?

As you say "Existing in both the mind and the world is hardest of all to understand. Does it mean that there are actually two relations? Which of them is the real one?" This is a problem for the Direct Realist as the relations in the world are duplicated in the mind, a case of "over-determination". For the Direct Realist, which are the real relations, the ones in the world or the ones in the mind. But this is not a problem for the Indirect Realist, in that the real relations are the one that exist in the mind. — RussellA

If the relations occupy space, they cannot be in the mind. If relations are even located in space, they are not in the mind. The mind is not a space - except metaphorically.

Relations don't need to ontologically exist in the world in order for there to be lines of latitude and longitude as the colour red does not need to ontologically exist in the world in order for there to be traffic lights. — RussellA

You are taking the description of the world in physics as "how the world really is". Can you justify that? I don't think that the description of the world as physics has chosen to see it is in any significant way different from out everyday description of the world. One could even argue that it is impoverished because it can't recognize colours, etc.

How can we know that relations exist in the world if we don't know where they are. If there is a relation in the world between A and B, and the relation cannot be found in A, the relation cannot be found in B and the relation cannot be found in a section of space between A and B, then why should we think that there are relations in the world at all. — RussellA

This is a category mistake. Where is the design of the table or chair? Where is the organization of our bodies? Where is a rainbow? Where is the age of our planet? You are trying to impose the framework of physical objects on something that isn't that kind of object.

In summary, the ontological existence of relations in the world is unnecessary, as Indirect realism, a valid theory of perception, does not require them. In addition, if relations did ontologically exist in the world, further problems would arise, including mereological overpopulation, the arbitrariness of determining the existence of objects, the question of whether a relation can exist independently of what it is relating and any scientific explanation of their nature alongside fundamental particles and forces. — RussellA

I don't think your theory of perception is valid. I don't see why "overpopulation" is a problem. You can say that some of our differentiations in the world are arbitrary, like boundaries between nations or real estates, but it doesn't follow that all are. The distinction between table and chair is not arbitrary. A relationshipt cannot exist independently of its relata. The fundamental particles are not particles in the same sense as molecules and atoms are. They are probability fields or something like that. Not objects of the same kind as tables and chairs.

If object A is 1.8 metre in size and object B is 1.7m in size, then there is a relation between their sizes. Does this relation exist in the mind, the world or both? — RussellA

The answer depends on what you mean by your question. Each word needs dissection.
However, one might start by asking whether A and B exist in the mind, the world or both. If A and B exist in the world, it is hard to see what one might mean by saying that the relation exists in the mind. But saying that it exists in the world generates that puzzle question about where it is. Existing in both the mind and the world is hardest of all to understand. Does it mean that there are actually two relations? Which of them is the real one?

If there were only 2 objects in the universe there is one relation. If there were only 3 objects in the universe there are 3 relations. If there were only 4 objects in the universe there are 6 relations. IE, in the Universe, there are more relations than objects. — RussellA

Look at this carefully: -

Each of A, B, C, D can be greater or smaller or equal to the size of each other object. So each object may be equal to itself. That gives numbers different from yours - much higher. So my question is where all those relations disappeared to?

You may not be counting A=A as a relation, and I grant you that there is something odd about that. We can just skip those cases for our purposes. In addition. since "smaller than" follows logically from "larger than", you may be treating them as the same.

(A,B) & (A,C) & (A,D)
(B,A) & (B,C) & (B,D)
(C,A) & (CB) & (C,D)
(DA) & (D,B) & (D,C)

Counting relations is not as straightforward as it looks.

If relations do exist in an ontological sense in the world, then there are more relations than actual objects. Where did these extra relations come from? — RussellA

What were you expecting? That there would be fewer, as there are in the case of 2 objects? That there would be just as many relations as objects, as in the case of 3 objects? Your surprise is just the result of not thinking through the situation in detail.
Counting relations is much trickier than you might think. Counting objects is even trickier. Count the number of bricks in a house. Count the number of walls in that house. Add the house itself. I would say that's double counting, wouldn't you?
I doubt it is even possible to count the number of sub-atomic particles in anything - mainly because they aren't particles in the usual sense.
Is a rainbow an object separate from the rain-drops that generate it? What about shadows?
I don't think the project is sufficiently defined to be capable of being implemented - even in a thought-experiment.

Relations are not unlike the lines of latitude and longitude. If those lines don't exist in the world, how can they enable navigators to know where they are in the world? Those lines are like boundaries, whether between nations or neighbours. Boundaries certainly have a location in the world - what is the point of them if they don't. But they are, let us say, one-dimensional - they have length, but not width or depth, unlike boundary markers, which have both. These objects are not objects like tables and chairs, which are three-dimensional (four, if you like), but what of that?
I'm very puzzled by the question where relations - even spatial ones - are. I don't think there is an answer to it. But it doesn't make any sense to me to deny that they are in space (the clue is in the name), even if we can't assign an exact location to them.