I wasn't crazy about writing it. :grin: I don't always know how to express myself in these matters. And sometimes it's not even my fault, As ssu just pointed out regarding the definitions of cause and reason. — Patterner

We all have our idiosyncracies and few of us come up with the perfect phrase every time. I tend to be a bit cautious, if you like, and perhaps scrutinize the text more closely than I need to. The reason is that one of the ways I come to understand meaning is by asking what the opposite would be and what would make it apply. (See below). The dictionary definitions of cause and reason were a bit of a blow. The philosophical use of "cause" and hence of "reason" is, if you like, specialized.

I'm not "actually choosing" if physical determinism literally prevents any other possibility. — Patterner

That start me wondering what it would mean if physical determinism only metaphorically prevented any other possibility. But I'm not arguing that we are not prevented from some choices in one way or another. The question is whether this is always the case or just sometimes and what the factors are that can prevent choices. See?

If I'm aware of all the possibilities, but I have no possibility of "choosing" from the myriad options, and can do only the one that the physical factors determine, then awareness is only watching the show. — Patterner

The question is whether you have no possibility of choosing from the options. But determinism effectively says that you have no options, because an option is by definition something you could choose to take.

Come on. It's a metaphor. You seem to have a problem with both Metaphors and Metaphysics. Do you remember how I define "meta-physics", not as religious doctrine, but as philosophical reasoning? — Gnomon

The difficulty is to understand metaphors. If one takes them literally, they are usually false or meaningless. They can have a meaning, and even a truth, of their own.

But soft, what light through yonder window breaks?
It is the east and Juliet is the sun!
(William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, 2. 2. 2–3)
Of course, Juliet is not the sun. But, at the least, the comparison expresses how Romeo feels about her, and so tells us a truth about the place of Juliet in his life.

—History, Stephen said, is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake.
(James Joyce, Ulysses, chap. 2)
This takes a simple metaphor which states a perspective on history. (Since we often apply "nightmare" to anything disastrous or upsetting that happens to us, it is perhaps not even a metaphor.) One could reply, calmly, that there are good bits as well as bad bits. But do the good bits outweight the bad bits? Stephen thinks not, but that the bad bits far outweigh the good bits and maybe even that the good bits aren't really good at all. Adding "from which I am trying to awake" makes it into a metaphor, and tells us that he thinks it may be possible to see things differently.
How would you feel if I said that Determinism is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake?

I do have a problem with metaphysics. I had forgotten your definition of it. I can work with that, although there are still problems.

I'm getting the impression that you don't do philosophy. I'm not sure what you think this forum is all about, if not attempts to construct or destruct a "philosophical position". — Gnomon

It depends what you think doing philosophy is. Does Heidegger or Derrida do philosophy. Many people (including most analytic philosophers) think not? Did Wittgenstein or Ryle do philosophy? Many people (including many analytic philosophers) think not. That's how it works.
I usually find it very difficult to construct or destruct philosophical positions. So I improvise. Jazz philosophy? A metaphor! Too pompous, certainly if I reference Wittgenstein.

FreeWill is not a physical (empirical) question, it's a metaphysical (theoretical) inquiry. My compatibility position is ultimately a Monism : Causation comes in many forms. — Gnomon

This changes everything. But let me ask whether you think that determinism is not a physical (empirical) question? I'll tell you now that I don't think it is. It is a way of thinking about the world and science. Whether it would count as metaphysical inquiry, I wouldn't know. But I certainly think it is a theoretical enquiry. Freedom (Free Will) is a way of thinking about certain parts (components - people) of the world. Understanding these two as ways of thinking, especially whether and how far they are compatible, not deciding between them, is (should be) the project.

My compatibility position is ultimately a Monism : Causation comes in many forms. — Gnomon

Well, we can talk about that.

That internal Causation (willpower) is different from external Determinism (energy) in the sense that a meta-physical Mind is different from a physical Rock. — Gnomon

There are some specialized causal processes that seem to be crucial to our functioning. They are not often found outside living things, so we may be fairly close to each other.

In Mathematics there is this well ordering theorem, so we can assume we can put them into order. Plato did it with his Dog 1, then on one side the dogs that eat more, and on the other side the dogs that eats less. — ssu

Yes. That will work fine if the criterion for their order can't change. But you have posited that they can change how much they eat. You need another, independent, criterion for "same dog".

If you move the dog that no longer eats the same amount to its new position, you've no criterion to establish whether you moved the same dog or a different one. (Watching it eat won't help. However much it eats, you need to know whether it is now eating the same amount as it did before or a different one.)

Perhaps our dog just automatically changes its position, as soon as they start eating differently. But if one dog can change how much it eats, other dogs can. But you have no way of telling whether they have changed or not and so no way of telling whether they are eating differently.

Rather, by rule #2, the one that eats "the most" and the one that eats "the least" are conceptual quantities that differ from any other quantities already given. — L'éléphant

Yes. But there is the supposition that how much they eat can change. To establish individuation, you need an additional criterion that is not empirical.

the meaning of a mathematical concept is not an object or 'configuration' but rather, the totality of rules governing the use of that concept in a calculus." Mathematical propositions are not about anything (in a descriptive sense) yet neither are they meaningless: they are norms of representation whose essence is to fix the use of concepts in empirical proposition. — Richard B

If one thinks about the various developments from, say, to Copernicus to Newton, "fixing the use of concepts in empirical propositions" seems like a more complicated process than this, and it might be thought to violate the purity of mathematical autonomy. The crucial step is the one from "mathematical hypothesis (which the theologians could accept) to description of reality, (which Newton's theory eventually achieved). True, the reality described was modified to accommodate this, but that itself raises questions about the autonomy of systems. I would prefer to say that the application of mathematical propositions to empirical propositions is an extension or development of their theoretical use. How could I rule out other extensions or developments?

Hence Godel was barred by virtue of the logical grammar of mathematical proposition from claiming that he had constructed identical versions of the same mathematical proposition in two different systems. — Richard B

Surely the question whether Godel had or had not achieved that aim is a question for mathematicians. But mathematicians disagree, (don't they?) and perhaps Wittgenstein counts as a mathematician. So the question does not have a determinate answer. That seems to me to be closer to what one might call the truth. I do not rule out the possibility that mathematicians might eventually devise rules for the use of the relevant concepts that would resolve the question. Fortunately, I am barred from attempting the project.

"In Philosophical Remarks Wittgenstein insisted contra Hilbert that ' In mathematics, we cannot talk about systems in general, but only within systems. They are just what we can't talk about(PR 152). The argument as presented sounds dogmatic, but it follows from the preceding clarification of the meaning of mathematical propositions as determined by intraliguistic rules rather than a connection between language and reality. — Richard B

Except when we come to applied mathematics, when that issue becomes central.
________________________

From Wittgenstein Blue Book "Philosophers very often talk about investigating, analysis, the meaning of words. But let's not forget that word hasn't got a meaning given to it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what the word really means. A word has the meaning someone has given to it." — Richard B

It is better to think that a word has the meaning someone has given to it than to think that the meaning of a word is an eternally existing (subsisting entity floating about in some alternative world. But at face value, for those of us using the words, that is simply false. We learn what words mean - we do not make it up; we discover what they mean (what the rules for its use are), or we do not learn to speak. So there can be a scientific investigation into what the word means - and how its meaning changes. To be sure, sometimes we know who gave a word its meaning, but even if it was coined by someone, its use is the result of a process of dissemination which is rarely documented and we do not altogether understand. But dictionaries often include remarks about it and it could be the object of a "scientific" investigation.

It is fair to say that Austin treats language as a tidy abstract structure, rather than a dynamic and messy collection of language-games, and this undermines his claim to be talking about ordinary language. But still, the resulting arguments are at least worth of serious consideration, so I'm not inclined to get too sniffy about his methodology.

From Quine, Word and Object, "There are, however, philosophers who overdo this line of thought, treating ordinary language as sacrosanct. They exalt ordinary language to the exclusion of one of its own traits: its disposition to keep evolving." — Richard B

"Overdo" is the right word, though whether it applies to specific texts is always going to be debateable. Ryle in "Dilemmas", as I recall, talks about technical and untechnical concepts and concepts that everyone uses whatever technical language they are using, rather than ordinary language.

from John Rawls "Principles of Justice", "My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. In order to do this we are not to think of the original contract as one to enter a particular society or to set up a particular government. Rather, the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are the principles that free and rationale persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality defining the fundamental terms of their association — Richard B

The difficulty is that I don't trust myself to dispense with all my selfish interests during this imaginative exercise. It is rather easy to say that if I was a slave, I would accept my slavery because those are the rules. It is equally easy to say that if I was a slave, I would do my level best to escape, despite the rules. For my money, it is much better to start where we are. Other people may start in different places. When we disagree, we shall have to have an argument. That's how it works. How can Rawls' exercise help? Back to ordinary language?

You cannot take Plato's dog, add the food of the dog which eats less than every other dog, and then get more than Plato's dog eats. — ssu

I'm sorry. I just don't follow this. Is there a typo somewhere?

If you would get a different amount of food, then that could be divided even smaller portions and the dog that eats the least wouldn't be the one eating the least. — ssu

Nor do I follow this. But I can agree that if you mess about with the food, some other dog might get less than the dog that eats less than any other dog.

"Plato's dog" is the dog that Plato chose. Let's call the dog that eats less than any other dog "Dog One" and the dog that eats more than any other dog "Dog Two". and the dog that gets less than Dog One "Dog Three".

In that Case, Dog One would no longer be the dog that eats less than any other dog, because Dog Three is getting less than Dog One. We will have to take the rosette off Dog One's collar and pin it on Dog Three's collar. What's the problem?

while the dog that eats less than any other dog, does this the definite it separate from all other dogs? — ssu

Each dog is an individual, so we will always be able to find a unique description or assign a unique name to each dog. Unfortunately, we won't be able to assign a number to each dog in the order they were created, but we can assign a unique number to each dog according to how much they eat, starting with Dog One. That won't work if you start messing about with how much they eat.

I'm afraid I don't see that the Small Worlds model affects the issue at all. Sorry.

… although in the strict physical sense our actions might be determined, we can still be free in all the ways that matter, because of the abilities we evolved". — Gnomon

I have a lot of time for Dennett. But that doesn't mean I agree with everything that he says. This is just throwing in the towel. We all have limitations - things we cannot do. But doesn't really affect the issue.

It's not the heavenly ideal, but a free-roaming mind is better than being a sentient mind trapped in an imprisoned body. — Gnomon

But I'm not a sentient mind trapped in an imprisoned body. I'm a person, as free as anyone is.

In a Matter-only world, "it is what it is" ; but in a Mind & Matter world, what is imagined might also become realized. — Gnomon

I wouldn't know. I don't live in a mind-and-matter world, nor in a matter-only world, not, for that matter, in and ideas-only world. On Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, I'm a monist. On Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, I'm a uncountable pluralist. On Sundays, I don't do philosophy.

"I feel that as human beings with free will, the mind tends to limit itself from living to the fullest when we become prisoners of our own mind." Is your mind locked-in? :chin: — Gnomon

Well, I suppose I can make some sort of sense of that. But not enough to add up to a philosophical position.

Creativity and Invention: Imagination often precedes innovation and creation. Many of the inventions and creations that shape our world start as ideas in someone's imagination. When these ideas are acted upon and brought into the physical world through effort, experimentation, and implementation, they can become a reality. This process involves turning abstract thoughts into tangible products, technologies, or works of art. — Gnomon

Either we are free all day and every day, or we are not free. It is entirely mundane, not special in any way. But perhaps you just want to change the subject.

Perhaps, but the "cause" of willful action --- as contrasted with physical actions --- is presumed to be within the agent. Otherwise, the action would be pre-determined instead of free-will. :cool: — Gnomon

What is wilful action as contrasted with physical action? In what way is a cause "within" me any different from a cause "without" me? How can an internal cause not determine the action unless it is not a cause or it is in some way special? What reason is there to suppose that an internal cause is in any way special - apart from the fact that it is inside me? (We have opened people up and not found any special causes.)

Remember, the story is told by Plato, not by a third actor. — ssu

Oh, you're imagining that you have discovered a previously unknown manuscript. Who wrote it - Plato, Zeno, Themis, Athene, Zeus? Or a rat, skulking in a corner.

Did he? Or did he try to make an counterargument to Plato? During the time, you tried to make questions that the one answering you would make the argument. So could it be that Zeno was arguing that by Plato's reasoning you get into the silly ideas like the Achilles cannot overtake the tortoise. Or the Arrow cannot move. Remember, the story is told by Plato, not by a third actor. — ssu

I thought it was Zeno who got the silly ideas. But then, perhaps this is a non-standard analysis.

In Abraham Robinsons nonstandard analysis that dog that eats the least exists and is fine. — ssu

So long as it is a non-standard dog, I guess it'll pass muster.

then you get the problem. — ssu

I'm glad of that. It doesn't mean I have any answers.
I'm afraid I have enough trouble getting my head around standard analyses. If I take on non-standard analyses, my head will go pop.

Your second statement goes with the lines of Plato then. Poor of Zeno's dogs. — ssu

Well, I don't know how this works. I have imagination deficiency. Doctors have tried for years to cure me. Don't worry, it's not fatal.

I know that there is no smallest member of a convergent sequence and no largest member of an increasing sequence (I've forgotten the proper term for that.) You may like to consider the possibility that Zeno's dogs don't exist. (After all, he told lies about Achilles and the tortoise.)

It's true that both sequences have a limit, but a limit is not a element of the sequence. So if they do exist they are not members of the pack. The other dogs would tear them to pieces.

So it's kind of a happy ending? — ssu

I suppose it is, if you think the misery of two dogs a satisfactory price for the happiness of the others. I'm sure it would get a majority vote from the dogs.

I would suggest the transfinite system as a home for the other dog - since it's the last one and w (omega) is the limit of the series.

It seemed that the number of the dogs couldn't be counted — ssu

I'm pretty sure that was an illusion. After all, each dog can be counted and the counting can continue for as long as there are any dogs that have not been counted.

There are real mathematical and philosophical issues about infinity. I think they may be insoluble. But philosophers are suckers for an insoluble problem.
The gods, the dogs, the beach and the food all exist but only in your imagination. The conversation between Plato and Zeno happened but only in your imagination. Athena and Themis are proxies for you. The rest of the gods are proxies for those of us who are enjoying the mischief that you have created.
I fear the dogs will starve to death. But they are innocent victims of your imagination and the incompetence of Plato and Zeno. Can you imagine a way to rescue the dogs? Can you resist that picture? Please? (I don't care whether Plato and Zeno starve to death - they're choosing to co-operate with you, so they deserve whatever happens to them. Anyway, they're dead already.) :grin:

It's about whether or not I can actually choose one path or another. — Patterner

That little word actually is interesting. What does it mean? Either I have a choice, or I do not.

I'm just saying that you can't have no ability to choose any but one of multiple equally possible paths and have free will in the matter. — Patterner

In one way, you are right. But there are some kinds of coercion that are compatible with the capacity to choose. Determinism eliminates the capacity to choose, and so eliminates the possibility of coercion.

When the cop arrests me and asks me to hold out my hands for the cuffs, do I have a choice? When I drag myself in to work on a Monday morning, do I go because I have chosen to go? When my opponent forces me to take his rook (castle) in order to get my queen, what choices do I have? When I pay my taxes, what choice do I have? Assume in all these cases that I have a normal capacity to choose.

Coercion usually means forcing someone to do something he or she doesn't want to do. — ssu

Quite so. Does the sun want to rise in the morning?

Finally on 12:20 she explains why she believes that determinism eliminates free will. — ssu

Interesting. Is that because she thinks that determinism forces me to do things, or because choice is meaningless in a determinist framework?

In many occasion giving a prediction doesn't affect what is predicted. That the Earth revolves around the Sun even a hundred years from now is a sound prediction. Giving that doesn't effect the future, the Earth or the Sun. — ssu

Yes. That means that the prediction does not force me to do anything.

Yet they disregard then the "more is different" argument, the emergent properties, and make simply a category error. — ssu

Yes, it is a category error. I'm not sure about emergent properties. There doesn't seem to be much agreement about them and maybe those arguments are giving too much away. Yet we are physical beings, and physics doesn't have exceptions. Understanding that is the problem.

Compatibility does not require total chaotic indeterminism, but only a few short-cuts on the road to destiny. — Gnomon

I get the first half of the sentence. But the meaning of the second half is not at all clear to me. Your diagram in your "Small world model" doesn't help.

Our physical actions may not be free, but our meta-physical intentions are free as a bird, to defy gravity by flapping. "If god intended man to fly, he would have given him wings". Instead, he gave us imagination. — Gnomon

Are you suggesting that an imagined freedom is any substitute for the real thing? Seems like a very poor exchange to me.

Note --- The man is not free --- he can be imprisoned --- but his mind is free : to roam the world of ideas. — Gnomon

No, it is not the case that the man is not free just because he can be imprisoned. If he is not imprisoned, he is free. In case, the freedom to "roam the world of ideas" is no substitute for the freedom to go home to you partner and kids.

3) the causes of voluntary behaviour are certain states, events, or conditions within the agent: acts of will or volitions, choices, decisions, desires etc... — The Chapter you cited entitled Compatibilism

So an action is free if its causes are inside the agent. If the causes of those causes are outside the agent, can we conclude that his acts of will, etc are not free?
By the way, can you identify his acts of will etc independently of the actions they cause to provide the basic empirical information you need to carry out an induction?

Compatibilism is determinism with a slight modification for the sake of appearances and for our language use. It is a position taken because of the perceived need to have some idea of accountability or responsibility for human behavior. — The Chapter you cited entitled Compatibilism

So compatibilism is window dressing - a concession to the ignorant. Why would I be interested in this?

Large societies need predictability, for example when driving in traffic, I think everybody is happy if you predictably stay on your own lane. — ssu

Quite so. Only, if at all possible, I would like to be regarded as only coerced by the law when I do so. Keeping the law means that one could break it.
That nicely reveals some of the complications about freedom.

When, exactly can someone who is capable of being free be said to be coerced? We say a blackmailer coerces their victim, but, from another perspective, the victim collaborates with the blackmailer. When I walk into my favourite bar (pub) and the person behind the bar pours my usual drink for me, I would normally be said to be choosing freely even though I am entirely predictable.

As the sun rises over the horizon, is it appropriate to say that the air is coerced to become hotter? If determinism excludes the possibility of freedom, as it seems to, then it also excludes the possibility of coercion. This is about what are called categories or language games. Certain concepts are said to be inapplicable (neither true not false, but rather meaningless) when applied outside their home language game. How much does the number 2 weigh? Does it weigh more or less that the number 3? Are both numbers weightless? The earth is neither free nor coerced as it orbits round the sun.

It's been long argued starting from J.R. Lucas (1961) and then continued with Penrose that human mind is different because we can understand Gödel's incompleteness theorems and computers cannot, but that argument is a confusing. — ssu

Well, that might be right. Though I would be a bit concerned if people who did not understand Godel were then to be classified as not free.

I don't think LD has any problem in predicting billiard balls as they follow exceptionally well even Newtonian physics. — ssu

But the billiard balls do not roll as they do because LD predicted how they would.

Yet LD has a problem of making an equation when the future depends on his equation, especially the negation of it. — ssu

Well, yes. I think feedback loops are an important part of enabling us to control our actions and hence act freely.

I think it would be productive for this thread if either you or anyone gives the most compelling case just why they cannot be both at the same time. Even if one doesn't personally agree with the argument. — ssu

We started this discussion because you said:-

In my view both are very useful concepts. I will argue that you can have determinism and free will. — ssu

I think I may have interpreted this in a way different from you. It's complicated. You can't play both language-games at the same time, any more than you can play chess and draughts ("checkers" in the USA, I think) at the same time. The tricky bit is that, while there is no problem about playing both those games on the same board, there does seem to be a problem about playing both language games in the same world. Moreover, while I would like to say that it is just a question of how you consider or articulate the phenomena, I don't think it is as simple as that. So I think there is scope and need to see if some bridges might not be built. But we might need to revise the rules of both games.

It would be reasonable to think that one cannot have one's cake and eat it, but here are some possibilities:-
Here's one possibility. Follow this link to Rubin's vase. It is both a picture of two profiles and of a vase, depending on how you look at it. Because there is definitely just one "it" that you are looking at, there is also a third possibility, that "it" is neither, though it is arguably a picture, even if one cannot say, in the normal way, what it is a picture of. Wittgenstein features this issue, but it was a big topic in the early 20th century in psychology.
Here's another, simpler, possibility. The same events can be a meteorological event, a humanitarian disaster, an economic set-back at the same time.
This is about analogies. None of them is true, all of them are suggestive.

The first point to get one's head around is that it is sometimes very helpful to think of a person as a machine. That doesn't mean they are a (simply) machine. (Nor does it mean that the solar system is a machine). The second point to get one's head around is that although homo sapiens (a misnomer if ever there was one!) is the only animal that is a person (that we know of, so far), other animals have person-like traits, and that we can attribute person-like traits to machines - in fact, it is possible to attribute full-blown personhood to certain inanimate objects or phenomena - then we call them gods. What follows? "Machine" is not simply a classification of objects, but a way of thinking about objects. Similarly "person" is not a simply a classification of objects, but a way of thinking about them.

in what way is a path taken for such causes by a person who comes to an intersection different from a path taken by a boulder rolling down a mountain? — Patterner

The person who comes down the mountain is not in a free fall, as the boulder is - though they might be. Their descent is under control. It's not about which path they take.

You can even innovate, do really something that hasn't been there before in your mind. — ssu

I'm not at all sure this is relevant for our problem. In the first place, the billiard balls can travel along paths they have never travelled before. In the second place, if we are only free when we innovate, then we are in chains for most of our lives.

But for entities that are conscious and sentient, free will is a really great model to use! — ssu

I don't disagree, but I do wish we could stop talking about free will, with all its baggage, and concentrate on freedom.

Case in point, the arrangement of games, as described in Toulmin's article, seems to have nothing to do with 'metaphysics' as traditionally used. — Lionino

Yes. Exactly.

"Metaphysical possibility" is sought as distinct from logical and physical possibility. — Lionino

I'm afraid I couldn't follow your account of this. I'll have to take another look at it later on. But I'm not sure that the project of trying to articulate the Venn diagram is necessarily the best way to go. It may be constraining, rather than guiding, your thinking.

Some philosophers make away with both the a posteriori / a priori and analytic/synthetic distinctions, — Lionino

Yes, but are the philosophers who want to make synthetic necessity among them?

I take the traditional view and accept all those distinctions. — Lionino

I'm afraid that I was brought up in the tradition that says that the analytic/synthetic distinction is the only one that means anything. My dilemma is that can see some sense in the point that that one only applies to language, where a priori applies to knowledge and contingent applies to "the world".

No, the infinite sum is the limit of the sequence of the finite sums. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Yes. Sorry. Careless.

But we don't need to run the code. We can understand the logic of it and so know that there is no consistent answer. It cannot be true, cannot be false, and cannot be anything other than true or false. — Michael

Fair enough. But that's a much better description, IMO. What more is there to say?

No no no! Sorry, I wrote badly. I didn't mean you, I meant in general "Now if you go" referring to people who go for scientism. And I'll change it to be more readable! — ssu

There was no need to do that. It was my misinterpretation of you. But I appreciate the gesture.

I did assume you were endorsing the view you quoted. I should have been a bit more cautious. But I wasn't annoyed or anything. You don't seem particularly upset, so I'm not sure whether an apology is appropriate?

I don't think it is obvious what label we should have for this phenomenon. But I do think there are problems with the proposal. For the record:-

1 I don't see this use of "metaphysical" has any strong relationship to the traditional meaning of the term, so the choice could be regarded as misleading. "New metaphysics" might work.
2 If this is "synthetic necessity", I wonder how we might define "contingent" - the opposite of "necessary" in the traditional structure of these terms.
3 This is classified as "a posteriori" because it is contingent on the relevant rules existing and applying. But all analytic truths are contingent on the relevant definitions (rules of language) existing and applying, so does the term "a priori" have any use?

The following pseudocode provides a demonstration of C3 and is the correct way to interpret the logic of Thomson's lamp: — Michael

Why don't you just run the code and see?
You call it a pseudo-code, but one assumes that you could turn it into real code.

Expecting more of a dictionary would be a mistake. A dictionary is limited to describing words with other words - there's inevitable circularity to it. There's something of a Munchausen Trilemma involved in writing a book full of words describing other words. — flannel jesus

You are quite right. But it's not often that I come across such egregious examples.
.

Now you go too far with applying the scientific method and hold a bit extreme views of scientism, but this usually comes from that the person doesn't understand that other fields do use logic too. — ssu

Dear, oh, dear. I thought it was the causal determinist who was guilty of scientism. I'm more than happy to insist that the methods (and concepts) of science do not apply when thinking about thinking. It's not really a strictly a question of logic, but of a more general conception of rationality. Or, put it another way, of a different kind of syllogism (though it was also invented by Aristotle) known as the practical syllogism.

That said, why should philosophy not have a normative role as well. — Richard B

I don't understand the question. I think that's because norms are not an optional extra in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Perhaps they are not so clearly visible because he is showing through describing.

That collection of quotations was very thought-provoking. Wittgenstein seems to be saying, on one hand, that philosophy is all about description:-

PI 124 “Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is.”
PI 126 “Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.” — Richard B

But on the other hand:-

What is your aim in philosophy? To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. — PI 309

So, a clear description shows the fly the way out. Making a clear description is itself a norm-governed activity, with its own norms and rules and criteria, which philosophy may (rightly) call into question. But these descriptions have a use in the service of the philosophical project - and their contribution to the project is also a criterion by which to judge their success. There is a goal, which (one presumes) is supposed to be a Good Thing. None of these norms are optional extras.
Note that the fly has to do some work as well. It has to grasp what Wittgenstein is showing it for itself. As he says in the introduction to PI:-

I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own.

But Wittgenstein has several goes at articulating his project:-

A philosophical problem has the form: ‘I don’t know my way about. — PI §123

There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. — PI §133

The philosopher treats a question; like an illness. — PI §255

The real discovery is the one which enables me to stop doing philosophy when I want to. The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself into question. — PI § 133

What I give is the morphology of the use of an expression. I show that it has kinds of uses of which you had not dreamed. In philosophy one feels forced to look at a concept in a certain way. What I do is suggest, or even invent, other ways of looking at it. I suggest possibilities of which you had not previously thought. You thought that there was one possibility, or only two at most. But I made you think of others. Furthermore, I made you see that it was absurd to expect the concept to conform to those narrow possibilities. Thus your mental cramp is relieved, and you are free to look around the field of use of the expression and to describe the different kinds of uses of it. — Lectures of 1946 - 1947, as quoted in Ludwig Wittgenstein : A Memoir (1966) by Norman Malcolm, p. 43

He once greeted me with the question: 'Why do people say that it was natural to think that the sun went round the earth rather than that the earth turned on its axis?' I replied: 'I suppose, because it looked as if the sun went round the earth.' 'Well,' he asked, 'what would it have looked like if it had looked as if the earth turned on its axis?' This question brought it out that I had hitherto given no relevant meaning to 'it looks as if' in 'it looks as if the sun goes round the earth'. My reply was to hold out my hands with the palms upward, and raise them from my knees in a circular sweep, at the same time leaning backwards and assuming a dizzy expression. 'Exactly!' he said. In another case, I might have found that I could not supply any meaning other than that suggested by a naive conception, which could be destroyed by a question. The naive conception is really thoughtlessness, but it may take the power of a Copernicus effectively to call it in question. — G. E. M. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, Chap. 12

Whether we are expected to weld these together to form a consistent and complete whole or just regard them as variants on a theme, either to allow different methods for different problems or just to prevent mental cramp, I do not know. Of course, in the end, it is up to us to decide what we will do.

Insofar as one reflectively reasons in order to critique and interpret norms (i.e. rules, criteria, methods, conventions, customs, givens), philosophy is performative. To say, for example, 'one ought to philosophize' does not seem a philosophical statement. — 180 Proof

Does what I have said articulate what you mean here?

PI 130 “Our clear and simple language-games are preparatory studies for future regularization of language--as it were first approximations, ignoring fiction and air-resistance. The language-games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities.” — Richard B

At first I thought this was inconsistent, harking back to the idea that logic could be the basis of an ideal language, free of all the dross that natural languages carry. But perhaps he doesn't mean re-forming, changing, language, but grasping the order that is already there.

But this is a bit of chicken and an egg: the causal determinist will simply say that a person, thanks to his thinking, reasoning and experience came to this conclusion because of the current situation that was can be traced to the past occurences, which can be then traced back to, well, the Big Bang. — ssu

In fact, when doing a quick search on the definitions of reason and cause, I got:
reason: a cause, explanation, or justification for an action or event.
cause: a reason for an action or condition : motive, something that brings about an effect or a result, a person or thing that is the occasion of an action or state — ssu

Yes, that's a classic example of what dictionaries can do, otherwise known as a circular definition. I believe it is somewhat frowned upon in philosophical circles. Fortunately, we are free to disagree with a dictionary, even if we have to be a bit cautious about it. It doesn't make it easier to articulate what's going on here.

There is a truth here. It is perfectly possible to apply the concepts (language-game) of persons to inanimate objects, and we are very familiar with partial cases - animals (anthopomorphization) - and even applications to inanimate objects (polytheistic gods, personification). It is also perfectly possible - even helpful - to apply the concepts (language-fame) of inanimate objects - machines - to persons and partial persons. So the radical move of applying both language-games simultaneously to everything is just pushing those tendencies to the extreme - and much philosophy depends on tactics like that. (Hume called it "augmentation".)

But I really don't think that my "thinking, reasoning and experience " is particularly amenable to the scientific method (methods, approach). Certainly, much philosophy has derived from those difficulties. Sweeping them all away with a few key-strokes is not an appealing solution.

That's the best I can do for now.

There is no truth of the matter, because it is a matter of deciding how to apply the rules to a situation which they were not designed to cater for. — Ludwig V

Which sequence? There are different sequences involved in the puzzles here. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I was thinking of a term that would apply to sequences in general.

0 is the value at the arguments 1, 3, 5 etc — TonesInDeepFreeze

I think I can work with that. But I see that you used "entry" elsewhere. That's simpler.

I was speaking in the context of the completion times halving. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I didn't realize that is the context. Then most of what I said is irrelevant.

An infinite series that has a sum (some might say the series is the sum) requires first having an infinite sequence (each entry in the sequence is a finite sum) that converges, and the sum is the limit. The sequence whose entries are 0, 1, 0, 1 ... does not converge. However, whatever you mean by 'complete', there are infinite series that have a sum. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I agree with all of that. There is a twist, of course. The sum is not the total addition of all the entries, but the limit of the total addition of all the entries. The total addition of all the entries up to a specific point will converge on/with the sum.

For that matter, I don't think the particulars about buttons, jabbing, or especially about human acts such as fingers reaching to touch a device are relevant, as the problem could be entirely abstract, as what is essential only is that the lamp goes on and off at the increasing rate mentioned, or, for that matter, it's not essential even that it's a lamp or any other particular device (could be clown klaxon going off an on for all it matters) as long as there are alternating states, whatever they may be. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I agree with all of that. That's why I ended up formulating the problem in terms of 1 and 0 alternating. Unfortunately, that doesn't resolve everything. But I need time to work out how to articulate this reasonably clearly. Sorry. I will get back to you.

They hold there is an identity that is metaphysically necessary, and it is metaphysically necessary because it is a a posteriori necessity. — Lionino

Well, I don't want to quarrel about a name. Call it metaphysics or call it a posteriori necessity, my account of the problem derives from Wittgenstein, Ryle and Toulmin. That's what matters.

There is no truth of the matter, because it is a matter of deciding how to apply the rules to a situation which they were not designed to cater for. — Ludwig V

The same comment applies to much of the discussion in this thread as well. Ryle seems to have thought it applies to all philosophical problems, but I wouldn't go that far.

We are being asked about the causal consequence of having carried out a supertask. — Michael

My problem is that I don't understand what carrying out a supertask is. So I can't even think about the consequences of carrying one out. @TonesInDeepFreeze, This is the best that I can do to articulate what bothers me.

I think claiming belief and not knowledge is paradoxical. The claim to 'faith' is, to me, an indication of dishonesty or delusion. — AmadeusD

Well, I'm inclined to agree with you at least this far, that "I believe that p and that p is false" is a contradiction. "I believe that p and that p might be false" is not a flat-out contradiction, and could be described as paradoxical. "I believe that p and that p cannot be known, even though p is capable of truth and falsity." is extremely odd, but, for someone who believes on faith, comprehensible.
The resolution is a bit complication. When I say "I know that p", I am endorsing p as true. When I say "AmadeusD believes that p", I am reporting that AmadeusD endorses p as true. I am not asserting that p is true or false. When I say "AmadeusD knows that p" I am reporting that AmadeusD endorses p and endorsing p myself. When I say "AmadeusD thinks that p" I am reporting that AmadeusD endorses p; but I am endorsing p as false.
It's a bit of a side-issue, but it's the only way I can make sense of the "phenomena".

to me, delusion implies that someone has simply formed a conclusion without adequately assessing the relevant states of affairs. — AmadeusD

That seems a reasonable idea. Maybe a bit harsh - people can be misled even if they do their level best to check things out properly.

I think it would be productive for this thread if either you or anyone gives the most compelling case just why they cannot be both at the same time. Even if one doesn't personally agree with the argument. — ssu

Thanks for the invitation. I can try. But as long as people think that the search for free will is the search for an uncaused cause or a search for indeterminacy, I doubt that anyone will be interested.

The basics, which I confess I though were universally known are that actions performed by people require for their explanation purposes, values and reasons. Values cannot be recognized in standard scientific determinism, because of the fact/value distinction. Purposes require orientation to a future state, which clearly cannot be the cause of action (in the standard sense of cause). Reasons are easily confused with causes, but they justify actions by linking the aim, purpose, ambition, goal or target of action to what is to be done (this is sometimes referred to as the practical syllogism) which is a form of explanation that has no role in causal determinism.

All of this is at least over-simplified and is possibly wrong. But unless this agenda is discussed, we cannot even articulate the difference between what people do and what happens in the inanimate world, never mind decide whether one is compatible with the other.

Forgive me if I've seem short-tempered, but I've been looking for a chance to put this on the table for a long time.

There are a few reading groups here — Wittgenstein, Aristotle, Kant, Descartes. But you don't see them unless you look for them because they get quickly taken over by dumb nonsense such as this and this. — Lionino

I've been aware of some of them. I suppose I'll just have to experiment and see what happens.

Anyhow, any meaningful discussion to be had is covered 90% in the IEP/SEP page of the respective philosopher — Lionino

That suggests one could start a useful discussion from the relevant pages of the encyclopedias - and then read the book. Standing on the shoulders of the giants.

In my view both are very useful concepts. I will argue that you can have determinism and free will. Free will is a great concept to use as it easy describing various events and phenomena extremely well. Yet so is determinism too. — ssu

I agree with this. But there are some questions.
A popular way of having both is to argue that they are compatible. There's been a lot of discussion of that possibility, but I haven't seen anything that really resolves the differences between them. There's either freedom in the gaps or reduction of freedom to causality. Or have I missed something?
Another way of having both is simply to treat them say that they are different concepts (language-games), not in competition with each other. That would support the pragmatism that you seem to be suggesting, at the price of giving up on the question of truth.

And your statement (at least as you wrote it) was that none of them could be completed, which is even more It is wrong. — TonesInDeepFreeze

In the quotation in that message, I made no statement. I just asked a question.

I made no judgement on that — TonesInDeepFreeze

Thank you for the answer to my question. It is very helpful.

It is incorrect to infer that infinitely many tasks may be completed in finite time from the premise that there is no finite upper bound to how many task may be completed in finite time. I would put it this way: For for any finite number of tasks, there may be a completion of all the tasks. But that does not imply that there may be a completion of all of infinitely many tasks. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I would have thought that "for any finite number of tasks, there may be a completion of all the tasks" does not imply that there may be a completion of all of infinitely many tasks and does not imply that there may not be a completion of all of infinitely many tasks.

It is not the case that when we define an infinite sequence we must individually define each entry in the sequence — TonesInDeepFreeze

I agree with what you say. But, nonetheless, we have defined each entry in the sequence. Or is there an entry that is not defined? I can't think of one.
My indirect response is:- I'm sorry. I should have explained.
I was thinking about "there is no finite upper bound to how many task may be completed in finite time." It occurred to me that that depended on how long each task takes. (And that depends on what the task is.)
Clearly, if each task takes 1 second, there is a limit to the number of tasks that can be completed in 2 minutes. But how long does it take to add 1 to a given number? Does it take less time or more to add 1,000,000 to a given number? How long does it take to switch Thompson's lamp on or off? How long does it take to divide a given number by 2 or 10?
And then,the proof that sqrt(2) is irrational is also a proof that no rational number is sqrt(2)? Do I have to show separately and individually that each rational number is not sqrt(2)? I think not, but I have proved, of each rational number, that it is not sqrt(2). Is this one task, or many? How long does it take, either to prove that sqrt(2) is irrational or to prove, of a specific rational number, that is not sqrt(2)?

It is not the case that when we define an infinite sequence we must individually define each entry in the sequence. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Certainly. But there are some points I am not clear about.

Example:
Definition of sequence S:
The domain of S is the set of natural numbers.
For every natural number n, S(n) = n+1.
That's a finite definition (all definitions are finite) of an infinite sequence. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Yes, but how long did it take? Have you not defined each individual member of the sequence and all the members of the sequence? Which members of the sequence are not defined? How many tasks have I completed?

I like to keep the word 'series' for sums per convergences, and the word 'sequences' for sequences. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Thank you. I struggle with that difference. I'm not sure that everyone is consistent. What term do you use for a member of the sequence. People seem to by using "stage" or "term". Then there's the difficulty that "0, 1, 0, 1, ...." has, in one way, two members, each of which occurs repeatedly, So what do we call the first "0" as distinct from the second "0"?

Hence 2500 years of philosophers, mathematicians and scientists talking about it. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Yes. They're still talking about Epimenides the Cretan (and variants), as well. I can't deny they are both fascinating and annoying.

Metaphysical possibility is either equivalent to logical possibility or narrower than it (what a philosopher thinks the relationship between the two is depends, in part, on the philosopher's view of logic).

quoted by @Michael
Which means that metaphysics does not have an authoritative definition that we can all use for communication purposes, apart from the recognition that it involves logic.
For that reason, I prefer to stick to logical and physical possibility. There at least appears to be some consensus about the use of those terms, even though philosophers will, from time to time, quarrel about their definitions as well.

For the purpose of learning philosophy, time spent actually reading the classics is more productive than arguing with idiots in the hopes of the occasional informative post. — Lionino

Well, I think that the opportunity to discuss them with other people who have also read them helps a lot. That's my biggest problem. Perhaps I should try to start some reading groups.

But that does not imply that there may be a completion of all of infinitely many tasks. — TonesInDeepFreeze

S has a lower bound in S if and only if there is a member of S that is less than or equal to every member of S.
S has a lower bound if and only if there is an x such that x is less than or equal to every member of S. — TonesInDeepFreeze

The range of the sequence 1, 1/2, 1/4 ... has no lower bound in the range, but it has a lower bound (the greatest lower bound is 0). — TonesInDeepFreeze

Thank you for the clarification. I must admit, I was a bit puzzled by "bound". I'm used to "limit". This clarifies something that was puzzling me - how one could describe the relationship between the 0 and 1 to the steps of the series. This seems to work very well.

Again, even if there is no completion of all of infinitely many subtasks, it is not entailed that there is a finite upper bound to how many may be completed, so, a fortiori, it is not entailed that each of the subtasks is not completed. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Are you suggesting that it might be the case that all of infinitely many tasks can be completed? What would the last task be?
On the other hand, perhaps we should accept that when Achilles catches the tortoise or finishes the race, he has completed all of infinitely many tasks. That might need some explaining, though, wouldn't it?

If I'm not mistaken, Thompson recognizes physical possibility and logical possibility, which are at least fairly well understood, but he doesn't mention metaphysical possibility. That's not to say that the notion of metaphysical possibility should be ruled out, but only that it requires explication. — TonesInDeepFreeze

There is the possibility that he doesn't recognize metaphysical possibility. Not everyone does.

P1. If (A) the first task is performed at 11:00, the second at 11:30, the third at 11:45, and so on, then (B) infinitely many tasks have been completed by 12:00
P2. B is impossible
C1. Therefore, A is impossible — Michael

Here's a thought. When we define the series, we have defined each and every step in the series (or, if you prefer, each and every member of the relevant set.) Defining a step is a task. Suppose we do that at 10:55. So we completed infinitely many tasks, not only before 12:00, but before 11:00. So it is not impossible to complete infinitely many tasks before 12:00.
What's more, adding together the first step and the second step is a task. I can calculate the limit (sum) of the infinite series, well before 12:00.
Obviously, I haven't defined the last step, or the penultimate step, but that wasn't the challenge.
Or have I misunderstood the mathematics?

The distinction comes from language and purpose, and is not physical, which is the point of me posting all this. — noAxioms

Yes. I'm not disagreeing with you, for a change.

Or in a double spiral, resulting in a pair of very difficult to disentangle Slinkys. — noAxioms

:grin:

There is, of course, some variance in edge cases, but on the whole convention seems to correspond to the observable properties of things across different cultures. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. Given that we are all human beings and therefore similar in many important ways (as well as different in other important ways, that is not surprising. That's why Wittgenstein grounds everything in human life and practices.

I would add that these problems become particularly acute, I would say insoluble, if one starts from the position that what we know/experience are "mental representations" or "ideas" rather than these being that through which we know. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. I think we should think of them as lenses, rather than obstacles.

What I'm trying to say that there being a certain future simply doesn't limit in any way free will. — ssu

Yes, I hear you. One of the basic issues I have with determinism is understanding why people equate it with being forced to do things.

Strict materialism and physicalism simply leads people to make silly generalizations and to wrong conclusions. — ssu

Strict idealism, empiricism also lead to silly generalizations and wrong conclusions. I realise that we can't avoid generalizations, but I think we have to be pragmatic about them. There's a lot to be said for treating them as useful or not (so long as we assess that in context) or not, rather than true or not. But I wouldn't be dogmatic about that.

I meant metaphysics as things before physics, like the nature of existence (and universal principles) and as the study of mind-independent features of reality. — ssu

the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space. — Gnomon

... which demonstrates why metaphysics is so confusing. But I can see that there might be philosophy to be done with concepts; but then, I don't see how concepts can exist without language and I gather that some people regard a turn to linguistics as problematic. "Mind-independent features of reality" are more problematic, unless you just mean tables, trees and so forth. On the face of it, I would have thought that the empirical sciences are more likely to be useful than philosophy.

To Ludwig's gutters: The gutters are two separate objects if considered by a convention that identifies them as such. Them being physically attached to each other or not is irrelevant. Physics is utterly silent on the topic. There is no device that can be pointed to a 'thing' that will tell you the boundary of that thing, despite all the fictional devices that do exactly that. — noAxioms

I agree with you about this. But I have a pedantic desire to clarify the matter of the gutters. I mentioned them when I suggested that one could decide to cut a pipe into two halves either by cutting across its length, so you get two shorter pipes, or by cutting along its length, so you get two objects of the same length, but not complete circles so not pipes - I decided to call them gutters because they could be used as gutters. When I posited painting the pipe, I did not consider painting the gutters.

The choice is not an illusion: we are actually making the choice - we have to actually go through the mental process to reach that choice. — Relativist

I agree that when we come to a fork in the road and take one rather than another, we are, under normal circumstances, making a choice. Sometimes, when we make choices, we weigh the options, thinking of benefits and costs and so forth. But I don't agree that we always go through any particular mental process when we do so.

the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space. — Gnomon

This looks like a definition of philosophy, rather than a branch of philosophy.

Here's my problem:-

Do you see any relationship between physical freedom (mathematical value) and mental freedom*3 (metaphysical value)? :smile: — Gnomon

I don't understand the question. I could probably invent some sort of meaning for it, but I would have no idea whether that was in any way relevant.

But meta-physical (mental) choices are not subject to physical laws --- perhaps only the laws of Logic", it can be argued that he is making the argument that there's something else than the physical. — ssu

I don't understand what you are saying here.

Is there some other "language" in my posts that give you pause? I haven't been indoctrinated in the legalistic "linguistic turn" in philosophy (Wittgenstein, etc). So my language is generally vernacular & informal, and may sometimes run afoul of "legal" usage. — Gnomon

I suppose you are aware that "indoctrinated" and "legalistic" have presuppositions and overtones that anyone who had been indoctrinated into that legalistic turn would not accept? So why ask the question?

Are you uncomfortable with my use of "meta-physics" in reference to mental processes. Are Ideas subject to physical laws of gravity, or is there some other force that gives "weight" to opinions? — Gnomon

I don't understand what "meta-physical" means in that question. It doesn't conform in any obvious way with your definition.

We tend to use physical metaphors to describe psychological concepts, but are the analogies intended to be taken literally & physically? — Gnomon

Metaphors are not ever intended to be taken literally. I don't know what it would mean to take a metaphor physically. I don't know what it would be to take analogy literally or physically.

Are Ideas subject to physical laws of gravity, or is there some other force that gives "weight" to opinions? — Gnomon

Of course ideas are not subject to physical laws of gravity - they are not physical objects. If there is any force that gives weight to opinions, it is an appropriate kind of force, and then the concept of opinions having weight is no longer a metaphor.

How do physical limitations affect abstract ideas? — Gnomon

Good question. I've no idea what it means.

The physics books discussed things that change; the metaphysics books discussed things that don't change. — Gnomon

On this definition, if natural laws don't change, then they are not to be studied by physics. The definition must be incomplete.

There are different philosophical dialects, which enable different approaches to philosophy to articulate their ideas. I'm happy to spend some time and effort to decode what you say into something I can respond to, but I expect you to do the same for what I say.

Of course, if you deny the supposition of the puzzle, then it may be easy to dispense the puzzle. But one may wish not to take the easy way out but instead grapple with the puzzle under the suppositions it makes. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Sticking to the supposition of this puzzle creates confusion. The only possible solution is to look at it differently, not being hypnotized by 1/2, 1/4, ..... But I accept that it is your choice.

There are not two x/2, each one a separate object made by dividing x. — TonesInDeepFreeze

That's right. The difficulty is, I think, the assumption that "divide" means exactly the same thing in all contexts, taking the case of cutting something into pieces as the model. It obviously doesn't apply to numbers, or to space or time.

It is taking this hypothetical premise – that there is no smallest unit of space and time – that gives rise to such things as Zeno's Paradox, Bernadete's Paradox of the Gods, and Thomson's lamp. — Michael

No, it's confusing theory with practice, abstract with concrete and not understanding that infinity means endless (but not necessarily limited)

We use models about reality to get answers to certain questions. Many times, those models aren't declarations of our views on ontological questions. Yet often the models are interpreted as how we think what reality actually is. The difference between reality and a certain model of reality (that answers certain questions about it) is blurred. — ssu

I don't quite understand this. I could understand if you were talking about hypotheses. The journey from hypothesis (possibility) to theory (proven) is a long and tortuous one - blurred, if you like. But a model doesn't have a similar journey - unless there is a way in which a hypothesis can be a model or vice versa. Is that your point?

Above all, do we have to fall into the pit of metaphysical discussions that we have no way of solving (and hence no way to climb out from)? There's no ladder there to reason your way out from the pit. — ssu

That's how I feel about it. But people keep using the word.

It's false to draw conclusions from a materialist World view that then free will or making decisions doesn't happen / is meaningless. — ssu

Are you saying that any theory that is incompatible with freedom (free will) is false on that ground alone? That's a good start. But many people speak as if determinism was true and we have to bear the consequences, yet seem to believe that determinism is an empirical claim. Even when there's empirical evidence against it, they don't give up on it. I think it has to be classified along with hinge and grammatical propositions, perhaps as a research programme.

Metaphysical questions of what reality really is, don't give an answer to this and deterministic world models are quite useless models to use in this place. — ssu

There are ways of determining what is real and what is not. Those ways differ depending on the kind of thing you are talking about, but they exist. Asking what's Real, as if there could be a single-non-context-dependent answer, is the metaphysical way and goes nowhere.

Physical actions are indeed constrained by the limiting laws of physics. But meta-physical (mental) choices are not subject to physical laws --- perhaps only the laws of Logic. — Gnomon

One has to be careful about language here. What we can do is obviously constrained by our physical limitations. But what we can do is also enabled by our physical capabilities. The physical both constrains and enables what we do.
When I choose my sushi from what's on offer or a book from the shelf, is that a physical action, a mental action or a metaphysical action? (What's a metaphysical action?)
When you say that my mental choices are not subject to physical laws, you are using language that is at home and perfectly clear when we are talking about the law of the land. What it means when we are talking about physical laws is not at all clear. What would it be like to be not subject to physical laws? I don't think that any of the many non-conformist phenomema that have been identified, both in classical physics and in quantum physics, take us any nearer to understanding human action. Freedom of the gaps is no more helpful than God of the gaps was.

In a way, I would agree with you; human actions and choices are a distinct category from events taking place among inanimate objects, and perhaps that's what you mean when you say they are metaphysical. I think it is clearer to say that they and physical events are embedded in a distinct language games. The law of the land operates as part of the language-game of human actions; it doesn't operate at all in the language-game of physical events and their causes. If we speak of law it is a distinct kind of law, almost a metaphor, derived from the idea that God makes (and presumably enforces) the laws of nature. I don't think we need that idea any more; certainly, part of the point of the 17th century was to abandon that resource in natural science; making room for the new theories absolutely required that.

That's why I'm only advocating FreeWill in a Compatibilist sense. — Gnomon

I think we cannot get away with just saying that human freedom and laws of nature apply to different categories/language games. They obviously interact, and it is that interaction that we have to understand.

There is only an illusion of freedom. — Relativist

That's an interesting half-way house. But can deterministic theories explain how there can be an illusion of freedom?

I would say that painting a pipe two different colours is not a case of dividing the pipe. To use your terminology, you are distinguishing two halves without separating them. This does not qualify as "dividing". When I look at an object I can distinguish different parts of the object, and even draw lines on its surface, and all this is done without dividing the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK. So I guess measuring an object would count as "distinguishing different parts" of it even if the line that I draw does not correspond to any pre-existing difference or discontinuity in the object.

Why do you say that the two gutters are not distinct objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps I wasn't clear. I never intended to say that. I thought this was crystal clear:-

You have two gutters (or that is what I call them). — Ludwig V

However, dividing an object in two always produces two new objects (as well as the waste material). — Metaphysician Undercover

It depends what you mean by "divide" and by "object".

However, dividing an object in two always produces two new objects (as well as the waste material). — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not exactly wrong, but requires that you recognize that "division" and/or "object" may change their meaning in some contexts. That's why I said:-

... if I paint half the pipe blue and half red, the halves do not become objects in their own right, but remain halves of the same pipe, even though they are of different colours. — Ludwig V

I said that the two painted halves do not become objects in their own right, meaning separate, distinct objects. You may argue that this is not dividing the pipe, or that each half becomes a distinct object. I don't mind what you choose. This shouldn't be too difficult for you, since you said earlier:-

And, divisibility is dependent on the type of thing to be divided. Therefore, when it comes to division one standard does not fit all things, and the principles of division must be specifically designed for the different type of things to be divided. — Metaphysician Undercover

But the fact of waste in any act of division nullifies the validity of the supertask. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh, there's no doubt that no-one could actually cut the pipe into halves, and then divide one of the halves into halves ad infinitum. But painting the pipe shows that it depends what you mean by "divide" and/or "object". You could say that painting the pipe is a theoretical, not a practical division; that would be a bit at odds with ordinary language, but we are not speaking ordinary language here.

But maybe we could notice that we are not actually cutting the pipe, but imagining cutting the pipe. So perhaps we could imagine cutting the pipe without any waste?