What if this is all a simulation and everyone you think is conscious are really NPC's? Is that any more farfetched than the idea that the sun doesn't really move across the sky? That you're just on a planet going really fast through space and you don't know it? — RogueAI

Can't say it's impossible. But if you can't tell the difference, what difference does it make? If it's real, and you drop a bowling ball on your foot, you're looking at some pain. If it's a simulation, and you drop a simulated bowling ball on your simulated foot, you're looking at some pain. Either way, careful with that bowling ball. — Patterner

As it happens, I can say that it is impossible that everything is a simulation. A simulation needs to be a simulation of something. Take simulations of people. It is possible to make a figure that is so like a person that people think it is a person - until they talk to it. That's a simulation of a person. But the idea that all people might be simulations doesn't work if there are no such things as real people.
It is not just an empirical discovery that other human beings are people or that I am a person. The process by which I come to understand what that means is the process by which I learn what a person is. Human beings are the paradigm of what a person is and it is no more possible that they are not people than it is possible that the standard metre is not 100 cm or 0.0001 km. (Yes, I know that it is more complicated than that. The point stands.)

Is there reason to believe other people aren't really other people? Or that the consciousness they seem to have is not? Has someone noticed something nobody else has that reveals the seeming to be false, and learned what's realty going on? — Patterner

We learn what people are by interacting with them. Once we know what a person is, we are in a position to recognize that some things that are like people are not (really) people. There will be reasons for such decisions, and, as it turns out, there are often disagreements about specific cases. Animals are the obvious case in point. More than that, we can imagine that things that are not people at all are people (anthropomorphization).
But, it seem to me, the critical point is that it is not just a question of fact, true or false. It is question of how we interact - how we treat them and how they treat us. It is not easy to recognize that the volcano is not a person, but it turns on recognizing that the volcano is completely indifferent to us - does not treat us as people.

In the case of living things, we find a huge range of half-way houses - beings that are like us in some respects, but not in others. Trying to decide whether they are or are not people may be futile and beside the point. The point is to understand how we can relate to them. That's the situation with animals. Why would it be any different in the case of AI's?

And then, because we have to assess each case, trying to decide in advance whether it is possible for an AI (or silicon-based machine) to be a person seems hopeless.

There's more to be said, of course, especially about the Turing test, but perhaps that's enough to steer the discussion in a more fruitful direction.

But most people assume that other people do have human sentience. We presumably base that assumption on what the other people do and say. — Agree-to-Disagree

That's exactly why Turing's test is so persuasive - except that when we find machines that could pass it, we don't accept the conclusion, but start worrying about what's going on inside them. If our test is going to be that the putative human needs to have a human inside - mentally if not necessarily physically, the game's over.

Yes. I don't think we'll really get anything out of going through all that again. Nor do I think we'll get further than our partial agreement. I'm just trying to articulate my own take on it.

If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, the air still vibrates with the fall. We don't need someone to hear the vibration of the air for the air to vibrate. — Philosophim

That's a very good example. "A cloud of philosophy condensed in a drop of grammar", as Wittgenstein would say. In this case, condensed in the definitions of two words - "sound" and "vibration".
I'm sure you know that the decision to exclude sounds, colours, tastes, smells, etc from physics was taken in the 17th century (first by Boyle, I believe) on the grounds that they are not amenable to mathematical representation. At the time, it was probably a sensible decision. But it set up a philosophical conundrum that has lasted from that day to this with no solution in sight.
So, you see, the conceptual framework that we apply to reality makes a difference to what reality we grasp. (I don't say it makes a difference to what is real. By definition, it doesn't.)
You prioritize the framework of physics in your intellectual life, but in your everyday life you have no problem knowing where sounds are and often what makes them and no problem knowing what colour the table is (and when it seems to be a colour that it isn't "really"). Neither has priority. Both are useful.

One theory about the big bang is that prior to it, there existed the big crunch. — Philosophim

I didn't know about that. I'm not surprised. I have never believed that the Big Bang was the end of the story. It doesn't make any difference to our problem, does it? But it does confirm my view that the first cause is a moving target, not a fixed point.

No, a first cause is not an opinion. It is a truth. A first cause can have no prior cause for its existence. This is independent of whether we discover its existence or not. — Philosophim

Well, of course it is a truth. By definition. But you have also specified conditions for its discovery that seem to exclude the possibility of ever discovering it, except as a temporary phenomenon of whatever theory we devise.

I did want to note that the conclusion applies to reality, not our knowledge or understanding of reality. — Philosophim

That's a complicated statement. I'm not at all sure that I understand it.

"First cause" does not mean, "The start of where we decide to look at the causal chain." — Philosophim

Sometimes it means exactly that. When it doesn't, it means "the first cause so far as we can tell".

There is no human context. — Philosophim

How can there not be a human context when we are discussing it?

To know it is a first cause, we must prove that it is. — Philosophim

Well, there's a scientific argument about that, so now the burden of proof is on you to prove that it isn't and to explain what would count as a proof.

If I could get my head round your dialogue with @ucarr, I would have intervened before now. But I can't.

Lets say, if anything is possible, that there is a 40% chance of a universe forming from a big bang, and a 60% chance of a universe forming from a little whisper. — Philosophim

No real meaning has ever been attached to possibilities. If what you are thinking is meaningful, you mean "Let's say, if anything is probable, that there is a 40% chance of a universe forming from a big bang, and a 60% chance of a universe forming from a little whisper." But to assign probabilities, you need to include all possible outcomes, and the total of your assignments must add up to 1.0 and no more. You need to assign a probability to all the "anythings" that you refer to in "if anything is possible". Unless you have a reason to assign different probabilities to different outcomes, you must assign the same probability to all outcomes. (Knowing the outcome doesn't count)

I think that there are infinitely many possibilities (including the possibility of a Big Bang and a Small Whimper). You cannot assign any special probabilities to either the Big Bang or the Small Whimper. However small a number you assign to each probability, either it will be infinitely small or the total will be infinity. This makes your assignments meaningless.

One more try...

The metaphor of a causal chain is helpful in one respect - each link in the chain is both cause and effect. The 10th link is the cause of the 11th link, and the effect of the 9th link. In the real world, no chain is infinite, but the possibility of another link, both before the first one and after the last one can never be excluded.
The actual causal chains that we formulate are constructed either in a practical context or in the context of a theory. They are limited in the first case by pragmatic considerations and in the second by the theories we have. So when we construct actual causal chains, there will always be a first cause and a last cause, and these will present themselves as brute facts - we discussed those a while ago.
Change the context and different possibilities will open up. Remove all context and the system is meaningless. That's why I cannot discuss this in the abstract and had to insist on discussing the first cause we actually know about.

Atheism itself is about a single issue and doesn't have a worldview. — Tom Storm

I guess that's true, though it leaves room for people to adopt a range of views, non of which would be incompatible so long as it doesn't presuppose a "Nobodaddy in the sky".
Agnosticism is similar. It's important that Buddhism starts from a diagnosis of the cause of suffering, and everything revolves around that. If religion is defined as believing in a god(s), it is not a religion. If religion is defined as a way of life, it is.

For my money this is waffle. It only makes sense if you already presuppose an account of god as per Berkeley. — Tom Storm

I wasn't saying that it is anything but waffle, just that Berkeley reveals here that his argument is constructed in the service of a project. There are other passages where he makes is quite clear that his metaphysics is supposed to reveal God's glory and lead to an awareness of the omni-presence of God. Side-note:- It seems that elsewhere, he thinks that we will then go on to accept that we need to obey him and his representatives on earth (and that includes the king).

(Don't forget he lived 1685–1753, so he would have had the British Civil War and all that in mind. One assumes he would also have disapproved of the French and American Revolutions if he had known of them.)

Does romanticism generally hold that the world is soulless or meaningless? — Tom Storm

I generalize cautiously - on the whole the answer is no, but the critical idea is the opposition to the dominance of the new science and critique of the industrial revolution, which seems to be a result of it.

It's not as if theists don't find life meaningless. I have worked in the area of suicide intervention and on balance those who find life meaningless and become suicidal are just as likely (if not more so) to believe in a god. — Tom Storm

I'm not surprised. The standard sales pitch makes big assumptions about what believing in God means. There are also people whose belief in God means guilt, self-loathing and sadism.

I do accept that "is" does not imply "ought". But there is no doubt that "is" does lead people to conclude "ought". Analytic philosophers, whose tradition derives from Hume, have great trouble recognizing that. Hence discussion of it is not academically respectable. Cavell points us in a different direction.

I'm afraid I can't resist some explanation why I can't contribute to this discussion. Paradoxical, I know, but then what's another paradox or two in this environment? You can always ignore me, and I don't complain at that, because my position doesn't take your dialogue forward. So I won't need to disrupt you again.

Your underlined fragment suggests randomness in the role of the trigger of the singularity's rapid expansion. If that's not assignment of causal agency to randomness, its a talking point that flirts with such — ucarr

I agree with this. The reason why this is so is simple. "Randomness" is being used unself-consciously, without an articulate understanding of how "random" (as opposed to "randomness" which is a misleading application of the grammatical rule that allows us to generate a noun corresponding to an adjective) is used in those applications where it is perfectly comprehensible and meaningful. If you want to extend the meaning of "random" beyond the Big Bang, it has to be done carefully and explicitly.

I don't think that "random" can be meaningfully extended beyond the Big Bang. Our normal use of "random" applies to events (which can also stand in causal relationships to each other. Ex hypothesi, those don't exist behind/before the Big Bang, so I can't grasp any meaning for it.

However, your mentions of nothingness, randomness and now potential vaguely suggest they're subject to the gravitational pull of causal status due to our reasoning minds needing talking points to grasp nothing-then-something inception. — ucarr

Exactly. But the need to do that is inherent in the positing of the Big Bang (and another extension beyond the Last Cause is equally inevitable). That's the power of the argument for infinite causal chains. But trying to apply concepts that were developed to apply to what exists after the Big Bang to what (if anything) exists before/behind the Big Bang is extremely problematic and liable to lead nowhere. Whether the mathematicians are doing any better, I can't possibly judge. But I would have thought that their approach stands a better chance than anything that can be made from ordinary language.

:smile:

Exactly, well said Ludwig! — Philosophim

It's nice to agree on something, isn't it? I wasn't sure whether you would welcome the agreement or criticize the way I undermined it.

1) the order inherent in thinking is foundational to the human identity; 2) the essence of thinking is its natural orderliness — ucarr

I'm not sure I have any clear grasp of what either statement means. Is 1) a version of the idea that the essence of humanity is rationality? If so, it depends what you mean by "rationality" and "essence", but is far from obviously true.

Following this line, I want to say the world appears to us orderly because it's rendered to our awareness through our thinking. — ucarr

I'm not sure the world does appear to us as orderly, though it is true that there is some order in it. But a lot depends on what you think of as order.

I mean, I can put my books on their shelf in order of size, price, weight, date of publication, name of publisher or printer, first letter of title, first letter of author, Dewey decimal classification etc. What's more, if you put them on the shelf at random, I can then find the order in which they are put. In short, I defy you to think of a way of putting them on the shelf that isn't in some order or another. Disorder among the books can only be defined in relation to some principle of ordering them. (I have not forgotten that "book" is more complicated than it might seem. Is the Bible one book or two or many? Is a volume of Gibbons' Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire a book or part of a book. Is a pamphlet a book?)

Is it (sc. "Origin boundary ontology is a gnarly puzzle") sufficiently suggestive to give you a clear impression of what it's trying to communicate? — ucarr

Not really.

Are you inclined to believe origin stories must discard causation at the start point? — ucarr

It depends what kind of origin you have in mind - I mean what the origin in question is the origin of. In terms of this discussion, it does seem that the origin of a causal chain cannot be a cause, though if you change your definition of cause (or of what counts as an explanation) at that point, it may be possible to provide some sort of account.

Maybe a practical application of the language of silence consists of the axiomatic supposition supporting analysis: things exist. — ucarr

Maybe. Though I have seen people trying to discuss that statement.

Is today's establishment science wrong in its pragmatic decision to keep within its analytical physicalism, with the axiomatic established as the boundary? — ucarr

No. It wouldn't be what it is if it didn't. I might have something to say about a scientist who kept strictly within the boundaries of physicalism, even within working hours and we might decide to set different boundaries if circumstances changed.

How so? — Tom Storm

Good question. It is awkward and that's why I like it.

Wittgenstein leaves us with these ideas, but little indication of how he would take them further. I am sure some people have tried to develop them, but there don't seem to be any inspiring ideas. It's a difficult area to deal with. It doesn't fit comfortably with what we think of as philosophy, which has abandoned the core question of Greek philosophy - how to live - because it appears unscientific and therefore not respectable.

For Berkeley, the point of his argument is not that it is true, but that it is the basis of what I will vaguely call an attitude. Paragraph 109 in the Treatise says:-

For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is the consideration of God and our duty; which to promote, as it was the main drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the Presence of God; and, having shown the falseness or vanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practice is the highest perfection of human nature.

That's an attitude and, according to Berkeley, it is the basis of a Christian life. It follows that he thinks that the scepticism, atheism that he is arguing against do not support that attitude. One wonders, though, what attitudes he thinks those doctrines lead to.

Religions codify and organize life, so it is easy to see what the implications are of accepting his arguments. Atheism and Agnosticism do not have a codified way of life that goes with them and it is not clear what kind of attitude or way of life might go with them.

Starting-points might be the Greek Sceptics - Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus. It seems that they were working in the same arena as Stoicism and Epicureanism and, like them, were pursuing scepticism as a way of reaching ataraxia - tranquillity. See Stanford Encyclopedia on Sextus Empiricus 3.3

In a different vein, Existentialism (and Romanticism) seem to me to be a response to the idea that the universe is a soulless, meaningless machine.

On the contrary, I'm suggesting true randomness cannot be contemplated because it deranges the foundational order of thinking.
— @ucarr
It simply causes us to consider something we have not considered before. This does not disrupt thinking or logic. Its merely a continuation and updating of what we can consider. — Philosophim

I'm not sure what the foundational order of thinking is or even whether there is one. But it is true that we are so reluctant to accept "no cause" that we try to corral it by speaking of probability, which at least establishes a sort of order in the phenomena.

The fact that we can consider something does not prove that it exists or even that it could exist, so that does not get us far. We can even accept that Pegasus might exist, but we all know very well that it doesn't, any more than dragons do. In the case of first causes, the evidential bar is so high, that it is more plausible by far to believe that it will never be met, except in the context of a specific theory, which is far from conclusive.

Suppose I succeed in stopping my internal dialogue, have I earned a nod from Walter White? — ucarr

I'm afraid you have me there. I don't know whether you mean the actor or the civil rights activist. But I don't think Wittgenstein meant that. He didn't say there was any problem about asserting well-formed propositions, did he? Certainly, he didn't succeed in stopping his own internal dialogue - I'm not even sure that he tried. Maybe a Zen monk?

Does this explain some of the cognitive dissonance required for specific religious claims counter to empirical evidence for you? — AmadeusD

I hadn't thought that far ahead. But yes, why not? It might require accepting, what Wittgenstein never said, but I suppose might have thought, that the rules of a specific language-game might be inconsistent, In fact, empirically, we find that existing language-games frequently throw up inconsistencies where we "don't know our way about"; we just settle them as we go, so that's all right. There's a further complication that what seems an inconsistency to an atheist, might not seem inconsistent to a theist - the problem of evil might be an example. Internally, at least in Christianity, there are certainly doctrines that seem inconsistent to some, but not to others - the Trinity, perhaps.

The big issue would be whether and how that way of life relates to other ways of life. I read Wittgenstein as thinking that there can be different ways of life, but not thinking about what differences between them mean - conflict or incommensurability. In practice, I would say, religions mostly think that their way of life should be universal and having great difficulty in inter-acting with them.

Are atheism and agnosticism ways of life? In a way, yes. Perhaps not entirely comfortable.

This may just be a language issue. There is no prior or external cause. Typically saying, "self-cause" implies that there is first a self, then a cause. That's not what I'm intending. There is no conscious or outside intent. It just is. That is the answer. Nothing more. — Philosophim

Too right. From my point of view, this discussion suffers because it sets out to discuss metaphysics, which seems to be interpreted as discussing the issues unself-consciously, that it, without paying attention to the tools that are being used - the language. I am not dogmatic about linguistic philosophy, but that doesn't mean that attention to the language-game is not relevant.

That's the start of causality and the end of our questions up the causal chain. — Philosophim

I'm afraid that the rules of the game can give you the start, but not the end of the questions. There is always scope for that.

Why is true randomness -- completely unpredictable and unlimited, but active -- not the cause of what you call first cause? But it is: something, then nothing. — ucarr

You mean that randomness that is not an unknown explanation is the only "true" randomness. What makes it true, as opposed to an illusion?

Randomness won't countenance links in a causal chain, so talk of links in causal chains is distraction which cannot distract from Wittegenstein's silence. — ucarr

Wittgenstein's silence in the Tractatus is defined against a very limited concept of what can be said - that is, of what "saying" is. Fortunately, there are more expansive views available. How far he took advantage of them in the later philosophy to say something that that cannot be said is an interesting question. One does notice, however, that his use of language is no longer limited by that early account of language.

I dealt with the existential realm, but there was no interest in that either. So where does that leave us? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure it is a question of interest or not, rather than a question of understanding or not.

We seem to have a range of philosophical approaches in play and a certain frustration because none of them seems to generate a constructive discussion. And so the nature of philosophy is called into question. What, exactly is at issue? What counts as a solution?

I don't know the answers. Perhaps we need to start from there, rather than a fixed position - which we all seem to have.

I'm not sure it makes any difference, but I think you have left out two options. I think the options are:-
1. A beginning, but no end (your ray).
2. An end, but no beginning.
3. No beginning and no end (your line).
etc.

Yes, I thought it an interesting - even ingenious - manoeuvre. But it ends up as a rather fruitless disagreement, which is fundamentally merely tactical.

What follows is not hard core philosophy, merely reflections.

Supposing this issue is raised by a presuppositionalist who wishes to simply assume the existence of God, without argument. All the atheist needs to do is to assert that they do not wish to make the same assumption. End of debate.

But that's not, apparently what presuppositionalists really want to do. Van Til, at least, wants to mount a transcendental argument for God and claim that order and reason in the world cannot be explained without appeal to God. No atheist would accept that idea, so, again, end of argument.

I'm not sure that the existence of at least some order and reason is a contingent fact. It seems to me more like a project, a way of looking at the world which we need to stick to because without it, we could not live. The concept of an entirely chaotic world is, by definition, incomprehensible to me.

One thing that I and the presuppositionalist might agree on is that the existence of God is not susceptible of rational proof (and hence not susceptible of rational disproof, either). I don't say that Christianity is irrational, only that rationality comes in after the starting-point (hinge proposition? axiom?) is established. I prefer, however, to say that the doctrine is secondary to an attitude and a way of life and derives from that, rather than the other way about.

Existence is a set of all things that exist. — Philosophim

Ah, well, that's different.

I even understand you when you say:-

The logical conclusion from there being a first cause is that there can be no prior cause for its existence, therefore there is no reason for its existence, therefore there is no reason for its existence, — Philosophim

But I don't understand you at all when you say

besides the fact that it exists. — Philosophim

. Why don't you just say "therefore there is no reason (or cause) for its existence"? I'm not saying there can't be a reason for its existence, just that there may not be one.

No. What you and many other people are accidently doing is confusing an origin with a first cause. An origin is a start for measurement. On a X/Y graph, the common origin is 0,0. However, we can also make the origin 50,50. Does that mean 0,0, suddenly does not exist? No. So imagine a line that represents a finite chain that starts at 1,2. We could do an origin at 0,0, but it would be pointless because there's nothing there. We could follow the line and make the origin at 10,15. — Philosophim

I had thought that it must be possible to "extend" our time-line beyond the Big Bang 14 billion years ago. If we treat "now" as the origin of the line. That's no different from treating the year Christ was born as the origin and extending it back from there.
The catch is that if time is not happening, there is no way of knowing how far back one is, or how long one has been there, as it were. The Big Bang is the origin of change and without change, there is no way of measuring time. It's not as if we can put a clock in our pocket before we go.

If you mean that when a first cause appears, it is bound by what it is and then is bound by the natural consequences of its specific interactions with other existences, yes. — Philosophim

I'm not at all sure that this really makes sense. If there are other existences, then the question arises what caused them? If that question has an answer, then the first cause wasn't the first.
I guess you might be thinking of some distinction like the differences that some people identify by talking about causes and conditions. The cause of the explosion is the spark, the molecular structure of the explosive is (part of) the conditions. But that doesn't apply to a first cause like the Big Bang, which is the cause and origin of all the physical things in our universe. Or perhaps it does?

So by the rules of the conservation law, that energy must still be within the system somehow, only not available to the system. — Metaphysician Undercover

A pretty puzzle indeed. So the conclusion must be that something continues to exist after the heat death, even though time and space no longer exist. I did notice that heat death did not say that the temperature must be zero, only that temperature differences would be ironed out.
No doubt that unavailable energy is hanging around waiting to be released in another Big Bang. That would not be an unsatisfying solution.
Naive question. Am I not right that, strictly speaking energy is work done - the capacity to do work is called "potential energy", isn't it? I can see why unavailable energy can't be called potential energy, but it sounds as if we need a concept like the potential for potential energy. Awkward.
On the other hand, there is so much mystery about in the form of anti-matter and dark energy, that perhaps we should just wait for someone to find all that unavailable energy and release it - hopefully not all at once.

It's simply a matter of recognizing that concepts naturally conform to the things which they are applied to, and if we want to understand what is outside of those things, like cause of and prior to them, we need to provide the concepts which can do this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quite so. It's perhaps worth noting that the same applies to what happens after the heat death of the universe.

So it is possible, like anything else, that there was only one first cause and that's all of existence. It has the same meaning as any other kind of first or set of first causes we could have. — Philosophim

My difficulty here is that you seem to be treating "existence" as if it were a property of the things that exist. I'm sure you are aware that this has been contested ever since Kant and Hume, and with Russell and Frege's treatment of it in the predicate calculus this has been a staple of analytic philosophy ever since. If that's right, pointing to existence as a cause of anything is incomprehensible. I wouldn't rule out the possibility of it qualifying as an non-causal explanation of something, but it can hardly explain why something exists (circularity). If you disagree, then there is scope of a discussion of the point, but you can't expect others to accept what you say on the face of it. In short, I agree with both the quotations below:-

In sum, all of this draws a circle back to saying temporal primacy of existence is meaningless. — ucarr

As said above, "it simply exists" does not qualify as an explanation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think Hume hit the nail on the head. Causation is a word that exists to account for a human intuition. — Lionino

I hope I'm not being too pedantic, but I think that's not quite what Hume says. He accepts the sceptical argument against the scholastic notion of a "power" that a cause exerts to produce its effect, but then says that we will continue to think and speak of causation based on a custom or habit arising from the association of our idea of the cause with our idea of the effect (not an intuition).

The conclusion "there is not a prior reason" is unsupported. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the case of the Big Bang, time and space are created by it and do not exist before it. So nothing can be prior to it, whether cause or reason. But, it seems to me that a cause cannot exist outside time, whereas a reason can. So there is reason to think that there might be a reason for the Big Bang. But I don't see that there could be a cause for it. (I have no idea what the reason might be, but there seem to be some interesting speculations around.)

Perhaps a physically reductionist causation is something worthy looking into.....but at least it allows us to clear up our language. — Lionino

Anything that cleans up our language is worth looking in to.

I think he missed the "prior" part as well. — Philosophim

Not quite right. For me, a cause must be prior to its effect (except when it is part of a causal analysis) and a distinct entity. So I interpreted "prior cause" as a pleonasm. But I see that I misunderstood.

Mostly because I've been ingrained to use different words instead of the same one repeatedly in a sentence. :) In this case there was overlap, as if there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. But not all reasons are causes just like not all cats are tigers. — Philosophim

Yes, you are not alone. I've seen some very well-known philosophers indulge themselves in that way. I don't think it is particularly helpful and it can be rather misleading. The terms here are very unclear and common usage is no help. In my usage. which I think is also common philosophical usage, a reason is not a cause, because it does not need to be an event or even a spatio-temporal entity.

And, as I explained to Philosophim already, if we move to allow that "cause" of an event includes also the "reason" for the event, as a type of cause, then we must remove the defining feature of a chain, series, or sequence, because this type of cause does not occur in a chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quite so.

The reason why there can be no prior reason for a first cause, is that there is no prior causal event. There can be a reason as an explanation for why a first cause exists, "That is it simply exists." But there cannot be a prior reason, as there is nothing prior which causes it. Does this clear up the issue? — Philosophim

As I tried to say earlier, the reason you suggest for the first cause/reason is, to me, not a cause/reason at all, but a rejection of the request to provide one. "Because it exists" marks the limits of our explanations - a brute fact or a first cause.

And this, so far, is the only weakness I've seen in the argument. It is only a logical argument. A logical argument does not mean empirical truth. — Philosophim

I always thought that the existence of something was always an empirical, not a logical question, so I'm treating your first cause as a possibility, not a certainty.
There was a time when it was thought that there must be a foundation for the earth and that seemed logically necessary. But it turned out, empirically, that it was not the case. That required new thinking, and the new thinking was forced on us by various empirical truths. Check out Five ways to prove the earth is a globe. That's why I regard a first cause as an opportunity for new thinking.

Why? Why not deal with the one he (@philosophim) presented, and either help him work out the defects, or understand what he's trying to say... — AmadeusD

Because considering a variety of cases in terms of similarities to and differences from the central case helps one to understand it.

But to your main point. You have a sequence, A is caused by B, B is caused by C, C is caused by D, and so on, and you suppose it to be valid to ask what causes the entire sequence. — Banno

We focus on the "A caused B" kind of cause. If the spark caused the explosion, we can ask what caused the spark and what effects the explosion caused (and sometimes it can cause another explosion, as in an atomic bomb). That's our paradigm of causation.
But we can also ask why the spark caused an explosion (or why sparks cause explosions) and we'll get an answer in terms of the reactions between molecules at certain temperatures. This doesn't fit the "A caused B" model, if only because it doesn't provide a "prior" cause, so it is probably clearer to call this an analysis. This kind of question is also recursive. When we reach the limits of our understanding, we are left with brute facts. The possibility of developing another layer can't be ruled out (and we have), but I think the argument applies.

For any person, it is legitimate to ask from whom they were born. It is not legitimate to ask that of the sequence of births - it is not a person and so does not have a mother. — Banno

That's true, so far as it goes. But we can ask, and answer, the question why people are born and then those people bear children. But not in the same terms. We need an analysis of the sequence, not an addition to it. That's what happens in the case of the explosion.

But the analysis is still in terms of cause/effect relationships, which are the presupposed framework of the sequence. It isn't at all clear to me what kind of answer can be provided to the question why causal relationships (regularities?) exist. It seems to me a brute fact - possibly necessary in some sense. I am clear that "It simply is" is not a cause and not even an explanation. On the contrary, it is a rejection of the question.

There was a moment when one of my children realized the power of the question "Why", which, as good liberal parents, we always tried to answer. But every answer can generate another "why?". When one runs out of explanations - or time - one has to say, "because it is." This is not answer. It is a refusal to answer or a confession of inability to answer.

I don't think I'm asserting anything as a first cause that would later be found to have a prior cause. — Philosophim

"Later" is a long time. How long would you wait?
For me, it will always seem more likely, and always possible, that any putative first cause will turn out to have a prior cause (or, in my language, that we will develop a prior cause) than the alternative.

The fundamental argument, if I'm not wrong, is this:-

If we don't know whether our universe has finite or infinite chains of causality A -> B -> C etc...
Lets say there's a finite chain of causality. What caused a finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.
Lets say there's an infinite chain of causality. What caused an infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is. — Philosophim

I notice that here, as elsewhere, you use the word "reason" at this point, instead of cause. "Reason" and "cause" are not synonyms, are they? At least, not in philosophy. So what is the significance of this change in language?

Non-religious theism as about god without dogma. — Lionino

That could work if a religion primarily of practice works. Depending on the details of the practice, that could be an intellectually respectable way to go. Perhaps that's why Bhuddhism is so popular these days.

I generally find presuppositionalists more sad than funny, because presuppositionalism is pure epistemic poison, that badly cripples the thinking of many who fall into it. — "wonderer1

I think it depends a bit on the attitude of the presuppositionalist. It seems to me the poison is in the attitude (as in the video earlier). Worse still, that dogmatic inability to engage with someone who verntures to disagree seems likely to me to betray a certain level of uncertainty.

How else could we guarantee the truth of these laws in an inherently meaningless and godless universe? — Tom Storm

I would suggest that gives far too much to the other side. If logic needs a guarantee, that means it could be wrong. But how could it be wrong?
For myself, I would go for observing that God's guarantee doesn't seem to be worth much, given how much chaos and disorder there is in the universe, and wondering why It didn't bother to include sub-atomic particles in its promise.

I used the term 'arbitrary' to indicate that I think mystical and psychedelic experiences can be rationalized in terms of any religious/ metaphysical framework. — Janus

Fair enough.

My experience is that bad trips may either be indicative of underlying psychoses or be just due to existential anxieties. So, I have known many people who have taken many trips, but no one whose subsequent ongoing psychosis or extreme neurosis could be definitively attributed to the use of psychedelics. That said, I don't doubt that the use of psychedelics can in rare cases trigger incipient psychoses. — Janus

That may be true. I only wanted to say that what happens after you swallow the pill is not determined. It depends on you (not in the sense that you are responsible for it or in control of it!) and your circumstances. From what I've read and heard, having an experienced guide with you makes a big difference, at least at the beginning. It goes back to the beginnings in the '50's. The "aristocrats" emphasized the need for a guide, the "democrats" insisted it was for everyone. The aristocrats were probably guilty of snobbery and elitism, but they were right about the guide - as the psychiatrists seem to be demonstrating nowadays.

The conclusion of the evolutionary argument against naturalism is that if our cognitive faculties are a product of naturalistic evolution, there is no inherent guarantee that our beliefs are true. Natural selection may have shaped our cognitive abilities in a way that prioritizes survival and reproduction over the accurate perception of reality. (note Donald Hoffman makes the same argument to support his version of idealism) — Tom Storm

This is an interesting argument. Another attempt to co-opt and transform a familiar sceptical/atheist position. But if natural selection is to prioritize survival, it needs to promote accurate perception of reality. Call me cynical, but the same does not necessarily apply to reproduction, which, arguably, often works quite well on the basis of misperceptions and misunderstandings.

If our cognitive faculties are not reliable in providing true beliefs, then the naturalist's confidence in the truth of naturalism itself becomes suspect, as it relies on those very cognitive faculties. In other words, we need a transcendental source for truth. — Tom Storm

The real flaw here is the presupposition that either our cognitive faculties (all of them) are accurate or they (all of them) are not. The awkward truth is that sometimes they are and some of them are not. We learn which is which through the feed-back loop (doing and being in the world) - and we never need to stop learning.

I can see how they might get to a god, but getting to Jesus is much harder. — Tom Storm

Quite so. But Tertullian already co-opted that problem. "I believe because it is unbelievable."

I've met a few people who were converted by this approach, so I suspect it works on some and for a while it was a refreshing change from Aquinas' five ways arguments and the like. ........ But this presents a problem for him [the pressup], if he doesn’t grant intelligibility he can’t reason transcendentally but if he grants intelligibility he grants autonomous reasoning — Tom Storm

Well, all sorts of tactics work - even the traditional approach of standing up and informing the audience that they are all sinners! Actually, this latches on to any private guilt that we might harbour (which I'm sure happens in any social system) and exploits it. Genius!
I'm prepared to believe that even Tertullian's approach might work sometimes.
Which goes to show that conversion is not just a matter of reason. Rationality may creep in after the event, but it doesn't set it off.

'God is the necessary condition of intelligibility and guarantees reason on earth, but he allows humans to use reason for good or ill, via freewill.' — Tom Storm

That's very odd. Reason is supposed to guarantee the truth of its conclusions. The truth might be used for good or ill, but that's not the fault of reason, is it?

There are also Muslim apologists who use presuppositional apologetics to 'prove' Islam. — Tom Storm

It might work better for Islam and Judaism. Though there would still be an awkward gap about proving that the Book in each case was the Word of God.

Relevant and funny clip: — Lionino

Quite so. If I were still teaching, I would use this to show how philosophy should not be conducted and how to ensure that a dialogue is unproductive. One must put one's own view at risk, or nothing will be gained.

Mainly because, as you say, they're ingenious. Quite a stunt to take reason (the skeptic's prized tool against 'superstition') and use the very possibility of rationality as proof for god. But they can also be monotonous and repetitive. — Tom Storm

The puzzle that strikes me is why he thinks his approach might change the mind of an atheist. Agnostics may be more open to it, though this one certainly isn't. It seems more relevant to Christians talking amongst themselves.

It's all very well to talk of rationality, but what, on this account is it? Is it the rationality of Hume, which "is and ought to be, the slave of the passions", or of Aristotle, who revolutionizes Plato's idea of it by observing that "reason, by itself, moves nothing". Why would a rational God present us with the Bible - especially the Old Testament - as its book? I could go on, but it might become monotonous and repetitive.

Yes. I agree, having experimented extensively with entheogens myself, and I think the 'spiritual' aspect is a 'feeling' phenomenon which does not support any claim about the metaphysical nature of reality. Religious and metaphysical conclusions are arbitrary, culturally driven, after the fact add-ons. — Janus

In a sense, yes. Though I'm not sure that "arbitrary" is the right world. I have an impression that the experiences seem to fit in to whatever religious/metaphysical framework the experiencer already has. Which is not to say that they may not change how the ideas are expressed and the aspects that are emphasized.

This is not to say that the experience itself is not rich and cannot be inspiring, even life-changing; it is necessarily vacuous only in the propositional. not the poetical. sense. — Janus

That's certainly true. Though aren't some experiences - "bad trips" - paranoid fantasies, which may be life-changing, but not in a good way. That's why I say they have to be assessed, in the end, by their results in the ordinary world.

Knowledge is not truth to me. It is a tool we use to best assess what is most likely to be true with the observations and reason we have at the time. — Philosophim

We certainly have tools to assess hypotheses and we certainly use "know" when we have discovered it. Knowledge isn't truth; it is applied when someone has discovered the truth. When we have only discovered what is most likely to be true, we use "believe". You can decide to use "know" differently, but if you do, the distinction between knowledge and belief is blurred and pointless. True, people can get things wrong. But that's not a problem. We just withdraw the claim to know.

I'm using general causality because I want to end a debate that's been going on far too long. — Philosophim

I don't think you are going to succeed. There are questions beyond the Big Bang. Whether you call them causal or not, they will, no doubt, be answered. And further questions will develop. And people will call all of these things causes. You can insist they are not, but that won't affect the process.

This time there is no re-invention needed. We have a clear definition of what it is, and what it would take to prove it exists. The Big Bang for example would be changed to, "The known starting point of universal creation" instead of "The first cause of creation". — Philosophim

Careful, now. If you say the Big Bang is the known starting-point of universal creation, you are saying, not only that it is the starting-point of universal creation, but that we know that it is. What you mean is that the Big Bang is the starting-point of universal creation so far as we know or, perhaps better, on the bases of the existing best theories.

There is an issue with your theory. You sweep everything up into one classification, and brush aside the variety and difference in the concepts of causation under one term. This is not wrong, exactly, because we do apply that term to all the different ideas. But it is no more significant that the conclusion that something exists, which neglects the differences between rainbows and trees, numbers and lines, arguments and theories, myths and fables, and all the rest of the many different kinds of object - and hence different kinds of existence (and of logic) that also exist. We have Aristotelian causes, Newtonian causes, Einsteinian causes, Quantum causes, not mention reasons for action, premises and conclusions in mathematical arguments. All of these are answers to the question "why" and begin with "because", but they operate in different ways and different fields.

So I don't say you are wrong. But I do say that you are brushing aside most of the interesting questions - and if you were to explain to me why you are doing that, you would misunderstand me if you explained the cause of your doing so.

Tackling the various proofs/arguments are just for sport. — Tom Storm

I was surprised to discover when I first ventured into this on-line world, that many people seem to be dead serious about the arguments. Which is not to deny that others just love the argument - for sport, as you say.

My favourite apologists are the currently burgeoning presuppositionalists, who bypass empiricism completely (via the transcendental argument and Cornelius Van Til). — Tom Storm

Yes. I have encountered those ideas. I haven't got my head around this, and my reluctance to engage with it is a big part of the reason why. The strategy is undoubtedly ingenious, but doesn't offer the sceptics and unbelievers much incentive to engage. Why do you like them?

In light of recent fashion, I think, 'they/them.' — Tom Storm

Yes. I use that sometimes, but I'm not comfortable with it. It's such a lash-up. But maybe it would not be inappropriate for a Trinitarian God.

I think the religious term for this is ineffable. — Tom Storm

Ineffability is a popular topic in this argument. I wish I could wave my hand and abolish it, But that would be to rely on a rather primitive version of logical positivism, so the grounds for that are not solid. On the other hand, the mystics can only persuade us to accept that their experiences are true, so philosophy will not be impressed. But the fact that some people have such experiences seems undeniable. Dismissing them all as frauds or unbalanced is as implausible as claiming that all such experiences are genuine. In the end, it will come back to common sense and everyday life to sort the sheep from the goats - and the criterion is not truth/falsity.

sacrifice himself to himself to save us from himself because of a rule he made himself? — Tom Storm

,
There is some room for some justifications for sacrifice. But it is too often talked about as if it were just a case of passing the parcel of guilt from the sinner to someone or something else or paying a fine. No, thanks.
You put me in mind of an important point that I did not include. For a very long time, there was, in philosophy, a long series of attempts to prove that God's existence was necessary and that a priori argument could be developed. But lately, it seems that both theists and atheists have agreed that it is an empirical question.

Both sides think that empirical evidence justified their view, so we can conclude that both sides are wrong. But we should remember Laplace's famous reply I had no need of that hypothesis. ("Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là" - (allegedly as a reply to Napoleon, who had asked why he hadn't mentioned God in his book on astronomy.) See WIkipedia entry on him. For him, it was clearly not an empirical question, but not a necessary question either. For me, it is a question of an attitude, which guides the interpretation of evidence. What does that mean? For a hint, consider Berkeley's argument in his A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. See, for example, section 109.

I suspect that discussion of God's existence will turn out to be no less infinite that he is supposed to be. (I can never decide whether God should be a he, a she, a s/he or an it.)

If you don't want to do the metaphysics, we can avoid it, but if you don't want to do the metaphysics then what's the point in discussing "first causes"? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what doing metaphysics is. It seems to be simply discussing issues in first-order mode - using terms rather than mentioning them. One could frame this debate as an issue about the concept or logic of causation.

An example could be something like my desire for a beer caused me to go to the fridge to look for one. "Cause" in this sense would be completely different from "cause" in the sense of the heat from the stove caused the water to boil. Notice how "desire" is not a physical activity which can be quantified and shown to be actively causing effects through a physical process. — Metaphysician Undercover

On the other hand, it would not be difficult to link your desire to a physical basis - dehydration, perhaps, or level of alcohol in the bloodstream. But they are neither necessary not sufficient for desiring a beer, so they cannot be straightforward causes. Social context etc. might also be factors and those are rules or habits and so, again, not causal.

but knowledge is not infallible, and depending on the unknowns which are hidden underneath that "something known", the knowledge which constitutes the "something known" may even turn out later to be wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I prefer to say that people are not infallible, so I would put the point differently. Notice, however, that providing a causal explanation for a rainbow does not conflict with the ordinary descriptions of it, though it may conflict with common sense explanations of it (such as that God put it there as a promise that he would not repeat the Flood.

There are no constraints prior to it coming into being, there are constraints after it comes into being. But what those constraints are cannot be predicted. Meaning it could be a photon, an explosion, or anything else you can imagine. — Philosophim

Well, if a first cause is the first cause of its universe, it may be unconstrained. But if your first cause photon can happen (in an already existing universe), then any constraints may only constrain it after it comes into being, but will apply the moment it does come in to being. But the consequences will, presumably, be unpredictable. Indeed, they must be.

Would you agree that we can have two distinct types, or categories of "cause", in the way I describe above, such that the "first cause" in a chain of one particular category of causes, has a prior cause of a different type? — Metaphysician Undercover

It is a tempting hypothesis and could be particularly useful when we want to link incommensurable theories. But I wouldn't be sure unless I had some examples.

There is the contingent type of actuality which always has the prior potential, and there is the logically necessary type of actuality, demonstrated by the logic to be prior to the contingent actuality, as necessary for the existence of a contingent actuality — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure I can cope with different types of actuality. Can't we just talk about the actuality of contingent things and the actuality of necessary things?

I do not see the problem here. I think that common sense explanations do, very often, rely on unknown events. This is because we explain things without knowing in completion the thing we are explaining. So the unknown is always lurking within the explanation somewhere. — Metaphysician Undercover

One can always dive deeper into an explanation (i.e. ask why a particular causal link holds). There's nothing special there. But there must be something known about A and B as a basis of the explanation. No doubt we all had a moment of illumination when we were presented with the causal explanation of a rainbow. We don't abandon what we knew beforehand and we knew fine what a rainbow is before that. Indeed, we couldn't understand the explanation unless we did know. We add the causal explanation in to our understanding of what a rainbow is. Similarly with wants and needs, beliefs and assumptions and their physical counterparts.

Would you accept, that the rationale, the values etc., which motivate an action, are "causal"? But this would mean that we obviously need to distinguish two distinct types of causation, one being the sense of a causal chain of physical events, the other being the motivators for actions of living beings. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Cause" is defined by the theory/hypotheses that it is part of, or theories and hypotheses have different ideas of what a cause is. I recognize those as different types of causation. Common sense explanations of actions are incredibly complicated. I would not rule out the possibility that some of the factors we appeal to might be considered causal. Examples would be needed. But I'm pretty clear that such explanations are often, even primarily, interpretations of actions. Analysis of all this is further complicated by the familiar fact that actions are mostly describable in different ways and can form into hierarchical structures, and explanations may address just one level of the hierarchy.

I meant that there are no existing proven discoveries of anything that is a first cause. No one to my mind, has ever conclusively proven that any "x" exists without something prior causing it to be. A belief or limitation in current capabilities is not evidence of a first cause. We must have the tools and evidence to conclusively demonstrate something is a first cause. — Philosophim

Yes, I agree. But that means whenever we think we have found a first cause, we must ask ourselves whether that is due to the limitations of our tools and evidence or to it really being a first cause. I would always bet on the former. Under what circumstances could I confidently bet on the latter? Given the ingenuity and determination human beings have displayed over the last 400 or 500 years, I can't imagine any.

My point was that every time something like a first cause or brute fact has been found, we have redefined (or perhaps better "re-invented") the concept of "cause" and carried on.

I take it that you are not prepared to make any judgements about the relationship between the two "modes of explanation". — Metaphysician Undercover

"Prepared" is the right word. I regard it as an unsolved problem; perhaps I'll have something to offer one day. If not me, it will be someone else.

I don't agree with your claim that in the past it was popular to just say that the two were different, and leave it at that. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm sorry, It was not helpful to use the word "popular" in different senses in successive sentences. This observation refers to Ryle and his followers. They thought that identifying categories was the end of the story, but that isn't satisfactory on its own - at least, not in this case. Ryle seems to recognize this in the context of his discussion of perception in "Dilemmas"

I think the popular way was just to take it for granted that intention, purpose, free will, acts to produce a first cause. It was popular just to accept the way things appear to us, — Metaphysician Undercover

It was certainly popular amongst some philosophers. Whether that way is the way things appear to us or is an analysis from a specific philosophical point of view (dualism) is another question.

Common sense explanations cannot possibly depend on unknown and unseen events in the brain (or mind); if that were so, common people like us could never explain what people do. In their simplest form, explanations of action give the agent's rationale for action (together with indications how sound that rationale is).

That cannot be the same as a causal explanation, because a rationale justifies the action, whereas a causal explanation does not justify or fail to justify what it explains. A major difference is that a rationale explains the values that provoke or motivation the action, and causal explanations have no equivalent to the question what motivates an action.

Finally, a false belief, a delusion or mistake can explain an action but only facts can explain events that are subject to causality.

Mathematical and logical explanations are, of course, different again.

The fact that all three modes of explanation rely on "why?" and "because" can mislead one into thinking that they are more similar than they really are.

Have you got a brief sketch of why you might argue this? — Tom Storm

Not really. My first question would be to find out which concept of God is at stake. When I say "the concept of God is incoherent", I usually have in mind the Christian conception of God. But even that takes many forms. Each thinks that the others are all wrong, but they can't all be right. They can all be wrong, though. But then, how to decide right and wrong here? The trump card is, of course, faith, and arguably coherence and incoherence aren't applicable to questions of faith. Internal consistency might be.

My best first argument is the problem of evil, which I'm sure you are familiar with. It has the virtue of being applicable to all Christian conceptions.

There is an argument whether omniscience and omnipotence are compatible. If God knows everything, can God alter anything?

Then there's the idea that God is everywhere at all times, which makes it hard to understand what his knowledge of the world would be like. Certainly not like ours, since we are at all times located at a specific place and time.

There is a list of more detailed issues, all well known in Christian theology, none of which have what I would call a solution. In alphabetical order, divinity/humanity of Jesus, original sin, redemption through sacrifice or scapegoating, transubstantiation, trinity,

The most general objection is that the concept of God only makes sense in a dualist (or maybe an idealist a la Berkeley) metaphysics.

I would classify God's existence as, for believers, a "hinge" proposition, around which all other issues are seen. But I also think the doctrinal question whether God exists is not as important as Christians (and Muslims) believe it to be. Religion is essentially a question of attitude and way of life. Doctrine is secondary.

Does that help?

With the understanding that there must be at least one first cause (there is no limitation of course) we have a very clear definition of what a first cause entails. This lets us do something great: require proof. While its logically necessary that first causes exist, saying, "X is a first cause" is a high bar of proof that is falsifiable. Thus we can propose ideas or have faith, but none of it has teeth without evidence. — Philosophim

I must have missed something. I thought you were saying that while first causes must exist, there were no existing examples.

I accept that there are first causes in pragmatic applications of an existing causal framework. Call them pragmatic. There are also first causes inherent, defined by, any causal framework - even if only as conceptually possible. But the concept of a cause outside a framework of definition and explanation, is meaningless. Hence any actual causal explanation is relative to its framework.

Well, agnosticism means that one doesn't "know" whether gods exist or not. However it is an error to then assume that believers and nonbelievers "know" that gods exist or don't exist. It is more accurate (when dealing with unknowable entities, like gods) to substitute "believe" for "know" on the question of existance. — LuckyR

For me, since I think that the concept of "God" is incoherent or perhaps empty, I'm inclinced to think that no-one, including me, knows that God exists or that God does not exist. But I do know that the concept of God is incoherent. It is clear, I would say, that believing on faith that God exists (or doesn't) is not knowing that God exists or doesn't. However, people often confuse knowledge with subjective certainty, and belief with subjective uncertainty - and this is not unreasonable; it's just a complication. But then, there's another complication, that religious belief is often called belief rather than knowledge; I'm not quite sure why and this may be an old-fashioned view, but the creed does begin "I believe..." I think this is a specialized use of belief to mean "trust"; it's not unknown outside religion.

But it's important to bear in mind that belief that p is belief that p is true, and hence it is hard to distinguish between belief and knowledge from a subjective point of view. The consequence is that knowledge claims should never be made for one's own beliefs, only for the beliefs of others - except in cases where the belief is "common knowledge" or certainly true.

That statement was addressed to Philosophim. To you i said I didn't understand you. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm sorry for the confusion. I'm still working out how to deal with situations when several people are involved.

But don't you agree that what you call "springs of action" are first causes in a causal chain? A person makes a choice, springs to action, and this begins a causal chain. If, later, we look back at the causal chain which has progressed from a spring to action, we see the choice which was made as "the end" of the causal chain, or the "final cause" in that chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes and no. There are two modes of explanation involved and much difficulty about the relationship between the two. There is, presumably, a causal chain involved. There is also what is usually called a rational or purposive explanation involved. These two are in different categories or frameworks. We are finding out a good deal about the first kind. We use the second kind every day. We (well, philosophers,) are in a good deal of confusion about the relation between the two. It won't do to say that they are just different kinds of explanation and leave it at that - though that was popular a few decades ago. Nor will it do to "reduce" one to the other or identify one or other as the "real" explanation. How much more do you want? It would take us miles beyond this thread. Perhaps I should post that paragraph as the beginning of a discussion.

As a thought experiment I hypothetically concluded that if things form self-explained, — Philosophim

There's a puzzle. I don't think that idea of a cause that is self-explanatory makes much sense. It doesn't seem to fit with your idea of causality. Is that meant to be an example of a first cause?

I find new questions to be fun and exciting to think about! I'm glad you do as well.) — Philosophim

So finding a first cause is just a reason for developing new ideas. It has happened before and no doubt it will happen again Whether one calls them causal or not really seems much less important.

No. A first cause is absolute. It is something which exists without a prior cause. It is not that we chose that as a starting point, it means that there comes a point in exploring the chain where there is no prior cause for its existence. It will exist, simply because it does. The logic points out this occurs whether the chain of causality is infinite or finite. — Philosophim

Yes, I take the point that there is a difference between the Big Bang and an arbitrarily chosen starting-point. The Big Bang is implicit in the framework of explanation. But then, there are these pesky people who ask questions which do not go away. And so we start developing new ideas, based on what we already know, but also going beyond them. Whether you call them causal or not is not really very interesting.

I let an AI break down the flaws of your OP. — Christoffer

I have to say that I trust your judhement about what an AI says way before I trust the AI. Why do you think that the AI can do that job? Mind you, I mostly agree with what you say.

The invention is the interpretation of reality that correlates to the real thing of 2 something. — Christoffer

H'm It's very tempting to think that way. But the question is always how we can "correlate" to a reality that exists independently of our interpretation. I'm not saying it can't be done. On the contrary, it must be done. So the criteria for "non-verbal" reality need to be built in to our interpretation.

But the key point is that the density of the universe right at the event of Big Bang would mean dimensions having no meaning, therefor no causality can occur in that state. It is fundamentally random and therefor you cannot apply a deterministic causality logic to it. And since you can't do that, how can you ask any of the questions in the way you do? It's either cyclic in some form, or it is an event that has no causality as its state is without the dimensions required for causality to happen. — Christoffer

I read this as saying that when explanation reaches rock-bottom, in one sense, it ends, but in another sense requires a new conceptual framework. Which people are developing in the case of the Big Bang. For me, it was always obvious that would happen. It has happened before and no doubt it will happen again.

Ok, you agree with me then. The free will act I described appeared to be random, but really it was a "first cause". — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm sorry. I didn't mean to say that free will is really a first cause. I meant to say only that that is the "traditional" view and as an example of what happens when you reach rock-bottom in a specific pattern of explanation. At that point, further explanation will require a categorial change in thinking. It was not a very good example. My own view is that actions by people are explained in a non-causal framework, by purposes, values and reasons. "Free will" is an umbrella for all the "springs of action" - convenient because it doesn't require us to consider all the complexities. Simplification can be useful - and misleading. It's a big topic and won't be helpful here.