By studying the DNA we know when wild dogs became fully domestic. Dogs are not the only animals that can be domesticated — Athena

Yes. I didn't mean to suggest that we know absolutely nothing. The DNA evidence is good enough for me. So is the evidence from archaeology. But I also think that the details of how, exactly, it happened, don't have good empirical backing. Yet we can develop reasonable speculations on the basis of what we know about dogs and humans now. I'm just saying we do well to remember how thin the evidence is.

That is so interesting! When teaching bonobo how to communicate with a picture board maybe this reaction of following a point plays into the learning? Do you have more information about this? — Athena

I certainly think that the ability to (be taught to) follow a pointer is the basis for some very interesting learning/teaching opportunities, which the subject may or may not be capable of. I'm afraid you seem to have a good deal more information about empirical studies of animals than I do.

Not unlike human children, until their culture teaches them not only to tolerate but to cultivate and promote double- and triple-think. — Vera Mont

Yes, I know. Double-think is often a great nuisance and yet seems inescapable.

What counts as thinking? What counts as rational thinking? — creativesoul

The lack of clear definitions does indeed make this debate much more difficult. But there's no easy way round it. Someone who doesn't see rationality in animals will define it in one way, likely by appealing to "language", which is assumed to apply only to languages of the kind that humans speak. Someone who empathizes with animals will be more inclined to a more flexible definitions.

I don't think "rational" is about a single thing, but about the multifarious language games that a language consists of; they have different criteria of meaning and truth. "Rational" refers to thinking that gets us the right results. In some cases that's truth of some kind, in others it's actions that are successful by the relevant criteria.

So here's my answer for this context. Meaning and concepts are shown in meaningful behaviour, which includes both verbal and non-verbal applications of the relevant concepts. This means that to attribute concepts to animals is perfectly meaningful, though not capable of the formal clarity beloved of logicians.

Much is made of learning from each other. — Patterner

Yes. Not just in formal teaching/learning situations, but in everyday interaction. At that age, everything is a learning opportunity.

... because, at least in humans, language is a huge part of a culture. How can we say either lead to the other? — Patterner

We can't say either leads to the other. The ability to speak and to interact with people are intertwined with each other.

Second, many species live in groups, and many have been doing so for far longer than we have. — Patterner

Good point. And why not? you may ask. But I'm pushing the point that our way of like is developed from animal ways of life and, in my opinion, cannot be down to just one factor, but to many interacting factors. All of which may have existed independently in the animal kingdom, but "took off", so to speak, when they developed together.

And, in my opinion, the way we are special is of more value, and has greater impact, than the way any the other species is special. (Also, The Incredibles?) — Patterner

I don't see how you can possible make that judgement. Given that our specialness is as much a curse and a blessing, to the rest of the planet and ourselves as well.

I would be surprised if you think a parent in any other species has ever gone through the depth or duration of emotional pain that you have. — Patterner

One is always tempted to think that it is worse for me than anyone else. I don't believe in comparing these things - "My grief is greater/lesser than yours" does not help anybody. It was a while ago, but it is, of course, very far from forgotten.

But does anyone think without words? — Patterner

Well, I once encountered someone (on another forum) who claimed that he planned how to pack his suitcase by imagining various arrangements of the things he had to pack - visually. He said it worked for him. How could I argue with him? I can't be dogmatic about it. If he could think in images, why can't dogs? Suggestive thought - Dogs do appear to have dreams.

What I mean is, once they have it, they don't run with it. They do not use tools for new purposes, and don't apply ideas to new situations. — Patterner

There is truth in that. We have hyper-developed various capacities. But I don't think we have hyper-developed just one capacity.

No, dogs don't do math. I know many animals recognize groups of objects of certain sizes. That doesn't mean they count them, and it doesn't mean they can add and subtract. — Patterner

No they don't. So how do they catch Frisbees? Actually, since we can also catch Frisbees without doing any math, we know that math is not critical to catching Frisbees. So articulate reason is not the only rationality. On the other hand, it seems pretty clear that we can locate sounds in space because of the time and volume differences between our two ears. But we are not aware of that difference, except as implied in knowing the location of the sound. This is not a simple issue.

Nor do I think they have any concept of ethics. Does an alligator, lion, or eagle think it's wrong to kill and eat whatever its prey is? Does a fisher think it's wrong to kill someone's little dog? Have we ever seen any behavior that suggests the any animals have such thoughts? — Patterner

They don't see anything wrong with killing their prey. Most humans don't either. Sure, there are complications in this case, but it is not the whole of ethics.

Chimps, apparently, and perhaps dogs do have a sense of fair play in that if they see another chimp/dog being fed better than they are, they will protest, vigorously. Their apparent sense of outrage when the pecking order is disrupted is another example.

Substitute 'soul' with 'mind' and I think Cudworth makes a valid point. — Wayfarer

I did enjoy that. I'll always be more tolerant of platonists in future.

that they construct a conception antecedent to the inquiry, hence establishing its possibility. — Mww

Dogs (I'll stick to the concrete example, if I may) have concepts, but not language. Their concepts are shown in their (non-verbal) actions - as are ours, if you recognize meaning as use.

under what possible conditions would lesser animals be determinable as possessing it, or anything like it, insofar as the self-reflective necessity, is impossible? — Mww

Well, you can watch a dog searching for a weak spot in a fence, and getting their companion to come and help open it up. That suggests how they might solve some problems - and that's a process that we can recognize as rational - in humans and in dogs.

They may not climb mountains because they are there, (is that rational??) but they can gallop across a field because it's there and eat a snack because it's there. There are lots of different connections, which we can only ever know if we engage with them sympathetically, setting aside presuppositions so far as possible, or at least being willing to question them.

I once watched a flock of sheep in a field. One of them had found a gap in the fence, and the whole flock was queuing to get through it, all lined up in a single file, clearly politely waiting for others to get through as opposed to all making a mad dash at the same time. What did they expect to find? Greener grass, possibly, but there was nothing wrong with the grass they already had. Perhaps just because it was there. Who knows? Did they know? (I had to ring the farmer, who turned up in short order and wrecked my philosophical moment.)

Pretty silly, methinks: dog says to himself…. — Mww

Very sensible, your dog.

(Sigh) — Mww

Oh yes, I know that sigh.

Exactly the kind of relationship you can't have with an automaton. Experiencing this mutual animosity, he yet insisted that dogs don't think and feel the way we do. — Vera Mont

Yes. I know it seems crazy. And you are right that animals don't seem capable of tolerating that kind of cognitive dissonance. They do seem wonderfully simple and direct by comparison with humans.

Our culture and philosophy generally lacks the language within which to interpret the word. It is usually treated as synonymous with religious dogma and rejected on those grounds. — Wayfarer

Those are both real problems. But I don't think it is just a question of religious dogma, but of metaphysical and ethical dogma. It gets used as an attempt to bolster views that are inherently problematic without addressing the problems.

But they aren’t using reason — Fire Ologist

Humans can judge (view) the dog's reaction as rational, not that it is rational. Fire's comment went on to explain that he does not see any evidence that the dog is using reason. — L'éléphant

This is exactly right, in one way. It is a question of interpreting what is in front of us. There's a problem, however, about the distinction between seeing the dog's reaction as rational and it being rational. That suggests that It is not a question of inferring from the dog's actions to something else, such as an inner experience or brain state. That takes us straight into a morass of undecidability and metaphysical speculation. Yet there is a real issue about assigning truth or falsity to an interpretation - it's very likely not possible.

The issue is what the principle of interpretation should be. If one adopts one principle or the other, it is not a question of some fact that provides evidence one way or the other, but what conclusions the evidence in front of us justifies - and that depends on what principle of interpretation we adopt.

The difficulty is to identify how to justify the principle of interpretation independently of assessing the evidence.
You are drawing the distinction between interpreting the dog's reaction and what the dog's reaction actually is (presumably, independently of any interpretation). But when it comes to interpretation, that's a very tricky question and the answer is by no means self-evident. In other words, the question is now how to distinguish between interpretation and reality? Or maybe how to decide when interpretation is reality?

Animals don’t read reasons. Otherwise we read off of smells and visions and feelings. Like other animals. And “read” in this context is metaphor for sensation. We read reasons, Animals don’t read anything (except metaphorically). — Fire Ologist

You are very confident about that. What grounds do you have? Or is this simply a decision about how you are going to interpret what they do and what they don't do? You can jump either way. But I want to know what justifies your choice. (Because I make a different choice and I'm prepared to go into my reasons/justifications.)

A dog doesn’t wonder if he is barking loud enough, if the volume of his barking is a reasonable volume to convey its fear of the cougar to the rest of the pack. The dog sees the cougar, and the dog barks. — Fire Ologist

The condition "if the volume of his barking is a reasonable to convey...." means that his barking is a rational response. If the rest of the pack don't respond, he will likely bark louder, which demonstrates a feed-back loop, which implies rational, purposive control of the bark.

Reason involves logical inference, representational language, judgment and choice. We have to use reason to deliberate and make a choice. We have to use judgment to choose what objects are the most reasonable objects to deliberate about. When we focus our reason on a subject, we are choosing that focus. These are all human things. — Fire Ologist

Yes, there are a range of activities that are constitute what I think you mean by "using reason". I agree that we do not recognize any animal activities that we can interpret as doing those things. (Actually, I'm not at all sure that's true, but let's suppose it is for the sake of the argument)

But here's the problem. If those activities are the only basis for rational action, what leads us to suppose that it is rational to engage in them.

If this idea were correct, the only basis for supposing that when we engage in those activities in relation to taking an umbrella when we leave the house is that we have debated and considered whether to take an umbrella. But what makes us suppose that it is rational to engage in debating and considering? The only answer is that we have debated and considered whether it is rational to engage in debating and considering whether it is rational to engage in debating and considering. I hope you see the infinite regress looming. I conclude that at some point, we do not engage in debating and considering before acting and yet are acting rationally.

Since we can act rationally without debating and considering what to do, there is no reason to suppose that animals cannot act rationally without debating and considering what to do.

When the air in my house is above 75 degrees, the air conditioning goes on and the house is cooled and the thermostat reacts to the cooler temperature and shuts off the air conditioner.
I could say that my air conditioner uses its thermostat to sense the temperature and then desires to cool the house so it rationally engages the air conditioner until the house reaches the system’s desired temperature.
Or I could just say it’s all a system of stimuli and responses with no inner life, self-awareness, decision-making capability or rational capability.
We could say the same thing about animals.
Determinists (use reason) to say the same thing about humans.
Maybe the better question is do humans have the ability to reason? My answer would be that formulating a question like that displays behavior of a being capable of reason.
Animals don’t ask questions. Ever. — Fire Ologist

Quite so. It's about how we interpret the phenomena. We can interpret them in a causal framework, or we can interpret them in a rational framework. Confusingly, we can sometimes interpret the same phenomena in both frameworks. Our question is which one is more appropriate in this or that case? People seem to be quite happy to make the choice (some in one way, some in the other), but to find it very difficult to engage in an argument about which is the better choice - even though they have made a choice. It's very difficult and confusing. That's when the real philosophy begins

I think your story is close to the story of how dogs became domesticated. A few wild dogs dared to come close to humans .... This led to genetic changes that made domestic dogs domestic. ... — Athena

One does feel that something like that must have happened. But we don't have, and probably never will have any detailed evidence about what actually happened. It's important to keep hold of the proviso. Philosophers are very fond of "it must be that way, so it is that way" - and less fond of being proved wrong.

Interestingly they are the only animals that will investigate where we point. Domestic dogs have learned to read us and how to manipulate us as well as how to be excellent hunting partners and service dogs. The bottom line this is genetic. — Athena

Yes. I'm sure there have been genetic changes in dogs. But, by the same token, also in humans. Note also that training is involved as well - learning to live together. I believe that pigs can also follow a pointer. It is significant, of course, because pointing (ostensive definition) is usually thought to be fundamental in learning language.

I did more research, and discovered that this was not true, and that at one point, Descartes had a pet dog which he treated with affection. However, the anecdote was not entirely devoid of fact, — Wayfarer

I had heard about this, so I'm very pleased to know the truth of it. Thank you. Comment - It was a myth and like all, good myths, it was based on a truth and captured a deeper truth in spite of deviating from the facts.

But I argue that with language, rationality, and also the capacity for transcendent insight, h.sapiens have crossed a threshhold which differentiates us from other animals, and that this difference is something we have to be responsible for, rather than denying. — Wayfarer

I'm very cautious about transcendence. It has been very common to take a reasonable idea and turn it into a fantasy.

(In reality, he was probably exaggerating, and the dog was simply annoyed at his attitude. People get very huffy when they're disliked or disapproved-of.) — Vera Mont

There's a feed-back loop. Human doesn't respond to dog's greeting. Dog is confused and unhappy and withdraws. Human thinks that dog dislikes them, which is not wrong, so gets prickly - body language, looks away. Dog gets further upset. It's about a dynamic relationship.

We humans can judge a dog’s reaction as a rational response or not, but I see no evidence that a dog is using reason prior to any response or after the fact, or during a “communication.” — Fire Ologist

OK. So it turns out that you will accept that a dog's reaction is a rational response, but deny that the dog is rational because they don't "use reason". I take it that you mean that the dog doesn't say out loud "This is the situation, so I should do that." But humans often act without verbalizing their reasons out loud. Does that mean they aren't rational either?

This is feeling and reacting not reasoning. Chimps needing a new troop will approach very carefully and hang around the fringes until invited in. — Athena

Well, if the feelings are rational and the reactions appropriate, what's the problem saying the meerkats, chimps or crows are rational?

The difference is about HOW we think, not WHAT we think. And the difference is being as an animal or as an evolved human being. — Athena

Are you talking about the out loud verbalizing of your reasons for doing something - or the maybe silent process of planning an action? But if you have to plan each action to be counted as rational, then you have to plan to plan, and plan to plan to plan.... If you have to verbalize your reasons for doing something if you are to count as acting rationally, then you have to verbalize your reasons for verbalizing your reasons... No, No, that doesn't work. It has to be possible to act without verbalizing reasons and without advance planning and yet to act rationally.

I once had an acquaintance who steadfastly denied that animals other than man had intelligence or any form of thought; he maintained that they are little more than automata that respond to stimuli without any understanding. Then he told me that his neighbour's German Shepherd hated him. (Gee, I wonder why!) — Vera Mont

They always know. It's the body language. Kids are pretty good at it, too. But we lose the knack when we get grown-up. Pity.

I think our ability to behave as rational human beings may be fragile. I think education focused on technology and not our development as good family members and good citizens, may have led to a much higher rate of irrational behavior. I think this happened to Germany and became the Nazi phenomenon. A social value shift that may come with threats of social breakdown. — Athena

Oh, I'm quite sure that our ability to behave rationally is fragile. I'm sorry to hear about your sister's behaviour.

However, I'm inclined to think this points to meerkats having at least some aspects of what could be considered criitical thinking. — wonderer1

Well, I wouldn't attribute the whole gamut of human critical skills to meerkats. Just some basics.

I think on this thread, we keep missing the point when we say ..."but animals also do this or that.."
Like us, animals can and do learn from each other. — L'éléphant

I don't doubt it. But I'm not clear what point you think we are missing. The key question is what, if anything, distinguishes humans from other animals. The issue is whether there is not merely a difference, but a difference so significant that it represents a difference in kind. So "but animals do this or that... " is the point.
It might be the case that a wider range of questions would be of interest. Why not try something out?

I do not believe we are thinking rationally unless we are using higher-order critical thinking skills. Each critical thinking skill is important but maybe this one is the most challenging.. — Athena

Yes, you are right. But you are setting a very high bar. Most of what we do does not involve critical thinking. Left to ourselves, we will only think critically when something is going wrong or in new and unfamiliar circumstances. You may have seen my story about the birds. Here's another. (I can't give you my source for this either, so treat it as a thought-experiment).

Meerkats actually post sentries who do not join in the feeding, but keep watch and raise the alarm when an intruder turns up. The other meerkats keep some food for the sentry, who feeds when all the others have finished. New members of the group are not permitted to act as sentries for a while. Eventually, they are allowed to stand sentry, but at first, when they raise the alarm, the others check it out before everyone rushes to their burrows underground. Eventually, when the sentry has been proved reliable, they are not checked out.
Is that not critical thinking? Or maybe critical thinking is less advanced than you think?

I don’t know this for sure. — Fire Ologist

H'm. In a way, I'm glad to hear it. I do agree that it is not an easy matter to identify what beliefs and what desires motivate animals. A general, perhaps rather vague, view is the most we can expect. Can a dog feel guilty or embarrassed? I'm not sure. Can a dog feel fear and anger? Oh, yes, definitely.

Humans bother to seek and communicate reasons and ideas through language with other humans. Dogs don’t bother with all of that. Neither does the sun. Every sound isn’t a word. Every response of a conscious animal isn’t born out of a self-reflective process of reasoning. — Fire Ologist

Perhaps better "Humans sometimes bother.... but not always". When they don't, we still read off their reasons from their behaviour. So what's so odd about reading off dogs' reasons from what they do?

It’s very romantic to personify things. Like the warm embrace of the dawn after the night’s unrelenting assault of darkness and cold. — Fire Ologist

Yes. Not a very persuasive argument. Perhaps the view of animals as machines is a welcome coolness of the evening after a hot day.

Dog barks to warn the pack? Or a dog sees something and just bursts into a bark? Pack hears one of its members making barking sounds and thinks “what is wrong?” Or pack just hears barking sounds and moves directly towards whatever range of responses have survived the evolutionary process? — Fire Ologist

OK. You know how one reads something and remembers the content but not the details or where you read it. I have an example like that, which I'll present as a thought experiment, although I believe it is an observation of actual behaviour.
I expect you know that many birds will warn the whole flock when intruders appear. Is the bird warning the flock or just shouting in fear when it spots an intruder? Hard to tell. But then you notice that some birds will shout an alarm when there is no intruder. All the other birds fly off, but the noisy one stays, with free access to all the food. Ah, no, you think. That's just reflex responses. But then the other birds, having learnt that the shouty bird is a liar will ignore future warnings from that bird. Is it really plausible to interpret that is "just reflexes" and not rational responses to a developing situation?

Because of the debate between free will and determinism, we might say that humans are not actually rational either, incapable of communicating a single communication clearly. Equating human behavior with animal behavior along the lines that none of us are using reason or making communications seems an easier argument than saying human and animal behaviors are equal in that they both involve levels of reasoning and communication. — Fire Ologist

You are right to think of this. I think you are choosing the harder path and I'll try to show you why.

Animals make sounds and other other animals react to those sounds. Humans see this as communication. But the animal that made the sound may have been forced to make that sound by some conditions, just like the other animal that responded to that sound was forced to respond. — Fire Ologist

How does this sound? "Humans make sounds and other humans react to those sounds. Animals see this as communication. But the human that made the sound may have been forced to make that sound by some conditions, just like the other human that responded to that sound was forced to respond." It's a question of interpretation, of employing a model, not an empirical fact.

Animals have behaviors, many of which humans share (eating, sleeping, hunting, etc.). One of the behaviors humans exhibit is reasoning, or being rational. This involves language and communication with other reasoners. — Fire Ologist

Rational behaviour is not just a set of behaviours distinct from everything else - talking, pondering etc. Rationality is on display in nearly everything that we do. Taking the umbrella when leaving the house is a rational behaviour. Going into the kitchen when hungry is rational behaviour. The dog's sitting staring at you when hungry is also rational behaviour.

But seems to me, if any thing in the universe used reason, it could make that ability clear to me by communication. Nothing else bothers to communicate a reasonable idea besides other humans. — Fire Ologist

Had you perhaps thought that the animals are communicating, but you're not hearing, because you don't believe that they communicate?

Animals don’t need any of it. We personify animals when we call their behavior rational like our behavior is rational. — Fire Ologist

How do you know that their behaviour is not rational "like our behaviour is rational"? Is there some other kind of rational that it could be?

Why do you say that animals don't need any of it - do you mean, language, communication and math? Many of them certainly have communication skills and can do things that seem to require mathematics, like catching Frisbees. Whether they have language or not is unanswerable until we agree our definition of language.

Fortunately, human beings can also communicate without language and do things that seem to require mathematics without having learnt the necessary mathematics. If we can do it, they can do it - or it is at least possible.

The foundation of our recognition of human beings as (sometimes) rational people is our relationship with them and their relationship with us. The same foundation is the basis of our attributing or withholding perception emotion and reason to them.

You can "see" an animal as a bunch of reflexes if you choose to. You can see an animal as a person if you choose to. That choice is a decision how far to extend your paradigm of a person in the context of your interactions with them. It is a hinge for how you see them and how you interpret what you see. I can try to persuade you that either extreme doesn't really make sense, but a conclusive demonstration either way is not to be expected.

Humans insert “reason” and deliberate some responses. We draw these deliberations out by communicating our reasons with other humans. — Fire Ologist

They can follow this leader or that one, but they are not going to debate the reasoning. — Athena

Well, let's allow, for the sake of the argument, that animals do not and cannot debate in the way that humans do. I'll accept also that debating is a skill that demands a capacity for rational thought. But you seem to think it is a necessary (probably not sufficient?) skill for rational thought. But does that really make sense?

I'll go further and say that although it is tempting to think that articulating one's reasons is what rationality is about, it is simply wrong. Articulating one's reasons for a rational action is an optional extra, distinct from the capacity for rational action. In the first place, people often find it quite difficult to explain why they did what they did when you ask. They have to stop and think about it immediately after they carried out the action. In the second place, we often act very fast when we need to. There simply isn't time to say to oneself "The traffic light has changed, it is dangerous and illegal to cross against the light, I had better stop". Indeed, the same applies when I look up at the sky and pick up an umbrella as I leave the house. I may say to myself or another that it looks like rain and I'll take an umbrella, and I may not.

They do have emotional bonds and this is so close to reasoning, it is hard to draw the line. — Athena

Yes. Even psychologists are abandoning the old conception of emotions as (purely subjective and irrational "feelings") and recognizing that cognition is part and parcel of the concepts.

I've brought up the subject of pattern recognition a lot on the forum. It's a quite useful concept in understanding the way people think. — wonderer1

Am I right to think that we are somewhere near the old-fashioned concept of a Gestalt? I think there is a lot to be said for it. It is not been a good thing that the atomistic methodology of empirical philosophers has not been helpful for philosophy or psychology. Patterns of behaviour.

Elephants seem like they might be well justified in disagreeing. Why waste time trying to figure out how to open a gate, if knocking the gate down is a trivial matter? — wonderer1

No, Knocking down the gate is perfectly rational, if it works for you. What is very telling is if the elephant tries to knock down the gate, finds s/he can't and then tries a different tactic. I didn't think to cover that case, that's all.


Funny how it works, isn't it? At the time, big headache, furious. Looking back, admirable, proud of them.
I have the impression that they are no longer with you. If so, I expect it's bittersweet. The full story is even more convincing than the short version.

In my book, opening doors and gates is rational thinking. Battering them down would not be, unless it was preceded by trying to open them. I can't assume that everyone will agree.

In my book, however, this is not a simple empirical question. As far as I can see, it is fair to say that our paradigm (NOT definition) of a person is a human being (under normal circumstances). Animals are like human beings in certain respects such that it seems most reasonable to think that they are like people. Crucially, it is clearly possible for human beings to form relationships with animals that are, or are like, relationships with people. But it's a balance. Some people do not go far enough and treat them as machines which can easily result in inhumane treatment. Other people go too far and get accused, sometimes rightly, of anthropomorphization.

I have to go now. But I look forward to seeing what happens next. :smile:

Clearly, not all thinking is existentially dependent upon words. — creativesoul

That's the minority opinion. — Vera Mont

Maybe I'm just stubborn, but I think that truth is not an issue that can be resolved by voting. Though I know that being in a minority can be discouraging.

Language less creatures have no words. Yet, they think about the world. Clearly, not all thinking is existentially dependent upon words. — creativesoul

Ver neat. You are changing the subject somewhat. It may prove fruitful. Contesting claims about what are or might be unique differentials between animals and humans has not been productive. The two sides appeared to me to be talking past each other - hence my remark about language.

In the mean time, I suggest that the question is partly whether thinking must be a process distinct from acting. My answer is no. For the sake of an example, here's one that @Vera Montshared with us a while ago:-

A not-so-clever Pyrennese who liked to roam would ask her border collie confederate to help her escape. The collie would stand on her hind legs and push on the far frame (not where it opens) with both paws of the big sliding patio door. She didn't have the weight to push it all the way open, but she'd slide it over just enough for the big dog to wedge her nose in and force it open. Then they would pad softly across the patio, around the corner of the house, duck behind the car and make their way down the drive. (I stopped them there, having watched the whole procedure. I was on guard, because they'd already gone AWOL twice.) — Vera Mont

Shared project, collaborative working, indirect approach to the problem. But no distinct moment that you could identify as "thinking".
It would be easy to provide what you might call a rational reconstruction of the action - a series of propositions attributing various beliefs/knowledges to the dogs and reconstructing a deductive process. That would provide what we commonly call an rational explanation of their actions. It doesn't rely on "what was going on in their minds".

Sure. If you define a word to mean what you want it to mean it will mean what you want it to mean.
I have not seen that particular definition: "rational thought is that to which possession of a suitable language is critical" in a dictionary. — Vera Mont

No, you won't. I'm talking about a philosophical position or even assumption, that the only true rational process is articulate reasoning which can only be laid out in language. I could have been clearer. Sorry.

LBJ began his political life in the Senate staunchly against civil rights legislation, but reversed his position as the tides began to turn. — jgill

That's politics for you. But I always understood that he was very effective (more effective than JFK?) in getting Civil Rights legislation through.

More or less. Frankly, I don't know what it has become since the "Squad" gained influence. — jgill

I think the problem of our times is that the left wing isn't clear what it's about. So many goals were achieved and the fall of the USSR was taken as "disproving" socialism. The right, these days, at least knows what it's about - and is much more ruthless in fighting for it. The left can't form a united front or articulate a coherent ideology.

Do you suppose the mother of a wildebeest that has watched it's child, perhaps more than one over the years, murdered, torn apart, and eaten, suffers the horrors I would? — Patterner

Do you suppose that I have any way of "really" understanding how any mother, never mind the mother of wildebeest, feels about the loss of a child - even though I have lost a child. The balance between understanding and projection is very difficult. To be more accurate, we can be pretty certain of our understanding at a general level, but when you get down to details it gets much, much more difficult.

I'm just saying we are unique in that we think in ways no other species thinks. — Patterner

I'm guessing that mathematics and perhaps ethics are examples of what you have in mind. Yet people seem quite happy to ask whether dogs can do calculus and to insist that they can make and execute a plan of action to achieve a common end. And then, attributing values to them seems inherent in saying that they are alive and sentient and social - even in saying that evolution applies to them.
I think you would question whether dogs can do any mathematics, never mind calculus, or really make and execute a plan. I also think you would question whether dogs really understand ethics, even if they have desires. There's a common theme, because it would not be unreasonable to think that (human) language is essential for both. Am I wrong?

Yet there is no spark of understanding. They somehow simply happened to stumble upon using X to accomplish Y, and they kept doing it. — Patterner

I don't understand you.
If a pigeon stumbles on the fact that pecking a specific item in their cage produces food and keeps on doing it until it has eaten enough, that it doesn't understand what is going on? It may not understand about the aims of the experiment or what an experiment is, but it understands what is important to it. In any case, human beings also stumble on facts and have no hesitation in exploiting them to the limit of their understanding (which is often quite severe and detrimental to their long-term interests).

And I'm not claiming I an incredibly special. We all are. Yes, even you. No member of any other species would be reacting the way you are now. One of the pitfalls of the ways we think that no other species does. — Patterner

I'm not denying what you say. But it's more complicated than that. If everybody is special, then nobody is special. So some explanation of what "special" means here is necessary.

Scientific humanism is hardly a fringe movement. It is hugely influential in modern culture. — Wayfarer

I know that. But that's compatible with many different formulations of what it is. Still, thanks for the responses. I'm most struck by the common denominator in the values involved. I'm more and convinced that this debate is underpinned by the ethical issues that underlie it. It's not (just) the facts, but what you make of them. But now I'm puzzled because scientific humanism seems to be a common or garden humanism with a respect for and faith in science. Or is that all there is to it?

Religion’s purpose then is to bring us back to the lost world of intimacy, and all its rites, rituals, and activities are created to this end. — The Violence of Oneness, Norman Fischer

@Wayfarer
That's all very well. But many people think, with reason, that the purpose of religion is keeping us all in line.

Evolutionary biology makes us part of a cosmic story, in which evolution and/or nature is now endowed with the kind of creativity that used to be assigned to God. — Wayfarer

Not really. Evolution does indeed imply creativity, but not the kind that was supposed for God. Divine omnipotence meant that the wish is sufficient. Not at all what evolution does.

You haven't seen any of the intelligence tests set for various other species by scientists? They do not, once in a century, 'stumble upon' solutions; they work them out logically and in a timely manner. — Vera Mont

I think @Patterner may be including trial and error under "stumbles upon". For me, "stumbles upon" is pure accident, without even recognizing the problem. Trial and error seems like a perfectly rational procedure. (When you can work out the solution in advance, it's not really a problem any more, since you know the answer.)

All i said was that these (sc. animal behaviours) are the product of rational thought, which, before the herculean humans endeavours, were expressed in the purposeful, conscious use of tools and other innovations by rational entities of lesser endowment, but nevertheless, with similar brains. — Vera Mont

That's very judicious and well balanced. But there are deeper issues. For example, what thought counts as rational? For some definitions, possession of a suitable language is critical and whether animal communication systems count as a language, never mind one suitable for rationality, is a moot point. So the possibility that the two sides are talking past each other remains.

So the mid-20th century party is the one you joined?

The Democrats used to be the party of the working class. They've become the party of the wealthy liberal elites and the poor who benefit from government services. — fishfry

Do you agree with fishfry about what the party has become?
If so, that's also the story of the Labour party - and it's also the story of the last ten years or so in the UK.

I've done that. I couldn't find delete either. I think there isn't one.

Though you can edit posts, so you can go to edit and delete the entire text and save an empty message. Not an appealing option.

You may be missing a point in your last message. It is not difficult to find a unique feature or features in any species. (That's largely how we identify them). The interesting question is what is the significance of those unique features. So the short reply to your list is simply that none of that proves that we are not animals. Whatever is unique, there are also features that we share with them and they with us. We are certainly not above them. Indeed, in some ways we might be thought to be below them. War?

But our ability to think in the ways we do, in ways nothing else is able to think, we are the undisputed masters of all these things. — Patterner

You could be right. But there are many contenders in the field. Language, (Rational) Thinking, Tool-making, Culture, Empathy, Moral sense, Social living. Each one is popular for a while - until empirical evidence pies up. It turns out that animals also have these things, or at least recognizable precursors. Reading publications from scientists about their research is often unhelpful, but, purely in the spirit of suggesting that you are casting your net too narrowly and long before science will catch up with you, here are two references that show how much empirical work is going on and how varied it is.

Scientific American 2014 - What Makes Humans Different Than Any Other Species

Scientific American 2018 - What Made Us Unique

The supreme irony is that if you ask what makes us human, you will likely find that the top contender is emotion. Which animals also clearly experience. Reason has had a bad reputation ever since the Industrial Revolution.

I'm beginning to think that this debate is a distraction.

Gets pretty lonely over here sometimes, I must say. — Mww

That's what comes of a) not thinking with the crowd and b) thinking about philosophy. I'm not ignoring you - it's just that I have limited bandwidth.

I think there's quite a lot of work both with you and Wayfarer to tease out "discovered" vs "constructed".

Because humans literally hold the power of life and death over the whole planet and separately, of many of its species, by what we do or don't do, or because of unintended consequences of our actions. — Wayfarer

This (which, in theory, I was perfectly aware of) made me look at things differently. Which is what good philosophy is all about. There are enough ways for people to doge the issue, and I'm in favour of ideas that make it more difficult for them. (But that doesn't mean I retract anything that I've said. Perhaps I would put some of it differently.)

I know it's a very non-politically-correct philosophy, but I can't help but believe there's something vitally important in it. — Wayfarer

Well, I would suggest that the reason why it's not politically correct is more to do with what people have made of it, rather than the doctrine in itself. But it's perhaps you have in mind the disfavour that platonism has fallen into amongst philosophers. The doctrine seems to be surviving, however. For me, however, that it is a philosophy and deserves to be considered as such. I'm not a fan myelf and I'm prepared to argue the issue as opposed to dismissing it.
However, for various reasons, I'm very interested in why you think it is important. After all, on the face of it, it doesn't make any difference to anything. Life will go on exactly as before.

I’m very much in the ‘discovered’ camp, although once we have the intelligence to discover, with it comes the ability to construct, which muddies the water somewhat. — Wayfarer

That deserves teasing out. But for the moment, let me observe that you seem not to hold a "pure" version (as exemplified in Lukasiewicz's articulation). That makes a difference.

But a rainbow is a matter for physics and optics, in a way that living beings are not. Yours is the misunderstanding here. — Wayfarer

Human beings not a matter for physics? What on earth is physiology about?

We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a universal;

I'm not sure that "north of" is usually considered to be a universal, but I'll let that pass, because platonism is about more than "formal ideas, like those of logical and arithmetical principles". It is about universals.
BTW I couldn't quite follow his argument here, but I'm not sure how much it matters. We're not dealing with details here.

.... the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'.

Well, Russell's answer suggests that it doesn't exist, which he doesn't mean to imply. But certainly they are not spatio-temporal objects. But that's not a dramatic conclusion. They are objects in a different category, which means that the manner of their existence is not that of spatio-temporal objects like "Edinburgh" or "London". No sweat. (I'm guessing that you might have no difficulty with the notion of a category, because Aristotle invented the term, in this application.) Is it a mental object? That's more dubious, partly because I'm not all that clear what mental objects are. But I can see why Russell would not want to call them that because the term suggests that it only exists as and when it is thought about and that clashes with the objectivity of "Edinburgh is north of London". My point here is only that there are different kinds of object in the world, and their existence is of different kinds. Not everything is a spatio-temporal object. That's not a problem for me. So what do you say about this example?

But somehow, there is not a 'cumulative culture' of the more complex behaviors in animals, unlike in humans. — L'éléphant

At least some animals learn from each other (likely by means of mimicry) and even pass on (some of) what they have learnt to succeeding generations. (Don't lionesses and wolves teach their cubs to hunt?) That is simply an extension of the ability to adapt one's behaviour in a changing environment. One might expect "memes" to develop and evolve as they do in human cultures. But what extends this process is writing, painting, sculpting, which leave a permanent record for later generations to interpret and adapt for their own use - and sometimes simply to preserve if we wish to.

Animals do acquire layers of behavior, but they are best described as scaffolds, rather than 'traditions'. — L'éléphant

"Scaffolds" is a very interesting concept. Without knowing exactly how ethologists apply the term, I shouldn't comment. But I don't see "scaffolds" as an opposition to "traditions". For human beings, our traditions are scaffolds - a framework within which we develop our behaviour and which we can alter and adapt as our needs and fancies change.

We are unexceptional in that we are the product of evolution, like every other species is, bacteria to sequoias. We designed ourselves no more than any other species did. We are on the continuum along with every other animal.
Where we ARE exceptional is that we are much further out on the continuum (than other species) in our ability to reason, invent, think, etc., and enact the rational and irrational motives driven by our far superior lust for aggrandizement. — BC

Yes, that's a much better picture of what's going on. Though we may be driven, not by a stronger lust for aggrandizement, but by better opportunities made available by our technological capablities. We may also be driven, not by simple aggrandizement, but by something as simple as population pressure.

We are the only species to do many, many things. All because of being the only one capable of thinking the ways we do. It seems to me that's the very definition of exceptional. — Patterner

Yes. I think the issue may be what our being exceptional means.

My objection was to the definition of the word, precisely because evolution accounts for the many traits common to species with a common ancestry. Nothing suddenly happened to strike man with reason; reason was developed in many species over millions of years. That man took it into further realms of imagination and language is interesting, but it makes him unique only in magnitude, not in kind. — Vera Mont

Sometimes a difference in magnitude does make a difference in kind.

The distinction between h.sapiens and other creatures is something we have to take responsibility for, rather than denying the obvious. — Wayfarer

I think this is the heart of the debate. Exceptional or similar is, to a great extent, a difference of perspective, or emphasis. What matters is what difference the difference in emphasis makes. Why does it matter? It comes down to a question of values. Does our dominance over other species mean that we are entitled to treat them as machines or use them for sport? Or does it mean we need to be stewards rather than owners, including taking into account the interests of at least other animals, but maybe also fish, insects, plants, bacteria and microbes.
This gets bound up with arguments appealing to enlightened self-interest - we need the planet to function in certain ways if we are to survive at all - as against arguments appealing to a moral view - that because we can see to the welfare of other living beings and even, in some sense, of the inanimate landscape itself, we ought to do so.

One of the ironies implicit in scientific humanism is that it looses sight of the very thing which enables us to pursue science. — Wayfarer

Not knowing what scientific humanism is, I wouldn't want to comment on what it loses sight of. Come to think of it, I don't even know what the very thing is that enables us to pursue science. I would have thought that there is no one thing involved, but a number of intersecting things, working, as it were, in concert.

My point is that to depict reason as a biological adaption is to undermine it....Reducing it to the status of a biological adaption fails to come to terms with it. — Wayfarer

That's like saying that the explanation of a rainbow in the terms of physics undermines it, or reduces it, or even abolishes it. Which, I'm sure you will agree, is a serious misunderstanding.
It is true that understanding the evolution of eyes doesn't deal with many questions and problems about sight. But it does do something to answer the question "how come we have eyes?", doesn't it?

I think we tend to assume that evolutionary theory provides an explanation for it when there are very many unanswered questions in that account.. — Wayfarer

Did I ever say that there are not?

Do you think, for example, that the basic axioms of logic, or the natural numbers, came into existence along with the hominid brain? Or are they something that brain now enables us to recognise and manipulate? See the distinction? — Wayfarer

Ah, yes. Now we are getting to the issue. The basic axioms of logic are certainly something that we are able to recognize and manipulate. Whether they are constructed or discovered is contested. That's what this is all about, isn't it? I'm very fond of this:-

Whenever I am occupied with even the tiniest logistical problem, e.g. trying to find the shortest axiom of the implicational calculus, I have the impression that I am confronted with a mighty construction of indescribably complexity and immeasurable rigidity. This construction has the effect on me of a concrete tangible object, fashioned from the hardest of materials, a hundred times stronger than concrete or steel. I cannot change anything in it; by intense labour, I merely find in it ever new details, and attain unshakable and eternal truths. Where and what is this ideal construction? — J. Lukasiewicz, A Wittgenstein Workbook, quoted and trans. by P.Geach

Which nicely states the problem. Lukasiewicz doesn't answer the question, but does observe that "A Catholic philosopher would say: it is in God, it is God’s thought." Perhaps we can get closer to understanding each other if you can see my observations as another attempt to answer Lukasiewicz's question. You would not be mistaken to see Wittgenstein's influence in my approach.

Scientific materialism. It is parasitic on the classical tradition of Western philosophy, but fundamental elements of that classical tradition are making a comeback. — Wayfarer

Well, the classical tradition never really went away. But it is true that it is more prominent now than it used to be.
I'm a bit puzzled. Many people say that materialism first appears in Democritus and Epicurus. But other pre-Socratics also have a claim. What distinguishes Democritus and \Epicurus is that they proposed an atomic theory of matter. In which, of course, they were, in a sense, right. It is true that they were largely ignored when Christianity became dominant until Gassendi revived that tradition in the first half of the 17th century. Is this revival what you are referring to as "scientific" materialism? Gassendi certainly though he was reviving the ancient works and developing them.
We may have different ideas about what "fundamental" means, but Aristotle, though early in our canon, was not at the beginning. Many people would put Plato/Socrates at the beginning, others various "pre-Socratics - such as Democritus and Epicurus. Thales of Miletus is a popular candidate for first place. He worked and wrote about 300 years before Aristotle.

It's just a word for empty that was translated to void. The world is already here, just kind of messy. — Vera Mont

Actually, that's how I read it. I suppose the problem is that the translation inevitably introduces distinctions and ways of thinking that may or may not have been available to the people who wrote the original. It's the word "form" that attracts my attention - I think that's an inescapable trace of philosophy, which might (MIGHT) have been in the original.

Most religion still demands the same. — Vera Mont

Yes, with the added twist that you are supposed to surrender voluntarily. (Threats of punishment notwithstanding)

You say we know how their habits, but not how they thought. Don't people usually have an attitude or idea before they decide on a course of action, which eventually becomes habitual? Don't their actions give us an indication of what they think?
A king of Assyria decreed massive lion-hunts, sometimes with caged lions in an arena and commissioned a huge bass-relief monument to the sport. Does this give you an inkling of his thought-process? He recorded his thoughts, and they match his actions perfectly. — Vera Mont

I think we've got a crossed wire here. Where we have archaeological relics, then of course we can, with due caution, read off something of what they must/might have been thinking. All I'm saying is that when the archaeology, as well as the writing, is missing, we are stumped.

Most people at the University disapproved of the Klan, and there had been some speculation the KKK might get ugly, but they backed off and were more or less silent. — jgill

I had no idea. I don't recall the Klan being even mentioned in the coverage here.

I was astounded in the transformation. — jgill

I bet you were. I don't suppose you ever had a chance to talk with him about what happened. Likely, he just wants to forget it.

The Democrats used to be the party of the working class. They've become the party of the wealthy liberal elites and the poor who benefit from government services. — fishfry

Thank you. That may be short, but it gets to what I was trying to say. And then I was trying to say that Labour has exactly the same problem. The working class, represented within the party by the unions, used to be represented by Democrats/Labour. But, since around 1980 (Thatcher/Reagan), that has gradually declined (basically, I think, as the power of the unions declined). The assumption was always that the working class would align with the poor and socially liberal ways, but that was simply false. Many of the working class do not think of themselves as poor and are certainly not socially liberal, and they basically have nowhere to go. Mind you, another dimension of the problem is that most people are not only reluctant to think of themselves as poor, but also reluctant to think of themselves as working class.

In other news from merry old England, I hear Labour has it in for the House of Lords.
Don’t ‘reform’ the Lords – abolish it — fishfry

Good Lord! You'll be wanting to abolish the Monarchy next! That's not how we do things here! We don't abolish things! The two Houses started in 1341! How could they be abolished? Tradition, you know!

I like your "spiked online" article. It explains things quite clearly.

More seriously, though, Your constitution is designed to make sure that no-one has total power by splitting the power into three parts - legislators, executive, law. We don't have that. But we do have the equivalent. Any Government, no matter how large its majority, is restrained by thinking that there's no point in doing something that can be undone by a later Parliament.

The reason that abolishing the Lords is not on the agenda is quite simple. If Labour abolished the Lords, the Conservatives would recreate it when they get back in. I'm sure that the Labour plans have been discussed through back-channels with the Conservatives, and they have signalled that they would not reverse these reforms when they get back in.

Mind you, there is another problem. If you abolish the Lords, what do you do next? There's no consensus about that - never has been and likely never will be. If there was a consensus, it would be done. Same for the monarchy.

There is one thing that your founding fathers missed. The theatre of the state. Dressing up in funny hats and strutting around like peacocks in gaudy costumes. That's what all this is about. It's gratifying for those in power and entertains the masses - and provides assurance of stability when everything else is falling apart. Like a conjuring trick, it works so long as you don't look too closely.

Starmer's plans are unsatisfactory, but they are very likely practical, so they will have to do. Better than nothing.

The reform I would like to see is the abolition of the life peers (political appointees) or at least their ejection from Parliament. Imagine if the President could appoint people to your Senate! We have a phrase "kicked upstairs", which means being "promoted" somewhere you can't get in the way. That's what the political peerages are all about. The weird practice actually helps to get things done. So there's absolutely no chance of that.

No, it probably originates in Sumer. — Vera Mont

I knew it had roots in earlier myths. I didn't know exactly which myths. So thanks. I've learnt something.

A couple of observations/questions about Genesis.

The opening about God and the Void. I seem to remember reading that the concept of the Void was a priestly concept much later than Sumer, in fact contemporary with when it was actually written. Do you know about that?

I take the point about the nostalgia for the pre-agricultural past. It makes perfect sense of the Garden of Eden. I hadn't thought of that.

It's always seemed very odd to me that the reason God told Adam not to eat the apples because he didn't want them to learn about good and evil and become like the gods (or was it God?). Why would God want us not to know about morality and become god-like. It's weird and very confusing.

Is it probable that they habitually acted on what they didn't think? — Vera Mont

I don't quite understand what you're getting at here.

It also reduced all other predators from a threat to be feared to rivals to be hated and exterminated. Settled agriculture did the same to land and vegetation, water and forest. — Vera Mont

We know about their habits. What we don't know is how they thought about them. I can see the point about the predators in the abstract, but that's not the same as knowing what they thought. We are talking about attitudes to nature. There's not going to be an record of that outside language.

The Genesis story (which originates in an oral tradition before Judaism) already shows the drive to "subdue and fill the earth" as well as nostalgia for pre-agricultural life. — Vera Mont

And Genesis is an example and that's much later than 3000 BCE, isn't it?

Yes, I know that's a pessimistic, depressing view of our reality, but I see no other. — Vera Mont

Oh, well, if you are talking specifically about climate change, yes, I'm pessimistic as well. It's already shifted from preventing climate change to mitigating it, and that the target of 1.5 degree rise is already pretty much out of reach. It's all a slippery slope now. God knows when we'll begin to take it really seriously, never mind actually do some effective things. I feel really sorry for upcoming generations and am already embarrassed about what they will think of us when they grow up and take charge.

But the fact that you and I can have such a conversation as this, should indicate a key differentiator between us and other creatures, none of which could entertain such ideas, let alone devise the medium by which we're able to discuss them. — Wayfarer

There might be a single difference that explains all the difference. But there might not.
There might be a key difference. But there might not.
The difference(s) might be a difference in degree, not in kind.
There is also the issue of what, exactly, reason is. If you define it as the ability to plan and execute a project, we have what seems to me to be an open and shut case.

A not-so-clever Pyrennese who liked to roam would ask her border collie confederate to help her escape. — Vera Mont

Sure, it's not rocket science. But that doesn't mean it is not rational.

Evolutionary biology is not, after all, an epistemological theory, but a biological one, intended to explain the origin of species, not the origin of such faculties as reason. — Wayfarer

Quite so. But the origin of species necessarily includes the origin of faculties. The evolution of the eye is also the history of the development of the faculty of sight, &c. For example, the development of the faculty of reason is part of the development of homo sapiens. So far as I know there is no doubt that faculty depends on the brain, at least in homo sapiens. There is story of the evolution of the human brain from the early precursors to our day compare the story of the evolution of the eye.

Donald Hoffman is .. a cognitive psychologist who argues that if our sensory faculties are explicable in terms of evolutionary fitness, we have no reason to believe they provide us with the truth. — Wayfarer

That's odd. One would expect evolution to favour a creature with sensory apparatus that provides them with true, rather than false, information. Still, I can't take responsibility for what cognitive psychologists might choose to say. (Perhaps he has an idiosyncratic view of what truth is?)

But that passage I quoted, concerning the ability of reason to grasp universals, is really, in my opinion, part of the real mainstream of Western philosophy, which I do think is Platonist on the whole. Incidentally the essay from which the quote was taken can be found here. — Wayfarer

Platonism is certainly an important part of the tradition of Western philosophy. But that is not a reason for believing that it is true. The traditional canon of Western philosophy is as much an opportunity for criticism as anything else. You seem to suggest that there is an unreal mainstream of Western philosophy. What does that consist of?

But the ability to reason, speak, and to invent science, indicates a kind of ontological discontinuity from other animals in my view. — Wayfarer

You mean something like the emergence of life from the sea to the land? Or of mammals from reptiles? Maybe.
I have to say that the emergence of science has not done much to change the basically animal nature of human beings, so for my money, the discontinuity is not particularly significant. If we do mange to destroy ourselves before we destroy the entire planet as a habitation for life, future species might well consider us to be a faulty evolutionary line that got out of hand, until it self-destructed, much to the benefit of the planet. But then, they may well think that they are the unique peak of their evolutionary line, just as we do....

Unlike other animals, we can see meaning in an abstract and comprehensive way. And I think the case can be made that this ability - the ability to grasp ideas and concepts - is foundational to language, and so a key differentiator between h.sapiens and other species. — Wayfarer

Well, you are making a case, so obviously it is possible to do so. I notice that you seem to accept that this is not the only, and not the only relevant, differentiator. A good deal of clarification of what you mean by "abstract and comprehensive" and "ideas and concepts" is needed, and you have the difficulty that philosophy doesn't have a consensus view about what those terms mean.
The other difficulty you face is the empirical evidence that animals do have communication systems that are, at least, language-like, so you need to show what the "essential" relevant differentiation is between animal languages/communication systems and human languages/communication systems.

I was wanting to get at the meaning of reason, in particular, which is fundamental to the OP. — Wayfarer

I'm not at all sure that there is single, coherent, meaning of reason.

I've read about the Caledonian crow studies and other studies indicating rudimentary reasoning ability in some animals and birds, but I don't see the relevance in terms of the philosophical question at issue, as to what differentiates the rational ability of h.sapiens, 'the rational animal', from other species. — Wayfarer

So the idea that human reason might be a development (hyper-development, perhaps) of abilities that animals have is not entirely implausible to you. Where we may disagree is that you seem to presuppose a cliff-edge distinction between humans and animals. However, if evolution is correct, even in outline, humans have evolved from animals, so the expectation must be that human reason is a development of animal reason. So to understand human reason, we have to understand animal reason. Of course, it is possible that you don't accept the evolutionary approach to these questions.

Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is 'sugar' or what is 'intruder'. He plays and lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; but he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And the dog's field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in h.sapiens -- a potential infinity of knowledge. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

Each differentiation of human from animal arrives out of the blue. I need to understand what each of them amounts to. It looks as if he is not writing from me, but for people who already accept the philosophical ideas that are at stake. There may be much that the dog does not know about sugar and intruders. But there are some things that they do know. What he means by "he does not see the similarlity, the common features as such". "The flash of intelligibility" and "no ear for the intelligible meaning" are particularly obscure, and my understanding of "(universal) idea", "concept", "objectivity" is clearly very different from his.

Intelligence does not see in its function of judgment -- there are not intuitively grasped, universal intelligible principles (say, the principle of identity, or the principle of causality) in which the necessary connection between two concepts is immediately seen by the intellect. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

When someone attacks a doctrine but doesn't bother to ensure that his version of the doctrine coincides with his opponent's understanding of his own doctrine, I'm a bit inclined to suspect that a straw man may be all that is at stake. But it may be that his writing is not directed at his opponents, but to his supporters.

Intelligence does not see in its reasoning function -- there is in the reasoning no transfer of light or intuition, no essentially supra-sensual logical operation which causes the intellect to see the truth of the conclusion by virtue of what is seen in the premises. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

Is he a platonist of some kind? What does "cause" mean here?

When a dog really wants something, whether it's your pizza or your flip-flops, he makes a plan and carries it out step by step. That's nothing like salivating on cue. And they're very good (wolf legacy) at co-ordinating team work. Watch some You Tube videos. — Vera Mont

I'm sorry. There is in; deed a wide spectrum. I wanted to undermine the idea that actions are either rational (plan, execute, enjoy liberty/food/ whatever) or mindless cause/effect. Salivation is not even a voluntary action - it is controlled by an "autonomic" system. Yet making rational connections is possible even at that level.

At some point - about 7000 years ago, but there were interim steps that took much longer - humankind turned against nature and began to treat it as Other/the enemy. — Vera Mont

I don't know. There's so little to go on. But I think you are over-simplifying. Our attitude towards nature is ambivalent, in the sense that there are negative and positive attitudes which play into our interpretation of nature. "We" don't have a single, consistent view of it.

There are people - a growing number of people - who take their own path to simplicity and balance. Global economy, global culture are too big to be changed, but individuals are capable of change. — Vera Mont

Surely there is some room for thinking that when more and more individuals start to change, sometimes the movement gathers weight and pace and ends up changing things at the macro scale?

Far from it. I grew up in a segregated South and the Democratic party supported that. Political winds finally shifted during the 1960s. — jgill

Yes. I knew that. I'm sorry I wasn't clear.
What I didn't know is that most blacks (I'm assuming you mean most blacks who weren't slaves) belonged to the Republican party before the war. I'm confused now.
Perhaps I'm just making a mistake trying to apply the political divisions that apply now to politics then.
I should read up on this more carefully before trying to talk about it.

I was in a math class at the University of Alabama in 1963 when Governor Wallace was asked to step aside and allow two Afro-American students to enroll. He complied and those of us on the sidelines cheered. An old Confederate cannon went off at the time, but I can find no reference to that. — jgill

I remember reading about that. Some of us thought there would be another civil war. I don't remember the reports saying that people cheered when Wallace gave in. That very good to know. It was also my first year at University. Do you think the cannon was a protest or a celebration? Presumably, it didn't have a ball, but was loaded blank?

My first vote for President was the 1960 election, and I caste my ballot for JFK. He had been a genuine war hero, and when he extended my tour in the USAF for a year because the Berlin Wall was going up I forgave him. Turned out it worked out well for me. — jgill

I was almost completely apolitical. That didn't change until 1968. Remembering those terrible yet exciting times makes me a bit less worried now.

I have to be honest. I'm afraid I lost the thread of this conversation. I'm not sure what I was saying here as well.

It's a pity. I thought we were doing well, even if we weren't agreeing. Thank you for your time.

I think there’s a difference between behaviours that can be accounted for in terms of stimulus and response, and behaviours that can be attributed to rational inference. — Wayfarer

"Stimulus and response" can cover a multitude of sins, including rational responses to events as they happen, but I get what you're after. Where I differ from you is that I think that actions can be rational responses even if they are not the result of (conscious) inference. This doesn't actually depend on a single argument, but it seems best to propose one here and develop others as needed. So, forgive me for quoting myself below. Put it down to laziness.

What's more, action without discursive reasons is found in human behaviour. Perhaps the most dramatic example, for philosophers, is the ability of people to use words correctly without being able to give a definition; they are often even more bewildered if they are asked to explain the rules of grammar (linguistic sense). It seems inescapable that articulating one's reasons is itself an example of an activity that is executed without discursive reasons. — Ludwig V

Human observers can obviously perceive the causal relationship between stimulus and response, but I don't think that implies conscious rational calculation ('If I do this, then that will happen') on the part of the animal (or plant). — Wayfarer

When a human, or a dog, smells food, it is an automatic reflex (i.e. not the result of conscious control"). It is by way of a preparation for chewing and digesting food - a product of evolution. Before Pavlov's dogs were fed, a bell was rung. Before long, the dogs started salivating as the bell rang, before the food arrived. In the jargon, they associated the bell with food. Was the response rational or merely causal? In my book, both. I'm not dogmatic about that, but rocks don't change their behaviour like that.

When a dog gets hungry and sometimes just when the smells get tempting, it is will known that they will position themselves where they will be noticed and sit very quietly, but very attentive. This behaviour is called "begging". It is a behaviour that is voluntary, not a reflex. It seems perfectly clear that the dog thinks that if s/he does that, food will happen. It is also perfectly clear that the dog did not say to itself or anyone else "If I do this, that will happen". If you don't call it rational thinking, what do you call it?

I don't think that plants think or believe or feel emotions or have desires. But we do say that they do things. So that's another whole mystery that needs untangling.

It might be worth recalling the distinctions Aristotle makes between different organic forms. — Wayfarer

It certainly is.
Though I sometimes wonder why he left insects and fish out of his hierarchy.

This rational capacity sets humans apart, as it involves deliberation and the ability to grasp universals, which Aristotle sees as the hallmark of true rationality. — Wayfarer

There's that sneaky little "true" rationality. Which means that whether Aristotle did or did not recognize other forms of rationality, you do. For some reason, you don't think that other forms are "really" rational. You cite Aristotle as identifying the critical marks as deliberation and a grasp of universals.

He recognizes at least two forms of deliberative rationality - practical and theoretical. The former directed to action and the latter to contemplation which he thought was infinitely superior to merely practical reason because it is what the gods to and so we are more god-like when we contemplate. If I remember correctly, one of the distinctions between practical and theoretical is that practical is concerned with universals. By that criterion, practical reason is also not "true" rationality. One can understand his reason, but I'm not at all sure that we can accept it.
EDIT Ouch! That should have been "one of the distinctions between practical and theoretical is that practical is NOT concerned with universals". Sorry. Red face!

Alice Juarrero, in her work on causality and complex systems, sees continuity with Aristotle’s notion of formal and final causes. — Wayfarer

Yes. These have more application to living things. He was apply to apply them to the whole universe because he thought that the entire universe was directed to achieving The Good - the supreme good of everything.

I said in my first post here that the goal of rational thinking or reasoning is to arrive at a valid/sound conclusion. Animals do not use rational thinking, but instinctive behavior. — L'éléphant

I think we're talking past each other. The short explanation is that we have different ideas about the goal of rational thinking. Let me put it this way. Arriving at a valid/sound conclusion may sometimes be the point of the exercise (as it usually is in philosophical discussion, for example). But very often the point of a valid/sound conclusion is that it is a better basis for successful action.

In particular, it enables the organism to adapt behaviour to circumstances, whereas purely instinctive behaviour, which cannot, by definition, adapt, is likely to be less successful and even counter-productive. However, very often, what animals (and people) do is a combination of instinct and rationality. Birds have an instinct to build nests, and do so in different ways according to species. But, inevitably, they have to pursue that goal in negotiation with their environment. Hunger is "hard-wired", but how we satisfy hunger is extremely flexible in response to the environment that we find ourselves in.

When we observe human behaviour, we do not hesitate to interpret (read) their behaviour as rational even when we have no access to their given reasons. If you like, we reconstruct their reasons, in order to make sense of their behaviour. To be sure, we make certain assumptions, which may be falsified and reconstructions based on them can be contested either at the level of the assumptions themselves or at the level of the specific reasons attributed.

What's more, action without discursive reasons is found in human behaviour. Perhaps the most dramatic example, for philosophers, is the ability of people to use words correctly without being able to give a definition; they are often even more bewildered if they are asked to explain the rules of grammar (linguistic sense). It seems inescapable that articulating one's reasons is itself an example of an activity that is executed without discursive reasons.

You said, "purpose", "rewarding" and "reasonable to suppose". All these are fine -- nothing wrong with this behavior, but it is not rational thinking. .... Did the parrot articulate to you his reasoning for mimicking? It looks reasonable to you, but you did not arrive at this 'reasonableness' by discussing it with the parrot. — L'éléphant

So when we see animals adapting their behaviour to circumstances, we are inclined to read their behaviour as rational even though we have no access to any verbal account. It seems to me to be a reasonable extension of our practice in relation to other human beings. What's more, it works.

Personally, I have difficulty in applying this process to insects and fish and I often feel that people anthropomorphize too far. A dog might sympathize at my distress when I can't find my glasses, but I don't think that s/he necessarily understand what my glasses are. But I have no doubt that lobsters are frightened when they get caught, so this is not binary issue.

Do we have a member here in the forum that is dog or a parrot? Then let us invite that parrot on this thread and let him lay out his reasons for mimicking. — L'éléphant

It's tempting to think that the discursive account by agents of their reasons is the gold standard. It is true that it will often give us details that we cannot read off from the behaviour or the context. But, the rational reconstruction is often so persuasive that when the verbal account of reasons conflicts with our rational reconstruction, we are often (but not always) inclined to give preference to the rational reconstruction.
So if animals could tell us what "their" reasons were, we would not necessarily believe them.

Well, I skimmed them. I'll read them more carefully.

Thanks for the Wittgenstein quotation. I had forgotten it.

The upper midwest of the US doesn't harbor many red squirrels, so I'm not familiar with their behavior. Grey squirrels are everywhere around here. They usually are grey with a white belly, but they sometimes are black or white (not a seasonal change). — BC

Your greys are a bit different from ours. I've never heard of black or white ones. It wouldn't be surprising if the two groups diverged over time. I wish I could post a picture of a red for you - their ear tufts are incredible.

I've read about the terrorism directed at your red squirrels by the Yankee grey squirrels. Social scientists and psychoanalysts have not been able to determine what, exactly, is the source of this inter-squirrel hostility. — BC

You mean that the cognitive dissonance created by the similarity combined with the difference in colour is not sufficient? They should read some social history.

It's not hard to let them eat out of your hand; even to sit on your knee and eat the offered peanuts. I've established such a relationship several times since I was a kid. I'm more fastidious as an old guy, and would just as soon NOT have even cute rodents sitting on me. — BC

I hate to say this, but most people in the UK regard grey squirrels as vermin along with rats and mice. But that's because the red squirrels are much cuter and the greys are immigrants and consequently are thought to have no right to exist.

The urban grey squirrel readily exploits human behavior. The smart squirrels on the University of Minnesota campus follow people carrying paper bags. If you stop, because you happen to like squirrels, they'll go so far as to climb up your pant leg to access the presumed food in your bag. This is somewhat disconcerting. — BC

There was a lot of fuss in sea-side tourist resorts a few years ago. People couldn't resist feeding the sea-gulls (herring-gulls) with sandwiches and potato chips. Then the sea-gulls took to swooping down and grabbing them from their hands as they were munching them. I haven't heard any complaints recently. People must have learnt not to "open-carry" goodies along the sea front.

Thanks. Obvious once you know. I can see the rationale for both projects. Beyond that, I'm not competent.

because the latter is pop-sci / metaphysical hype and the former is a scientific research program. — 180 Proof

I had the impression that Einstein pursued the T.O.E at one point. So how come you are so scornful of it? Especially as the G.U.T. looks like a stepping-stone to the T.O.E.

Sorry, I don't know what G.U.T. and T.O.E are. Could one of you explain?

I am still a registered Democrat, but it has been awhile since I have thought of myself as one. — jgill

Same here. It's the Dems who changed, not me. — fishfry

I can't really talk about the Dems, but I have the impression that the Dems, back in the day, were an alliance of (mainly social) liberals and political left wingers; there was also a lot of support in the South, which goes back to the civil war. If that's true, there's a very similar phenomenon in the UK. The Labour party has always been a rather uneasy alliance between those two points of view. It's not unreasonable, because both were in opposition to existing orthodoxy, just on rather different grounds and with rather different aims.

The last ten years in the UK were largely based around this problem, which got hugely focused on Brexit, though it was never just about that. The promises have been revealed as fantasies, and now we have to make the best of a bad job.

The problem arose because of the success of the social liberal movement, which became a new orthodoxy, in many ways, but also transformed. Many social liberals became successful and powerful and so acquired a new point of view. "Socialism" became more of a threat to them and they espoused free market ideologies, which had been their route to success and became their security. This left the left wing isolated and nearly powerless.

Do you (two) think that I'm talking rubbish, or does this fit with what has happened to you?

For me, it does fit, with one further development since the good old days. The liberation movements since the successes between, say, 1950 and 2000 have moved on as the generations have changed, and some of the demands and expectations seem to me more problematic than the original demands. I'm very hesitant about this because I am just an old fogey who has fallen behind the times. Nonetheless, I'm not comfortable. But I'm even more uncomfortable with what the free market ideology has become.