One can interpret things that way. I don't think it's obvious.ust taking the sentence alone without specifying that it was uttered, so that it wasn't in a context where the utterance is intended to refer to a particular experience of the utterer's, the word "orange" still logically refers to the colour of some fictional orange afterimage. — Janus
What could it mean to say that the word 'orange' in this sentence "I saw an orange after-image" didn't refer to the orange after-image I saw? What would the lack of reference there look like? — Janus
I hope I didn't give the impression of disrespect. Is he not saying that we judge our acts by reasons for and against? — Antony Nickles
we do not make anything explicit before we do an act — Antony Nickles
If we picture communication working that way, then we are a slippery slope from attributing "intention" to each act, or imagining morality as a matter of working out what is best ahead of time. — Antony Nickles
:up:we’re smart enough and sympathetic enough that we assume that other people experience much the same thing. We’re very good at projection. — Michael
I find that attitude unconvincing because I see it as over-simplistic. — Janus
it's possible that you are creatively misreading Wittgenstein. — Janus
The "proof" is if you can see it for yourself; come to the same conclusion. I would say the idea of this kind of Truth is that it is accepted, adopted more than justified, which I would agree gives it the feeling of being not tied to specific grounds of the here and now. — Antony Nickles
But then this gets back to the argument against the author and the fixing of the meaning of texts according to the intentions of the author. — Janus
It's actually Wittgenstein, — Antony Nickles
I took you to be referring to it. — Janus
BTW your new name evokes some associations which you may or may not have meant to invoke. — Janus
does 'poison' refer to toxins or to danger or both? — Janus
Right, I'd say the meanings of words are not "anchored" in anything other than the fact that individuals associate them (as sounds or marks) with items they have experienced. — Janus
What I was alluding to was something a little different: that we encounter number on account of pattern, difference, similarity and repetition, all of which are inherent in perception. — Janus
I like the stressing of the choice to begin with the inner.a presumed gulf between inner and outer and the choice to begin with the former. — Jamal
I love Husserl, and I've been reading The Husserl Dictionary lately, and I'm impressed by all the terms he forged. As far as I can tell, he never stopped evolving and changing as a philosopher. As you may know, Derrida was a Husserl specialist, and of course Heidegger was the bad son.And who is well-known for having introduced the concept of 'lebenswelt' into the philosophical lexicon? — Wayfarer
In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each "I-the-man" and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this 'living together.' We, as living in wakeful world-consciousness, are constantly active on the basis of our passive having of the world... Obviously this is true not only for me, the individual ego; rather we, in living together, have the world pre-given in this together, belong, the world as world for all, pre-given with this ontic meaning... The we-subjectivity... [is] constantly functioning.
:up:When philosophers talk about the “I”, they presuppose the “we”, because they do not mean a single empirical subject but the universal form of subjectivity — Jamal
What the observer brings to experience is a perspective, a point of view, only within which any statement about what is real or what exists is meaningful. — Wayfarer
You have just referred to it positively and in a way anyone might understand; we all probably know that experience of the orange candle flame, so what's the problem?
I wouldn't say it overflows conceptuality, in the telling at least, since 'orange, 'candle' and 'flame' are all concepts. — Janus
When people are focused on making claims, it seems that they are mostly much more concerned with convincing others to their way of thinking than they are with being sure that they are consistent in their own thinking. — Janus
I can't honestly say I'm much impressed by Wittgenstein. I have tried to read his main works and never gotten far. I've read several secondary works, but the ideas seem pedestrian and have never really grabbed me, although some of his aphorisms are good. I know saying that amounts to heresy in the eyes of many, but there it is. — Janus
Numbers as metaphors for objects? — Janus
The point of that paragraph is to illustrate the sense in which time and space - or duration and location - are provided by the observer and have no fixed or absolute reality outside that. — Wayfarer
I agree that we are metaphorical creatures and that is precisely why I would say meaning can indeed be divorced from use. — Janus
Neither mathematical logic nor empirical testability are applicable in the case of the idea that meaning can be divorced from use. — Janus
Allusions to famous philosopher's arguments in lieu of laying them out in your own words (which I haven't seen but if there are such layings-out, then all you have to do is point out where they are) doesn't cut it for me; it reads like an appeal to authority. — Janus
One does not have to decide about the limits of the law (in regard to Paul's view) to see how Augustine made the issue about a personal choice. — Paine
I am not ascribing to that view but think it is closer to what Feuerbach was talking about than the Gospels taken by themselves. — Paine
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/19322/19322-h/19322-h.htmIf I understand anything at all about this great symbolist, it is this: that he regarded only subjective realities as realities, as “truths” —that he saw everything else, everything natural, temporal, spatial and historical, merely as signs, as materials for parables. The concept of “the Son of God” does not connote a concrete person in history, an isolated and definite individual, but an “eternal” fact, a psychological symbol set free from the concept of time. The same thing is true, and in the highest sense, of the God of this typical symbolist, of the “kingdom of God,” and of the “sonship of God.” ...the word “Son” expresses entrance into the feeling that there is a general transformation of all things (beatitude), and “Father” expresses that feeling itself—the sensation of eternity and of perfection.
The “kingdom of heaven” is a state of the heart—not something to come “beyond the world” or “after death.” The whole idea of natural death is absent from the Gospels: death is not a bridge, not a passing; it is absent because it belongs to a quite different, a merely apparent world, useful only as a symbol. The “hour of death” is not a Christian idea—“hours,” time, the physical life and its crises have no existence for the bearer of “glad tidings.”... The “kingdom of God” is not something that men wait for: it had no yesterday and no day after tomorrow, it is not going to come at a “millennium”—it is an experience of the heart, it is everywhere and it is nowhere....
...
This “bearer of glad tidings” died as he lived and taught—not to “save mankind,” but to show mankind how to live. It was a way of life that he bequeathed to man: his demeanour before the judges, before the officers, before his accusers—his demeanour on the cross. He does not resist; he does not defend his rights; he makes no effort to ward off the most extreme penalty—more, he invites it.... And he prays, suffers and loves with those, in those, who do him evil....
— Nietzsche
It is in direct contradiction to the Sermon on the Mount and the letter of the Law. My guess is the influence of Paul, which can b seen throughout the synoptic gospels. — Fooloso4