You say “only within which [a point of view] any statement about what is real or what exists is meaningful”, and I can equally say that only within a community of speakers is any such statement meaningful, and further, only within such a community does your observer even exist. — Jamal

Incidentally, epistemology steps in here to say it’s only from a in my single point of view that I can find any secure knowledge, the “community of speakers” being relatively uncertain. But that’s just the Cartesian mistake, based on a presumed gulf between inner and outer and the choice to begin with the former.

a presumed gulf between inner and outer and the choice to begin with the former. — Jamal

I like the stressing of the choice to begin with the inner.

I suspect this is connected to Kojeve's framing of stoics and skeptics as denying/escaping their bondage in the real world by insisting on a secret, inner freedom --saving them from risking their lives in a battle with the lord of this world. Antithetical values. Spirit is invisible, immaterial, uncaged. Feeling is first.

What I was alluding to was something a little different: that we encounter number on account of pattern, difference, similarity and repetition, all of which are inherent in perception. — Janus

Ah. I might call that abstraction or the methodical ignoring of differences that make no difference.

Right, I'd say the meanings of words are not "anchored" in anything other than the fact that individuals associate them (as sounds or marks) with items they have experienced. — Janus

While association is a plausible explanation on the local level (how participants learn), I think it's worth focusing exactly on the social interactions involving signs and (for the moment) ignoring the internals of the participants. We can study words and other gestures, as if we were aliens, and learn to predict actions that follow such words, and so on.

The latest bots have only piles of examples from which to gather such structure. In my view, the coming triumph of these bots (their eerie facility with language) will force us to question what meaning is in a way that only a few weird philosophers have managed to do so far.

And who are these people just sitting around observing all the time? Why are they the paradigmatic subjects when others are busy doing stuff?

That sounds like Heidegger. Are you a fan of the work ?

I haven’t read Heidegger. There was a time when I was very attracted to his early thought and I’d planned to read it, but lately I’ve been swayed by Adorno’s rather scornful criticism. But I see what you mean with respect to the observer. However, I think that aspect of Heidegger is shared among a few other twentieth century thinkers.

I remember liking Adorno's The Jargon of Authenticity. Fascinating character.

As far as Heidegger's ideas being shared, I agree. I think the later Wittgenstein is pretty close to the early Heidegger. Lee Braver's Groundless Grounds makes a case for this. I also think Hegel and Feuerbach contain much that Heidegger is associated with. The point about unwittingly presupposing language is in Kierkegaard's journal. So it goes. Not much new beneath the sun. But I maintain that 'the Dilthey draft' of B&T is a mean 100 pages. Heidegger said it more directly (in terms of theses) (for better or worse) than Wittgenstein.

I think the later Wittgenstein is pretty close to the early Heidegger. Lee Braver's Groundless Grounds makes a case for this — plaque flag

Yes, I was thinking about that. I read it years ago.

We can study words and other gestures, as if we were aliens, and learn to predict actions that follow such words, and so on. — plaque flag

True, we can do that. If we didn't know a language and found ourselves stuck among its speakers with no one to teach us, we might have to learn that way. But if they had some words which signified certain
emotions that we didn't ever experience then we could never learn the meanings of those words until we were fluent enough to ask for explanations of them, in which case we might gain some sense of their meaning.

In my view, the coming triumph of these bots (their eerie facility with language) will force us to question what meaning is in a way that only a few weird philosophers have managed to do so far. — plaque flag

Perhaps, but I don't think it likely since we can be fairly confident that bots don't have any sense of meaning, which would mean they don't really understand what words mean, they are just programmed to be able to put coherent sentences together, a facility which relies on their being able to mimic grammatical structure based on statistical data showing how ceartin questions elicit certain kinds of responses. Or something like that, I imagine ("I imagine" since I know next to nothing about programming).

Ah. I might call that abstraction or the methodical ignoring of differences that make no difference. — plaque flag

Yes we call it abstraction or generalization. If we are counting trees the differences between them don't matter, they just have to be similar enough to be counted as trees. It seems plausible to me to think this was done long before any conception of methodology had arrived on the scene.

they don't really understand what words mean, they are just programmed to be able to put coherent sentences together, a facility which relies on their being able to mimic grammatical structure based on statistical data showing how certain questions elicit certain kinds of responses. — Janus

But what if we are hardware 'designed' by evolution to do roughly the same thing ? These things can reason. They can outperform humans on important tests. It's starting to look like humans are superstitious about their own nature. As far as I can tell, it boils down to the problem of the meaning of being, the problem of the being of meaning, the problem of the thereness of 'qualia'. And I claim we don't have a grip on it. Don't and maybe can't say what we mean. That special something that sets us apart is requiring a more and more negative theology. We are the shadows cast by tomorrow's synthetic divinity ?

If we didn't know a language and found ourselves stuck among its speakers with no one to teach us, we might have to learn that way. — Janus

Add interaction to the mix, and I think babies must learn this way.

[deleted remark]

Speak for yourself — Wayfarer

That's just it. Private referents don't make sense. Meanings and rational norms are public. That's how we can agree enough to intelligibly disagree. I'm not trapped in a little meatsuit. I'm softwhere, a locus of responsibility, an infinite task, a selfreferential vortext. We are made of the same signstuff, different experiment versions of the tribal ego, adversarial and cooperative candidates for partial assimilation by the tribe at large, memevendors with our shops on the same boardwalk.

.

I deleted the remark of mine you’re commenting on because it was impulsive and not constructive.

You mean, the reality that exists in the absence of any observers, right?
— Wayfarer

I mean the reality that the observers are part of and that is bigger than them. — Jamal

As the issue at hand is the role of the observer in the construction of reality, then the assertion of a reality that is 'bigger than the observers' begs the question - it assumes what needs to be shown.

“….. When we try to discover the nature of the reality behind the shadows, we are confronted with the fact that all discussion of the ultimate nature of things must necessarily be barren unless we have some extraneous standards against which to compare them. For this reason, to borrow Locke's phrase, "the real essence of substances" is forever unknowable. We can only progress by discussing the laws which govern the changes of substances, and so produce the phenomena of the external world. These we can compare with the abstract creations of our own mind…”
(James Jeans, “The Mysterious Universe”, 1930, in “Quantum Physics and Ultimate Reality Mystical Writings of Great Physicists”, Michael Green, 2013)

Big doings back in those days, for sure. The ultimate Humpy Dumpty.

As you imply, what hurts us is real for that reason. — plaque flag

The deeper metaphysical issue here is that in order to say that what hurts us is real, we must assume that the hurt itself is real, because the hurt has logical priority. So the conclusion that what hurts us is real is derived from the premise that the hurt is real. Now the metaphysical question is what does it mean to be hurt.

This is where the icon analogy is relevant. Hurt is simply a meaningful sensation representing some sort of damage to the living system. We could say it's a symbol The base tactile sensations are all like this, pleasure, pain, soft, rough, firm, etc., they are simply symbols of meaning, significance. The higher senses like hearing and sight, or even taste and smell, are able to discern many finer differences, so they can build much more complex structures of meaning, through these many different symbols produced. But they all can be seen to be like icons, fundamentally, as symbols of significance.

Where the analogy is limited, is that unlike the icons we really do not adequately understand the underlying significance. And despite the claim of 'fitness" we really do not understand the value structure, upon which all these feelings, pleasure pain, etc., are supported. reproductive fitness really does not suffice here. Furthermore, we do not adequately understand the system which constructs the symbols either. So the real problem turns around this value structure which creates these symbols of significance, sensations. It must be a structure of value because the basics are grounded in the categories of pleasure and pain.

There you go again. We’re not talking about the location of a system, but only the location of a faculty within it. — Mww

It's you who is creating the problem by saying that this faculty is 'within" the system. By doing this you are necessarily confining the possible location to 'within" the system. Now "the system" refers to something physical, the material body, so you've restricted us to a materialist premise by saying that this faculty must be within the system. This excludes the possibility that the faculty is related to the system, as cause to effect. In the case of freely willed, intentional acts, the system is the body, and the faculty moves the system. By Plato's analysis it is incorrect to say that the soul is "in" the body.

Using your parlance, the reality of any judgement just is that judgement. Even basic understanding grants judgement to be merely a conclusion of some kind, which immediately presupposes that which makes it possible. So not all that is necessary is the reality of a conclusion, which wouldn’t even occur without its antecedents. Besides, we don’t care about the reality of judgements, insofar as we cannot possibly escape them. What we care about, is their validity, which cannot be determined by the judgement itself. — Mww

I agree with the first, the reality of a judgement is the judgement itself. Further, we can consider the effects of a judgement, and we might consider the causes of a judgement. Do you agree?

You say, that a judgement presupposes "that which makes it possible". By using the word "possible", this does not necessarily refer to the cause of the judgement, but more like the physical conditions which allow for a judgement to occur. Would you agree, that as well as "that which makes it possible", there must also be an actual cause, that which makes the judgement actual, and this we could call the agent in the judgement? So we would have the physical conditions which make a specific judgement possible, and also an agent which makes the actual judgement.

Why do you think that we do not care about the reality of judgements? Isn't this the debate of free will vs determinism, the question of whether judgement is real. Do you not apprehend the ramifications of this question, in relation to validity? If judgement is not real, and that which appears to be a judgement is causally determined simply by the passing of time, then there is no difference between valid and invalid. The apparent "judgement" is what it is, by causal determinism, it can not be otherwise. Any supposed further judgements like valid or invalid are completely unnecessary, and irrelevant, because the judgement simply is what it is.

I think that we are back to the principles of the argument against mistake in sensation. If sensation is simply a determinist cause/effect relation, then there is no mistake in sensation, it simply is what it is. But that's what I see as clearly wrong, because it leaves the human being without free will, and completely determined. Then judgement is not real.

Odds are I’m going to regret this, but it might be helpful to know what you think judgement is. — Mww

That's what I'm working on bringing out. It seems you might already regret being involved in this.

The idea that science give a view from everywhere is wrong. The scientific view is from anywhere. — Banno

What Wayfarer shows is that this proposal, the view from anywhere, does not make any sense. It is incoherent, an oxymoron, because a view must be from somewhere or else it would not be a view. Therefore your understanding of science, as being a view from everywhere, is wrong as incoherent, it does not describe what science really is.

You could alter that proposal, and say that science attempts to be a view from everywhere. But that makes no sense either, to say that science would attempt to do something which is illogical, as incoherent. So the proposal really just shows a misunderstanding of what science really is, or aims to do.

As the issue at hand is the role of the observer in the construction of reality, then the assertion of a reality that is 'bigger than the observers' begs the question - it assumes what needs to be shown. — Wayfarer

Fair point, but since I wasn’t trying to show that there is such a reality, this might be a slightly unfair accusation. When I said that idealism is parasitic on the real, it was semi-rhetorical; I perhaps could have said, more boringly, that idealism is parasitic on that which is contingent and transient, which I happen to believe is the reality that is bigger than us. So Kantian-style idealism cannot thereby escape the accusation that it secretly depends on empirical facts--actual people and actual society--to ground its supposedly foundational pure a priori concepts, i.e., its posited transcendentally subjective conditions for objective reality. Since empirical facts are what this idealism is supposed to be explaining with these conceptual conditions, I'm effectively accusing idealism of question-begging.

In a nutshell I'm arguing that the subjective route to the objective, as exemplified by Kant and Schopenhauer, and more loosely other kinds of idealism that seek foundations in some pure and necessary universality removed from the quotidian chaos, are more grounded in empirical contingency than they think. This argument does not rest on realism, though it's motivated by it.

(that's more or less straight out of Schopenhauer) — Wayfarer

And mine is straight out of of Adorno :grin:

However, it's interesting that Adorno's attitude differs from my own instinctive sympathies in that he is keen not to just join the realists against the idealists, while at the same time also criticizing idealism. This is to do with his basically dialectical approach to everything, where opposite poles are mutually dependent, and both idealism and realism are somehow true. Maybe.

But I’m probably some way off-topic here; I haven’t read up on Hoffman.

We’re not talking about the location of a system, but only the location of a faculty within it.
— Mww

Now "the system" refers to something physical, the material body, so you've restricted us to a materialist premise by saying that this faculty must be within the system. — Metaphysician Undercover

Another unwarranted deductive inference. Excepting perception, no concept used thus far in this dialectic can be associated with a material system. In fact, I stated for the record I’m working with abstract conceptual analysis, which makes explicit an isolated metaphysical system.

This excludes the possibility that the faculty is related to the system, as cause to effect. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a closed physical system, it is the material that is necessary cause for metaphysical effect. But in the metaphysical system itself, any faculty contained in it is necessarily related to, but may not be caused by, some other faculty in that same system, re: cum hoc ergo propter hoc logical inconsistency.
————-

we can consider the effects of a judgement, and we might consider the causes of a judgement. Do you agree? — Metaphysician Undercover

Not in so many words, no. Given a purely logical metaphysical system, the consequence of judgement is determined by its antecedents. Cause/effect doesn’t say enough, and there is an argument, perhaps too obscure for this particular discussion, that because cause/effect is a category and the categories are only applicable to empirical conditions, cause/effect does not apply to purely logical systems, which are concerned merely with rational form without regard for empirical content.

You say, that a judgement presupposes "that which makes it possible". By using the word "possible", this does not necessarily refer to the cause of the judgement, but more like the physical conditions which allow for a judgement to occur. — Metaphysician Undercover

In this case, cause is better than physical conditions, but again, with respect to a purely logical system, antecedent is better than cause. An effect presupposes its cause but does not presuppose any knowledge or understanding of it. In judgement, which is a logical conclusion, the antecedents are also presupposed, but they are always understood, in accordance with their respective placement and functionality in the system.

That there is an absolutely necessary physicalism involved here is given, but it is irrelevant with respect to metaphysical systems. The former we can’t talk about because we don’t understand enough about it to answer all it is possible to ask, we can talk about the latter because its very invention, from which its understanding is given automatically, was in order to talk about all it is possible to ask.

Would you agree, that as well as "that which makes it possible", there must also be an actual cause, that which makes the judgement actual, and this we could call the agent in the judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. The agent is not in the judgement, the agent is of the judgement, although you might get away with agency is in the judgement. Judgement relates to an agent, insofar as the one belongs to the other, but an agent does not relate to a judgement, insofar as the agent does not belong to the judgement. Judgement relates to agency as the one is only possible from the other, and agency relates to judgement as the one is necessary for the other.

Why do you think that we do not care about the reality of judgements? — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said….they are inescapable. It is impossible that there be no judgement. Again, in accordance with the predicates of a particular speculative metaphysical system. Which of course, has absolutely NO WARRANT FOR BEING RIGHT. Logically coherent and internal consistent, yes; correct….not a chance.

Take a hint, fercrissakes!!!!
—————

If sensation is simply a determinist cause/effect relation, then there is no mistake in sensation, it simply is what it is. But that's what I see as clearly wrong, because it leaves the human being without free will, and completely determined. Then judgement is not real. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no mistake in sensation. Determinism from human sensory physiology grounded in natural law.
In a strictly representational cognitive system, on the other hand, in which the natural determinism of sensory apparatus, re: Plato’s “knowledge that”** or Russell’s “knowledge by acquaintance”, Kant’s “appearance”, is translated into purely logical explanations immediately upon loss of empirical explanatory knowledge, the loss of which occurs as soon as consciousness of the operations of the physiological system is lost, leaves the human being to fend for himself, but still legislated, not by natural law, but by logical law in the form of the LNC.
(**quotation marks here indicative of attribution to the respective author’s terminology, to nip that in the bud)

The loss of consciousness of operational conditions and therefore empirical knowledge in fact occurs, but only at the faculty of intuition, an altogether abstract conceptual device, which is the point where real physical objects become represented as mere phenomena. We are not the least bit conscious of this activity, however physiological it still is, re: peripheral nervous system constituency, hence can say nothing about it with respect to empirical knowledge. Even more importantly, without this conscious awareness, we can say nothing whatsoever about the effect the real object has on the subject himself, which in turn reflects on the absence of subjective agency, which in its turn, eliminates any form of judgement being present in the faculty of sensibility.
————

it might be helpful to know what you think judgement is.
— Mww

That's what I'm working on bringing out. It seems you might already regret being involved in this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nahhh, I got nothing better to do. Beats the shit outta these woke social-media oriented dweeb’s topics hereabouts.

Anyway….editorializing aside…..I’ve posited some boundaries/limitations on it, but I’m going to wait til you work on bringing out what you think it is, before going further. I’m sure you’ll bring along your own necessary presuppositions in support, cuz you’re gonna need ‘em.

Telling an Australian how to punt? :lol:

In the post in which this discussion started, you claimed that one could accept idealism and realism simultaneously, that this was an acceptable paradox, analogous to other supposed paradoxes. — Banno

Sorry if I was bringing "coals to Newcastle". I wasn't sure that the American football idiom would have the same meaning for those who are not allowed to touch the ball with their hands. :joke:

Apparently, my idiomatic use of the terms "Idealism" and "Realism" also did not translate for you. To some absolutist thinkers, they are like oil & water, which don't mix. But in the Enformationism thesis, aethereal Ideas & Real stuff grow from the same root : Generic Information. I don't expect you to blithely accept my idiosyncratic Holistic (multi-value) BothAnd*1 worldview. FWIW, it is a modern alternative to the ancient classical Either/Or (two value) compartmentation, which ignores complexity and divides the world into convenient categories and stark oppositions. Either/Or is an idealized worldview.

Instead, the 21st century BothAnd Principle derives from the 20th century Quantum Uncertainty Principle*2, which acknowledges a "fundamental limit" to human knowledge. BothAnd also accepts such counter-intuitive "facts" as Wave/Particle duality, for which you can't draw a hard line between those classical definitions. In my worldview, mental Ideas exist within the same Reality as material objects, not in some heavenly realm. So the line between Ideal & Real is arbitrary. It's all one universal system, stemming from a single source. Therefore, the exclusive Paradox exists in your mind, not in the world. :nerd:


*1.   The BothAnd principle is one of Balance, Symmetry and Proportion. It eschews the absolutist categories of Idealism vs Realism, in favor of the relative compromises of Pragmatism. It espouses the Practical Wisdom of the Greek philosophers, instead of the Perfect Wisdom of the Hebrew Priests. The BA principle of pragmatism requires “skin in the game” to provide real-world feedback, which counter-balances the extremism of Idealism & Realism. That feedback establishes limits to freedom and boundaries to risk-taking. BA is a principle of Character & Virtue, viewed as Phronesis or Pragmatism, instead of Piety or Perfectionism.

*2. Uncertainty Principle :
In quantum mechanics, the uncertainty principle is any of a variety of mathematical inequalities asserting a fundamental limit to the accuracy with which the values for certain pairs of physical quantities of a particle, such as position, x, and momentum, p, can be predicted from initial conditions. ___Wikipedia

It was an offhand remark, so I will say that 'what hurts us is real' is not a considered final thesis. But let me try to expand it so that it's more defensible. 'Hurt' doesn't refer to immaterial pain here. I mean instead damage to our ability to thrive and replicate. We are stubbornly persistent patterns who leap over the graves of our hosts. It's hard to see how a 'mind' (control module, tribal-individual software) will persist if it tends to ignore what is likely to harm it in this way. Patterns that don't tend to avoid harm (their destruction) and seek help (what they require) tend to vanish.

As the issue at hand is the role of the observer in the construction of reality, then the assertion of a reality that is 'bigger than the observers' begs the question - it assumes what needs to be shown. — Wayfarer

I think the issue is that the observer without observed is like the left without the right. Some concepts come in pairs.

we can be fairly confident that bots don't have any sense of meaning, which would mean they don't really understand what words mean — Janus

If we are confident, is such confidence logically justified or just mere meatbias ? For most of our history, we have done what we like with machines, without worrying about their feelings, excepting of course some of the the 'machines' provided by biological evolution.

If 'sense of meaning' is understood to be immaterial and invisible to scientific and perhaps even conceptual approach, it's hard to see how such an assumption can be justified.

Anyway….editorializing aside…..I’ve posited some boundaries/limitations on it, but I’m going to wait til you work on bringing out what you think it is, before going further. I’m sure you’ll bring along your own necessary presuppositions in support, cuz you’re gonna need ‘em. — Mww

We're going to have to discuss these boundaries. I think your proposal of a purely logical system is untenable. There is no way to free ourselves from content in an absolute way. Some types of formalism attempt this task, but what happens is that the content gets hidden within the form and this leaves the logic less reliable.

Another unwarranted deductive inference. Excepting perception, no concept used thus far in this dialectic can be associated with a material system. In fact, I stated for the record I’m working with abstract conceptual analysis, which makes explicit an isolated metaphysical system. — Mww

I have no idea what you mean here by "metaphysical system".

In a closed physical system, it is the material that is necessary cause for metaphysical effect. But in the metaphysical system itself, any faculty contained in it is necessarily related to, but may not be caused by, some other faculty in that same system, re: cum hoc ergo propter hoc logical inconsistency. — Mww

It makes no sense to me, to talk about a faculty which is contained within a metaphysical system. A metaphysical system, to the extent that this makes any sense, would be the product of the faculty which produces it.

Not in so many words, no. Given a purely logical metaphysical system, the consequence of judgement is determined by its antecedents. Cause/effect doesn’t say enough, and there is an argument, perhaps too obscure for this particular discussion, that because cause/effect is a category and the categories are only applicable to empirical conditions, cause/effect does not apply to purely logical systems, which are concerned merely with rational form without regard for empirical content. — Mww

You've gone off on some strange tangent. What the heck is a "purely logical metaphysical system"? These assertions you are making are not based in anything. There is no such thing as "purely logical systems, which are concerned merely with rational form without regard for empirical content", because even a logical form requires expression through the means of symbols which demonstrate the method, and these symbols are empirical content.

No. The agent is not in the judgement, the agent is of the judgement, although you might get away with agency is in the judgement. Judgement relates to an agent, insofar as the one belongs to the other, but an agent does not relate to a judgement, insofar as the agent does not belong to the judgement. Judgement relates to agency as the one is only possible from the other, and agency relates to judgement as the one is necessary for the other. — Mww

Yes, this is the point, the agent is necessary for the judgement. So my point was that the agent, as cause, is something other than the conditions which make judgement possible.

As I said….they are inescapable. It is impossible that there be no judgement. Again, in accordance with the predicates of a particular speculative metaphysical system. Which of course, has absolutely NO WARRANT FOR BEING RIGHT. Logically coherent and internal consistent, yes; correct….not a chance.

Take a hint, fercrissakes!!!! — Mww

I really do not understand what you are saying here. I'm not good at communicating through hints. If there are judgements, as you assert, then there is necessarily right and wrong. Right and wrong are the necessary presuppositions for judgement. If right and wrong are not presupposed, then there is no will to judge, therefore no judgement.

So, in you own words, you are being incoherent, and inconsistent, to say that it is impossible that there be no judgement, but also claim in the same statement that there is no warrant for being right. If judgement is necessary, then right or wrong is also necessary.

You've dug yourself into a hole, because in reality judgement is not necessary, it is freely chosen. Therefore it is possible that there is no judgement, and this is the first principle of some forms of skepticism, to suspend judgement. Once you allow that judgement is voluntary, rather than necessary, then you see that it is possible that there be no judgement, and only from this perspective could you conclude that there is "no warrant for being right". But the way you presented it, where judgement is necessary ("impossible that there be no judgement"), it is logically inconsistent or incoherent to say that there is no warrant for being right.

There is no mistake in sensation. Determinism from human sensory physiology grounded in natural law.
In a strictly representational cognitive system, on the other hand, in which the natural determinism of sensory apparatus, re: Plato’s “knowledge that”** or Russell’s “knowledge by acquaintance”, Kant’s “appearance”, is translated into purely logical explanations immediately upon loss of empirical explanatory knowledge, the loss of which occurs as soon as consciousness of the operations of the physiological system is lost, leaves the human being to fend for himself, but still legislated, not by natural law, but by logical law in the form of the LNC.
(**quotation marks here indicative of attribution to the respective author’s terminology, to nip that in the bud) — Mww

As I said, "purely logical explanations" is fictional nonsense.

The loss of consciousness of operational conditions and therefore empirical knowledge in fact occurs, but only at the faculty of intuition, an altogether abstract conceptual device, which is the point where real physical objects become represented as mere phenomena. We are not the least bit conscious of this activity, however physiological it still is, re: peripheral nervous system constituency, hence can say nothing about it with respect to empirical knowledge. Even more importantly, without this conscious awareness, we can say nothing whatsoever about the effect the real object has on the subject himself, which in turn reflects on the absence of subjective agency, which in its turn, eliminates any form of judgement being present in the faculty of sensibility. — Mww

You describe a situation here, in which judgements are being made (objects are being represented as phenomena) without conscious activity, then you make the inconsistent conclusion that there is no form of judgement present. If the object is not present in sensibility as the object, but instead there is a representation, or phenomenon, then we must conclude that something decides how the object will be represented. How do you not understand this? How do you think that something could make a representation without some form of judgement as to how this will be done?

'Hurt' doesn't refer to immaterial pain here. I mean instead damage to our ability to thrive and replicate. — plaque flag

The problem though, is that what is real, and present to us, is the feeling of pain. So when you talk about "our ability to thrive and replicate", this is just an interpretation of the real hurt, the feeling we get when we suffer such damage. And since this hurt may be interpreted in many different ways, this is why it is appropriate to understand these sensations as symbols.

It's hard to see how a 'mind' (control module, tribal-individual software) will persist if it tends to ignore what is likely to harm it in this way. Patterns that don't tend to avoid harm (their destruction) and seek help (what they require) tend to vanish. — plaque flag

This is but an initiation to the problem. We all die and vanish, so that's not the issue. The purpose of the hurt therefore is not to incline us to avoid the harm so that we do not vanish. Vanishing is already inevitable. So what is the real purpose of the hurt? Is it so that we might continue to reproduce? Surviving and reproducing are two very different purposes. The former promotes a continued existence of the same. The latter promotes difference.

The problem though, is that what is real, and present to us, is the feeling of pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Personally I reject the thesis that signs have private immaterial referents. I also reject the assumption of some immaterial Given from which an image of the forever otherwise hidden world is constructed.

Surviving and reproducing are two very different purposes. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think so. We should probably look at what survival (persistence) of the pattern requires and work backwards. Instances of the pattern will only need to survive long enough to replicate. Of course we can make this model more complex. The point is that instances can perish once they've replicated but not in general before.

We all die and vanish, so that's not the issue. — Metaphysician Undercover

Just to be clear, we are 'instances.' We are relay runners for our DNA. Some of us don't pass the torch. Enough do though, so far anyway.

How do you not understand this? — Metaphysician Undercover

And there it is. Right in front of you the whole time. I wasn’t going to use the word until you did, which sooner or later you must. No silver platters for you, though, nope, no way. Get there on your own, only way to the possible epiphanic moment.

you make the inconsistent conclusion that there is no form of judgement present. — Metaphysician Undercover

(Sigh) I said no form of judgement present…..in sensibility. But if I made an inconsistent conclusion, which is a judgement, but necessarily beyond, outside, other than by means of, sensibility……fill in the blanks for yourself.

How do you think that something could make a representation without some form of judgement as to how this will be done? — Metaphysician Undercover

Been telling you all along how I think judgement as you use it could NOT be done, which presupposes I think how it can. It could NOT be used as you’ve been suggesting because eventually it leads to methodological self-contradiction, exemplified by, regarding phenomena, the notion of my concluding something when I’m not conscious of that which I’m concluding about. That I’m not conscious of the construction of my intuitive representations, is a fact, even if such construction being necessarily the case for the operation of human intelligence, is not. Point being, such construction is nowhere contradictory, neither naturally nor logically, so while there may be no satisfaction with respect to empirical knowledge, there is complete satisfaction with respect to reason.

Horace Greeley: “go west, young man!!!!”
Me: “Go deeper, young man!!”

Personally I reject the thesis that signs have private immaterial referents. — plaque flag

I'm talking about meaning. Do you accept that the same physical thing, the sign itself, might mean something different to me as compared to what it means to you? To me, that would indicate "private immaterial referents". "Referent" here implies what the sign symbolizes, or is associated with, for the individual.

Instances of the pattern will only need to survive long enough to replicate. — plaque flag

Yes, this is exactly why reproduction and survival, as ends or goals, are completely different. If a particular instance of a pattern only needs to survive long enough to replicate, then survival is simply a means to the end, which is to replicate. Survival is only necessary so far as to replicate, and if replication could be accomplished instantaneously survival would not be necessary at all. So if replication is the goal, we can dismiss survival as not the real goal at all. Survival is not necessarily consistent with replication.

The problem with your presentation though, is that "replicate" is not a good word for you to use here. That is why I used "reproduce" instead. "Replicate" implies the production of a replica, a copy, but that is not what living beings do, they change through the course of reproduction, they do not replicate. This change is an essential aspect, as necessary for evolution. So we ought not call reproduction replication, because replication is not conducive to evolution, but reproduction is.

This difference is why it is important to separate reproduction from survival. If maintaining the very same being was what is important to life, then survival would take precedence over reproduction. But if change is more important than staying the same, then reproduction takes precedence over survival. The latter is what is the case. If you model reproduction as replication then you negate the importance of change, and you are left with little if any difference between survival and replication. Then you have no principle for the reality of evolution, which is change.

And there it is. Right in front of you the whole time. I wasn’t going to use the word until you did, which sooner or later you must. No silver platters for you, though, nope, no way. Get there on your own, only way to the possible epiphanic moment. — Mww

Well, are you going to explain, how something can make a representation without some sort of decisions or judgement as to what the representation will be of, and how it is to be produced, so that I can have that epiphanic moment, or are you just going to continue with your unsupported assertions that judgement requires a conscious mind?

Been telling you all along how I think judgement as you use it could NOT be done, which presupposes I think how it can. It could NOT be used as you’ve been suggesting because eventually it leads to methodological self-contradiction. — Mww

All you've told me is that you believe that judgement necessarily implies conscious thinking, as a logical requirement. I've shown you how the existence of illogical, irrational, emotional, and seemingly random judgements, demonstrate that what you belief is not the case. The evidence shows your belief is false.

The "methodological self-contradiction" which you refer to is the result of your faulty definition of "judgement", which makes conscious thinking a necessary requirement for judgement. This leads to multiple levels of "thinking" within the same being. If you would divorce judgement from thinking, as the evidence of illogical, irrational, emotional, and random judgements necessitates, then this "methodological self-contradiction" would disappear. You would no longer be confronted with multiple levels of thinking because you would accept the reality of what the evidence indicates, that the act of judgement does not require any thinking at all.