A square circle is not either/ or and nor is it a paradox, It is just an incoherent conjoining of words. — Janus

If my analogy isn't good, can you answer the question anyway? Many people think these two things are mutually exclusive. It doesn't seem unreasonable to think they are. You say they are not, and we should ditch the either/or thinking. I don't see how it is possible that they are not in an either/or relationship, and cannot simply change my thinking on three matter. If you are right, and ditching either/or thinking is a valuable thing, I'd like to know how to get there. Can you explain how these two things are not in an either/or relationship?

↪Wayfarer Of course they do, but we also act for reasons. As I keep trying to get you to see they are just different kinds of explanation. You might get it if you ditch your either/or thinking. — Janus

What if the either/or thinking is correct? There are either/or situations. A square circle is either/or. It's not both. It's booty a paradox. It's just wrong. Why would I think this situation is not another?

According to the definitions I quoted earlier, epiphenomenalism says mental states do not have any effect on physical events. Walking is a physical event, not a mental event. And walking certainly has an effect on physical events. So I don't know how you are thinking walking is epiphenomenal.
— Patterner

I already addressed this. The causal exclusion argument that motivates epiphenomenalism applies equally to physical events in a similar supervenient relationship. — SophistiCat

That's fine. But that wasn't the most important part. Walking certainly has an effect on physical events. How can it be epiphenomenal?

Henry Rearden's trial says it all.

According to the definitions I quoted earlier, epiphenomenalism says mental states do not have any effect on physical events. Walking is a physical event, not a mental event. And walking certainly has an effect on physical events. So I don't know how you are thinking walking is epiphenomenal.

Also, walking is moving our feet. For simplicity, it's the word we use instead of spelling out the whole process. I don't say;
While upright, which is possible thanks to visual cues and the delicate workings of my inner ear, I moved my feet, alternating them, always placing the rear one in front of the other, until I found myself at the store.

instead, I just said I walked to the store.

So, if abortion is declared illegal in a very broad way, you end up with unintended consequences like what happened in Alabama. In vitro fertilization became illegal because the fertilized eggs in test-tubes were considered people because human life began at conception, which means their disposal was murder. — Hanover

I hadn't heard about whatever is happening in Alabama, and hadn't considered the test tube scenario. Thanks!

:up:

Good points. But I'm wondering. We can say therr are just killings of people. For example, it's not murder when we execute a convicted murderer. Or when we kill in self-defence. But what is an example of a just killing of a fetus? When it puts the pregnant woman's life in danger seems like an obvious example. Any others?

I think we should be consistent. If it's murder then so is abortion. If abortion is not murder, then neither is this.
— Patterner
H'm. You didn't cover "If it's not murder, ..." Given what you've said, if it's not murder. abortion is not murder. It's vicious nasty crime, but who was killed? No-one. So it's not murder. — Ludwig V

What do you mean I didn't cover that? That's what I said in the third sentence you quoted. In short, either they're both murder, or neither is. (That is, if the law is consistent.)

Yes, of course. If the law says it's murder, then it's murder. And the law says murder only applies when the victim is a human being. Kill someone's cat or dog, and you are not charged with murder. It's illegal, and you'll be charged with something. But you might be in more trouble for how you killed the animal than for the fact that you killed it. Like if you use the gun in a residential area. Of course, those laws are different from one area to another.

Kill someone's herd of cattle, and you are not charged with murder.

If someone was to slip an abortion pill in a pregnant woman's body without her knowing and it results in the death of the foetus. Whether or not the person would be arrested for murder depends on your standpoint on abortion? — Samlw

No. It depends on your standpoint on the status of a fetus. We are only charged with murder if we kill a human being. If a fetus is a human being, then it's murder.

I think consistency is important.

So this is part of the argument that "becoming human" isn't a single moment, a single event, but a process. Is that what you were getting at? — Ludwig V

I think we should be consistent. If it's murder then so is abortion. If abortion is not murder, then neither is this.

So, if moving your feet does all the causal work, then walking is reduced to an epiphenomenon. — SophistiCat

Trying and trying to figure out what you mean, but I'm not getting it. But I feel this sentence is key. Can you explain the relationship between moving your feet and walking? (Of course, we're not talking about sitting in a chair and shuffling your feet around. Or lying on the ground doing leg-lifts. Or pumping your legs on a swing to gain height. Or any number of things other than moving them in the way that produces walking.)

I don't understand. It doesn't harm her if she want the abortion, so sneaking would not be necessary. But it sneaking is necessary, then it's likely that she does not want the abortion and in that case, it definitely does harm her. — Ludwig V

What I meant is, if she wants to have the baby, and you sneak drugs into her food so it aborts, it's not murder. Men have been known to punch a woman in the stomach so they abory. Sad if she wanted to have a baby. But if it's not a child, and had no status on the eyes of the law, then the man is only guilty of assault & battery. The fetus is irrelevant, as far as criminal acts goes.

I don't know if that's how the law actually looks at the issue anywhere. But if abortion is legal somewhere, I have to assume that's how the man's (and I use that term extraordinarily loosely) defense attorney would approach it.

Many believe a fetus should have the same consideration as a child.
— Patterner
.... and many do not. Should not the parents have the right to their own conscience? — Ludwig V

Many believe not.

But if we aren't talking about a child, I don't think "parents" is the right word. There is only a pregnant woman.

And, again, sneaking drugs into a pregnant woman's food so that she aborts, as long as it doesn't harm her, is no worse than breaking her window. Breaking her window is worse, in fact, because she had been sitting at it for years as it protected her from the cold and rain, looking at the beauty of nature, watching her husband pull into the driveway when he comes home from work.

Some think a fetus is a stage in the life of a human being, so nobody should have the right to choose what to do with the fetus' body.
— Patterner
That's absurd. Parents (biological or other) not only have the right, but the duty to make decisions about their children's lives. Why should there not be a similar right and duty to make decisions about a foetus? After all, we allow people to make decisions for their relatives when they are ill and unable to make the decisions themselves. — Ludwig V

You're talking about the right and duty to make decisions about their children's lives that are in the best interest of their children. Even when we disagree on what is in their best interest (Raise them with religion? Home-school them? Allow them to drink soda?), we almost always let the parents make the decision. But we don't allow parents to make the decision to end their children's lives because they no longer want to raise them, can't afford to raise them, or regret having had them. Many believe a fetus should have the same consideration as a child.

I don't understand how you mean things. What is epiphenomenalism?

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. — SEP

Epiphenomenalism is the view that phenomenal properties – the what it’s like of conscious states – have no physical effects. — Emerson Green

relating to an epiphenomenon (= something that exists and can be seen, felt, etc. at the same time as another thing but is not related to it) — Cambridge Dictionary

of or relating to an epiphenomenon (a secondary phenomenon accompanying another and caused by it /
specifically : a secondary mental phenomenon that is caused by and accompanies a physical phenomenon but has no causal influence itself) — Merriam Webster

In what way does the physical act of walking fit any definition of epiphenomenal? I may be misunderstanding your questions.

If walking consists in putting one foot in front of the other, is walking epiphenomenal? — SophistiCat

I would not think so. But wanting to walk would be, as wanting milk would be, if we are nothing but physically deterministic machines.

Around 60% of the world’s population has the right to an abortion. And in the interest of freedom and not allowing a government to have control on what life choices you want to make with your personal body, — Samlw

Some think a fetus is a stage in the life of a human being, so nobody should have the right to choose what to do with the fetus' body.

Some think it is wrong to abort even if only moments after conception, because conception is the beginning of unique human DNA. Again, that being a stage in a human being's life.

Some think that, if the fetus does not have rights, because it is not alive, or isn't human, or whatever the criteria, then destroying it without the pregnant woman's permission isn't any more of a crime than an abortion is. (Assuming no harm is done to the woman, obviously.)

Why would we not experience wanting? Why compare us to robots? We are not robots we are evolved organisms. — Janus

I'm comparing us to an example of something that unquestionably operates entirely within the bounds of physical determinism, in order to show why I think we do not.
-Robots do not have any subjective experiences of the electrical activity within them by which they detect sensory input, discriminate this input from that input, and act based on what they are currently detecting. We do. Why don't they? Why do we?
-Building on what we have that something operating entirely within the bounds of physical determinism does not, we are aware of our subjective experiences. We talk about them all the time.
-Building on top of that, we are aware that we are aware of our subjective experiences.

That seems to be a lot that physical determinism needs to explain. Why any difference at all, and how those three differences are accomplished.

Even if we could observe in living detail the neural processes we cannot observe conscious experience, so establishing the link between the two would still seem to be impossible, as far as I can imagine. Of course I might be mistaken, I won't deny that. — Janus

We don't have reason to think otherwise. But sure, it's possible we'll discovery something or other one day.

Right. But, if all is physical determinism, then why would we experience the wanting? A robot that is programmed to fill a cup with water when its sensors detect it is empty doed not "want" water. Nor does it experience the electrical activity that senses the low water level, or that moves the parts that refill the cup. It's all just mechanical stimulus and response.

Body needs a nutrient that is found in milk. Brain initiates action potentials to move body to open refrigerator to get milk. Photons bouncing off of contents of refrigerator do not hit retina in a pattern that closely enough matches any patterns representing milk that have been stored in the past. Brain initiates new action potentials, so body goes to store.

There is no wanting in that description, and no need of wanting. Stimulus and response accomplishes what is needed. The subjective experience of the need for that nutrient is not necessary.

But the subjective experience is there. One would think because it is an evolutionary advantage. But if it is only the subjective experience of the neutral activity, and is not causal, then how is it an advantage?

And, advantage or not, how is the subjective experience accomplished?

Humans are the worst. It's hard to articulate how stupid we are. We know love is the best thing about life. We know you can't use it up, because giving love only generates more love. And yet, we so very, very ... very often blow it.

Pride is one of love's biggest enemies. I can hold my pride tight, or I can give and receive love. I can't do both. They're mutually exclusive.

As Ed learned on Northern Exposure, low self-esteem is also a big problem. It's difficult to accept love when you don't think you're worthy of it. And it's difficult to give love when you think your love isn't worthy.

Fear. "What if it's too late?" "What if s/he doesn't feel the same any longer?" But, if you don't try, you definitely lose.

Say I go to the shops for milk. If someone asks why I went to the shops I'll say it was to buy milk. That's one explanation. On the other hand, I could say I went to the shops because the neural activity which is experienced as realizing I was out of milk and neural activity which is experienced as wanting to have milk led to neural activity which led me to go to the shop. — Janus

I guess there are those who say the neural activity isn't experienced as wanting to have milk. Rather, the neutral activity is wanting to have milk. Experiencing the neural activity vs. the neural activity being the experience. The latter being the case if we are ruled by physical determinism. In which case, the "wanting to have milk" is, I guess, epiphenomenal, and serves no purpose.

And half remembered from Ursula LeGuin, I think — "Love is like bread, you cannot preserve it; it has to be made fresh every day." — unenlightened

She's as good as it gets!

You two nailed it. Before they're born, you know you'll love your kids. It's a given. Then it happens, and you realize you had no idea. To steal a line from comedian Larry Miller, it's like the difference between shooting a bullet and throwing it. It's not a decision. It's like breathing.

I don't think so, and that is the problem I've been describing to you in the inverse form, (separating the pure immaterial subjective agent, sometimes called soul, or mind, or intellect) from the material object is not possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. I'm just brainstorming a possibility of a physicalist scenario. I don't know if any physicalist agrees. But if physicalism is the answer to everything, then it will reveal the brain operations that are, literally, consciousness. @wonderer1 just suggested it might take another couple hundred years. But at that point, we will, perhaps, be able to literally see consciousness in some brain activity that we're unable to detect now. And then we could try what I suggested

But no, I don't think any part of that paragraph is correct.

See The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation by Peter Tse. — wonderer1

Is there any chance you can give any guidance on that? You must know it fairly well to have recommend it multiple times as having found a solution. I find it very difficult. Likely my lack of education in most areas ever discussed here. But maybe you can give me some kind of summary? Or handholds to look for along the way? Anything to keep my head above water.

The logics of intentional behavior on the one hand and being constrained to act by external causes on the other just seem incompatible. — Janus

Yet they are entirely compatible. There can be no question of that. Here we are. There is some commonality, or they could not exist in the same universe, much less in the same being. We just have to figure out what the commonality is. Something explains the different modes operating in the same being.

The question is why this is accompanied by a subjective experience of it,
— Patterner
Define subjective experience. — L'éléphant

We have devices that can detect the part of the electromagnetic spectrum that we call visible light. They can even distinguish different frequencies, 430 THz and 650 THz.

We can add to the machine, and give it the ability to detect vibrations in the air, and distinguish different frequencies. Maybe it can detect simultaneous frequencies of 262.63 Hz, 329.63 Hz, and 392 Hz.

But the machine does not see red and blue, and does not hear a C major chord. That is our subjective experience of seeing and hearing those frequencies.

We can hook sensors to our machine and to us, and see where the electricity is running, observing what is happening inside of us as we both detect these things. But we won't see anything in the scans of us that explains our subjective experience that is on top of the detecting that both the machine and we do. There aren't two activities taking place, one for objectively detecting, and one for subjectively experiencing. It would be interesting, and I'm sure we'd think of ways to block the subjective activity, so a person would only detect like a machine. But we don't detect a second activity.


All of the subjective experiences are why there is, as Nagel said, something it is like to be me.

But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism – something it is like for the organism. — Nagel - What is it like to be a bat?

I can't know what it's like to be you, even though there is common ground between us. But I'm willing to believe there's something it's like to be you - for you. You have a point of view.

I really can't know what it's like to be a bat. There is still enough common ground for me to believe there is something it's like to be a bat - for the bat. It has a point of view.

There is nothing it's like to be a boulder - for the boulder. It does not have a point of view.

There is nothing it's like to be our machine - for the machine. It does not have a point of view.

I haven't said that the factor or mechanism or whatever you might want to call it in the neural processes that gives rise to conscious self-awareness is well understood. I would say it never will be because consciousness cannot be directly observed, and because the kinds of explanations we have for intentional behavior are given in terms of reasons, not causes, and the two kinds of explanations cannot be unified into a single paradigm. — Janus

If those two kinds of explanations cannot be unified into a single paradigm, then one or both of those kinds of explanations need to be modified or discarded. Because, since everything exists in this one universe, there must be a single paradigm that explains it all.

But perhaps there is a paradigm that they both fit within. As opposed to melding the two.

Reading back to try to get a better handle on your position. my apologies for making you repeat yourself at any point. I'm just not understanding.

You say material had to have been preceded by immaterial, and organized had to have been preceded by un organized. If not, the current would not have been preceded; it would simply be a continuation of. Perhaps I have that right?

First of all, I don't know why that is the assumption. It could be the current is a continuation. if there was anything prior to the Big Bang, the Big Bang erased any empirical evidence of it. So we just don't know.

But let's just say you're right. Qualities of the current could not have existed in the prior. You say this:

Your phrasing ("how non-living matter became living") betrays an underlying misunderstanding of the problem. Classical ontology premises immaterial Forms which are prior to, and the cause of material existence. In this ontology, there is no issue of non-living matter becoming living matter, there is an immateri — Metaphysician Undercover

There was no material or organization prior, but there was life? What Is unorganized life? And why assume this particular quality of the current existed in the prior, when no others could have?

I understand that. I'm asking literally how does it exist. I'm referring to the HPoC. Always looking for how such things can exist in a physically deterministic reality.

I wonder which pretty species feel guilty. Our pets certainly seem to. Catch them in the act of eating something they shouldn't have, and they definitely look more guilty than they do anything else. But I wonder about in the wild. I don't think a wolf that takes a weaker pack member's food feels guilt over it. Or an alpha male of whatever species that kills the offspring of other males. I wonder if guilt exists outside the human sphere. If not, then can we say it evolved? Or did it come into being with us, along with our other unique mental abilities/thinking.

That makes sense for behavior. Behave this way, and you have success. Behave that way, and you fail. But it doesn't explain the subjective feeling of guilt. The fact that guilt can make people rethink their future plans, and increase their success, doesn't explain how it exists at all.

Guilt - Why would you feel guilty if you believe there is no free will? It isn't your fault that happened it was always going to happen, — Samlw

I agree. I'm not sure how guilt even exists in such a scenario.

Responsibility - That person isn't responsible for that murder, they didn't freely choose to kill that person, it was always going to happen. People would be just be charged for manslaughter at most. — Samlw

It's true that there would be no responsibility in such a scenario. However, the knowledge that there would be consequences for committing a murder would become part of the mix of a physically deterministic reality. Just as it is in our world of free will. So punishments should stay. (Although ending a life that is nothing but physical interactions of it's constituents and the environment wouldn't be any different from "killing" a robot.)

What you say makes sense, and was what I was expecting you to say. But I'm thinking, we know a) it is possible for something that is immaterial to be organized, and b) the material that the immaterial caused is organized. Don't these two things present a good case for thinking the immaterial that caused the material was, itself, organized?

I thought I understood. But I had a typo. I meant "immaterial." I just wanted to verify that you are saying only material things can be organized.
— Patterner

That is what I meant. I don't see how we could assign any type of order to something which is completely immaterial. It's a difficult subject to discuss though — Metaphysician Undercover

Why are immaterial things we deal with all the time that are organized not relevant? Logic and mathematics, for example.

But it isn't explained through physicalism alone.
— Patterner
It does explain that the processes such as the consciousness are made possible by the physical bodies that we possess.

Here is the folly of the civilized humans:
It is us that labeled the consciousness as non-physical before we have an argument for it. Let us admit this much. So how is it that we have arrived at this conclusion without first explaining its relation to the bodies. In fact what's happening here is that we already have a notion of what is non-physical before we have a reasoning for it. And the way we win this claim is by saying "no", "no", "no" to the theory of physicalism. And we feel smug about doing this because the theory of physicalism, according to us, did not even provide an adequate account of the non-physical.
Why would they? We invented the non-physical notion. And yet our senses do not deny that there are physical bodies that we perceive -- with the help of the light, the air, the atmosphere, darkness, and particle invisible to our eyes, the mass, the texture, we come to know what a tree is, a table, a chair, another human being, animals, starts and the sky. Everything we do involves matter — L'éléphant

Yes, matter is a requirement of consciousness. At least the only kind of consciousness we're aware of. But we don't have to declare consciousness non-physical. Let's just assume, for the sake of argument, that it's entirely physical. What is the physicalist explanation? Brian Greene is no slouch in the physical sciences, and he says there is nothing about the properties of matter that even hints at an explanation. Christof Koch paid off a 25 year old bet, admitting they don't know, after all that time he and Crick were trying.

Physicalism can even explain mental functions, like how we perceive different wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation, differentiate between different wavelengths, and move to avoid things that will harm the body.
— Patterner
I am guessing this is a typo. Last time I checked, you are opposed to this. — L'éléphant

No, I am not opposed to this. These things are mechanical. We've had machines that can do these things for years. The question is why this is accompanied by a subjective experience of it, rather than taking place "in the dark." The physical processes don't need consciousness, and they don't suggest it. What I've read about theories doesn't include anything that explains it. Is it the phi of Integrated Information Theory consciousness? How? How is integrated information consciousness? Why is it not just integrated information?

A nervous system allows for representations/images. Those help the body know what is good and what is harmful. We program robots work the same ability. See the depth of a drop, and stop before falling and being damaged. But that doesn't suggest subjective experience, awareness, or awareness of awareness.

How does a clump of particles knows it is a clump of particles? It's not explained by photons hitting retina, ion channels, and action potentials. Only the vision is. That's explainable, just as liquidity, fight, and life are.

I would love if someone could tell me of a book or site that explains it. I would very much appreciate a summary. Just a brief one, so I'll know what to keep in mind as I read it. This stuff is often far over my head. Like Tse. I feel like I was thrown into the middle of the ocean without a life preserver. Damasio is great. He's passionate, but goes slowly. But, still, how do these physical things accomplish the task?

Material things cannot be organized?
— Patterner

I suggest you reread that. I said "organized" refers to material things. The cause of existence of material things is cannot be material (is immaterial) and therefore cannot be called "organized". "Organized" refers to a spatial ordering, a concept which cannot be applied to the immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

I thought I understood. But I had a typo. I meant "immaterial." I just wanted to verify that you are saying only material things can be organized.

"Organized" refers to material existents. The term therefore is not applicable to the cause of material existence which, being prior to material existence, is necessarily immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

Material things cannot be organized?

And the terminology of "uncaused cause" is not very useful unless well defined, due to the multitude of distinct ways that "cause" is used. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, not very useful until well defined. Still, I don't see how you could not be talking about an uncaused cause. Immaterial and uncaused. No?



Thank you. I've started it.