Comments

  • On delusions and the intuitional gap
    And yet the fact is that we don't know what consciousness is.
    — Malcolm Lett

    We do know what it is. It is the capacity to experience.
    bert1
    True. We just don't know how it comes about.
  • Abiogenesis.
    it's physically impossible to search beyond our galaxy in a million yearsRelativist
    With our current technology. I suspect advancements to our technology will allow us to search beyond our galaxy in far less than a million years.
  • Abiogenesis.
    I agree with you - that nothing human made in my mind is "artificial" -somehow removed entirely from natural things.
    Or "unnatural".

    What single thing can natural beings do that is unnatural?
    Benj96
    Why do we have the words "natural" and "unnatural"? We know what we mean. If we discover a cave deep underground that we don't think anyone could have been in, or land on another planet, or look at an asteroid field through a telescope, there are any number of things we could see that would tell us an intelligence had been at work, and had intentionally made something with an end product in mind. Without intent, the laws of physics don't lead to all things. Terrence Deacon put it this way in Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter when taking about the things that motivated a boy on the beach to skip a stone across the water:
    In contrast, prior to the evolution of humans, the probability that any stone on any beach on Earth might exhibit this behavior was astronomically minute. This difference exemplifies a wide chasm separating the domains in which two almost diametrically opposed modes of causality rule—two worlds that are nevertheless united in the hurtling of this small spinning projectile. — Deacon
    Then, after mentioning some of the things that had to be done to manufacture his computer:
    No non-cognitive spontaneous physical process anywhere in the universe could have produced such a vastly improbable combination of materials, much less millions of nearly identical replicas in just a few short years of one another. These sorts of commonplace human examples typify the radical discontinuity separating the physics of the spontaneously probable from the deviant probabilities that organisms and minds introduce into the world. — Deacon
  • Abiogenesis.

    Far worse is the non-modified primates winning time after time.
  • Abiogenesis.

    Indeed!

    And thank you, once again.
  • On delusions and the intuitional gap
    I'm also not trying to prove that materialism and reductive explanations are absolutely true. But I'm trying to show that a reductive materialistic explanation can go much further in explaining conscious phenomenology than is generally accepted by those who dismiss reductive materialism.Malcolm Lett
    Even if reductive materialism is not the totality of the answer, it's an indispensable ingredient.
  • Abiogenesis.
    I'd say metabolism and reproduction are key. Complexity and self-organization seem to suggest these things can come about, given the opportunity for enough chances. A billion years might provide that.

    Then we need a body.
    Certain large molecules containing fatty acids—lipids, in the language of chemistry—possess a special property. They automatically self-assemble into a membrane. Their physical nature is to link together into an elastic wall that bends back on itself to create a sphere. You’ve witnessed this process anytime you’ve noticed a bubble emerge from soapy water. Soap bubbles contain molecules similar to those found in the membranes of living organisms—and similar, perhaps, to those in the primeval membranes that originally cordoned off life from not-life, thereby constructing a private room where the story of biology could unfold in fragile safety.

    The establishment of a distinct physical boundary around metabolizing and self-replicating chemical processes inaugurated something marvelous. A body.
    — Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam, in Journey of the Mind

    All educated guesses, I suppose. It would be helpful if they could make life in a lab. We can stack the deck any way we want.
  • Abiogenesis.

    Hehe. Although Benj brought consciousness into the conversation in the first post, trying to stock to abiogenesis here isn't a bad idea, imo.
  • Abiogenesis.
    One could argue that everything you are, including your consciousness, is the byproduct of chemical and electrical interactions between a very, very large number of nonliving atoms! — Khan Academy
    I guess we know Khan's position on consciousness.
  • On delusions and the intuitional gap
    I think of this description as being reductive, but then I also think of the explanation of H2O producing the wetness of water as being reductive.Malcolm Lett
    And it is reductive. A macro characteristic is not reductive only if the same characteristic is present in the microscopic constituents. To be reductive, we need to be able to see how the properties of the microscopic constituents combine to make the macro property. Which we can do with liquidity, as well as solidity. We know why a substance's solid form is more dense than its liquid form. And we know why H2O is an exception to that, which is why ice floats in water. Which is why a lake does not freeze from the bottom up, allowing life to get through the winter.

    We do not know that consciousness is a physical characteristic. We do not know how it comes about. Therefore, we cannot reduce it to the properties of its constituents.
  • On delusions and the intuitional gap
    I think panpsychism might fall under the heading of a paradigm shift.
    — Patterner

    I think it might present one, in the Nagel sense. I don't quite think it's anything new, generally. Panpsychism the concept has been around millennia.
    AmadeusD
    True, the idea isn't new. But, if it was found to be factual (can't imagine how that could happen), the acceptance of it would be. The world would have a very different concept of reality.
  • On delusions and the intuitional gap
    I think panpsychism might fall under the heading of a paradigm shift.

    But, assuming panpsychism isn't true, what other ideas being suggested do?
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    Beefiness' :roll: ?Wayfarer
    OMG that's hysterical! :lol: And that's what I get for not proofreading. I would much rather accidentally post gobbledygook than some of spellcheck's best guesses.

    Anyway, thanks.
  • On delusions and the intuitional gap
    As I understand it. The non-reductive thesis about something, paraphrased as "more than the sum of its parts", says that something cannot be entirely explained by its parts and their interactions because it has some additional qualities that are not explained by those parts and/or their interactions. Thus, consciousness being an example of such a thing, consciousness cannot be explained via the existing reductive methods of science.

    I'm yet to see an argument that proves the non-reductive thesis - though I probably just haven't read enough.
    Malcolm Lett
    I try to find analogies. If I saw a skyscraper made entirely of liquid H2O, I'd know something was up. The properties of liquid H2O cannot explain a skyscraper. I know something else is at work.

    Consciousness is a very different situation. H2O and skyscrapers both have physical properties, and no suggestion of non-physical properties. Neither has any non-physical properties that present a mystery, and need explanation. Even processes like flight, metabolism, and vision can be seen to come from purely physical foundations. Subjective experience cannot. The properties of matter that we know of, and have measured to an amazing degree, do not suggest subjective experience.

    The argument for reductionism I hear most often is, just because we haven't figured it out with our sciences yet, doesn't mean we won't. My opinion is the fact that we haven't should not be considered evidence that we will. Nor is it evidence that the things we are aware of because of our sciences are the only things that exist, or the only things involved. The different nature of subjective experience, on the other hand, suggests something different is involved.
  • I am deeply spiritual, but I struggle with religious faith
    I was sent to Presbyterian Sunday School as a child. Church at times, though not weekly, thank God. I knew the quotes and all that jazz.

    When I was about 10, I saw someone talking about atheism on tv. That was the first time I'd ever heard of it. I just took it for granted that all the stuff I'd been told all my life was established fact. It hadn't occurred to me that others didn't think that. This guy on TV said people only believe in God because they're afraid they'll go to hell for not believing in him. Even then I knew that was not the reason everybody believes. Nevertheless, it made me think about things I'd never thought about before. I knew right then that, if it's not a fact, but belief, then I didn't believe. Nothing resonated with me. I don't feel any of it. Been an atheist since.

    If we need to, I suppose we could define spiritual as having to do with the human spirit. I feel awe for many reasons. Scenes of nature; Bach; just the feeling of being alive. I wonder - a human thing - about many things, like consciousness, and try to learn. As it says in some quotes i recently posted, I strive. Is that spiritual? If so then I'm spiritual. It not, no worries.
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?

    Partial to the attribute of matter idea, myself. But can you explain the "latent beefiness patent" thinking?
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    Well that's interesting! I noticed yesterday that he has a new book, Then I Am Myself the World: What Consciousness Is and How to Expand It. The blurb did not give me the impression that he thinks the way he does in this video.
  • Counter Argument for the Evolution problem for Epiphenomenalism

    I just went looking. Turns out it was you who recommended Damasio. Ha!
  • Counter Argument for The Combination Problem for Panpsychism
    We can duplicate, in a different medium, a lot of the physical processes
    — Patterner

    That's what a model is. Or rather, you need a model to be able to do that
    flannel jesus
    But they are only duplicating physical processes like those that let us perceive a certain range of the electromagnetic spectrum, distinguish different wavelengths within that range of the spectrum, and store representations of what has been perceived. They are not duplicating consciousness. What would that even mean? Which part of which neurons are adding the experience of vision to the perception of parts of the spectrum? What chip design do they need to manufacture to duplicate that? Or what specific wiring do they need in order to make the consciousness circuit?

    As I said, I expect we'll stumble onto consciousness eventually. If proto-conaciousness exists, it's also in the particles the computer is made of. When we get the right configuration, well get consciousness. Obviously, that will happen if there isn't proto-consciousness, as well.

    But if there is proto-consciousness, might we approach things differently? What if some parts of the brain, or some processes, aren't important, and that idea only came along while considering proto-consciousness? Maybe we're wasting time on things that don't matter. Or maybe what seems to be a good pro-proto-consciousness approach doesn't seem as likely in electronics as in biological, and we think we should try to accomplish the same thing with a very different method, rather than trying to make an electronic brain as much like ours as possible.

    Beats me. Just considering possibilities. I don't think it's the best idea to rule out entire fields of thought when we can't find any evidence that it's purely physical. Consciousness is the most unique, mysterious thing there is, and we shouldn't be surprised if it comes about for a unique, mysterious reason.
  • Counter Argument for The Combination Problem for Panpsychism
    There are a lot of parts of the physical underpinnings of consciousness that can be understood if one spends time developing a broadly informed perspective on scientific findings relevant to the subject.wonderer1
    I'm working on it!!! :grin:
  • Counter Argument for The Combination Problem for Panpsychism

    180 says magic.

    You mean "soul realm" the way you mean it. I know that now, but only because you told me. Other readers won't necessarily know that. Particularly people who are new here. Bert isn't new, and he didn't understand.

    A lot of people in a FB consciousness group like to call it "woo woo." People can easily see such terms, and read it as ridicule and dismissiveness. In most cases other than you, it is meant that way. Either way, it establishes an atmosphere.

    But I'm done with that part of the conversation. I'll just take it the way you intend it from now on.

    Regarding models, we don't have any for physical processes any more than we do for panpsychist processes. We can duplicate, in a different medium, a lot of the physical processes. But are we endowing it with subjective experience? Is there something it is like to be a computer? Or ChatGPT? Something that we cannot understand by knowing all therr is too know about its construction and programming? Something more than what it is like to be a can opener?

    Frankly, I suspect we will achieve it the way you expect we will. Because I think we'll eventually stumble upon what's needed for the proto-consciousness to get what it gets from the configuration/arrangement of our brains. IOW, freakin' huge complexity and number of systems. But we won't get it by figuring out which circuits, or wiring, or whatever, will do the trick. We can't spot it in our brains, after all. So how can we duplicate it?
  • Counter Argument for the Evolution problem for Epiphenomenalism

    I do very well with this kind of book on audio. Rewind 10-30 seconds is very helpful. I always get the kindle/nook also, and read and highlight parts that particularly strike me. Someone else here recommended another neurologist, Antonio Damasio. Going through one of his at the moment.
  • Counter Argument for the Evolution problem for Epiphenomenalism

    Amen. And I have apnea. Even with the CPAP, it's almost impossible for me to read. Even excellent, exciting novels are almost always beyond my ability. But I commute more than a half hour each way, and often more than an hour, and audible is great for me.

    Tse is not available on audible. I try to read it as I can.
  • Counter Argument for the Evolution problem for Epiphenomenalism
    As some added food for thought, here's a blurb on a recent article on the ability of bumblebees to engage in social learning:wonderer1
    Lars Chittka is mentioned in the article. He has a great book called The Mind of a Bee.
  • Counter Argument for The Combination Problem for Panpsychism
    We are told the physical processes in a computer are doing x, y, z. Yet we are told they are also doing this other thing - beating us at chess.

    Things can do multiple things.
    flannel jesus
    Beating us at chess is x, y, and z. One process or another is looking at what is possible given there current position of the pieces. Another is comparing all the possibilities with what happened in past games whose details it has been programmed with, and had the same possibilities. One process to calculate which of the current possibilities had worked out best. On and on.

    All that is what we do. But we also have a subjective experience of playing the game. That's what there computer lacks. Which wire needs to be soldered where to make it conscious?
    So do we continue to follow the one single avenue of investigation for consciousness, as being the result of physical brains following physical processes, or... do something else? What would the 'something else' be? And, knowing about the massive achievement of AI from neural nets, why even consider giving up on the physical idea? We can literally *talk to a simulation of physical neurons*, for free right now.flannel jesus
    I have never even hinted that we should give up on what's been done that has accomplished so much. We should certainly continue all of that. I think there is room for discussion of all manner of approaches.

    Calling what I'm talking about as "magic," and referring of the "soul realm," otoh, smacks of ridicule. What is the goal?
  • Counter Argument for The Combination Problem for Panpsychism

    I do believe the brain is the seat of consciousness and minds. I do not believe physical properties and physical processes can account for it. I try to explain myself here. In short, the physical processes being described as doing x, y, and z are already doing something. That is, x, y, and z. Yet we are told they are also doing this other thing - producing consciousness. But there is no explanation for how they accomplish consciousness. Point to this or that category of events, and we can see how it leads to our ability to detect a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, or discriminate wavelengths within that portion, or whatever. But we cannot see how those same events produce this other thing at the same time. It's especially vexing because that other thing is of a different nature. It cannot be measured, or even detected with the same science that we are told can answer all questions. We're told it's just how things are. I find that entirely unsatisfactory.

    So how about consider that something exists which we cannot detect with our senses or science? We don't seem to have a problem accepting the existence of dark matter, even though we have no ability whatsoever to detect it. We know it must be there, because we see it's effects. SOMEthing has to explain certain phenomena.
  • Counter Argument for The Combination Problem for Panpsychism

    I don't know anything about, or have any thoughts about, your soul realm. I'm probably not too interested in discussing it, but, if you can gives me any specifics about it (which seems unlikely, considering how many times you said we have no model of it), we'll see.
  • Counter Argument for The Combination Problem for Panpsychism

    Do we suspect any of those physical things are conscious? I guess we're becoming less certain all the time that they are not. But if we think they are not, why not? What about them is different from us that makes them not? If we think they are, why? What about them is the same as us that makes them so?
  • Counter Argument for The Combination Problem for Panpsychism
    The way you've phrased it sounds like you're going to "science can't figure it out", which is possibly a misreading.flannel jesus
    You are not misreading, if we think we have reached the end of all possible scientific methods. But, as Nagle says in Mind and Cosmos, "The world is an astonishing place, and the idea that we have in our possession the basic tools needed to understand it is no more credible now than it was in Aristotle’s day." Consciousness is not in the perview of our current scientific understanding and methods. That's why it doesn't offer an explanation.


    It sounds like you're extremely confident that it's JUST interactions of physical things,flannel jesus
    What that's not physical do you suspect?

    I think there is a mental property to all things. So, while we can currently perceive, directly or indirectly, the physical interactions, we cannot perceive what the mental aspects are up to.
  • Counter Argument for The Combination Problem for Panpsychism

    I didn't suggest magic. You did. And it applies as well to your position as mine.

    It is an unfounded assumption that the only things that exist in our reality are things we can find with our physical senses and science. The only things we can find using Method X are things that can be found with Method X. That doesn't suggest there are no things that X can't find.

    When we see something that doesn't seem, in principle, explainable by X, is makes sense to consider something that X cannot find does, indeed, exist.

    "We don't know" feels like a comfortable thing to say, I don't see why I would want to propose souls.flannel jesus
    Nor do I.
  • Counter Argument for the Evolution problem for Epiphenomenalism
    On this view, I believe that James’s argument is invalid, the process of handling pain and sex are completely physical, and we have physical drives to avoid / indulge in these actions.amber
    The question is - how are these physical drives accompanied by our subjective experience of them? Even if we think the subjective experience is of no consequence, unable to do anything but observe, how does it exist at all?
  • Counter Argument for The Combination Problem for Panpsychism
    How do you know that "how matter becomes conscious ... just is"180 Proof
    I don't know that. I'm saying no explanation is given. We are told that, when Physical Processes X, Y, and Z are present, we find consciousness. But we are not told why. Why do X, Y, and Z not take place without the subjective experience of it? What is taking place - photons hitting retina; signals traveling asking optic nerve; storage of information; etc. - doesn't suggest the presence of consciousness. It's just interactions of different levels of physical entities.
  • Counter Argument for The Combination Problem for Panpsychism
    The main problem with panpsychism is that all the non-living objects in the universe including the universe itself, refuse to respond in intelligible manner, when they were interrogated with the questions about them.Corvus
    Not every arrangement of matter is conscious. Do we scoff at the idea of electron shells because not every arrangement is solid?
  • Counter Argument for The Combination Problem for Panpsychism
    its so-called "combination problem" is solved by magic180 Proof
    Without an explanation (whether panpsychism or something else), the question of how matter becomes conscious is "it just does." Which is magic without an attempt at an explanation.
  • Counter Argument for The Combination Problem for Panpsychism
    some pansychists just conceptualize it as "there's something it's like to be EVERYTHING".flannel jesus
    I think the question remains. As Chalmers respeatedly asks, why is there something it is like to be anything?
  • What is 'Mind' and to What Extent is this a Question of Psychology or Philosophy?
    I want to make sure I'm following. I asked "From which aspect of encompassing reality are we separable?", and you said "Nature." If natural beings cannot be separated from nature, then that means we are not natural beings?

    And in what way are we able to be separated from nature?