The second important point is: the lack of determinism does not imply free will, it only implies randomness, and randomness is not what makes free will possible. — noAxioms

What makes free will possible?

Speak for yourself. I picked the cars as an example since I consider it to be making choices, even if I don't think it is a very good example of AI. They're complicated, but still very much automatons, but they do make choices about which route, which lane to use, and so on. If that's not choice, then fundamentally, as a physicalist, what am I doing that is different? — noAxioms

That's what I'm asking.

"Does naturalism state that we currently know of all things natural?" -Patterner

Quite the opposite. It implies that it is far better to say "We don't know how X works yet" than to say "X? Oh, that's done by Gods, magic, woo, whatever. The latter attitude discourages research. The former methodology encourages it.
Hence the dark ages when methodological supernaturalism was prevalent, and the explosion of knowledge when methodological naturalism took over some 7 centuries ago give or take.

If your question is about a new kind of physics that implements mind, well, if it can be shown that such is how it really works, then it falls under naturalism, yes. But nobody is treating it as something that can be investigated. The whole point of woo is that it be based on faith in lieu of lack of evidence. So empirical research into any of it is discouraged. — noAxioms

I suspect the reason believers who don't engage in empirical research don't engage in empirical research is their minds aren't strong in that area. "God did it" and "How does it work" are not incompatible thoughts. Francis Collins is such a strong believer that, when he finished mapping the human genome, he called it the Language of God. Also Mendel, Carver, Maxwell, Cantor, Kelvin, Heisenberg, and many others.

Other minds don't much function in one sphere or the other. Some see the two as incompatible, and are opposed, even violently, to the one they don't function in.

Some don't seem inclined to either.

Yes, that's right. But that form of determinism does not amount to anything that could threaten freedom. There's a difference between being able to determine which horse will win the race, in the sense of being able to predict the result of the race and being able to determine which horse will win the race by fixing the race. Laplace's demon can do the first, but not the second. — Ludwig V

Agreed. The question of freedom arises when asking whether or not the decision to fix the race is anything other than physical interactions. Are we anything other than extraordinarily complex wind up toys?

The pool balls can come to rest in a huge number of arrangements after being struck by the cue ball at the break. But I wouldn't say any arrangement is ever a choice.
— Patterner
Pool balls don't seem to be an example of something enacting will, of something making choices. — noAxioms

Right. But our will is the result of physical interactions. Regardless of their complexity, physical interactional are physical interactions.
-Physical interactions determine the final arrangement of the pool balls after the break.
-Physical interactions determine whether a bunch of particles will gather into a planet orbiting a star; become a loose gathering, such as the asteroid belt; or scatter to the various directions of space.
-Physical interactions determine if and when solid H2O will become liquid, and vice versa.
-Physical interactions cause the globe's weather patterns.
-Physical interactions determine what a person has for dinner, or how a person deals with a cheating spouse.

It is only when talking about what humans (some people include other animals) do that anyone calls the outcome choice. Why is that? The planet's weather is the result of more particles than are in our brains, and a huge number of different types of physical activity (gravity, tides, solar radiation, the many different ecosystems of all areas of the worlds, all states of matter, human activity, etc.) are involved. Yet, even there, we do not speak of choice or will. Why do we only when the physical activity within a human brain is involved?

Not having free will does not mean you have no choice. — noAxioms

The pool balls can come to rest in a huge number of arrangements after being struck by the cue ball at the break. But I wouldn't say any arrangement is ever a choice. Aside from the greater numbers and complexity of the types of physical interactions, in what way are our choices different if we don't have free will?

Thee simulator implements physics. Physics implements your consciousness, regardless of whether the physics is simulated or not. Under supernaturalism, this isn't true. — noAxioms

Does naturalism state that we currently know of all things natural?

I don't hold a presumption that the entities in the simulation will be held responsible for their choices, by entities not in the simulation. — noAxioms

If entities create a simulation that includes other entities that do not have free will, the creators would be ... what's there right word ... idiots if they held the creations responsible for their choices. i'm not sure it would be worse to hold characters in a story you write responsible for their choices.

I know there's no agreement regarding free will. But if we have free will, then we aren't simulations. I mean, how can you use rules and code to write something that doesn't follow rules and code?

Why are we simulating? Where will Voyager 1 be in fifty years? We don't simulate it's existence for every moment of the next fifty years. We just calculate.

Also, I don't think LD supposedly knows where every particle will be at every moment for the rest of time. I think it only has to be able to calculate the answer to specific questions. After it tells me where Voyager 1 will be in fifty years, I ask it where a particular particle in Jupiter's red spot will be next week. Then I ask it something else.

Of course, the farther into the future I'm asking about, the more other things will have an impact on it. But LD's intellect is vast enough.

And I really don't think Laplace was trying to convince us that such a demon is likely, or possible. He was just saying, in a universe where everything is deterministic, anything at any point in the future would be, in theory, calculable.

Sure. Demons are supernatural. I've never heard of a story with one that wasn't.

Hey, how about this idea... To try to put a natural entity in this role, it would, obviously, need to be made of particles. A quantum computer, or whatever the next step would be, made up of enough particles could calculate the rest of the particles. If there are finite particles in the universe. It wouldn't work for infinite particles.

It's a supernatural being in a thought experiment. I don't know how to put limits on that. It's all silly.

Demons are made of atoms? I had no idea.

↪Patterner I have no idea what the first thing is that you're disagreeing with — flannel jesus

I don't know why you think that, even in principle, the demon cannot exist inside of the same universe it's capable of predicting, even if that universe is 100% physicalist and 100% deterministic. But actually, two thoughts came to mind. My first thought was that you thought something that is not 100% physicalist and 100% deterministic would be, as it were, breaking the rules.

My second thought was that you thought it's own non-determined actions would make calculations impossible.

If neither of my guesses was correct, what is the reason you think that, even in principle, the demon cannot exist inside of the same universe it's capable of predicting, even if that universe is 100% physicalist and 100% deterministic?

↪Patterner It should be noted, and maybe already has, that even in principle the demon cannot exist inside of the same universe it's capable of predicting, even if that universe is 100% physicalist and 100% deterministic. — flannel jesus

I don't know what you have in mind. But if it's the first thing I can think of, I disagree. First, it could, itself, be ruled entirely by determinism.

Second, if it has free will, it could fully calculate the consequences that all of its own actions would have on the rest of the universe.

That's fair enough. I'm just trying to say that it isn't an empirical idea - no amount of empirical evidence will confirm it, or refute it. — Ludwig V

I agree. I think Laplace was just saying something with all knowledge of where everything is and of all the forces would be able to calculate everything for the future. Sure worried be nice, since it could tell us about any asteroids that are going to impact the Earth. It could probably solve cold fusion pretty easily, also.

And it would be able to tell us if quantum events are truly uncaused, and if there is free will.

but, we don't have this marvelous demon. It's just a fun thought. Although the demon could help us quite a bit, the thought cannot.

IF determinism rules all things..." but does it? What's your evidence? — Ludwig V

It's Laplace's premise. It's not mine. I don't believe it to be the case.

Interesting that he doesn't mention that God would be such an intellect. — Ludwig V

My guess is that he didn't want to get into God, because that would be a discussion about why God set things in motion in exactly that way. What's the plan, what's the purpose. That kind of thing. He only wanted to discuss the positions, properties, and forces.

That's... now what I said. That's not even a response to what I said. — flannel jesus

I don't think it was specifically for you.

Shirley you don't mind.

↪Ludwig V it doesn't struggle have to, though. — flannel jesus

Autocorrect?

Nonetheless, it is treating the universe as a closed system. — Ludwig V

Yes. I would not interpret Laplace's words as including any other universes. The defined system is the universe.

1 If LD cannot figure some things out, what follows? Does it follow that determinism is false? No.
2 If LD can predict everything accurately for the next nyears where n is any number you like. Does it follow that determinism is true? No. — Ludwig V

I answer Yes to both. Why not? That's the premise. Determinism rules all things, and LD has the perception and intellect to figure everything out.

If you think of some restricted problem, such as the movements of the planets in our solar system, this seems to work. But it treats the solar system as a closed system and restricts the predictions that are made about it. — Ludwig V

LD is also aware of where every particle in the universe outside of our solar system is, which way each is going, and can calculate which will interact with our SS, and when. Even if two hunks of rock a thousand light-years away that are not heading this way are going to collide, and some debris from that collision will then head this way.

Yes, it is complicated. I have not had any luck trying to find out how we determine which slit a photon goes through. What kind of device can detect which slit a photon goes through without actually intercepting the photon? How else would it know? we don't see photons unless they hit our retina. What kind of device sees it without the photon hitting its visual receptor? I don't even know how to ask the question. Lol

That's exactly what they want me to believe.
— Patterner

Do you think avatars in video games can believe anything? — Janus

I didn't get a notification of this. Glitch the matrix?

I am not an avatar in a video game, for the usual Cartesian reason. There's a "me" in here having subjective experiences. — fishfry

That's exactly what they want me to believe.

Then LD isn't really useful in determining whether or not the universe is deterministic. — Harry Hindu

Well, I mean, since LD doesn't actually exist, no, it isn't really useful in determining whether or not the universe is deterministic. LD isn't a diagnostic tool. It's just an interesting way of expressing what a deterministic universe is like. If we actually had an LD, all of our questions would be answered. It might say, "Quantum events are uncaused. Therefore, I can't know precisely how things at the quantum level will look at any point in the future." Or it might say, "Quantum events only appear uncaused to humans, because you don't have sufficient intelligence (or senses, or technology) to understand the causes. But I see their causes and understand them, so I can calculate where everything at the quantum level will be at any point in the future."

Similar scenarios regarding consciousness.

I wonder if it would know every DNA mutation that will ever take place.

The question then is if the universe is not deterministic, then why does it appear that it is? How are we able to make consistent predictions and when our predictions fail we can point to some information we lacked in making the prediction. We only know that our prediction failed when we have access to new information. — Harry Hindu

Certainly, the macro physical universe is deterministic. We can calculate a whole lot of what's going to happen in the future. We know when Haley's comet will be back again. We know when the next high tide will be on any beach. We can shoot a moving target with a gun, drive cars, play baseball, and any number of other things.

Even if the quantum world is truly not deterministic, it's probabalistic to a very predictable degree, making the macro deterministic.

Yeah, I understand that. But we're talking about free will. I'm not saying our minds don't cause things. I'm saying that, according to this view, our minds cause things in the same sense that the cogs cause the clock to work. And LD knows what is going to happen everywhere, including what we will all think and do, just as we know what a clock will do.

I agree. I guess where I was headed is that an idealist can also be a determinist. LD can be revised to know everything about a universe that is essentially mind. — frank

I don't see why not. If idealism is correct, the reality the minds are thinking up that we take to be physical has consistent properties, rules, etc. No reason LD couldn't know all there is to know about all those properties, rules, etc., regardless of their true nature.

That's if you limit LD to so-called physical events, which automatically excludes non-physical things like numbers and mental states. We could imagine an LD that has knowledge of the non-physical stuff, right? — frank

That, I believe, is the point of LD. Maybe? If all is deterministic, then numbers and information, and consciousness and intent, are irrelevant. It can all be reduced to particle physics, just as thermodynamics can. I suppose it would know why brain states also feel like mental states to us. But if "feel like" is all there is, but they have no casual power, and are, themselves, determined by the physical events, then it doesn't matter. Itt doesn't interfere with the calculations.

The quote can be found on anything number of sites...

We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes. — Laplace

I believe this is saying that LD knows everything about everything IF everything about everything is deterministic. That, I believe, is the point of Laplace's thought experiment.

But if all of reality is not deterministic, LD's calculations would not be able to figure everything out. Comparing what, based on its calculations, it says the universe would look like at any given point with what the universe actually looks like, there would be discrepancies. I suppose LD would say, "Something non-deterministic took place at that spot."

Chalmers adapted LD to accommodate quantum physics by just making it open ended. In other words, the demon knows how events unfold, however that may be (I think that's what he meant anyway). So couldn't we have an LD that know mental states and however it is they evolve? — frank

I don't know how LD would deal with quantum events. I suppose it's possible that it would understand why things happen randomly, uncertainly, and, to it, the events would not be random and uncertain. If half the atoms of plutonium are going to decay in 81 million years, maybe it knows which half, and maybe even which one at which moment. I have no idea. But I am certainly willing to stipulate that for the sake of argument.

however, if consciousness is not the result of, or at least not entirely the result of, physical events, of which LD has absolute knowledge, then it would not have absolute understanding of consciousness. LD only knows what it knows knows.

Not determined in the same way? — frank

Right. if there is free will. If everything we think, feel, and do is not determined solely by progressions of arrangements of all the constituent parts of our brains, which change from one arrangement to the next because of the ways the laws of physics act upon them.

Well sure we cannot know it.But the really question is,could Laplace's Demon know it indeed? — dimosthenis9

Yes, that's the question. Knowing where every particle in the universe is, and what each is doing, would LD be able to calculate exactly what we were going to do, think, and feel at any point in the future? Or would it say, "I don't know, because there is something going on in conscious beings that is not determined in the same ways everything that is not conscious can be determined."

Knowledge that one will be held accountable may very well result in better behavior than would be the case if no accountability were expected. — Relativist

I agree. If there is no free will (however anyone wants to define that), and we all do what we do only because that's how the billion bouncing billiard balls in our heads landed, then, yes, the knowledge that we will be punished if caught also becomes part of the bouncing.

Am I correctly understanding what he's saying?
— Patterner
I think so. Great analogy. (And your quote was hilarious!) — Relativist

Thanks. And yeah, he's awful funny. Lol.

So if Tse is correct, let me ask about this:

In what way is this robot less a casual agent, affecting the world less, less of a "self" than we are?
— Patterner
It is a causal agent, but lacks a mind. Our minds mediate our actions, and provides our sense of self. — Relativist

Certainly, the physical interactions taking place among the components of our brains are more complex than those taking place among the molecules of air in a room, among the robots parts and programming, and maybe even among the components of anything else in the universe. Still, our minds are the product of nothing but physical interactions. What is the value of our sense of self if it can do nothing other than move from one arrangement of its constituent parts to the next, as the laws of physics require? Even wondering about the value of itself is nothing but the progression of arrangements, as determined by the laws of physics. One person's thought that there is value in the self, and another person's that there is not, are, ultimately, both the result of the properties of particles and the forces that act upon them.

You can say 'how do you know it isn't determined?', but you can't say with any accuracy that plans don't change the future. — Barkon

I can. Because the future isn't something that exists in the present. Something can only change if it exists. My television can be on channel 2, and I can change it to channel 4.

I can cut the legs off of my table, and screw skies onto it, thus changing my table into a sled.

I can add a floor to my house, changing it from a one-story to a two-story.

I can sell my Nissan and buy a Ford. I won't have changed the physical object, but I will have changed the car I own.

But if I take saw, hammer, nails, and wood, and build a chair, I will not have changed the future because I had said I was going to build a table. I only changed my intention, my plan of what I would have in the future. There was no table in the future that ceased to be and was replaced by a chair.

Basically it's being suggested by the opposition that if we make a plan, it's not us, but some universal force controlling us to make a plan, and thus, no will is involved. — Barkon

Yes, I believe the opposition is saying that. However, I don't think they are saying the force that is controlling us is doing so with intent, thought, or purpose. I think they are saying it's the laws of physics, or physicalism, or whatever the best term is now.

Thanks for pointing me at these things. When a page or two after what I quoted last time says

Endogenous attentional binding/tracking is realized in cholinergic/noncholinergic bursts sent from the basal forebrain and other areas that trigger a transition from tonic to phasic processing in pyramidal circuits from retinotopic areas up to anterior inferotemporal cortex and hippocampus, facilitating recognition. — Tse

I fear I'm not going to get too much out of the book.

The quote in your post before the diagram post makes me think of this analogy. I don't know if this is what he's saying, so let me know.

There are an uncountable number of air molecules in my living room. They are all flying about in various directions, at various speeds. We have nothing resembling the slightest hint of hope of tracking them all. But we can measure the temperature of the room. As Anil Seth writes in Being You : A New Science of Consciousness

Importantly, thermodynamics did more than merely establish that mean kinetic energy correlated with temperature—it proposed that this is what temperature actually is. — Seth

We, likewise, have no hope of tracking the activity of every neuron and synapse in someone's brain. As with the air molecules, the numbers, alone, make it impossible. But it's even more complicated, because, due to the nature of neurons, as Tse says, "The criteria for what makes a neuron fire can change." If we have no hope of mapping out the motion of the molecules of air in the room, then "no hope" is a pitifully inadequate way of expressing our ability to map out neutral activity. Nevertheless, if I'm understanding this, Tse is saying that, to paraphrase Seth, neural activity doesn't merely correlate with thought— this is what thought actually is. Although we can measure the macro property of temperature in a room, but cannot map out the motion of the air molecules, we know that the temperature is nothing more than the motion of the molecules. And, although we can comprehend thoughts, but cannot map out the neural activity of the brain, we know that the thoughts are nothing more than the neural activity.

Am I correctly understanding what he's saying?

I think this is the main problem here when we start from the logical premiss of "the future is what really will happen".

To change the future assumes a variety of "possible futures" that then don't happen, through our actions. Which goes against the definition that the future is what really will happen. — ssu

Indeed. There is no such thing as a future that "really will" or "is supposed to" happen. We only have what comes to be. Planning to do something is not establishing a future state, and changing that plan is not changing the future.

Even though mental states are the product of neural processes, it's still the case that there is mental causation. So your thoughts and feelings actually do affect the world in a unique way. The 'self' is your consciousness; a "machine" that develops intentions and acts upon them. You are caused to be what you are, but you were not caused through prior intent (not entirely). — Relativist

What if we build a robot that does various things under various conditions. When it's optic sensors detect something of a certain size range coming into the room, it sprays that thing with water. When its auditory sensors detect sounds within a certain frequency range, it opens a can of cat food and puts it in the dish on the floor. We can go on and on, programming it to compare different sensory input, having it act on only one in some cases, act on multiple in other cases, modify a typical action under shine circumstances, as complex as we can manage.

In what way is this robot less a casual agent, affecting the world less, less of a "self" than we are?

I don't think "you" exist apart from your physical body, but you do have a mental life. IMO, agential control is not an illusion if mental causation exists. It certainly seems like we have it, and it can be accounted for with purely physical processes (Peter Tse provides such an account in his book, "The Neural Basis of Free Will"). — Relativist

I tried to read Tse's book about fifteen years ago, but I have to admit I found it unconvincing (assuming that I understood it). — Janus

I have started the book a couple times. I'll try again. But I can't find it in me to be overly hopeful that Tse provides an account of how mental causation exists, Relativist, when he begins the book by saying:

§0.4 The deepest problems have yet to be solved. We do not understand the neural code. We do not understand how mental events can be causal. We do not understand how consciousness can be realized in physical neuronal activity. — Tse

I'm asserting that if we aim to change course, i.e. switch the mode we're in (what we're doing right now) it changes the future indirectly. — Barkon

What is an example of changing the future directly?

(I had a debate earlier which a person asserted a coin flip is in fact not random as, much like your rock example, could in theory be measured by force, friction, etc.) — Outlander

Sure. If we could measure EVERYTHING. In theory, we could tell how the coin would land if we had all of the variables at the instant it lost contact with your hand. The question is whether or not the instant it leaves your hand is as knowable, in theory.

While I don't take the ideas of me being a simulation or being in a VR seriously for a second, here's a thought. IIRC, the characters in Sophie's World think they are real. I think they are not. What if I wrote a book about characters in another reality, with entirely different physics, who thought they were real? Someone could ask them about their physics, and they could respond with as much detail as I can invent. Maybe I'm the character in someone's book.