You are quite right. Enthusiasts are fascinated by the speculative possibilities and so forget the provisos. It's really quite annoying.But this is just a hypothesis based on "Let us suppose for a moment that these predictions are correct." — SpaceDweller
That's not exactly wrong. But let analytic philosophers loose on an -ism and in a few years you'll have dozens of them. In the first half of the last century, there wasn't a concept of computability, so that issue is undetermined.Is naturalism = physicalism? Or is there a further distinction? — fishfry
The term “naturalism” has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy. Its current usage derives from debates in America in the first half of the last century. The self-proclaimed “naturalists” from that period included John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook and Roy Wood Sellars. These philosophers aimed to ally philosophy more closely with science. They urged that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing “supernatural”, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the “human spirit” — Stanford EP - Naturalism
In philosophy, naturalism is the idea that only natural laws and forces (as opposed to supernatural ones) operate in the universe.[1] In its primary sense,[2] it is also known as ontological naturalism, metaphysical naturalism, pure naturalism, philosophical naturalism and antisupernaturalism. — Wikipedia - Naturalism
I'm clearly out of date. Apologies to Searle. However, I'm not much reassured. If Searle is positing consciousness as an unknown something-or-other in addition to what is currently recognized as physical, he is positing a consciousness of the gaps, which is at least close to dualism.I believe in that same lecture (or perhaps a different one) he did NOT advocate dualism. He advocated what I call "secret sauce," my phrase, not Searle's. That is, consciousness is physical, but not computational. That's the point I've been making to noAxioms. — fishfry
I apologize. I should have referred more generally to "philosophical theories of the mind". Bostrom clearly has one, though he proceeds as if it was certainly correct. A serious error, in my book.Mind-body problem is only relevant to dualism, and sim theory isn't dualism, so the there's no problem. I think the term is 'interactionism', how the dual aspects interact with each other. — noAxioms
If there is a causal connection between my decision to point a gun and Lara Croft raising her arm, there are two things that interact. That's what causality means. Whether you are dualist, monist, physicalist, idealist, epiphenomenonalist or panpsychist.How does my decision to point a gun at the baddie cause Lara Croft to raise her arm? There has to be a causal connection between my decision and her arm, and there is. But under sim theory, there isn't two separate things that need to interact, so the problem doesn't arise. — noAxioms
The pool balls can come to rest in a huge number of arrangements after being struck by the cue ball at the break. But I wouldn't say any arrangement is ever a choice. Aside from the greater numbers and complexity of the types of physical interactions, in what way are our choices different if we don't have free will?Not having free will does not mean you have no choice. — noAxioms
Does naturalism state that we currently know of all things natural?Thee simulator implements physics. Physics implements your consciousness, regardless of whether the physics is simulated or not. Under supernaturalism, this isn't true. — noAxioms
Pool balls don't seem to be an example of something enacting will, of something making choices.The pool balls can come to rest in a huge number of arrangements after being struck by the cue ball at the break. But I wouldn't say any arrangement is ever a choice. — Patterner
I suspect that they're better choices if they're not free. Being 'free' seems to imply being controlled by an external entity, which I consider equivalent to being possessed. One never knows if what possesses you has your best interests in mind, especially if its survival isn't dependent on the survival of that which it possesses.in what way are our choices different if we don't have free will?
Quite the opposite. It implies that it is far better to say "We don't know how X works yet" than to say "X? Oh, that's done by Gods, magic, woo, whatever. The latter attitude discourages research. The former methodology encourages it.Does naturalism state that we currently know of all things natural?
Quite right, and there very much is such a connection in that example.If there is a causal connection between my decision to point a gun and Lara Croft raising her arm, there are two things that interact. That's what causality means. — Ludwig V
There's a difference. With physicalism, there's a wire connecting the physical system where the will is implemented, to the system where the motor control (and eventually the arm) is implemented. Under dualism, that causal chain is seemingly broken/unknown, and it's a problem that needs to be solved, something that isn't a problem for the monist.Whether you are dualist, monist, physicalist, idealist, epiphenomenonalist or panpsychist.
You're asking somebody who claims brains are not. Heck, even I am one of them since I wouldn't consider a brain on its own to be conscious. it is beings/complete systems, not just brains, that are conscious or not, per a physicalist view.Do we have any inkling of how brains are conscious? — RogueAI
Right. But our will is the result of physical interactions. Regardless of their complexity, physical interactional are physical interactions.The pool balls can come to rest in a huge number of arrangements after being struck by the cue ball at the break. But I wouldn't say any arrangement is ever a choice.
— Patterner
Pool balls don't seem to be an example of something enacting will, of something making choices. — noAxioms
I notice you seem to use the verbs 'cause' and 'determine' somewhat interchangeably there. I agree with all, but I want to highlight some distinctions, the main one being, 'under physical monism' (not dualism), all the above is true, since some (not just the last one) is not true under dualism.But our will is the result of physical interactions. Regardless of their complexity, physical interactional are physical interactions.
-Physical interactions determine the final arrangement of the pool balls after the break.
-Physical interactions determine whether a bunch of particles will gather into a planet orbiting a star; become a loose gathering, such as the asteroid belt; or scatter to the various directions of space.
-Physical interactions determine if and when solid H2O will become liquid, and vice versa.
-Physical interactions cause the globe's weather patterns.
-Physical interactions determine what a person has for dinner, or how a person deals with a cheating spouse. — Patterner
Speak for yourself. I picked the cars as an example since I consider it to be making choices, even if I don't think it is a very good example of AI. They're complicated, but still very much automatons, but they do make choices about which route, which lane to use, and so on. If that's not choice, then fundamentally, as a physicalist, what am I doing that is different?It is only when talking about what humans (some people include other animals) do that anyone calls the outcome choice.
My decision to not burn the cat is also the result of more particles than is in my brain. In fact, that choice is a function of pretty much everything else you listed. It is not a function of matter 50 billion light years away. That's how far I need to go.The planet's weather is the result of more particles than are in our brains
Because that's how language is used, and language usage, more than anything else, sets one's biases.Yet, even there, we do not speak of choice or will. Why do we only when the physical activity within a human brain is involved?
I believe in that same lecture (or perhaps a different one) he [Bostrom?] did NOT advocate dualism. ... That is, consciousness is physical, but not computational.
— fishfry
Wait, Bostrom said that mind is not computational, and yet pushes a view that our consciousness is the result of a computation? That seems to be a direct denial of his own paper. Got a link to where this is said? — noAxioms
Is naturalism = physicalism? Or is there a further distinction?
— fishfry
That's not exactly wrong. But let analytic philosophers loose on an -ism and in a few years you'll have dozens of them. In the first half of the last century, there wasn't a concept of computability, so that issue is undetermined. — Ludwig V
I'm clearly out of date. Apologies to Searle. However, I'm not much reassured. If Searle is positing consciousness as an unknown something-or-other in addition to what is currently recognized as physical, he is positing a consciousness of the gaps, which is at least close to dualism. — Ludwig V
The mistake is to start with "Consciousness is....". We know what consciousness is; we don't know how to explain the physical basis of consciousness - yet. But it is clear that there are many disparate phenomena involved and it is possible that consciousness will not map neatly onto the physical world. (Consider the many complicated physical phenomena that are involved in the emotions, for example). — Ludwig V
Do we have any inkling of how brains are conscious? — RogueAI
No, they are not just hormones. The causes of the hormones in the brain and the effects of the hormones in the body, together with their psychological counterparts are all part of the package. Think about it.Emotions are another good example, thanks for that. They're squirts of hormones in the limbic system or some such. Nobody understands how it works. It doesn't seem very computer-like to me. — fishfry
No, they are not just hormones. The causes of the hormones in the brain and the effects of the hormones in the body, together with their psychological counterparts are all part of the package. Think about it. — Ludwig V
But that's an issue that goes back millennia. A century ago, there was "elan vital" or "Life Force". Before that, it was the "mind", the "soul". Aristotle's "psyche",He (sc. Searle) associates it (sc. "secret sauce") with life. Something about living things. — fishfry
I'm sorry. It was lazy of me to do that.I could think about it a lot, without ever figuring out what you were trying to tell me here!
I thought I was agreeing with you, that emotions are an argument against computationalism. But perhaps I misunderstood. — fishfry
Ah, Searle said that, which makes sense. Of course Searle isn't going to accept a naturalist premise, but his unwillingness to set aside his opinion about it prevents his rendering any proper critique.You grabbed a statement I made to Ludwig V about Searle, interpolated Bostrom — fishfry
For purposes of this discussion, I've been using the two terms interchangeably.People keep using the word naturalism and I'm trying to understand what it means. Is it the same or different than physicalism? — fishfry
If this world is part of a simulation, it is definitely going to have to simulate chemical/hormonal influences on our experience. Far more than that even.The causes of the hormones in the brain and the effects of the hormones in the body, together with their psychological counterparts are all part of the package. — Ludwig V
I don't think a proper critique requires the critic to set aside their opinion. But it does require a willingness to engage with the opposition. I think he has an extreme form of a regrettable, but not uncommon, tendency to adopt a premiss (axiom, "truism") which presupposes his conclusion. But to be fair Derrida, in their famous debate, does not exactly go overboard to understand Austin, but I thought that he did at least try to do so.Ah, Searle said that, which makes sense. Of course Searle isn't going to accept a naturalist premise, but his unwillingness to set aside his opinion about it prevents his rendering any proper critique. — noAxioms
For my money, this doesn't amount to direct realism. Note the references to "raw phenomenology" and "presentational intentionality". But I can see why one might pigeon-hole him under that heading. But I'm quoting the summary, not Searle himself. Perhaps there's a distortion in that.With special emphasis on vision Searle explains how the raw phenomenology of perception sets the content and the conditions of satisfaction of experience. ...... He next justifies the claim that perceptual experiences have presentational intentionality and shows how this justifies the direct realism of his account. — GoogleBooks on Searle's Theory of
Yes. Only a naive person like myself would want to differentiate the two. But I had in mind the much-abused ordinary experience that was so popular in Oxford at a certain point; it seemed better to call it naturalism.For purposes of this discussion, I've been using the two terms interchangeably. — noAxioms
Yes. The question is How much more? Emotions (as opposed to moods) have a cognitive content, and that wouldn't be a problem. But they also involve desire and value. That is extremely problematic. It seems to me that software commands can simulate emotion, but having an emotion (desire, value) is a very different kettle of fish.If this world is part of a simulation, it is definitely going to have to simulate chemical/hormonal influences on our experience. Far more than that even. — noAxioms
What makes free will possible?The second important point is: the lack of determinism does not imply free will, it only implies randomness, and randomness is not what makes free will possible. — noAxioms
That's what I'm asking.Speak for yourself. I picked the cars as an example since I consider it to be making choices, even if I don't think it is a very good example of AI. They're complicated, but still very much automatons, but they do make choices about which route, which lane to use, and so on. If that's not choice, then fundamentally, as a physicalist, what am I doing that is different? — noAxioms
I suspect the reason believers who don't engage in empirical research don't engage in empirical research is their minds aren't strong in that area. "God did it" and "How does it work" are not incompatible thoughts. Francis Collins is such a strong believer that, when he finished mapping the human genome, he called it the Language of God. Also Mendel, Carver, Maxwell, Cantor, Kelvin, Heisenberg, and many others."Does naturalism state that we currently know of all things natural?" -Patterner
Quite the opposite. It implies that it is far better to say "We don't know how X works yet" than to say "X? Oh, that's done by Gods, magic, woo, whatever. The latter attitude discourages research. The former methodology encourages it.
Hence the dark ages when methodological supernaturalism was prevalent, and the explosion of knowledge when methodological naturalism took over some 7 centuries ago give or take.
If your question is about a new kind of physics that implements mind, well, if it can be shown that such is how it really works, then it falls under naturalism, yes. But nobody is treating it as something that can be investigated. The whole point of woo is that it be based on faith in lieu of lack of evidence. So empirical research into any of it is discouraged. — noAxioms
That depends heavily on how one defines free will. The way it is being used in this topic, free will is agency of a physical entity (something in the simulation) from a will that isn't part of the physics of the universe (the simulation). So in a VR, Lara Croft has free will since her will comes from outside the physics of the tomb. The NPCs she shoots do not have free will since their agency does come from said physics.What makes free will possible? — Patterner
I don't see a fundamental difference, so 'other people' must answer your question since you say that "It is only when talking about what humans (some people include other animals) do that anyone calls the outcome choice", which implies that only living things have choice. But 'living' is just a language tag. There's no physical difference between a thing designated as living and one that isn't. They're both (per the naturalism view) just material doing what material does.That's what I'm asking.
DNA doesn't explain how supernatural will has the agency to move one's arm. Searle apparently did a talk on how one can willfully move one's arm, but I don't know how he claims to have solved the problem. I'm pretty confident that there's a step in there that require hand-waving or begging or some such, but I've not seem a link to what he says.I suspect the reason believers who don't engage in empirical research don't engage in empirical research is their minds aren't strong in that area. "God did it" and "How does it work" are not incompatible thoughts. Francis Collins is such a strong believer that, when he finished mapping the human genome, he called it the Language of God. Also Mendel, Carver, Maxwell, Cantor, Kelvin, Heisenberg, and many others.
Well, all of it, but I see the question being, at what point can we back off on the level of detail simulated? Simulation is necessarily an approximation, and the further away you get (say the wall to your left), the more you can approximate the physics of it, if the intent is mostly to make the simulation undetectable to the humans. The bugs on the wall will notice, but the sim is not giving them buggy experience. The bugs are but phenomena to the humans, not things that have phenomenal experience themselves. All the above is per Bostrom, describing how the simulation could be optimized. But if the simulation does this (inconsistent physics between say the wall and one's gut biome), then it opens the door for empirical ways to detect this, but it gets hard because the sim is an AI that gleans intent, and it would change the physics of the bug if one focuses sufficient interest in one.The question is How much more? — Ludwig V
I find all of that list to be part of cognitive content, but with chemical influences as well. Fear is a very chemical emotion, but fear is necessarily initiated as a cognitive function: One must conclude a danger of some sort first before the chemicals come into play.Emotions (as opposed to moods) have a cognitive content, and that wouldn't be a problem. But they also involve desire and value.
Software is not driving any emotions in the sim described. It is just simulating molecular interactions or some such, essentially an uncomplicated task. It is the molecules that are arranged into a person who has real emotions that emerge from the molecular activity, never simulated emotions.That is extremely problematic. It seems to me that software commands can simulate emotion, but having an emotion (desire, value) is a very different kettle of fish.
Code which is influenced by chemistry. Good luck with that.I find all of that list to be part of cognitive content, but with chemical influences as well. — noAxioms
That's just a version of Laplace's demon. Hand-waving.Give it particles and forces and such, and off you go. It would need an insane amount of power and memory, but a relatively trivial code base. — noAxioms
That's just a lot of hand-waving.But Bostrom adds a lot more to the software requirement because it needs to know which molecules comprise a set of particles that is designated as a human, and it needs to glean intent from that human so that it can change the physics of some systems when necessary. Now the software is a million times more complicated, but the extra code is worth it for the optimization it buys. — noAxioms
No. Simulated cognition influenced by simulated chemistry. The code is not simulated, unless of course you're multiple layers deep.Code which is influenced by chemistry. — Ludwig V
Another word for determinism, and determinism is not hand waving. It's simply a valid philosophical view.That's just a version of Laplace's demon. Hand-waving.
Yes, that part is hand waving. It assumes that the hard problem isn't hard, or rather, that there isn't a hard problem. The hard problem, as stated, is also hand waving, and will by definition never be solved, regardless of the progress of science and the success of a simulation such as Bostrom describes. The runners of the simulation have zero evidence that the simulated people are conscious as defined by the dualists, as opposed to p-zombies.That's just a lot of hand-waving.
But that's an issue that goes back millennia. A century ago, there was "elan vital" or "Life Force". Before that, it was the "mind", the "soul". Aristotle's "psyche",
Searle's mystery component can be seen in his Chinese Room. It is (from what you tell me and my memories) just a gesture towards something in the future. — Ludwig V
I'm sorry. It was lazy of me to do that.
One point about it was indeed that the physical basis of the emotions is clearly not just a matter of processing information. The focus on the brain, together with the computer analogy, misleads us. Even the knowledge that we already have should prevent us from thinking that there is necessarily any simple correlation between mental and physical phenomena. People equate fear and anger with the circulation of specific hormones. But that is, surely, clearly not the sort of thing that our computers can do. It is one phenomenon in among others that are associated with the emotions. The brain, presumably, is involved in triggering the release and the whole of the rest of the body is affected. Compare the call of "action stations" in a ship or perhaps the fire alarm in a building. Everything is affected. There's no way of picking out the specifics, except by the general description "ready for action" or "falling in love".
Computers of the kind we are familiar with do not (so far as I can see) have any capacity to be afraid or fall in love, to value one outcome over another and one of the reasons for that, it seems to me, is that the way they "think" has no conceptual space for those things. (Though I'm sure that some people will respond to the challenge by developing simulations.)
I'm going to stop there. There's not much I'm sure of beyond this point, except that philosophers don't seem to be able to grapple sensibly with what's going on here. — Ludwig V
Ah, Searle said that, which makes sense. Of course Searle isn't going to accept a naturalist premise, but his unwillingness to set aside his opinion about it prevents his rendering any proper critique. — noAxioms
People keep using the word naturalism and I'm trying to understand what it means. Is it the same or different than physicalism?
— fishfry
For purposes of this discussion, I've been using the two terms interchangeably. — noAxioms
But there is a conceptual link between danger and fear that makes it hard to understand what recognizing a danger could be if one didn't fear it.One must conclude a danger of some sort first before the chemicals come into play. — noAxioms
I hope I'm free to disagree with you?Another word for determinism, and determinism is not hand waving. It's simply a valid philosophical view. — noAxioms
So we agree on something.Yes, that part is hand waving. It assumes that the hard problem isn't hard, or rather, that there isn't a hard problem. The hard problem, as stated, is also hand waving, and will by definition never be solved, regardless of the progress of science and the success of a simulation such as Bostrom describes. — noAxioms
And that adds up to genuine emotion?Simulated cognition influenced by simulated chemistry. — noAxioms
Not sure what you're saying here. If you don't fear something, then it seems you don't recognize it as a danger. I suppose one could employ wordplay to come up with a scenario illustrating one but not the other, but it seem that the fear reflex is triggered exactly by recognition of something that can be characterized by danger.But there is a conceptual link between danger and fear that makes it hard to understand what recognizing a danger could be if one didn't fear it. — Ludwig V
As do most people. If determinism is true, then you still disagree, but the disagreement isn't free. I also want to point out that my personal opinion isn't one that supports determinism, but that doesn't mean the view is 'hand waving' or that it's wrong.I hope I'm free to disagree with you?
If Bostrom's hypothesis is true, and your definition of 'genuine' doesn't include simulated cognition influenced by simulated chemistry, then your emotion is indeed not genuine. That's the best I can answer without a clear definition of 'genuine' in this context.And that adds up to genuine emotion?
I really need a quote on that for context. He asserts that mind works differently than everything else physical. Sounds like dualism to me. If it can be show that it really works that way, then physics needs to be rewritten to include this magic as part of naturalism.Searle is making an entirely naturalist premise. He denied dualism. — fishfry
And how has this been demonstrated? He has no more evidence of that than the science community has that it IS computational, but even a rock rolling down a hill hasn't been shown to be computational.He says consciousness is physical, just not computational.
Again, how do you know this? Fervent belief, or something with actual evidence? Are you asserting (without evidence) that something computational cannot be conscious? Or is it the weaker claim that consciousness simply exists in a classical environment that emerges from non-classical underlying physics? I would fully agree with the latter statement, but I know of zero evidence for the former.it's my point. Consciousness is physical, but not computational.
The same could be said of a transistor in a computer, the operation of which is utterly dependent on quantum effects. It doesn't mean that one cannot create a classical simulation of a transistor, something that is done all the time.Wiki says:
Penrose argues that human consciousness is non-algorithmic
...
Penrose hypothesizes that quantum mechanics plays an essential role in the understanding of human consciousness. The collapse of the quantum wavefunction is seen as playing an important role in brain function.
I really need a quote on that for context. — noAxioms
He asserts that mind works differently than everything else physical. — noAxioms
Sounds like dualism to me. If it can be show that it really works that way, then physics needs to be rewritten to include this magic as part of naturalism. — noAxioms
And how has this been demonstrated? — noAxioms
He has no more evidence of that than the science community has that it IS computational, but even a rock rolling down a hill hasn't been shown to be computational. — noAxioms
Point is, it's no big claim to say something isn't computational. — noAxioms
The big claim is one that says that the effect in question cannot function in a computational way. — noAxioms
I can computationally simulate an approximation of the rock rolling down the hill, a simulation that will yield almost any property I want of a rolling rock. — noAxioms
Bostrom's hypothesis suffers from this. A simulation seems necessarily classical, and yet science has demonstrated (Bell's theorem for starters) that our physics isn't classical. So Bostrom has to modify his hypothesis to change physics when attention is paid to it, to make it appear non-classical when in fact it actually is. That make the job of the simulation so very much more difficult. — noAxioms
Genuine=Not simulated. If I'm experiencing fear, the fear is real.If Bostrom's hypothesis is true, and your definition of 'genuine' doesn't include simulated cognition influenced by simulated chemistry, then your emotion is indeed not genuine. That's the best I can answer without a clear definition of 'genuine' in this context. — noAxioms
But my point is that the recognition and the reflex response are both the fear. Both causally and phenomenologically.I suppose one could employ wordplay to come up with a scenario illustrating one but not the other, but it seem that the fear reflex is triggered exactly by recognition of something that can be characterized by danger. — noAxioms
Well, I don't really think that determinism is just hand-waving. It is much more serious than that.As do most people. If determinism is true, then you still disagree, but the disagreement isn't free. I also want to point out that my personal opinion isn't one that supports determinism, but that doesn't mean the view is 'hand waving' or that it's wrong. — noAxioms
Isn't that hand-waving? It looks very much like it to me. So does Laplace's description of his demon. In addition, his thought-experiment describes predictability as opposed to determinism.It would need an insane amount of power and memory, but a relatively trivial code base. — noAxioms
OK, by those two strangely unaligned definitions, if Bostrom's hypothesis is true, then your experience of fear is real, but not genuine.Genuine=Not simulated. If I'm experiencing fear, the fear is real. — Ludwig V
I don't see that. For one, there is no power requirement for a simulation at all, except the impatience of the runners of the simulation. As for memory, why would a deterministic simulation need any more memory than a non-deterministic one? They would seem to have similar requirements as far as I can see. Do you know what determinism is? I suspect otherwise.[determinism] would need an insane amount of power and memory, but a relatively trivial code base.
That experiment has been shown to be wrong.So does Laplace's description of his demon. In addition, his thought-experiment describes predictability as opposed to determinism.
This is completely false. 1, I have shown an example just above (Norton) where classical mechanics does not do this. 2, Our universe is not classical[Per Laplace], According to determinism, if someone (the demon) knows the precise location and momentum of every atom in the universe, their past and future values for any given time are entailed; they can be calculated from the laws of classical mechanics. — wiki
I'll do better. I retract much of what I said of Searle. I read the transcript of his Ted talk, and yes, he seems to attempt to stay physical. I perhaps have mixed up some assertions from Chalmers, It is Chalmers that needs to explain how the arm goes up, not Searle, who seems to have a consistent story about this.I have stipulated that I am not quoting Searle;
...
Can we just start from what I also said, that I am willing to make this maxim my own. — fishfry
Why do you want this to be the case? It doesn't seem to be just a random assertion.Consciousness is physical but not computational.
I've said as much, but it doesn't prevent the running of simulations of parts of the universe. Why can all the other parts be simulated, but a human cannot? It's not like the simulated human has a different reality to compare, and say "Hey, this consciousness feels different than a genuine consciousness does!". Maybe it 'feels' totally different from one person to the next, and not just from one universe to the next.LOTS of things are physical but not computational.
None of it is about proof. But a shred of evidence always helps. I have no proof that the universe isn't computational, but the evidence suggests that. If we're 'in a sim', the sim has to go out of its way to fake that evidence. Bostrom addresses this problem.I have no proof of that either
You seem to think I assert this, or even that it's my opinion. It isn't. Evidence suggests otherwise. There's no proof either way.If you have proof that everything physical is computational
OK, so we're back to zero evidence for your opinion, which doesn't make the opinion wrong, but it also isn't evidence against the SH. It only renders SH something you won't believe because it conflicts with your opinion.There is no demonstration of the proposition or its negation.
Science is not about proof. I've always agreed with you on this point. Evidence suggests physics is noncomputatinal, and a rolling rock (a genuine one, not a simple approximation of one) is physics.Wait, now you're agreeing with me. If a rock rolling down a hill hasn't been shown to be computational, then you admit that you claim that "everything physical is computational" has no proof.
Yea, but my opinion doesn't count, except that my opinion rejects Bostrom's probability argued to the first two options.So we each have an opinion, and nobody has a proof. I hope we can agree on that.
And my point is that like the rolling rock, it being noncomputational doesn't prevent it from being simulated to enough precision that it works. There's no evidence that consciousness is dependent on non-computability. If it was, then indeed, it could not be simulated at all. The lack of evidence of this dependency means that the SH isn't falsified by this [lack of] evidence. Falsification requires evidence.You have gone a long way towards agreeing with me. If a rock rolling downhill might not be computational, then surely consciousness might not be either.
Yes, you got it. Functioning in a computational way means being approximated to sufficient precision. I can approximate a car crash to sufficient detail that when I finally make a genuine car, I will know how safe it is, how it handles specific collision scenarios.You seem to be making a distinction between "computaional" and "functioning in a computational way." I do not understand that distinction. Unless by "functioning in a computational way" you mean something that can be approximated or simulated by an abstract model. But that is not functioning that way -- it's only being approximated that way.
OK, I grant that. I just want to know if the rock will bust in two when it hits that other rock, or if it will essentially bounce off with only small fragments ejecting. I don't expect the simulation to predict exactly which atoms within it will decay during the time simulated. No amount of precision will predict that.I agreed with you right up till you said, "any property I want." Clearly we can't do that, because we haven't got a theory of quantum gravity, meaning that we have not yet got a complete theory of gravity.
Those we can predict with enough precision, with enough detail of initial state. Those are classical properties. They do have simulations of dark matter, and they explain the unusual rotation curves of some galaxies. The simulations show how those galaxies seem to have little dark matter in them compared to most. The simulations don't get the predictions correct partly due to the inability to guess correctly at initial conditions. Bostrom doesn't seem to address this problem in his paper. It is apparently 'hand waved' away. How does one set up initial conditions of this 'ancestor simulation'? Apparently an exercise for the people of the future to solve,So there are SOME properties, tiny little wobbles, that we can NOT simulate or approximate, because we haven't got enough physics.
Yes, he does. This point obviously grates against your opinion enough to prevent further reading.He explicitly assumes that the "simulation" implements consciousness.
Yes, that's what he's talking about. I thought that was clear, even from the abstract.So he is (in my reading) NOT talking about simulation as approximation; or simulation as a perfect implementation of an abstract model that captures most but not all of a system's behaviors. He is talking about my consciousness, this noisy voice in my head and the feeling of the keys under my fingertips, the pleasant sensation of the soft breeze coming in the open window, being literally implemented, instantiated, created by the "simulation."
He does not suggest that we're computer programs. Being a program is very different than being simulated by one. You don't buy the hypothesis because it conflicts with your beliefs. Nothing wrong with that.I find that most unlikely, for the simple reason that I don't think computer programs have inner lives.
I hate to say it, but how does instantiation differ from execution of a model? I thought I had got it right, but now you're treating these terms as distinct.So he is using the word simulation to mean instantiation or creation; and NOT approximation or execution of an abstract model.
No, but simulated bowling balls are attracted to each other (not much). Either that or the gravity simulation isn't as accurate to sufficient precision. Most gravity simulations don't go to that precision.Remember: Simulations of gravity do not attract nearby bowling balls. I hope you will consider this.
I think that is what Searle is saying. Except that he doesn't consider raising an arm to be "the exact same thing" if it is done by you or me and if it is done by a machine. The issue is what the difference is. From what I've seen is that he thinks that there is some causal difference between the two. I think the difference is only partly empirical, but the difference between two different language-games. One, the game that the concept of a person defines; the other the game that the concept of a machine defines.If two things are doing the exact same thing, it is 'X' if a human does it, and it is not X if a machine does it. That's what I got from it. — noAxioms
Yes, there is a problem there.OK, by those two strangely unaligned definitions, if Bostrom's hypothesis is true, then your experience of fear is real, but not genuine. — noAxioms
Could we just say "recognition of something as dangerous" or "recognition of a danger"? Anyway, if I've understood what a simulation is supposed to be, it involves feeding me information that is false. False information can easily trigger real or genuine fear. So the fear is not actually appropriate in that situation, but it would be misleading to call it simulated because that suggests that I am not really afraid. I'm not sure what the right word would be.but it seem that the fear reflex is triggered exactly by recognition of something that can be characterized by danger — noAxioms
I said:-It would need an insane amount of power and memory, but a relatively trivial code base. — noAxioms
You replied:-That's just a version of Laplace's demon. Hand-waving. — Ludwig V
I don't understand what you are saying. It may well be true. But I don't care about the difference between a deterministic simulation and a non-deterministic one. I do care about the difference between reality and a simulation of it.I don't see that. For one, there is no power requirement for a simulation at all, except the impatience of the runners of the simulation. As for memory, why would a deterministic simulation need any more memory than a non-deterministic one? They would seem to have similar requirements as far as I can see. — noAxioms
Well, I don't really think that determinism is just hand-waving. It is much more serious than that.As do most people. If determinism is true, then you still disagree, but the disagreement isn't free. I also want to point out that my personal opinion isn't one that supports determinism, but that doesn't mean the view is 'hand waving' or that it's wrong. — noAxioms
This is completely false. 1, I have shown an example just above (Norton) where classical mechanics does not do this. 2, Our universe is not classical — noAxioms
Well, at least we are agreed that Laplace's demon is out of date.None of the interpretations of physics, not even the fully deterministic ones, are consistent with the claim made above by Laplace. — noAxioms
I used to know, but then I did a bit of reading and now I don't. But everybody else does seem to know, or think they know. If determinism is not about physics, - and the SEP does say that it is not - then what is it about? Or is it perhaps as out of date and the demon?Do you know what determinism is? I suspect otherwise. — noAxioms
I tried to be more precise than that. Something not actually dangerous at all (say most spiders), can trigger a fear reflex. Some actually dangerous things don't trigger it if it isn't thus characterized. But yes, essentially, your wording is fine.triggered exactly by recognition of something that can be characterized by danger
— noAxioms
Could we just say "recognition of something as dangerous" or "recognition of a danger"? — Ludwig V
No, that sounds like a VR. I say that, but since Bostrom posits the changing of physics when you pay attention to the thing, his vision of a simulation does feed the simulated humans lies, in particular, that the universe is non-computational, when in fact it is a computation.Anyway, if I've understood what a simulation is supposed to be, it involves feeding me information that is false.
It can't be genuine since the person experiencing the fear is not genuine. The fear of being bit by the dog is very real and not false information, but the dog is apparently an NPC per Bostrom, just a mindless object controlled by AI, at least until you look closer, which most people don't.False information can easily trigger real or genuine fear.
You are really afraid. If the dog bits you, it will hurt. You might bleed. You might get a permanent scar.So the fear is not actually appropriate in that situation, but it would be misleading to call it simulated because that suggests that I am not really afraid.
By your definition of 'real', the simulation IS reality to the people in it. It simply isn't real to the people running the simulation, but Bostrom doesn't posit that we're the ones running it. We're not 'posthuman', as he puts it.I do care about the difference between reality and a simulation of it.
Well, I don't really think that determinism is just hand-waving. It is much more serious than that.
Laplace's demon is a story illustrating/presuming determinism, which you declared to be hand waving, and now declaring it to not be just hand waving.That's just a version of Laplace's demon. Hand-waving.
Very much so, yes. It just doesn't mean that determinism has died with the demon.Well, at least we are agreed that Laplace's demon is out of date.
Determinism says that subsequent states of a closed system is fixed, given an exact initial state. It means that a system will evolve the same way, every time, from the same initial state. It implies all effects have a cause.I used to know [ what determinism is]
I'll do better. I retract much of what I said of Searle — noAxioms
I read the transcript of his Ted talk, and yes, he seems to attempt to stay physical. — noAxioms
I perhaps have mixed up some assertions from Chalmers, It is Chalmers that needs to explain how the arm goes up, not Searle, who seems to have a consistent story about this. — noAxioms
The Ted talk seemed to play the language game. If two things are doing the exact same thing, it is 'X' if a human does it, and it is not X if a machine does it. That's what I got from it. — noAxioms
I got nothing from him that suggests that human consciousness cannot be simulated, that it isn't computational. That bit seems to be your assertion. — noAxioms
My apologies if I seem to respond to most of your comments. We both tend to do that, which makes the replies lengthy. I try to edit out repetitive replies. — noAxioms
Consciousness is physical but not computational.
Why do you want this to be the case? It doesn't seem to be just a random assertion. — noAxioms
LOTS of things are physical but not computational.
I've said as much, but it doesn't prevent the running of simulations of parts of the universe. — noAxioms
Why can all the other parts be simulated, but a human cannot? — noAxioms
It's not like the simulated human has a different reality to compare, and say "Hey, this consciousness feels different than a genuine consciousness does!". Maybe it 'feels' totally different from one person to the next, and not just from one universe to the next. — noAxioms
None of it is about proof. But a shred of evidence always helps. — noAxioms
I have no proof that the universe isn't computational, but the evidence suggests that. If we're 'in a sim', the sim has to go out of its way to fake that evidence. Bostrom addresses this problem. — noAxioms
You seem to think I assert this, or even that it's my opinion. It isn't. Evidence suggests otherwise. There's no proof either way. — noAxioms
OK, so we're back to zero evidence for your opinion, which doesn't make the opinion wrong, but it also isn't evidence against the SH. It only renders SH something you won't believe because it conflicts with your opinion. — noAxioms
That's where we differ. I don't reject something because of conflicts with my opinions. I don't consider my opinion to count as evidence one way or another. — noAxioms
Science is not about proof. I've always agreed with you on this point. Evidence suggests physics is noncomputatinal, and a rolling rock (a genuine one, not a simple approximation of one) is physics. — noAxioms
Yea, but my opinion doesn't count, except that my opinion rejects Bostrom's probability argued to the first two options. — noAxioms
And my point is that like the rolling rock, it being noncomputational doesn't prevent it from being simulated to enough precision that it works. — noAxioms
There's no evidence that consciousness is dependent on non-computability. If it was, then indeed, it could not be simulated at all. The lack of evidence of this dependency means that the SH isn't falsified by this [lack of] evidence. Falsification requires evidence. — noAxioms
Yes, you got it. Functioning in a computational way means being approximated to sufficient precision. I can approximate a car crash to sufficient detail that when I finally make a genuine car, I will know how safe it is, how it handles specific collision scenarios. — noAxioms
Note that I am using here and earlier the word 'genuine' as defined by Ludwig at the top of this post, since his definition of 'real' would not be fitting. — noAxioms
OK, I grant that. I just want to know if the rock will bust in two when it hits that other rock, or if it will essentially bounce off with only small fragments ejecting. I don't expect the simulation to predict exactly which atoms within it will decay during the time simulated. No amount of precision will predict that. — noAxioms
Those we can predict with enough precision, with enough detail of initial state. — noAxioms
Those are classical properties. They do have simulations of dark matter, and they explain the unusual rotation curves of some galaxies. — noAxioms
The simulations show how those galaxies seem to have little dark matter in them compared to most. The simulations don't get the predictions correct partly due to the inability to guess correctly at initial conditions. Bostrom doesn't seem to address this problem in his paper. It is apparently 'hand waved' away. How does one set up initial conditions of this 'ancestor simulation'? Apparently an exercise for the people of the future to solve, — noAxioms
He explicitly assumes that the "simulation" implements consciousness.
Yes, he does. This point obviously grates against your opinion enough to prevent further reading. — noAxioms
Yes, that's what he's talking about. I thought that was clear, even from the abstract. — noAxioms
He does not suggest that we're computer programs. — noAxioms
Being a program is very different than being simulated by one. — noAxioms
You don't buy the hypothesis because it conflicts with your beliefs. Nothing wrong with that. — noAxioms
I hate to say it, but how does instantiation differ from execution of a model? I thought I had got it right, but now you're treating these terms as distinct. — noAxioms
No, but simulated bowling balls are attracted to each other (not much). — noAxioms
Either that or the gravity simulation isn't as accurate to sufficient precision. Most gravity simulations don't go to that precision. — noAxioms
But if this is indeed a simulation, then anything we purport to know about our present levels of technology (and thus any extrapolation therefrom) is illusory, because we don't actually possess that technology: such technology is simulated. — Arkady
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