Yes, of course, Oracle can perfectly know what is truly going to happen. However, his knowledge of the truth is not actionable. What else is he going to do with it? — Tarskian

This was your idea. I didn't know you were looking for a purpose for Oracle. What did your have in mind? Off the top of my head, I'd say there's money to be made at the roulette wheel.

Thwarter needs a prediction as input. Otherwise it does not run. — Tarskian

Ok. Oracle gives a final spoken prediction, but secretly writes down what it knows thwarter will do at that point.

The thwarter first asks the oracle what it predicts that it will be doing. The oracle then looks at the source code of the thwarter and at the inputs that it would be getting from the environment, and then predicts what the thwarter will be doing. Upon receiving the answer from the oracle, the thwarter does something else instead, because that is exactly how it was programmed. — Tarskian

The oracle would know how the thwarter would react to its prediction. It could say, "Now that I've told you you will do X, you will do Y, just to thwart me." Which would make the thwarter do X, or Z, or whatever. And the oracle would know every step of the dance. A dance that might go on forever, thwarter never actually doing anything, as oracle endlessly says, "But now that I've said that, you will..." Which oracle would know ahead of time.

Or, at any point, oracle might say, "I'll (app equivalent of) write it down, and, after you act, you can read it. And you'll see I predicted accurately."

If the majority think what's good for everyone is incompatible with what some minority wants,
— Patterner
If. But why would the majority think that way? — Vera Mont

Because they are smarter, and they know best. At least in their own minds. If there was going to be a democratic vote on same sex marriage, I'd bet everything I own that it would be outlawed. "It's not good for society.". "It erodes our values." "It's a slippery slope. Soon we'll have to allow people to marry their dog." "They are equal. They have the same freedom to marry someone of the opposite sex that everybody else has."

About half of the USA is going to be enraged in the next few months by the decision the other half made. Because the two sides have drastically different ideas of what is good for everyone, and many are not as concerned with what's good for everyone as with what's good for them.

If the majority think what's good for everyone is incompatible with what some minority wants, and they believe they are voting for the good of everyone by outlawing what that minority wants, and "It's for their own good, even if they don't know it, and they'll thank us for it later," or they think the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few, then we do not have freedom and equality.

In a democracy, we would vote on all the issues. For example, whether or not people of the same sex, or different races, can get married. I remember an episode of Different Strokes where the prom committee was voting on which songs would be played. There were two black students on the committee, and three or four white students. It wasn't working out too well for the black students. Democracy doesn't promote freedom or equality. It just gives the freedom to cast a vote that is equal to any other person's vote. (Unless a vote forbids certain people to vote in the future.)

Yes, but electric charge is something out there that we come to know about. Consciousness is not like that, it's in here, not out there. We know about consciousness because consciousness is itself knowing, we know that we know, and we know the nature of knowing by being a knower. — bert1

We know what knowing is. But we don't know how it is that we are able to know. We all have our favorite theories. Yours and mine both fall under the umbrella of panpsychism. I believe @RogueAI's is idealism. (I don't know how many specific theories fall under that umbrella.) The fact that there can be different theories, but we have no way of verifying any of them, means it's a mystery. We have a general idea of what it does. Ask ten people here what the characteristics of consciousness are, and you'll probably get a dozen answers. But the bare minimum is subjective experience. But how that happens is a mystery. The Hard Problem.

That's a good question. Perhaps a dream like this allows to experience a whole lot of things we normally wouldn't be able to in our "natural state" of oneness with the cosmic mind. A dream where reality seems materialistic and we seem to be a bunch of individuals in a materialistic world (and of course we decide to forget we made the decision to dream all this up) seems like an excellent way to separate from the godhead and try out some unique experiences. What's it like to be in a concentration camp? What's it like to be a concentration camp guard? A celebrity? A nobody? A king? A peasant? And so on. — RogueAI

I understand the idea of Atman being, shall we say, shards of Brahman, limiting itself in order to experience things in different ways. But that, itself, is speculation. Adding the idea that the material world that we experience, of such incredibly different nature than a reality of just minds, is entirely made up (because, if it's not entirely made up, then it's based on something else), which would be like us coming up with an different reality with entirely different properties and laws, which we can't do In anything but the most general terms, but which would have to be a reality that we could survive in... Well, I don't see the logic in believing that over believing things are generally as they seem. Things may not be exactly as they seem, since our perceptions can only give us a certain amount of what's there. However, that's far from saying nothing at all is as it seems.

The materialistic explanations for consciousness, otoh, are completely bonkers, at least imo. — RogueAI

I agree. The materialistic explanations amount to "It just happens." Why are certain physical things and processes, which would take place without consciousness, nevertheless, accompanied by consciousness? They just are. Adding more physical processes to the mix, making the system more physically complex, doesn't suggest an answer for how physical becomes conscious.

Consciousness is its own explanation. It's nothing other than itself. — bert1

We can say matter is its own explanation, and is nothing other than itself. how does choosing to not try to explain something solve the mystery of it, or tell us about its intrinsic nature? In Until the End of Time, Brian Greene writes:

I don’t know what mass is. I don’t know what electric charge is. What I do know is that mass produces and responds to a gravitational force, and electric charge produces and responds to an electromagnetic force. So while I can’t tell you what these features of particles are, I can tell you what these features do. — Greene

I can't imagine he is ever going to stop trying to figure out what those features are. Newton could not figure out what gravity is. He only figured out what it does. Einstein kept at the mystery, and figured out its intrinsic nature.

Ditch the whole "matter" thing entirely. There is no matter. It's all mental stuff. — RogueAI

I don't understand why minds, being mental stuff, in a reality of nothing but mental stuff (or maybe there wasn't any mental stuff other than minds?), would ... what's the word ... fabricate a reality (an illusory reality?) that is of a nature unlike the mental, which we call "matter." And, to our knowledge, minds do not exist without, or can't function without, this fabricated reality. Why would minds do that, instead of existing and interacting in purely mental ways?

Consciousness is not in need of explanation - the mystery is already solved. We know what it is. We know its intrinsic nature, I suggest. There's nothing more to be said about that. — bert1

I don't understand what you mean. What is the mystery, and how have we solved it? What is its intrinsic nature?

"How is it that it never rains in southern California?"

That start me wondering what it would mean if physical determinism only metaphorically prevented any other possibility. — Ludwig V

I don't know what you mean.

But I'm not arguing that we are not prevented from some choices in one way or another. The question is whether this is always the case or just sometimes and what the factors are that can prevent choices. See? — Ludwig V

Certainly it is impossible to do anything and everything we can think of. I can't jump up and fly to the moon. I can't walk through the earth to find lost treasures or mine diamonds. And sure, coercion happens. But even if coercion prevents me from accomplishing a particular goal, it doesn't prevent me from taking all but one exact action.

The question is whether you have no possibility of choosing from the options. But determinism effectively says that you have no options, because an option is by definition something you could choose to take. — Ludwig V

Right. What are the words for this kinds of ideas? "Numerous things it is possible for a humsn to do in a given situation" is not the same as "choices" if, despite being actions that it is known humans can perform, determinism only allows one. But, to my knowledge, we don't have a word that expresses that, because our languages were developed by beings who thought we could have done other than we did.

It's about whether or not I can actually choose one path or another.
— Patterner
That little word actually is interesting. What does it mean? Either I have a choice, or I do not. — Ludwig V

I wasn't crazy about writing it. :grin: I don't always know how to express myself in these matters. And sometimes it's not even my fault, As ssu just pointed out regarding the definitions of cause and reason.

I'm just saying that you can't have no ability to choose any but one of multiple equally possible paths and have free will in the matter.
— Patterner
In one way, you are right. But there are some kinds of coercion that are compatible with the capacity to choose. Determinism eliminates the capacity to choose, and so eliminates the possibility of coercion.

When the cop arrests me and asks me to hold out my hands for the cuffs, do I have a choice? When I drag myself in to work on a Monday morning, do I go because I have chosen to go? When my opponent forces me to take his rook (castle) in order to get my queen, what choices do I have? When I pay my taxes, what choice do I have? Assume in all these cases that I have a normal capacity to choose. — Ludwig V

In any scenario, let's just take the cop, there are numerous things it is possible for a human to do.
-Hold your hands out as requested.
-Punch the cop.
-Run away.
-Beg and plead.
-Etc.

Even within each of those, there are numerous variations. If you hold your hands out as requested, you can:
-Simply hold your hands out.
-Say "Yes, officer" and hold your hands out.
-Say "Does this makes you feel like a big man?" and hold your hands out.
-Roll your eyes and hold your hands out.
-Many many other things, and many many combinations.

If I roll my eyes and hold my hands out, and, because of physical determinism - because the trillions of physical events in my brain play out and resolve in the one-and-only way they could have given the initial conditions (just as the pool balls settle into one-and-only configuration they could have given the initial conditions when the cue hits them) - there is no possibility of me doing anything else, despite all the possibilities available to a person in that situation, then I do not have free will. I'm not "actually choosing" if physical determinism literally prevents any other possibility. A couple pages ago, to Relativist, I said it's not a "meaningful choice".

If this is correct, then coercion is just another physical factor that goes into the mix. We experience it as coercion, but it's all reducible to physical events in our brains.

It also means our subjective experience of everything is epiphenomenal. If I'm aware of all the possibilities, but I have no possibility of "choosing" from the myriad options, and can do only the one that the physical factors determine, then awareness is only watching the show.

The person who comes down the mountain is not in a free fall, as the boulder is - though they might be. Their descent is under control. It's not about which path they take. — Ludwig V

It's about whether or not I can actually choose one path or another. As opposed to having multiple paths in front of me, but there being no possibility of choosing any but one. If I have no possibility of choosing any but one, despite others being just as available, then I do not have free will. And that's fine. I'm not arguing. It's a perfectly legitimate stance. (Although I disagree with it.) I'm just saying that you can't have no ability to choose any but one of multiple equally possible paths and have free will in the matter.

There's been a lot of discussion of that possibility, but I haven't seen anything that really resolves the differences between them.
— Ludwig V
I think it would be productive for this thread if either you or anyone gives the most compelling case just why they cannot be both at the same time. Even if one doesn't personally agree with the argument. — ssu

I see it the other way around. If choices are made because of the physical interactions of all the constituent parts of the brain (whether considered at the level of particles, atoms, molecules, cells, neurons, brain areas, or whatever), due to the properties and laws of physics, and no choice could ever have been/be other than it was/will be, then what is the definition of Free Will that allows for choices to be made freely? Free from what? Other than our awareness of the whole thing, which a boulder lacks, in what way is a path taken for such causes by a person who comes to an intersection different from a path taken by a boulder rolling down a mountain?

I truly don't understand how you can say the things you are saying. It occurs to me that we're miscommunicating. Thinking we're talking about things the same way, when we're not. So let me try this. This is an equivalent of our conversation, as far as I can tell.

R: "We are circles, but we are squares."

P: "Something that is a circle cannot also be a square. They are mutually exclusive. How can that be possible?"

R: "It is possible. The circle can have four 90° corners, and four equal sides."

P: "You have given different wording for a square, but you have not explained how it is possible for a circle to be a square."

R: "But if it is true, then circles can be squares."

P: "But what reason do we have to think it is possible?"


And now substitute our topic.


R: "We are the product of physical interactions, which are determined entirety by the laws of physics, and none of our choices could ever have been, or ever will be, other than exactly what they were, or will be. But we have agency."

P: "Something that is entirely governed by physical determinism cannot have agency. They are mutually exclusive. How could that be possible?"

R: "It is possible. We are governed by physical determinism, but we are autonomous."

P: "You have given different wording for 'agency,' but you have not explained how it is possible for something ruled by physical determinism to have it."

R: "But if it is true, then we can be ruled by determinism, yet make independent choices."

P: "But what reason do we have to think it is possible?"


Am I not understanding something you are saying? Or are we defining our terms differently?

Suppose your mind is immaterial, (at least partially) operating independently of the laws of nature. — Relativist

My mind being immaterial would not mean it, even partially, operates independent of the laws of nature. Since my mind is a natural thing, it would mean the immaterial is part of the laws of nature.

However, it would mean that my mind, at least partially, operates independently of the laws of physics that we have been able to discover and understand so far. (Let's just say we understand the laws of physics entirely, for the sake of an easier discussion.)

You have chosen a path down the mountain, but you might have taken a different path if you knew it to be more scenic, offering more shade, or if you knew a rattlesnake awaited you on your chosen path. You were, at all times, free to choose a route based on your knowledge, the aesthetic appeal, fears, and your skills. Do you agree this is different from the boulder? — Relativist

I certainly agree it's different from the boulder. Because, in this scenario (which I agree with) our minds are not nothing but an incredibly complex expression of the laws of physics.

Now suppose your mind is entirely the product of physical brain function. You have the exact same freedom to choose a route based on your knowledge, the aesthetic appeal, fears, and your skills. In both cases, these factors are the result of events in your life (e.g. the DNA that produced you, your studies, your physical conditioning and mountaineering skills). Why should the fundamental basis of these factors (physical vs immaterial) matter? I don't think it does. You have no more, and no less, freedom. — Relativist

In this scenario, there is nothing other than the laws of physics at work. The dominoes fall/the billiard balls bounce around. There is no possibility of anything happening that is not the result of those physical interactions, and the result can only be one exact thing. There is literally no possibility of any other outcome.

I'm not fond of strawberry ice cream. But if there's a dish of it on the table, and the dishes of chocolate, salted caramel, and vanilla ice cream are inside of unbreakable glass cases, then I'm going to choose the strawberry. Did I make a meaningful choice? Of course not. No choice is meaningful if I literally cannot choose otherwise, regardless of the reasons I can't.

How is an act intentional if there is no option but to act, and in that exact way?
— Patterner
There ARE options. See my above reply to Gnomon (the bold part). — Relativist

I understand that there are options. But if I chose which path to take when I hiked down a mountain the same way a boulder chose which path to take when it rolled down the mountain - that is, because of physical events (since "minds are purely a consequence of physical brain activity") - and, despite there having been many different routes between top and bottom for each of us, I had no more ability to have taken a different route than the one I took than the boulder had, then "agency" and "intention" are simply feelings we have for the results of physical events that take place in our brains. We call the physical events that take place when an airplane moves through the air flight; the physical events that take place in green plants photosynthesis; the physical events that take place as it rains on a mountain erosion; the physical events that take place as the earth circles the sun orbiting; on and on. The airplane is not even aware that it is flying, much less have feelings about it. Same for the plant, the rain, and and the earth.

How is an act intentional if there is no option but to act, and in that exact way?

Perhaps I misunderstand your use of the words "choice" and "agency." What you describe still sounds like an avalanche. It's possible for a boulder to roll absolutely straight down a mountain, or to some degree to the left or right of straight down. Probably any given angle of descent has happened at one time or another in the past, and will again. But, every time a boulder has or will roll down a mountain, it can only follow one exact path. Rocks in its way, shaped and composed exactly as they are; changing incline; changing tilt on the other axis; texture and compactness of the soil; plants holding the soil together to different degrees in different places; moisture; air pressure; precipitation; etc. It's all far beyond our ability to calculate exactly where a boulder will land once it gets moving, even if we could freeze time whenever we wanted to and take measurements. But there is only one exact way it's going to fall and land.

It sounds to me that you're describing our choices the same way. Possibly more factors and/or types of factors, but the principle is identical. We can even say the specifics of the mountain's topography are memories of things like past rainfalls and landslides, which affect the boulder's path as surely as our chemically stored memories affect which path we take at the cusp of decision.

What are "choice" and "agency," and how do they change any of that? Every hurricane and avalanche affects the world. Sometimes in incalculably complex and powerful ways.

The illusion is that of hindsight: that we could actually have made a different one. — Relativist

As I was going back and forth between the two doors of Ben & Jerry's in the freezer section at the store today, picking up several and reading the description, considering if I was in the mood for something with peanut butter, or caramel, considering the marshmallow ice cream, etc., it certainly felt like I had a choice then, not merely in hindsight.

So yes, I believe the antecedent state will necessarily result in the consequent state. — Relativist

In actuality, we could have only made a different choice had there been something different within us (a different set of beliefs, disposltions, impulse...). — Relativist

Sure, but every choice was preceded by some sequence of one or more thoughts. Given that sequence, the resulting choice will follow. — Relativist

It seems to me that we could call the physical events that involve rock and snow being pulled down a mountain by gravity an avalanche, the physical events that involve air and water moving In a huge circular pattern a hurricane, and the physical events of bio-electric impulses moving through a brain a choice. They, and every other example we can make, are all entirely the result of the laws of physics that we are familiar with. Their settings and materials are different, but the difference between the setting/material of the human brain and any other setting/material is not more significant than three difference between any other two setting/materials.

Is that an accurate statement about your position?

Here's what in 2014 Josef Ruckavicka wrote in The American Mathematical Monthly Volume 121, 2014 Issue 6, which goes total the same lines as we have discussed: — ssu

Unfortunately, I would have to pay $61 to read that. And that is nothing close to a guarantee I would understand it.

If assumed that LD has God-like abilities, that's a different issue. The basic idea didn't start from the entity have other abilities except perfect knowledge of the laws of nature and perfect knowledge of the data about everything. Nowhere is it hinted that LD is in control of everything, the idea is really that the LD can perfectly extrapolate from current data and knowledge what the future will be. — ssu

Yes, that is my understanding of LD.

Yet notice that it's not anymore interacting. LD is then more of a historians ultimate event checker. But the issue of course is settled when LD doesn't interact with the World it's forecasting. But this naturally wasn't at all what Laplace had in mind. We are part of the universe ...and so are our models too. — ssu

But a thing with the perceptions and intellect to understand everything, whether or not it interacted with anything, is not a necessary part of an entirely deterministic reality. The fact that there isn't such a thing (someone recently told me why there could not be such a thing on another thread, although I never suspected there was) does not have any bearing on whether or not everything, including everything about us, is deterministic.

And here you see the obvious difference: there is no negative self reference loop. The friend doesn't know the information. As I've not read the book, I think the friend doesn't then say to the scientist "Why don't you do it yourself? Are you going obey and write what the paper says you to, or can you write something else?". How the writer would continue on, would be interesting... — ssu

Well, naturally, the scientist tested it himself at first. I don't remember all the specifics of the conversation (it's been decades. But I have the paperback, so I'll check.), but I can't imagine he did not try to trick it.

Just think about it: if this something with the perceptions and intellect to understand everything would now write here what you Patterner will say, how could it get it right? Because before you write you next comment you would read it, think about and comment on it. — ssu

I think I am finally understanding you. :grin: I don't know if you changed your wording in such a way that I finally caught on, or if I was just too dense to figure it out until now. The latter is certainly a good possibility, and I don't want to embarrass myself by going back and looking at what you were saying before.

Without ever trying it, you and I are smart enough to see the problem that will arise if the thing with the perceptions and intellect to understand everything [Maybe we can just call it Laplace's Demon (LD)?] declares what my next post will be. I don't see any reason to think LD would not also see the problem. It would, in fact, have perfect knowledge of what my response would be. And it would be unable to state that ahead of time without changing what I would have said. On and on and on.

That doesn't invalidate the idea of determinism. Requiring LD to announce the forecast, and an endless chain of revised forecasts, is just setting up an impossible condition. LD wouldn't announce the forecast ahead of time. But it would know, if everything I think and do is the result of determinism. Maybe it could write it down, only to reveal it after I made my post.

There is a science fiction book called ]I]Thrice Upon a Time[/i], by James Hogan. A scientist puts his friend in front of a computer. A small piece of paper prints out. The scientist looks at it, but does not show his friend. Then the scientist tells his friend to type six characters on the computer and hit enter. After the friend does that, the scientist shows him the print out from a minute earlier. It matches what the friend just typed. The scientist found a way to send that amount of information back in time one minute. So what was printed out a minute before it was typed. At that point, of course, the friend tried to outsmart the machine. After the scientist gets a print out, the friends typed nothing. And the scientist revealed a blank printout from 60 seconds earlier. And then the friend tries to double-fake the machine, and on and on.

Is everything in this reality deterministic,
— Patterner
I don't think that the idea that everything in this reality is deterministic is an empirical hypothesis. It is a completely different kind of proposition. — Ludwig V

Is it not the proposition of this thread? Some think it is, some think it isn't. Not to say we can prove it one way or thre other. If we could, there wouldn't still be new threads about it.

And before he or she thinks that you are attacking the whole idea of determinism, it should be told that the issue in the limitations of modelling that determinism, not the determinism itself!
— ssu
So you are saying that the world is deterministic, even though our models will never demonstrate that? — Ludwig V

This is what I'm trying to understand about where some of you - you two in particular, at the moment, but others who are not posting in this thread - stand. Is everything in this reality deterministic, and we just don't have the necessary information and intelligence to be able to calculate terribly much, particularly regarding human choices, about the future? Or are some aspects of this reality - notably, human choices - not deterministic? Understandable if anyone does not know which they think is the case.

That you did make choices isn't relevant for the determinist model: your choosing to throw the pillow is just given.
— ssu
Yes. Physics doesn't have the conceptual apparatus to describe or even acknowledge choices. Ordinary life requires a whole different way of thinking — Ludwig V

I'm basically asking the same thing again. Does ordinary life require a whole different way of thinking in the same sense that we need to think of large numbers of air molecules as thermodynamics, because we simply can't perceive such a gargantuan number, much less calculate all the interactions that will take place between all of them within the space they occupy?

You cannot write a comment that you don't write, even if obviously those kind of comments that you don't write do exist. — ssu

Why is that? Whether I chose to write a comment or not, it is a decision. I have perceived what I perceived. It is all converted into bio-electric impulses, neurotransmitters, and what not. Then it all runs to whichever parts of my brain each thing runs to. Parts where memories are stored, parts where logic examines, etc., etc. Then things move towards a decision. Particles collide, neurons fire, structures do their job, action potentials are initiated, etc.

If, in principle, something with the perceptions and intellect to understand how all those physical events interacting translates to decisions and actions, and can forecast what response I would type, why would it not be able to forecast that I would choose to not respond? It's still a choice. Surely, the choice to not move is not, in principle, of such different nature from the choice to move.

Second scenario is fine. Not at all scary. Dying can be scary. Being dead isn't.

The crucial part here is that modelling the past there's no interaction and the model doesn't have to take itself into account. What has happened has happened. That you did make choices isn't relevant for the determinist model: your choosing to throw the pillow is just given. But you hopefully understand that it's different to model this when it hasn't happened, especially you know about the model before you have thrown it. Then a whole Pandora's box has been opened from the determinist view. — ssu

Yes, I understand. But why can't how a model takes itself into account be calculated? That's just more input fed into the algorithm.

If a "fatalistic" determinist argues that this kind of determinism (where all of our reactions can be forecasted) is perhaps possible in the future (as we don't know what the future holds and what kind of technological/scientific advances there are), then one has simply to remind them that this science then simply can't be logical. — ssu

I believe the idea is that all of our actions are determined by the progressions of arrangements of all the constituents of our brains. Mental states are either identical to, or entirely determined by, brain states. In theory, a more advanced technology could pinpoint all the constituents of our brains, see all the forces acting on them, and calculate future arrangements. Why can that not be logical?

I see below that you just responded to a previous post of mine. Off I go! :grin:

The language-games around actions are unbelievably complicated and very difficult to summarize. The same is not true of events — Ludwig V

The causes of some events are more complicated than others. The causes of our simplest actions are probably more complicated than the causes of most events. Possibly any event. As I recently said, there are many variables, many kinds of variables, and all of the variables are interacting with at least some of the others. We don't have the ability to track that, much less predict future actions. We barely have the ability to predict future events. (Some people are amazing at pool.) Still, is it not all on the same spectrum?
Simple Events > Complex Events > Simple Actions > Complex Actions.

Can you give me an example of a free action?"
— Patterner
Tempting. But it wouldn't be a clear case. Almost everything we do can be described as free from some perspectives and not free from others. — Ludwig V

You said, "We could not act freely..." What do you mean?

The question is this: Did I let go of the pillow in exactly the way I did because all the constituents of my brain - whether we examine them as particles and physics, or molecules and chemistry, or structures and biology, or whatever - acted in the only ways each of them could, all purely physical interactions driven by the physical laws?
Did I throw the pillow because all the constituents of my brain acted in the only ways each of them could, all purely physical interactions driven by the physical laws?
— Patterner
The answer to those questions is yes. But the questions are asked in the context of the glass breaking and so lead us to neglect the conceptual difference between the glass breaking (an event) and my throwing the pillow (an action, normally). — Ludwig V

Can you explain the conceptual difference?

If the answer is Yes, then we are not choosing things any more than the glass is choosing to break exactly as it does, or the debris is choosing to come to rest exactly as it does after an avalanche. We merely have awareness of things that the glass and mountain lack.
— Patterner
So you are an epiphenomenalist?
I don't agree. If the answer is yes, that doesn't justify your conclusion. It defines our problem. If the answer is no, that also doesn't justify any conclusion. It also defines our problem. — Ludwig V

Can you tell me what the definition of our problem is if the answer is Yes?

I am as far from an epiphenomenalist as can be. I am playing Determinist's Advocate, presenting the case for determinism as I see it. Not knowing the definition of our problem, I don't know how you can both agree that the answer is Yes, and not be an epiphenomenalist. At the moment I typed this post, given every bit of sensory input I've ever received, every bit of information I've ever learned, the physical structure of my brain that my DNA is responsible for, the physical structure of my brain that was determined by other factors, and every other variable we can think of, could I have posted a different response? Could I have posted the same ideas, but in different words? Could I have chosen to respond later tonight? Could I have chosen to not respond at all?

I'm asking for a definition. I've been expressing what I take determinism to be. I tried to be as clear as I could here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/910043

I honestly can't be sure, but it seems that you are saying we are in a deterministic reality, but you disagree with my post. If so, then I ask what determinism means.

Now, does this deterministic view of there being your answer 1038, 1039 and 1050 limit what you can write? No. Could they be forecasted? Again no, this isn't simple extrapolation from what has become for. — ssu

Why is determinism called determinism? What is deterministic about it?

That's a very long thread, and he has some great stuff to say.

And you can't go wrong with scifi. :grin:

Your post brings a post on another site to mind.
https://kevinswatch.com/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?p=1098685#p1098685

It's a site dedicated to a series of fantasy books, and the author in general. But we have forums for various other things.

Freedom is not opposed to determinism; it requires it. — Ludwig V

Can you define "freedom"? Freedom from what?

We could not act freely if the causal network was not (reasonably) reliable. — Ludwig V

Can you give me an example of a free action?

Also, by "reasonably reliable", do you mean the casual network is not always reliable? If that is what you mean, can you give an example of it not being reliable?

Does this refute the idea that you let go of the pillow in exactly the way I did because all the constituents of my brain? Actually not. The determinism holds. But it shows that this determinism isn't at all a limit here. — ssu

Unlimited determinism is still determinism. That's my point. Many say we can make choices within an entirely deterministic reality. My position is that those choices are equivalent to the glass breaking. Yes, glasses hitting floors can break in in gigantic number of different ways. But every glass that has ever actually hit a floor broke exactly as it did because that's the only way it could have. Because of the speed it was going when it hit, the spin, the exact location that first made contact, the material it and the floor were made of, and many other factors.

If all is deterministic, then every decision I've ever made was exactly as it was because that's the only decision I could have made. Pointing out things like stored memories that affect how I react to stimuli, or how hearing a forecast of when I will take action affects when I do, don't change the fact that it's all just physical events. Even if our decisions are the result of more physical events, more kinds of physical events, and physical events that interact far more than anything else that we are aware of.

We call the glass breaking an event, but what I do a choice. But, despite the different levels of complexity, the only actual difference is that I am aware of what's going on, and the glass is not. and if the determinists are correct, my awareness is also only physical events, and it doesn't have any causal power.

Sorry. Not ignoring you. I would answer you as I just did ssu. Ssu's was last, so I just quoted that post.

What is the sham here is thinking that determinism limits your actions or you don't have the ability to choose... because it's somehow preordained, because there is the deterministic future. — ssu

If I knock a glass off of a table, I do not think it is preordained that it will then fall to the floor and break into pieces. But it will fall to the floor and break into pieces. And, given all the factors, it can only break in one specific way, with x pieces of various sizes and shapes. What I mean is, exactly how it falls determines what part of it hits the floor first, at what angle, at what speed, etc. If it falls without spinning and lands on its base, it will break in one way. (I support it might not break at all in the scenario.) If it spins at a rapid rate, it might land not quite horizontal, with its rim hitting first, and shatter spectacularly. No matter how it hits, even though we don't have the ability to calculate everything the instant before it hits the floor and know how it will break, once it hits, there is only one possible outcome.

Exactly how it hits is the result of exactly how it was knocked off the table. Again, not preordained. It's just physics. Did I throw a pillow across the room and hit it? That pillow was going at exactly this speed, and was spinning in exactly such and such a manner, and, when the impact came, the glass could only moved on one exact way.

We have nothing close to the ability to see the pillow flying, and calculate exactly how it will hit the glass, exactly how the glass will fly and land, and exactly how the glass will break. But, in principle, it's all calculable. It's just physics.

There's nothing preordained in any of that. There's also no "choosing."

The question is this: Did I let go of the pillow in exactly the way I did because all the constituents of my brain - whether we examine them as particles and physics, or molecules and chemistry, or structures and biology, or whatever - acted in the only ways each of them could, all purely physical interactions driven by the physical laws?

Did I throw the pillow because all the constituents of my brain acted in the only ways each of them could, all purely physical interactions driven by the physical laws?

If the answer is Yes, then we are not choosing things any more than the glass is choosing to break exactly as it does, or the debris is choosing to come to rest exactly as it does after an avalanche. We merely have awareness of things that the glass and mountain lack.