Determinism doesn't say much. It also doesn't limit our choices. — ssu

It seems to me that the idea of choices in a deterministic reality is a sham. Sure, it is possible for a human to choose cake over ice cream. But when one of us is actually presented with the two options, if we pick one up because the billion bouncing billiard balls landed that way, and we could not have picked up the other because the balls landed in the only way they could, then how is such a "choice" is of no greater value or interest than is the final arrangement of the rocks and dirt when an avalanche settles?

Thank you for bringing this idea to my attention, Patterner. I really like how a seemingly hopeless situation like uncountable air molecules can – by their motion – actually bear fruit by giving us definitive information… namely temperature. And expanding this idea to “firing neurons” and “thought” is interesting. — Thales

I guess the idea is common enough. In How to Create a Mind, Ray Kurzweil writes:

Although chemistry is theoretically based on physics and could be derived entirely from physics, this would be unwieldy and infeasible in practice, so chemistry has established its own rules and models. Similarly, we should be able to deduce the laws of thermodynamics from physics, but once we have a sufficient number of particles to call them a gas rather than simply a bunch of particles, solving equations for the physics of each particle interaction becomes hopeless, whereas the laws of thermodynamics work quite well. Biology likewise has its own rules and models. A single pancreatic islet cell is enormously complicated, especially if we model it at the level of molecules; modeling what a pancreas actually does in terms of regulating levels of insulin and digestive enzymes is considerably less complex. — Kurzweil

Of course, there is much debate over whether or not consciousness is explained by this physical system.

For some reason, this brings to my mind the principle of “Operationalism,” which gained some popularity among certain logical positivists in the 1920s-30s. It goes something like this: Scientific concepts that lack direct, empirical evidence can be “saved” by linking them to experimental procedures. “Gravitation,” for example, can not be seen, heard, smelled, tasted or touched, but it can nevertheless be determined “operationally” by observing phenomena such as planetary orbits. — Thales

We can take that a step further. Knowing what we know about gravity, we cannot fully explain the motion of stars and galaxies. it has been determined that there must be something that we cannot detect in any way, but which has a gravitational effect. It is called dark matter, and the amount of it that exists has been calculated.

I recently posted the following to @Relativist when we were talking about Peter Tse's The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation.
---------------------
There are an uncountable number of air molecules in my living room. They are all flying about in various directions, at various speeds. We have nothing resembling the slightest hint of hope of tracking them all. But we can measure the temperature of the room. As Anil Seth writes in Being You : A New Science of Consciousness:

Importantly, thermodynamics did more than merely establish that mean kinetic energy correlated with temperature—it proposed that this is what temperature actually is. — Seth

We, likewise, have no hope of tracking the activity of every neuron and synapse in someone's brain. As with the air molecules, the numbers, alone, make it impossible. But it's even more complicated, because, due to the nature of neurons, as Tse says, "The criteria for what makes a neuron fire can change." If we have no hope of mapping out the motion of the molecules of air in the room, then "no hope" is a pitifully inadequate way of expressing our ability to map out neutral activity. Nevertheless, if I'm understanding this, Tse is saying that, to paraphrase Seth, neural activity doesn't merely correlate with thought— this is what thought actually is. Although we can measure the macro property of temperature in a room, but cannot map out the motion of the air molecules, we know that the temperature is nothing more than the motion of the molecules. And, although we can comprehend thoughts, but cannot map out the neural activity of the brain, we know that the thoughts are nothing more than the neural activity.
---------------
I asked Relativist if that's what he thought Tse was trying to say. It seems some people here are saying the same.

The Matrix is also an example of a VR, not an example of the simulation hypothesis. — noAxioms

I guess the Matrix is a simulation to many sentient programs, and VR to many other sentient programs (Smith and Oracle, for example) and humans.

Thanks!

I just find it difficult to read fiction. — punos

After decades of reading fantasy/scifi, I haven't been able to get started for the last few years.

I never read the Dune book or books — punos

If I could makes any one book required reading for everyone, it would probably be Dune.

Heh. Thanks, but I'm not overly concerned with these mis-taps. I was just thinking that knowing I was doing something I didn't want to be doing, but being unable to stop, is very interesting. I like the idea in punos' second post.

I assume it takes practice to get very good at that. — punos

And they usually fail, it seems to me. The large muscles that are in motion can't be stopped sufficiently by the smaller ones. Still, they are able to try.

I'm also sure you can train yourself to be more conscious about taping that icon. It's probably a good idea to at least run that experiment on yourself. See how it goes, and see what you learn. — punos

Difficulty to test it. If I know I'm on the wrong screen, I don't commit myself in the first place.

Fighting what I guess would be called reflexive action is interesting, though. When an animal darts out in front of me as I'm driving, it seems like a reflex to slam on the brakes and turn the wheel to avoid it. But that's not a good idea, because you might end up in the other lane, hitting another car head on. Better to kill the critter than yourself and others in both cars.

But, for some reason, even though the movement began, just as when I start to tap the icon, the batter can put a stop to it, unlike me with the finger tap. My guess would be that check swings were never actually fully committed swings that were stopped. Rather, with so many muscles involved in swinging, some never got the swing command. The wrist muscles might be the last to get the signal. Instead, they get the signal to prevent the swing. But many muscles earlier in the chain were already moving, and many swings can't be checked.

That makes perfect sense. Thank you very much.

I wonder what happens when a batter tries to check his swing.

I'm apparently not describing the situation very well. It's not a visual problem at all. I should scroll twice before tappint the top left icon. But I'm not paying enough attention, and I only scroll once before tapping the icon.

The oddness is that I realize my mistake after my finger begins to descend, but before it touched the icon, but I can't do anything about it. It seems my "tap the icon" command to my finger is irrevocable. Even though I know it's a mistakes, and want to correct it, I can't. I believe it's what these two are experiencing:
https://www.instagram.com/reel/C7ukDr-uagx/?igsh=NWV4bTl2aGhwbW43
In at least some cases, they know they're about to hit the bell, but can't stop. We could possibly say their arms have too much momentum. But when it's just my finger, that's not the case. I simply can't give my finger the command to stop in time.

Thanks. Never heard of that.

Heh. I'm thinking it's something that might be common in people, like those other things I mentioned. I learned long ago that I'm not the first person to do or think anything. So others must have this, and it's probably already a field of study, or at least there's been an experiment on it. Delay between being conscious of something, and being able to do something about it. Seems like the flip-side of Libet.

↪Patterner if it doesn't exist because of physics, it exists because of human minds, but human minds exist because of physics, then...

Then human minds aren't fundamental, they exist because of physics, and indirectly those other things exist because of physics too. — flannel jesus

Yes. If human minds exist because of physics. Or, since the human body, particularly the brain, seems indispensable for the existence of human minds, if they exist solely because of physics.

I think we need a way for non fundamental things to still be real. Basically. Because WE are non fundamental, and my mind is the most real thing I know. — flannel jesus

Indeed. Fundamental things are not responsible for books, televisions, the internet, space shuttles, music, automobiles, bombs, poetry, mathematics, and a billion other things we could list. Not one of these things exists because of the laws of physics and properties of particles. They only exist because of human minds. I do not think the sole cause of the world being reshaped so thoroughly, in so many ways, could be not real.

. It's really hard to type causal instead of casual using swipe text on my phone — flannel jesus

:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

The second important point is: the lack of determinism does not imply free will, it only implies randomness, and randomness is not what makes free will possible. — noAxioms

What makes free will possible?

Speak for yourself. I picked the cars as an example since I consider it to be making choices, even if I don't think it is a very good example of AI. They're complicated, but still very much automatons, but they do make choices about which route, which lane to use, and so on. If that's not choice, then fundamentally, as a physicalist, what am I doing that is different? — noAxioms

That's what I'm asking.

"Does naturalism state that we currently know of all things natural?" -Patterner

Quite the opposite. It implies that it is far better to say "We don't know how X works yet" than to say "X? Oh, that's done by Gods, magic, woo, whatever. The latter attitude discourages research. The former methodology encourages it.
Hence the dark ages when methodological supernaturalism was prevalent, and the explosion of knowledge when methodological naturalism took over some 7 centuries ago give or take.

If your question is about a new kind of physics that implements mind, well, if it can be shown that such is how it really works, then it falls under naturalism, yes. But nobody is treating it as something that can be investigated. The whole point of woo is that it be based on faith in lieu of lack of evidence. So empirical research into any of it is discouraged. — noAxioms

I suspect the reason believers who don't engage in empirical research don't engage in empirical research is their minds aren't strong in that area. "God did it" and "How does it work" are not incompatible thoughts. Francis Collins is such a strong believer that, when he finished mapping the human genome, he called it the Language of God. Also Mendel, Carver, Maxwell, Cantor, Kelvin, Heisenberg, and many others.

Other minds don't much function in one sphere or the other. Some see the two as incompatible, and are opposed, even violently, to the one they don't function in.

Some don't seem inclined to either.

Yes, that's right. But that form of determinism does not amount to anything that could threaten freedom. There's a difference between being able to determine which horse will win the race, in the sense of being able to predict the result of the race and being able to determine which horse will win the race by fixing the race. Laplace's demon can do the first, but not the second. — Ludwig V

Agreed. The question of freedom arises when asking whether or not the decision to fix the race is anything other than physical interactions. Are we anything other than extraordinarily complex wind up toys?

The pool balls can come to rest in a huge number of arrangements after being struck by the cue ball at the break. But I wouldn't say any arrangement is ever a choice.
— Patterner
Pool balls don't seem to be an example of something enacting will, of something making choices. — noAxioms

Right. But our will is the result of physical interactions. Regardless of their complexity, physical interactional are physical interactions.
-Physical interactions determine the final arrangement of the pool balls after the break.
-Physical interactions determine whether a bunch of particles will gather into a planet orbiting a star; become a loose gathering, such as the asteroid belt; or scatter to the various directions of space.
-Physical interactions determine if and when solid H2O will become liquid, and vice versa.
-Physical interactions cause the globe's weather patterns.
-Physical interactions determine what a person has for dinner, or how a person deals with a cheating spouse.

It is only when talking about what humans (some people include other animals) do that anyone calls the outcome choice. Why is that? The planet's weather is the result of more particles than are in our brains, and a huge number of different types of physical activity (gravity, tides, solar radiation, the many different ecosystems of all areas of the worlds, all states of matter, human activity, etc.) are involved. Yet, even there, we do not speak of choice or will. Why do we only when the physical activity within a human brain is involved?

Not having free will does not mean you have no choice. — noAxioms

The pool balls can come to rest in a huge number of arrangements after being struck by the cue ball at the break. But I wouldn't say any arrangement is ever a choice. Aside from the greater numbers and complexity of the types of physical interactions, in what way are our choices different if we don't have free will?

Thee simulator implements physics. Physics implements your consciousness, regardless of whether the physics is simulated or not. Under supernaturalism, this isn't true. — noAxioms

Does naturalism state that we currently know of all things natural?

I don't hold a presumption that the entities in the simulation will be held responsible for their choices, by entities not in the simulation. — noAxioms

If entities create a simulation that includes other entities that do not have free will, the creators would be ... what's there right word ... idiots if they held the creations responsible for their choices. i'm not sure it would be worse to hold characters in a story you write responsible for their choices.

I know there's no agreement regarding free will. But if we have free will, then we aren't simulations. I mean, how can you use rules and code to write something that doesn't follow rules and code?

Why are we simulating? Where will Voyager 1 be in fifty years? We don't simulate it's existence for every moment of the next fifty years. We just calculate.

Also, I don't think LD supposedly knows where every particle will be at every moment for the rest of time. I think it only has to be able to calculate the answer to specific questions. After it tells me where Voyager 1 will be in fifty years, I ask it where a particular particle in Jupiter's red spot will be next week. Then I ask it something else.

Of course, the farther into the future I'm asking about, the more other things will have an impact on it. But LD's intellect is vast enough.

And I really don't think Laplace was trying to convince us that such a demon is likely, or possible. He was just saying, in a universe where everything is deterministic, anything at any point in the future would be, in theory, calculable.

Sure. Demons are supernatural. I've never heard of a story with one that wasn't.

Hey, how about this idea... To try to put a natural entity in this role, it would, obviously, need to be made of particles. A quantum computer, or whatever the next step would be, made up of enough particles could calculate the rest of the particles. If there are finite particles in the universe. It wouldn't work for infinite particles.

It's a supernatural being in a thought experiment. I don't know how to put limits on that. It's all silly.

Demons are made of atoms? I had no idea.

↪Patterner I have no idea what the first thing is that you're disagreeing with — flannel jesus

I don't know why you think that, even in principle, the demon cannot exist inside of the same universe it's capable of predicting, even if that universe is 100% physicalist and 100% deterministic. But actually, two thoughts came to mind. My first thought was that you thought something that is not 100% physicalist and 100% deterministic would be, as it were, breaking the rules.

My second thought was that you thought it's own non-determined actions would make calculations impossible.

If neither of my guesses was correct, what is the reason you think that, even in principle, the demon cannot exist inside of the same universe it's capable of predicting, even if that universe is 100% physicalist and 100% deterministic?

↪Patterner It should be noted, and maybe already has, that even in principle the demon cannot exist inside of the same universe it's capable of predicting, even if that universe is 100% physicalist and 100% deterministic. — flannel jesus

I don't know what you have in mind. But if it's the first thing I can think of, I disagree. First, it could, itself, be ruled entirely by determinism.

Second, if it has free will, it could fully calculate the consequences that all of its own actions would have on the rest of the universe.

That's fair enough. I'm just trying to say that it isn't an empirical idea - no amount of empirical evidence will confirm it, or refute it. — Ludwig V

I agree. I think Laplace was just saying something with all knowledge of where everything is and of all the forces would be able to calculate everything for the future. Sure worried be nice, since it could tell us about any asteroids that are going to impact the Earth. It could probably solve cold fusion pretty easily, also.

And it would be able to tell us if quantum events are truly uncaused, and if there is free will.

but, we don't have this marvelous demon. It's just a fun thought. Although the demon could help us quite a bit, the thought cannot.

IF determinism rules all things..." but does it? What's your evidence? — Ludwig V

It's Laplace's premise. It's not mine. I don't believe it to be the case.

Interesting that he doesn't mention that God would be such an intellect. — Ludwig V

My guess is that he didn't want to get into God, because that would be a discussion about why God set things in motion in exactly that way. What's the plan, what's the purpose. That kind of thing. He only wanted to discuss the positions, properties, and forces.

That's... now what I said. That's not even a response to what I said. — flannel jesus

I don't think it was specifically for you.

Shirley you don't mind.

↪Ludwig V it doesn't struggle have to, though. — flannel jesus

Autocorrect?

Nonetheless, it is treating the universe as a closed system. — Ludwig V

Yes. I would not interpret Laplace's words as including any other universes. The defined system is the universe.

1 If LD cannot figure some things out, what follows? Does it follow that determinism is false? No.
2 If LD can predict everything accurately for the next nyears where n is any number you like. Does it follow that determinism is true? No. — Ludwig V

I answer Yes to both. Why not? That's the premise. Determinism rules all things, and LD has the perception and intellect to figure everything out.

If you think of some restricted problem, such as the movements of the planets in our solar system, this seems to work. But it treats the solar system as a closed system and restricts the predictions that are made about it. — Ludwig V

LD is also aware of where every particle in the universe outside of our solar system is, which way each is going, and can calculate which will interact with our SS, and when. Even if two hunks of rock a thousand light-years away that are not heading this way are going to collide, and some debris from that collision will then head this way.

Yes, it is complicated. I have not had any luck trying to find out how we determine which slit a photon goes through. What kind of device can detect which slit a photon goes through without actually intercepting the photon? How else would it know? we don't see photons unless they hit our retina. What kind of device sees it without the photon hitting its visual receptor? I don't even know how to ask the question. Lol

That's exactly what they want me to believe.
— Patterner

Do you think avatars in video games can believe anything? — Janus

I didn't get a notification of this. Glitch the matrix?

I am not an avatar in a video game, for the usual Cartesian reason. There's a "me" in here having subjective experiences. — fishfry

That's exactly what they want me to believe.

Then LD isn't really useful in determining whether or not the universe is deterministic. — Harry Hindu

Well, I mean, since LD doesn't actually exist, no, it isn't really useful in determining whether or not the universe is deterministic. LD isn't a diagnostic tool. It's just an interesting way of expressing what a deterministic universe is like. If we actually had an LD, all of our questions would be answered. It might say, "Quantum events are uncaused. Therefore, I can't know precisely how things at the quantum level will look at any point in the future." Or it might say, "Quantum events only appear uncaused to humans, because you don't have sufficient intelligence (or senses, or technology) to understand the causes. But I see their causes and understand them, so I can calculate where everything at the quantum level will be at any point in the future."

Similar scenarios regarding consciousness.

I wonder if it would know every DNA mutation that will ever take place.

The question then is if the universe is not deterministic, then why does it appear that it is? How are we able to make consistent predictions and when our predictions fail we can point to some information we lacked in making the prediction. We only know that our prediction failed when we have access to new information. — Harry Hindu

Certainly, the macro physical universe is deterministic. We can calculate a whole lot of what's going to happen in the future. We know when Haley's comet will be back again. We know when the next high tide will be on any beach. We can shoot a moving target with a gun, drive cars, play baseball, and any number of other things.

Even if the quantum world is truly not deterministic, it's probabalistic to a very predictable degree, making the macro deterministic.

Yeah, I understand that. But we're talking about free will. I'm not saying our minds don't cause things. I'm saying that, according to this view, our minds cause things in the same sense that the cogs cause the clock to work. And LD knows what is going to happen everywhere, including what we will all think and do, just as we know what a clock will do.