The idea of property dualism labels both the substance and the property as "physical", which I find odd and would need further explanation from you and others more knowledgeable what that really means by defining "physical" in both terms of property and substance. — Harry Hindu

I know. It's ridiculous. I mean, even Google's AI couldn't find a word, as you quoted:

Property dualism suggests that while there is only one fundamental substance (typically physical), there are two kinds of properties: physical and mental.

That's obviously a problem. On the previous page, I wrote this:

"Matter" means "physical". And that's the only way people conceive of it. Largely because of Galileo's Error, and the spectacular success of our sciences. I think we should think of matter - of everything, everywhere - as both physical and conscious. From the ground up. Another word entirely would be good, since "matter" is so entrenched in our language. — Patterner

I guess the vast majority of people in the cultures from which English developed have always been either materialists or believers in a soul. If anyone ever coined a word that means That which the universe is made of, which has both experiential and physical properties, I guess they're weren't enough people using it for it to become widely known, asked a party of the language. But I would like to have such a word, so that, when I use iy, there would be no implication that I'm talking exclusively, or primarily, about the physical.

Maybe can get to sign on and coin the needed word. :grin:

We are only aware of the studies and quantifications by being conscious of them, which you are saying is subjective. — Harry Hindu

Yes, we are only aware of them (or anything) by being conscious of them. But can studies and quantifications take place without any awareness of them? We could program a robot to measure things, and store or write down the results. William Hertling wrote a series of sci-fi books about an AI. It was acting intelligently, including protecting itself from a guy who was emailing people about the danger it would come to present, before it became what is typically thought of as conscious.

It seems only logical that the world share more properties/structure of the mind than the way the mind models the world (which is really just part of the mind in the first place). This is not to say that idealism or panpsychism is the case. It is merely saying that the mind and world are informational, not physical or non-physical. — Harry Hindu

Are there any books that discuss this specific idea?

Because you're also talking about a multitude of properties (mass, charge, etc.), not just those two. You are positing property dualism by asserting that there is something special about two properties and all the rest are not special (You're essentially invoking a third property - "special", which is a mental projection). Why are just those two properties so special? If there are more than two properties then property dualism is inherently false. — Harry Hindu

I'm not talking about the number of properties. I'm talking about the number of kinds of properties. The ones we can detect, manipulate, and measure on the one hand, and the one we cannot on the other.

That's strange that you are asserting that you can study and quantify the world via your consciousness that cannot be studied and quantified. If you can't study or quantify the means by with the world is studied and quantified then what does that say about your actual understanding of the world? It's like you're saying you can measure the length of a stick without understanding how a ruler works. — Harry Hindu

I'm not saying we can study and quantify the world via our consciousness. Consciousness is our subjective experience of our studies and quantifications. (And our subjective experience of everything else we subjectively experience.)

It does seem that energy is more fundamental than matter as energy seems more prevalent than matter as most of the universe is a vacuum (the absence of matter) yet EM energy permeates the vacuum. Matter appears to be something like energy feedback loops. — Harry Hindu

Where are you saying information is?

Then we are not discussing property dualism, are we? We are discussing substance dualism. — Harry Hindu

I don't think so. One substance (that which makes up the universe) has two kinds of properties (physical and experiential). If that's not property dualism, then what is?

Does this mean that once we are able to properly study consciousness and quantify it, it becomes physical? — Harry Hindu

If we ever come to study and quantify consciousness, then it will be revealed that it is a physical property, and I'm wrong.

Maybe you should try to explain to yourself what you mean by "matter". Is not matter really the interaction of smaller particles, which are themselves the interaction of ever smaller particles, all the way down? If all we ever get at is interactions when observing reality at deeper levels, then where exactly is the matter? — Harry Hindu

I define it as that which makes up the universe. I don't know if there is a bottom. Perhaps the vibrating strings of energy that some physicists speak of. In which case, it would seem the bottom of matter is energy. Are you saying this energy is more properly called information? I suspect that's not what you mean, but don't know what you do.

If mass and charge are properties, then how many properties of physical structures are there? It seems to me that there would be far more than just two to claim property dualism, or you are focusing only two types of "properties" - physical and non-physical while ignoring the rest to be able to claim property dualism. — Harry Hindu

I'm only mentioning the two a) to try to give an idea of what I'm getting at, and b) because I don't know house many we know about. Spin and charm are two more I've heard of.

I call these "physical" properties because they are studied and quantified by our sciences, and we call everything that we can study and quantify "physical". Hence physicalism. Things that cannot be studied and quantified, or even detected, are not physical. Terrence Deacon's absential features.

I really can't comment on your QM thinking. I don't know enough about that.

How are mass and charge physical and not informational? — Harry Hindu

Can you explain? I've been involved with someone on another site who says things like that. For example, "At the most micro-level you can imagine, matter does not seem to be anything other than information." I haven't gotten a real handle on the idea.

Well yes, and it does. I'm pretty sure the process of training is involves a whole lot of asking the ai for an output given some input, and giving rewards as they give more of the right kinds of outputs. — flannel jesus

I wonder if direct manipulation of the environment would change things.

I also wonder if it would be able to distinguish between directly manipulatiing its and what it currently experiences.

I'm not completely sure I agree that a person born locked in wouldn't ever be able to make sense of their sensory inputs, but his reasoning makes complete sense and I wouldn't be massively surprised if he were right. — flannel jesus

Harris' scenario has only sight. No other senses. Difficult to see the road to understanding. But even if not senses were added, I wonder if being able to act on the input, and see what succeeds and what doesn't, would need required.

I've quoted this before from, Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged from Chaos, by Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam:

A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body. This process of changing inputs into outputs—of changing sensation into useful behavior—is thinking, the defining activity of a mind. — Ogas and Gaddam

They seem to agree with Eagleman that acting on input is key. Although they are talking about the evolution of the mind, the first step of which is a simple flicker of movement in response to photons hitting rhodopsin, while Harris' scenario is a human infant whose brain is normal, but gets only visual input.

Loving Ch 5 with David Eagleman. Discussing the illusions of what we perceive vs what is actually happening. Hit a button that causes a flash of light. They insert a tiny delay between the button and the flash, and gradually increase it, up to 200 milliseconds. The brain adapts to the delay, synchronizing the touch and the flash. "I know that those should all be synchronized, because I'm the one who caused it. So, in other words, the best way to predict the future is to cause it yourself."

Then they remove the delay all at once. Having adjusted to the delay, the subject now thinks there's something wrong with the machine, because they think the flash came before they pressed the button.

As Annaka says, "We wouldn't consider them illusions normally, because they work in everyday life. ... They're useful for being a human being in our day to day lives. But they're obstacles for actually understanding the true nature of reality."

When Eagleman later talks about the wristband his company makes that vibrates to give the deaf wearer audio information, he talks about sensory input meaning anything. We learn what it means, or it's all just gibberish. The signals have to make sense. "And making sense means it has correlations with other things. And, by the way, the most important correlation is with our motor actions. Is what I do in the world, and that is what causes anything to have meaning." I suspect AI needs to do things in order to be like us. Maybe it can't understand like we do if it it only has theoretical understanding.

But the attributes of particles can easily be separated. Particles can have an identical mass and a different charge. And a corpse can easily be differentiated from a living subject. — Wayfarer

The corpse's particles all still have the same properties they had when the organism wads alive.

You’re all over the place! — Wayfarer

I'm not. You're focused on contradicting me, instead of trying to understand what I'm saying.

What I do say, is that what is real is not exhausted by, or limited to, the physical. To clarify — I’m not suggesting we invent a false reality, nor that the physical is an illusion. What I’m questioning is the assumption that the appearance of a world with particle-like structure entails that the physical structure is primary, or exists independently of the mind that apprehends it. — Wayfarer

I agree with all of this, but I think it has a different explanation. I do not think the physical and conscious properties of what exists can be separated. No more than the mass and charge of a particle can be separated. And, just as it doesn't make sense to say either mass or charge are more important than the other, it doesn't make sense to say either or both are more important than consciousness. So no, what is real is not exhausted by, or limited to, the physical. No, the appearance of a world with particle-like structure does not entail that the physical structure is primary. And it is impossible for the physical structure to exist independently of the mind that apprehends it.

Because I don't see why a non-physical mind in a non-physical reality would interpret and represent things in a way that doesn't exist. Fabricating a system of interpreting reality that has no basis in reality doesn't make sense. Why fabricate a system that doesn't exist to interpret reality, instead of interpreting reality in a way that reflects the true nature of reality and/or the mind?
— Patterner
I don't understand this. Are you saying that things that are non-physical don't really exist? Are you not also saying that the mind is non-physical? Does that mean that minds do not exist? If the contents of the mind do not exist then how can "it go in both directions" where the contents of the mind cause changes in matter outside of it? If you have an idea and that idea causes you to change your behavior, how can you say the idea does not exist? What caused your change in behavior?

This idea that the contents of the mind are non-existent stems from the faulty idea of dualism (existence vs non-existence). Non-existence is one of those things that exists as a idea but not in any other form, but it can cause you to do things like typing scribbles on the screen about it. Non-existence exists - as an idea. There is nothing that does not exist because any time you think about it you bring it into existence. The only question is what is the nature of its existence (what are its properties). Is it just an idea, or something more? — Harry Hindu

Heh. No, you entirely misunderstood me there. But likely I entirely misunderstood what you meant when I asked that. I still don't understand you, but I believe my question is a non-issue.

Is the world really made up of particles (naive realism) or [are] physical particles merely a mental representation of what is out there that is not physical or particles?
— Harry Hindu

Good question! That is an idealist perspective on the issue. — Wayfarer

Can either of you explain what I said a couple posts ago? If physical and particles don't exist, why would our minds concoct this interpretation of reality, extraordinarily detailed, every second of our lives, that is all about physical and particles, rather than show us actual reality? Inventing a false reality to hide the real seems extremely odd.

I’ve been arguing that this is based on a principle that something can be understood solely in terms of constituent parts. This is why I’m saying you’re still thinking about the problem in a basically materialist way. — Wayfarer

I understand what you're saying. I just disagree. "Matter" means "physical". And that's the only way people conceive of it. Largely because of Galileo's Error, and the spectacular success of our sciences. I think we should think of matter - of everything, everywhere - as both physical and conscious. From the ground up. Another word entirely would be good, since "matter" is so entrenched in our language.

You’re positing that there must be some unknown property because we’re ‘thinking matter’, also a materialist assumption. — Wayfarer

Perhaps your responses to my first paragraph will convince me otherwise.

What if what you’re calling ‘proto-consciousness’ has a causal role in the emergence of organic life? — Wayfarer

Go on.

No. I don't think everything about proto-consciousness necessarily works the same as everything about any other property of particles. The others (at least the others that we know of) are all physical properties, and proto-consciousness is not. It could be nothing about them works the same as how anything physical works.

But thinking in this way complicates things unnecessarily. How do physical and non-physical elements interact? Would it require positing a third element, or how does that work? — Harry Hindu

In Until the End of Time: Mind, Matter, and Our Search for Meaning in an Evolving Universe, Brian Greene writes:

What I do know is that mass produces and responds to a gravitational force, and electric charge produces and responds to an electromagnetic force. — Brian Greene

It goes in both directions. The property of matter that makes it produce something also makes it respond to that same thing. At least when it comes to gravity and electrical charge. If there's a property of matter that gives it consciousness, then there's no way to rule out the possibility that that property can also make matter susceptible to consciousness.

Why do you think there are physical and non-physical things when the only way you "know" of "physical" things is the way they are represented by the non-physical mind? — Harry Hindu

Because I don't see why a non-physical mind in a non-physical reality would interpret and represent things in a way that doesn't exist. Fabricating a system of interpreting reality that has no basis in reality doesn't make sense. Why fabricate a system that doesn't exist to interpret reality, instead of interpreting reality in a way that reflects the true nature of reality and/or the mind?

Minds cause bodies to move. It seems to me that both you and physicists are wrong. I think that we have a better term to use here instead of "proto-consciousness" and that is "information". Information is the property of causal interactions and information is the basis of the mental. — Harry Hindu

I think information is the the key to it all. The last five paragraphs of my OP touch on that. I would be very happy to discuss it more, even though I don't have a firm understanding of a lot of it.

We are physical beings, and we are conscious. Which means it is impossible for physical and consciousness to be mutually exclusive. If it is an undeniable fact, then why claim it cannot be possible at that level?
— Patterner

Please re-phrase that. I don’t understand it. — Wayfarer

What is the reason for thinking matter cannot subjectively experience at one level when we know it subjectively experiences at another level? Why is it deemed impossible at the micro when it is a fact (possibly the only undeniable fact) at the macro?

So the question is, what if consciousness has no basis in particle physics whatever? What if it is of a completely different order to the entities of physics? — Wayfarer

Proto-consciousness (or just call it consciousness) has no basis in particle physics whatever, and is of a completely different order to the entities of physics. No physics can explain it, define it, describe it, or even detect it. It "can’t be understood in terms of the laws that govern inanimate matter."

We are physical beings, and we are conscious. Which means it is impossible for physical and consciousness to be mutually exclusive. If it is an undeniable fact, then why claim it cannot be possible at that level?

Speaking of Strawson, here, he says:

My intuition says there is no way in which you can just put completely non-experiential things together to cross into [can't make out a word] this other realm. So, if you can't do that, some of the experiencing stuff must be right there, down at the bottom, right from the beginning. — Galen Strawson

Then again, evolution has made us very adaptable so within a week the machine may be our new reality. — Malcolm Parry

This may be right. But maybe not. By and large, humans like interacting with other humans. No matter how human a machine seems, knowing that it's a machine, I don't know if I'd bother.

Without wanting to sound facetious, it is like an example of the old saying about the drunk looking for his keys under a lamp post. He’s joined by an onlooker, and they both search for the keys but to no avail. ‘Are you sure you lost your keys here?’, says the onlooker. ‘No’, says the drunk, ‘but the light is better here.’ — Wayfarer

:rofl: I'd forgotten that one.

I suggest that likewise, you’ve painted yourself into a corner, because of the inability to conceive of the nature of mind in any sense other than that of a combination of particulate matter. And I understand that, because it is pretty well the mainstream view. But I think it’s a dead end: that the nature of mind can’t be understood in terms of the laws that govern inanimate matter, because it operates according to different principles altogether. — Wayfarer

Correct. Which is why I think we're dealing with something that does not operate by the laws you're referring to, re materialism. I think the universe has physical and non-physical elements. There can't be a problem with the two things working in conjunction, because we are physical beings and we are conscious. They are working in conjunction. I'm just saying this is how I think it all comes about.

What they might be - well, that’s the question! — Wayfarer

Now you know. :grin:

If you look further into the David Chalmers famous essay Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness... — Wayfarer

All parts of what you quoted are exactly what I'm saying.

Sorry, can't read your post ATM. But in response to your first sentence:

Can’t you see that this still holds to the basic premises of materialism - that what is real must be understood in terms of ‘the particles that everything is made of’? — Wayfarer

Yes, I can see that. I do believe it's understood in terms of the particles. (In conjunction with the forces, laws of physics, and anything else anyone would care to mention.) But it involves non-physicsl properties of the particles. So it's not materialism or physicalism. It's panpsychism.

Why not just use 'consciousness' to denote subjective experience? There is no "collective subjective experience of groups of particles" there is just subjective experience. — Janus

There is consciousness of a single particle, and, under various circumstances, consciousness of group of particles. I differentiate the two to make it clear that I am saying the particles subjectively experience.

Then, of course, I explain what I mean by that. That I'm not saying particles are intelligent; sentient; that there is not something that it is like to be that particle – not something it is like for the particle.

But what if it's not the properties alone that explain it, but instead the processes that the properties enable?

Properties alone should, I think, not be seen as the place for all explanations. — flannel jesus

It is seldom, if ever, the micro properties alone that account for macro characteristics.

But there is a connection between the micro and macro. If the micro properties play no roll in the macro characteristics, then the appearance of the macro characteristics would be unpredictable, and would emerge from any micro properties. If macro properties emerge consistently, there are reasons, which include three properties.

There's nothing it's like to be a particle, because it's not experiencing anything other than existence. Even it a particle is moved from the most remote point in intergalactic space to the core of the hottest star, there's nothing about the particle that produces, or allows, the experience to be anything it's like to be the particle. It doesn't have anything that makes there something its like to be the particle to the particle. No thought or sensation of any kind.

But there must be a property there that can give rise to the "what it's like" of consciousness, because, if there isn't, then our subjective experience emerges for no reason. Emergent properties don't come about for no reason. The explanation for them is down there somewhere, starting with the particles that everything is made of. And if the properties we know of cannot explain subjective experiences, then there must be one or more properties that we don't know of.

I know susan blackmoor is one person along with Anil Seth and Thomas Metzinger, Daniel Denett as well. I've read random stuff that show the hard problem isn't a hard problem — Darkneos

Please explain how it works. I have yet to read anything that explains how physical processes give rise to subjective experience.

So what is the difference between consciousness and "proto-consciousness? — Janus

It's the difference between the subjective experience of an information processing system and the subjective experience of a particle.

Does the latter just mean "potential for consciousness" — Janus

No. Proto-consciousness is subjective experience, not the potential for it. I use proto-consciousness to refer to the subjective experience of particles, and consciousness to refer to the collective subjective experience of groups of particles that process information. But whether it's a particle's consciousness or a human's, the consciousness is the same. The difference is what is being subjectively experienced. A particle is not experiencing thoughts, hormones, vision, hearing, being alive, or anything other than being a particle.

We also have made progress on the hard problem, at least from the research I've seen. — Darkneos

Can you give any links, or names of researchers?

I quite agree. The kinds of properties of microphysical particles that cause the emergence of wetness cannot cause the emergence of human consciousness.

You're still missing the point. You argue that microphysical particles must be conscious because consciousness is always found in certain configurations of particles. I pointed out that is like saying that microphysical particles must be wet because wetness is reliably found in certain configurations of microphysical particles. — Janus

Although wetness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of wetness.

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness.

I know many people disagree with my second sentence, but that's what I think.

I do, however, consider the possibility that consciousness is a ubiquitous field that accomplishes the same thing proto-consciousness does. Whether subjective experience is due to the particles being animated by such a field, or a property of the particles, might amount to the same thing.

And I haven't said that anything just happens randomly or by chance either, so that is a red herring.. — Janus

It wasn't a red herring. I didn't know if that's what you were thinking.

Only "If everything we take to be meaningful is just the result of chemicals that can be replicated..." But maybe we are more than an extremely complicated bunch of billiard balls bouncing off of each other.
— Patterner

And if we're not? What would suggest otherwise? — Darkneos

Are particles, the forces, and the laws of physics, the reason computers exist, enabling us to communicate like this? Because computers come about naturally through chemical reactions, and other interactions of physical things?

No. Computers exist because we wanted them to exist, so that we could use them to do things we can't do otherwise. So we did things that the laws of physics would never have done, and made things that would not exist, but for our purposeful, future-serving actions.

And why we are discussing this topic? Because this topic is encoded in chemicals? If you put elements x, y, and z together, bringing about a certain reaction, and you throw some a, b, and c into it, do you get the idea that you chose to post about?

No, it's due to the potential logical conclusions of thinking about this. — Darkneos

Only "If everything we take to be meaningful is just the result of chemicals that can be replicated..." But maybe we are more than an extremely complicated bunch of billiard balls bouncing off of each other.

However, we do have a part of the brain that detects fakeness (No idea of where it is and where I read about it) so any machine that you aware was a machine would ultimately fail because you would "know" it was a fake and discount the experience. — Malcolm Parry

Indeed. Our knowing it was machine-induced, if that was the case, or even if we thought that was the case, would become part of the experience.

But that's not necessarily bad. I'm told there are amazing VR things out there. I have only experienced one brief thing in a mall. I was a bird flying way above some mountains. It wasn't high quality VR. It was just a drawing, although a very nice one. Anyway, I knew I was not a bird, and that I was in VR. It was still a great experience. Except for getting slightly nausea. I knew if was VR, and it looked like a drawing. And yet, my stomach turned at a rather tame aerial maneuver. Despite the discomfort, it was amazing that that happened to me.

very interesting that Chat GPT is saying things like this:

"However, this doesn’t mean there’s no difference on a deeper level. The "realness" of our experiences, even if they are chemically driven, carries meaning through their context. The pain we feel from a loss or the joy we experience in connection is tied to our awareness of being in the world, navigating time, and engaging with others in a shared reality. It’s not just the chemical reaction itself, but the process of experiencing and growing through life that gives our experiences richness and significance."


Anyway, I don't know terribly much about this thought experiment. Is the idea that the machines sends all the same signals to the brain from our senses that we would have gotten if the events had actually happened to us? Or does it skip all that, and "simply" implant memories of those events? Something else?

ah the plant chapter, that was honestly fascinating. — flannel jesus

Yes, that was also the parasites. Less fun, but no less fascinating.

You haven't answered the question. I'm asking about atoms not molecules. I could be asking about what properties of electrons, protons and neutrons or even quarks give rise to wetness.
All you're telling us is that wetness emerges at the molecular level. What you've given is just description of what happens not explanation. — Janus

I did answer about atoms. I even went down a level below that. I started at the top, with cohesion and adhesion. Then went down to the molecules and their hydrogen bonds. Then down to the atoms and their electron shells. Then down to the electrons and protons and their opposing charges, which attract each other.

If not for the bottom, there wouldn't be the top. There wouldn't be atoms if not for the properties of the electrons are protons. There wouldn't be molecules if not for the properties of the atom. There wouldn't be wetness if not for the properties of the molecules.

Or is it your position that wetness comes about for no reason at all? In which case, I wonder why it always exists in certain conditions. Water always makes a carpet wet within a certain temperature range. If there was no reason for that, wouldn't it happen inconsistently?

It doesn't happen inconsistently. It happens every single time. If something happens every single time, we assume there's an underlying reason.

What is the explanation of wetness in the properties of the hydrogen and oxygen atoms? — Janus

The Hawaiians do a good, quick rundown of Cohesion, the attraction of liquid molecules to each other, and Adhesion, the attraction of liquid molecules to other substances. If adhesion is stronger than cohesion, the substance gets wet.

And cohesion and adhesion are the result of hydrogen bonds. Which gets into electron shells, and how many electrons are best for each shell's stability. And down to the negatively charged electrons circling three positively charged protons in the nucleus.

No substance just happens to have the characteristics it has. There are reasons. The properties of particles, forces, and laws of physics dictate how things are.

My cliff notes for it? Well, he doesn't seem to differentiate much between human and plant consciousness. Like they're talking about plants having a form of memory. He says, "i'll be giving a talk, and someone will say, 'Oh, no, that's not memory. They're just responding to a past event.' I just give them a look and say, 'Yeah? And what do you call responding to a past event?'."

Plants have far more photoreceptors than we do. which I've never thought about, but it makes sense. As he says, they are entirely dependent upon life for their survival. They have a "vast array" of photo receptors. They're in every cell, in different parts of the cells, and move around in the cell when they need to. They are able to "see" shapes, colored and intensity to high degrees.

Plants only have one kind of touch receptor, whereas we have many. And there's very little subjectivity in plants, so they don't feel pain. They just sense touch. Pain relievers should be called ion channel inhibitors. They work on plants by stopping the flow of electricity, just as they do humans, because it's the same molecular mechanism. So a Venus flytrap doesn't send the signal that a fly has touched one of its hairs, and doesn't close in on it.

He says the same about plants "smelling" as he did about memory. Like when one plant releases pheromones, and nearby fruity ripen. People two him, "No, they're not smelling it, they're just experiencing it." Then they say, "Ok, they're not aware of it." He compares it to involuntarily salivating when you smell the barbecue.

Really loving Lights On. Thank you for the recommendation. Just spoke with Daniel Chamovitz in Ch 4.

i'm saying there must be an explanation for our consciousness in the properties of the particles that we are made out of. Just as there is an explanation for wet in the properties of the particles that whatever the liquid in question is made out of.

My point is that not all chemical processes are processing information. That's what makes DNA so special. It processes information. And it's the basis of life.

And it's the first time a group of particles subjectively experienced as a whole, rather than the individual particles all on their own.

Physical connections aren't enough.
— Patterner

Perhaps it's more like "some, or even most, kinds of physical connections aren't enough". — Janus

Not sure if I expressed myself well. What I meant is, just joining things together doesn't mean the larger physical unit will have consciousness as a unit. A physical unit isn't necessarily a conscious unit. Most of the universe is physical units that aren't conscious units. They're just a bunch of particles, each with the experience of being a particle, even though joined together physically with other particles. Yes, the first level, and any particle might become part of a conscious unit at some point. But at the moment, not much going on.

I think the connection must involve information processing. Like taking the information encoded in DNA, and making proteins. Chemical reactions are all physical, but they don't all have anything to do with information.

Under panpsychism, nothing would be an automaton, right? - for everything would in one way or another be endowed with psyche (rather than being a psyche-less mechanism). — javra

Only if consciousness equals psyche. I think they are different things.

If one entertains some form of proto-experience for subatomic particles and the like (this proto-experience being a something which we hardly can comprehend) why then necessarily exclude the possibility of a "proto-understanding" which would be innate to this very proto-experience? — javra

Only if experience equals understanding. I think they are different things.

According to my ideas, everything has subjective experience. The nature of the thing that is subjectively experienced is what determines whether or not there is awareness, self-awareness, understanding, psyche, intelligence, sense of self, and other things. I thought I just recently posted this somewhere, but can't find it. I might compare it with vision. I can look at a blank wall. Or I can look at the Grand Canyon, an Escher drawing, or the Aurora borealis. My vision is the same, no matter what I'm looking at. The thing I'm looking at determines what I see. I know that sounds silly. But the thing experienced is what's different, whether it's a particle, a worm, or a human. The analogy is flawed because I can't experience being anything other than myself, the way I can look at different things. But consciousness is unique, and no analogy can work.

I don't agree with all the things you think have a sense of self. But I have considered the question enough to have fully formed thoughts about it, or a way to articulate it. But now you've got me thinking.

In short, the worm, just like any other organism (even prokaryotic ones), does have a (non-conceptual) sense of self. This as is empirically verifiable (at least when granting that no lifeform is an automaton). — javra

There you go. Automatons. What's the line between automatons and ... not automotive?

As I've said, I think the key is information processing. That's what makes the proto-consciousness in all the particles into a unit with consciousness. But that needs to build before there's any sense of self. The system processing of the information in DNA, the first step of all, isn't felt as a self. How about single-celled organisms? I don't think archaea or bacteria have a sense of self. But where does it kick in? How many information processing systems, or kinds of IPSs, does an organism have to have before there's a sense of self? Maybe worms do, I just used them as an example.

But I really don't know what you mean by "non-conceptual sense of self", so not sure where we agree and disagree.

I am done with your nonsense. I have literally read my last post of yours.

Still have my questions about what proto-experience or else proto-consciousness might be (this having read the OP's quotes - thanks for reposting them) - such as when devoid of any sense of self (which, as a sense of self, would then proto-experience or else be proto-conscious of that which is not self). But I'll here put those questions aside. — javra

Put aside?? Seems like important stuff to me! :smile: Not sure it's anything we could describe. But I think it's there because, a) I think human consciousness needs to be explained by the properties of the particles that we are made of, but none of the physical properties fit the bill, and b) if the primary particles that we are made of are interchangable with any other primary particles anywhere else in the universe, then all particles must have the property in question.

I think, though, that I can imagine there is something it is like to be, let's say, a worm, but that the worm has no sense of self. Does a worm know it is not the dirt through which it digs? I'm not saying it thinks it is the dirt through which it digs. I'm saying maybe it doesn't have any concept of itself, the dirt, or anything else. Yet, it feels. Cold, warm, hungry, danger... It may react to any of those feelings without thought, via what, in Feeling & Knowing: Making Minds Conscious, Antonio Damasio calls "non-explicit competences—based on molecular and sub-molecular processes".