The dog expects their human to arrive. The dog recognizes that their human is not showing up. It is also true that it does not abandon its general expectation that their human comes back on the 5:00 train every day. — Ludwig V

I take issue with taking certain kinds of leaps. "Increase" works well. Very very slow increments.
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The detail of mutations remains unclear. What makes a mutation... a mutation? — creativesoul

The moral of the sorites paradox is that some concepts do not have precise border-lines. Consciousness seems to me to be one of them. (So does "rational") — Ludwig V

I wouldn't disagree with that or what I think it means. It could use a healthy unpacking. — creativesoul

Do all thought and belief share a set of common elements, such that they are the exact same 'thing' at their core? — creativesoul

They were talking more broadly though than you I think ;) — I like sushi

"Greater" abilities??? I'm not sure what that means — creativesoul

All elements of human language (spoken/written/signed) can be seen in the rest of the animal kingdom, it is just that we happen to possess them all. — I like sushi

"hello no, I am not going to let them believe they are right and all the emotional problems are because I have been so bad." — Athena

I think it's the sorites problem. One bit of information processed doesn't mean anything. Many bits of information processed is more persuasive. But it's more than just processing information. It's reacting to it in complex ways, and, it's not just responding to information, but initiating action based on information as well. — Ludwig V

I think any bit of information processing brings a little bit of consciousness.
— Patterner
H'm. I think that's a bit extreme — Ludwig V

You didn't mention it in your account of how different humans are from animals. Mind you, I don't mention what you emphasize in my accounts of how similar they are. Perhaps it comes down to "glass half full/empty" - a difference in perspective rather than a disagreement about the facts. Then we need to tease out why that difference in emphasis is so important. — Ludwig V

My point is there couldn't be such a thing. As I've said before, just because we can say the words, doesn't mean we can conceive of them. Like a square circle.
— Patterner
That's exactly why I can't do anything with your thought-experiments. — Ludwig V

This is more towards philosophical zombies. — SophistiCat

OK. The PZs are supposed to be indistinguishable from normal humans, so that case is not relevant. — Ludwig V

It depends. If they have sensory input, they are conscious, so I don't accept that we have robots like that. But I agree that we can strap a camera to a computer (or input an image) and program it to respond in certain circumstances. I understand also that we often call that seeing or calculating or speaking. But it's by extension from human beings, not in their own right. Getting it to do everything that we do is a different matter. I don't rule out the possibility that one day there might be a machine that is conscious, but I have very little idea of what it would be like. — Ludwig V

But I also don't think that consciousness is on/off, like a light and sometimes there may be no definitive answer. — Ludwig V

Now we think about things, and kind of things, nothing else thinks about.
— Patterner
.. and yet we are still animals. — Ludwig V

I do notice the frequent assertions on this forum that, although neuroscience can't yet 'explain consciousness', they will do at some point 'in the future'. I would include that tendency under the same general heading. — Wayfarer

But that doesn't mean that we have to now sort of put our heads in the sand and say, "Well let's just wait and see." We can start thinking about why is the problem as hard as it is. And what is giving rise to this systematic difficulty. — Chalmers

The brain's activity could do these things without any subjective experience/consciousness anywhere.
— Patterner
The problem is that your thought-experiment only works if I pretend that I accept this. It begs the question. (This is about the P-zombies, isn't it?) — Ludwig V

The difficulty is setting out the ways we're similar, and the ways we're unique. Our own thinking is bolstered by our own complex language use and all that that facilitates. Naming and descriptive practices are key. They pervade our thinking. They allow us to reflect upon our own experiences in a manner that is much more than just remembering.

Other animals cannot do that. — creativesoul

According to the definitions I quoted earlier, epiphenomenalism says mental states do not have any effect on physical events. Walking is a physical event, not a mental event. And walking certainly has an effect on physical events. So I don't know how you are thinking walking is epiphenomenal.
— Patterner
Well, the fact that mental states make me walk to the shops demonstrates that epiphenomenalism is false. — Ludwig V

It seems to me a complete misunderstanding or misrepresentation to say that the screen display is an epiphenomenon. The screen display is the point of the whole exercise. — Ludwig V

Wanting to have some milk is the point of the causal sequence, not an epiphenomenon. — Ludwig V

("neutral" is a typo for "neural", I assume.) — Ludwig V

My reductio aims to demonstrate that this argument is based on a misunderstanding of causality. — SophistiCat

My starting-point is that human beings are animals. We have bodies in the same way that they do. We have instincts which dominate our lives just as they do. Pretending we are not animals is something that are very much tempted to do, because we spend much time and effort trying to distinguish ourselves from them. But most animals do that in one way or another. For the most part, species prefer not to share their homes, roosts or whatever with other species. So that desire is shared with other animals as well.

When someone tries to find some respect in which humans differ from animals, what I hear is a desire to pretend that they are not an animal. But they eat and sleep and do all those animal things. How are they not animals - admittedly an animal with over-developed capacities? But that doesn't change the foundation. — Ludwig V

Nicholas? Who's that? — creativesoul

Well, I would concur that no one has been picklefree. :wink: — creativesoul

Since there is no God, there is no one to conceive humanity before it exists, thus the human being has no nature before he (I write as sexistly as Sartre) exists. Therefore, he is free to do has he chooses. — Jedothek

You will probably both disagree with me, — Ludwig V

A square circle is not either/ or and nor is it a paradox, It is just an incoherent conjoining of words. — Janus

↪Wayfarer Of course they do, but we also act for reasons. As I keep trying to get you to see they are just different kinds of explanation. You might get it if you ditch your either/or thinking. — Janus

According to the definitions I quoted earlier, epiphenomenalism says mental states do not have any effect on physical events. Walking is a physical event, not a mental event. And walking certainly has an effect on physical events. So I don't know how you are thinking walking is epiphenomenal.
— Patterner

I already addressed this. The causal exclusion argument that motivates epiphenomenalism applies equally to physical events in a similar supervenient relationship. — SophistiCat

So, if abortion is declared illegal in a very broad way, you end up with unintended consequences like what happened in Alabama. In vitro fertilization became illegal because the fertilized eggs in test-tubes were considered people because human life began at conception, which means their disposal was murder. — Hanover

I think we should be consistent. If it's murder then so is abortion. If abortion is not murder, then neither is this.
— Patterner
H'm. You didn't cover "If it's not murder, ..." Given what you've said, if it's not murder. abortion is not murder. It's vicious nasty crime, but who was killed? No-one. So it's not murder. — Ludwig V