It's great you're digging into this, but you will need to understand that you can't both agree with Chalmer's argument, and also hold that consciousness is physical. — Wayfarer

Oh, I don't agree with it. I just don't have a problem with it. When he defined what it was that was separate from 'physical', I understood what he meant. Chalmers is not asserting that subjective consciousness is necessarily separate from the brain. What he's saying is we can't at this moment measure it as a physical entity, and that I have agreed with the entire time. Just like we can't measure space as a physical entity, nor can we measure time as a physical entity. And in this, subjective consciousness is not 'physical'. But it doesn't mean its apart from the physical, or that its even its own entity.

He's using physical in the sense of 'the physical and mental'. It doesn't mean the mental is existent in some reality, just like being mentally unconscious doesn't mean your physical brain is in a state of unconsciousness. He's not claiming mental as 'some other thing existence'. Its a classification of a state of being. And we know as beings, that we are physical. As long as none of his claims outright deny the idea that consciousness does not have a physical origin, I'm fine with it.

David Chalmers: "It's not physical"

Yes, this is his opinion to the solution of the hard problem, but not the hard problem itself. I still believe what I have said does not contradict what the underlying issue of the hard problem is. I disagree with his solution to the problem, because he also currently has no evidence to deny that subjective consciousness could be an aspect of matter and energy. The only thing he can truly conclude is that we cannot be other matter that has the subjective experience, therefore we cannot measure it. If you listened to the rest of the video, he notes that scientists right now are working to correlate their own subjective experiences with their brain states, something I've noted before. His, "Not physical" at best is using a category that does not require us to know whether it is physical or not. Which here, I have no disagreement again.

he says it might be an additional property that is associated with matter (a position which is called 'panpsychism'). But it's crucial to recognize that he doesn't say it can be explained in terms of known physical properties. He says that science has to admit consciousness as a fundamental property. By that he means it is irreducible, it can't be explained in terms of something else. — Wayfarer

No, he does not mean that it can't be explained in terms of something else if he is intending it to be like space or time. Space is a concept we use in relation to matter. We measure it with matter, yet space itself is not matter, but the absence of it. Time is not an existent 'material' concept, but it is is determined by watching and recording the differences in materials. Subjective consciousness as well, if it can only be known by being a material, is still known and defined in terms of the material that it is. Chalmers cannot deny this by his own reasoning. Just that we can't directly measure what it is like to be some other thing.

So if he wants to claim subjective consciousness as an existence that cannot be directly measured like space or time, I'm fine with this. He's not claiming that space and time exist apart from matter and energy, and he has no legs to claim with any evidence that consciousness is not in the same boat. This fits fine into the behavior version of consciousness, and simply gives another linguistic approach to the discussion. I certainly don't see it as a paradigm shift. It gives no argument that the brain does not or cannot cause consciousness, or that consciousness could exist without matter and energy. At most, its an option we can explore, of which I have always been open to.

Right. There's your 'thinking stuff' again. — Wayfarer

Just like Chalmers came up with his ideas using 'thinking stuff' too. He's just a man like you or me. Its fine if you don't agree with my conclusions, but don't discount thinking and questioning ideas, because you will subtly be against it in yourself as well. People move forward and discover by using the proposals, thoughts, and ideas of others as a springboard for new and better ideas. The alternative is dogma, and the elevation of an idea to a pedestal where most do not belong. It is great that you like the idea of subjective consciousness as another category of thinking, but I think the idea that the existence of the hard problem leads to the necessary conclusion that it is some other form of existence unrelated to matter and energy, does not follow.

I don't agree with it. I just don't have a problem with it — Philosophim

You're taking issue with it, saying he's mistaken, so don't be too polite about it. :wink:

I disagree with his solution to the problem, because he also currently has no evidence to deny that subjective consciousness could be an aspect of matter and energy. — Philosophim

A lot is resting on 'aspect' there. You could mean panpsychism, or dual aspect monism or some other view. Certainly as physical beings we are constantly energetic. If you read more of Chalmers, you will see he in no way discounts the neurological perspective. But he says it must be combined with a phenomenological approach because that methodology specficially integrates a first person perspective.

Speaking of evidence - and here we're talking philosophically not scientifically - matter is only known to us contingently and indirectly. We don't know what it actually is. We receive visual and auditory data about it, on that we all agree, and then interpret it. When you say that 'neurons cause consciousness', that they are an aspect of consciousness, that is not in doubt. What that leaves out is the mind that makes the judgement. As it must, because mind is not objective. But then as Schopenhauer says, 'Materialism is the attempt to explain what is immediately given us by what is given us indirectly'.

Space is a concept we use in relation to matter. We measure it with matter, yet space itself is not matter, but the absence of it. Time is not an existent 'material' concept, but it is is determined by watching and recording the differences in materials. Subjective consciousness as well, if it can only be known by being a material, is still known and defined in terms of the material that it is. — Philosophim

What do you make of this, then? it does have bearing as I will explain.

The problem of including the observer in our description of physical reality arises most insistently when it comes to the subject of quantum cosmology - the application of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole - because, by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers.

Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe.

So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness...in the absence of observers, our universe is dead'. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271

The point being, physicalism only gets to a certain point before having to admit the reality of 'the observer', who is not in the picture. Happens at the other end of the scale, too. It is another aspect of the 'hard problem'.

It is great that you like the idea of subjective consciousness as another category of thinking — Philosophim

I don't think that its another category of thinking. It's the first- and third-person perspectives.

I don't agree with it. I just don't have a problem with it
— Philosophim

You're taking issue with it, saying he's mistaken, so don't be too polite about it. :wink: — Wayfarer

Ha ha! No, I genuinely respect Chalmers. How do I explain this...human beings form knowledge and outlooks on life from their perspective. This perspective includes their background, use of language, culture, and their own particular view point on reality. As such, we are all going to have our unique approach to figuring out the world around us. I respect a person's view point that is internally consistent with this background.

As you noted, we are all representing the world the best we can. Hearing of another perspective of how to view that world has always fascinated me. There are people who cannot visualize for example. How different would one's perspective be with that? Someone very short or very tall. Someone incredibly wealthy and another incredibly poor. And of course, 'the average person' (which is more a concept then reality). The fact we're able to come together and have a communicable discussion about reality at all is sometimes a feat in itself. :)

From my own perspective, which of course is just as circumspect as any other perspective, I am a fan of knowledge and communication that is both accurate in assessing reality, and open to the greatest number of people despite our different perspectives. But I'm also aware that there will always be the need for sub-perspectives and different ways of viewing and stating things about the same underlying reality we're all looking at. And sometimes, those sub-perspectives have invaluable points or additions that can and should be brought into the larger perspective.

My disagreement with Chalmer's conclusions is not as a sub-perspective. I don't believe he's in any way noting that it is a fact that subjective consciousness is at its core, necessarily separate from matter and energy. Matter and energy as the building blocks of reality are of course incredibly broad representations of existence around us. To be specific, 'energy' is really just the momentum of matter. And if we wanted to be even more general, its just 'existence'. How we part and parcel that undefinable but all encompassing concept into 'existences' is part of that unique and individual group experience of humanity. His conclusions and word choices within his sub-perspective, can be easily misinterpreted using the language of the general culture. Few people have the learning and background of Chalmer's to truly understand what he is intending, and instead think he means that subjective consciousness is necessarily apart from the brain, and therefore there is a soul, afterlife, etc. That conclusion helps no one.

If you read more of Chalmers, you will see he in no way discounts the neurological perspective. — Wayfarer

Yes, and this is the point I was trying to get at as well. We don't disagree on this aspect. Like Chalmers I am not asserting that it is the truth that subjective consciousness is necessarily neurological, but he is also not asserting that he truly knows what it is otherwise. What I am stating is out of the available theories that I am aware of, the one which fits in with what science has demonstrated to us over decades about the brain so far, is that consciousness is the experience of being. Every being we know of is 'physical' in the fact that it is made up of matter and energy.

There has never been a discovery to my mind, of some 'thing' which is not matter and energy at its core. While speculation, creative thinking, different perspectives, and experimentation are all to be encouraged, the existence of such possibilities does not mean that at this moment, their existence should override what we know currently works to help us navigate the world and make life preserving and enhancing decisions. It doesn't mean that these exploratory measures won't result in a change to the general understanding of the world in the future, but they must prove themselves as offering some real and tangible value to the general perspective that our current understanding and knowledge does not.

Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271

This is a category error. One mistake our brains do over and over again, and I am not immune from this, is elevating concepts that that we have reasoned completely through language as if they are actual representations of reality outside of that language.

Getting stuck in the language and perspective can lead us to think, "Yes, we measure time by observing change. The observation of change requires memory. Memory requires an observer. Therefore time only happens with observers!" Of course, we have to be careful what we mean by time here. "Observed time" would be a more accurate representation of reality. If we're not here, wouldn't the Earth still rotate around the Sun? Of course. Meaning that relations between objects would still persist with the momentum that they have at any X time. If there is no observer to label it as 'time', then that label and concept doesn't exist. But the fact that there wouldn't be a label based off of an observer is what wouldn't exist, not the relation of the matter and energy. Useful labels are descriptors of reality for us to understand, but our 'logical' conclusions involving labels must not be confused with reality itself.

The 'observer' needed for quantum mechanics is also a misunderstanding of descriptions within the context of the math, and mixing them with our common English understanding of the word. Taken from each context, or perspective, they are not the same meaning. Our observations, or our passive existence taking in light, does not change quantum mechanics. Otherwise the rest of space would not exist. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical understanding of particles so small, that our scientific attempts at observation; bouncing a beam of light off of them to measure them for example, affects the particle itself. I've often described it as using a bowling ball to measure the velocity and location of a ping pong ball. The experiment affects the outcome itself, and this leads to mathematically logical limits in outcomes.

I don't think that its another category of thinking. It's the first- and third-person perspectives. — Wayfarer

I have not problem in viewing consciousness from both a first and third person perspective. I just think its the most reasonable case that consciousness is the brain's first person perspective.

If you are interested into a deeper explanation of what I've noted here, I have a post on these forums in which I tackle knowledge. Feel free to give it a read or not. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

Space is a concept we use in relation to matter. We measure it with matter, yet space itself is not matter, but the absence of it. — Philosophim

Would matter warp space if space was merely the absence of matter?

Time is not an existent 'material' concept, but it is is determined by watching and recording the differences in materials. — Philosophim

The differences in materials come over time.. Without time, nothing would change.

Every being we know of is 'physical' in the fact that it is made up of matter and energy. — Philosophim

Right. And maybe all matter/energy has physical and mental properties.

There has never been a discovery to my mind, of some 'thing' which is not matter and energy at its core. — Philosophim

I agree. And maybe all matter/energy has a mental property that is a necessary ingredient of consciousness. That would mean consciousness is matter/energy at its core.

That would mean consciousness is matter/energy at its core. — Patterner

Or vice versa.

:up:

This would require a little more than improvements in transportation or communication… This would require that our mind is restructured in a way that does not require “consciousness” to be a building block in our mind. And even if that is managed, this would be replaced by another “building block” and we would then face the same problem for this other building block. We use tools from our mind to understand the world, just like in the Lego analogy I explained later in this message, and it’s impossible to explain these tools when all we have to do so are the same tools we’re trying to explain... — Skalidris

You have so much to say but yet you don't have anything else to add to my remark?

If you want a more formal proof of this reasoning, it’s the same principle as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems: any consistent formal system capable of arithmetic contains true statements that are unprovable within that system. The self reference problem brings contradictions when you're trying to prove something by using that thing itself, just like with the liar paradox, just like the hard problem of consciousness. — Skalidris

You wanted a more formal proof of this logic impossibility, are you not satisfied with this one?

I did see something red. And I don't need post hoc reflection on such an experience. I can look at something red right now, and reflect on the experience as I'm having it. — Patterner

I don't see how any reflection on any experience is not after the fact.

The different nature of subjective experience, on the other hand, suggests something different is involved. — Patterner

That subjective experience seems somehow radically different is not a guarantee that it is so.

Well said Janus. — Philosophim

Cheers

I did see something red. And I don't need post hoc reflection on such an experience. I can look at something red right now, and reflect on the experience as I'm having it.
— Patterner

I don't see how any reflection on any experience is not after the fact. — Janus

Fair enough. Wrong choices of words on my part. You said:

We reflect on experience and say things like "i saw something red". Perhaps it is that post hoc reflection that makes us think we are sometimes consciously aware. It is only the moments we recall that could make us believe that. Those moments are in the tiny minority. At least for me. — Janus

I am aware of seeing something red as I am seeing it.

The different nature of subjective experience, on the other hand, suggests something different is involved.
— Patterner

That subjective experience seems somehow radically different is not a guarantee that it is so. — Janus

That subjective experience seems somehow radically different is not a guarantee that it is not.

I am aware of seeing something red as I am seeing it. — Patterner

I would still say you cannot see something and be reflectively aware of seeing it in the same moment. Self-awareness seems to me to be always post hoc.

That subjective experience seems somehow radically different is not a guarantee that it is not. — Patterner

That's true. We just don't know. Maybe we cannot ever know the answer to that question. Perhaps subjective experience is nothing more than an idea—a perennially after the fact idea.

If that were so then consciousness, as Dennett argues, would not be what we think it is.I don't have a firm opinion on this either way. But I do argue against those who claim that the (purportedly self-evident) reality of subjective experience proves that physicalism is necessarily false.

I am aware of seeing something red as I am seeing it.
— Patterner

I would still say you cannot see something and be reflectively aware of seeing it in the same moment. Self-awareness seems to me to be always post hoc. — Janus

I suspect you are making a point that I haven't yet caught on to. I don't know why you say this. I just looked at my blue shirt. As I was looking at it, I said, "I'm looking at my blue shirt. And I am aware that I am looking at my blue shirt." And I was aware that I was looking at my blue shirt as I was looking at it. You can't think I only became aware that I had been looking at it after I looked away from it, can you? You are saying something else?

That subjective experience seems somehow radically different is not a guarantee that it is not.
— Patterner

That's true. We just don't know. Maybe we cannot ever know the answer to that question. Perhaps subjective experience is nothing more than an idea—a perennially after the fact idea.

If that were so then consciousness, as Dennett argues, would not be what we think it is.I don't have a firm opinion on this either way. But I do argue against those who claim that the (purportedly self-evident) reality of subjective experience proves that physicalism is necessarily false. — Janus

'Purportedly self-evident'? Do you doubt that you subjectively experience?

I subjectively experience. I do not believe physicalism can explain it. Physicalism tells us there are micro physical properties, like mass and charge. We know how the micro physical properties give rise to macro properties, like liquidity. To characteristics of macro objects, like height. To macro processes, like flight. To characteristics of macro process, like speed.

But we don't have any idea how the micro physical properties give rise to subjective experience. We can't figure it out. And, as I've quoted a few times, Brian Greene, who Has a BA in physics from Harvard, and DPhil (PhD) in theoretical physics at Magdalen College, says the micro properties don't seem to have any connection to consciousness.

Might we find a new physical property of matter that explains it? Although I don't see how objective physical properties could, even in principle, explain it, I can't say it's not possible. But, the mystery being so total, I think trying to find another explanation isn't the moist illogical idea.

But we don't have any idea how the micro physical properties give rise to subjective experience. We can't figure it out. And, as I've quoted a few times, Brian Greene, who Has a BA in physics from Harvard, and DPhil (PhD) in theoretical physics at Magdalen College, says the micro properties don't seem to have any connection to consciousness. — Patterner

That still doesn't mean conscious isn't physical. That's like saying, "We don't understand how rain works, so obviously its not of this world and God must cause it." Everything points to consciousness being physical by every measure of behavior we know. Just because we can't figure out the subjective portion of it in no way entails that its suddenly made of some new non-physical material.

Consciousness is 'something'. The best explanation from what we know is that it is the first person experience of matter and energy when it is organized in a particular way. So far, we understand human consciousness is the brain. You alter the brain, you get reports of people saying their first person experience is altered. Don't get so wrapped up in theory that you forget the decades of medicine and neuroscience behind this.

The point of 'using other language' is just to put the discussion in another contextual model that doesn't require the physical to describe it. That's it. It doesn't mean its physical or not physical, it just means 'we don't talk about it'. People misunderstand this and think, "Oh, that means consciousness isn't the brain!". No, all of our knowledge points that being the only thing which currently makes sense.

Just like back in the day people may not have understood that water turned into gas, and thought that was evidence that water was from another world.

Person: "Water must be magic. It vanishes into nothing in a few days! It must go to God's realm."

Scientist: "Well according to our studies, and our understanding of the conservation of mass and
energy, it turns into something else. All of our studies so far seem to imply it rises up in the air. We're calling it a 'gas'."

Person: "But isn't water a liquid? How can you call a liquid a gas?"

Scientist: "Well technically its still 'water'. Its just that when enough heat happens, it changes enough that its better that we don't call it a liquid anymore. Its invisible, so using a 'gas' model is better. But its still of this Earth."

Person: "So it still could be magic or God right? I mean, water comes from clouds which are clearly visible so they can't be a gas. And how does this 'gas' go from the ground to way up in the sky?"

Scientist: "Yes, its true, we can't study clouds as they're too high in the air. But its probably just water as a gas turning back into a liquid."

Person: "I heard you said its not water anymore, so it could be anything. And since its impossible to study clouds and you can't explain it, its still probably from another world."

This 'conversation' has taken some form or the other throughout centuries of human history. Here we are at consciousness, and the same thing is happening again. The money is on the brain at this point. You can be the 'person' if you want, but I think we should all try to be the 'scientist'.

Everything points to consciousness being physical by every measure of behavior we know. — Philosophim

Behavior isn't consciousness. Behavior can take place without consciousness. It does so in things we have made, and in simple forms of life that nobody would think has anything but the most rudimentary consciousness. An ant in the Amazon get infected with a certain fungus. The fungus causes the ant to climb to the top of a tree, at which point the fungus, which has been growing inside the ant, bursts out, and spreads far and wide, infecting more ants. Every autumn, monarch butterflies migrate to a very specific place in Mexico, from as far away as Canada. They have never been to Mexico. Their great grandparents lefty Mexico on the spring. This generation returns to three same place - literally the same trees - to continue the cycle. I would not think the behavior of either the ant or butterfly has anything to do with consciousness.

Just because we can't figure out the subjective portion of it in no way entails that its suddenly made of some new non-physical material. — Philosophim

It isn't sudden.

Consciousness is 'something'. The best explanation from what we know is that it is the first person experience of matter and energy when it is organized in a particular way. — Philosophim

That is not an explanation at all. An explanation would tell us why matter and energy organized in a particular way has first person experience. As opposed to it doing whatever it does without first person experience. No physical-only explanation amounts to anything more than "It just happens."

So far, we understand human consciousness is the brain. — Philosophim

We understand that consciousness takes place in the brain. And, since, as far as we know, brains are the only places consciousness takes places, it doesn't make sense to think that the brain isn't essential for consciousness. But that is a different thing from "the brain is consciousness."

You alter the brain, you get reports of people saying their first person experience is altered. — Philosophim

Yes. Change what is happening in the brain, and you will change what consciousness experiences. Just as if you cut off my arms, you will change what my consciousness experiences.

Don't get so wrapped up in theory that you forget the decades of medicine and neuroscience behind this. — Philosophim

I can't imagine a way to test the idea I'm talking about, so I can't call it a theory. Still, it is at least an attempt to explain it the way we explain all other macro characteristics and processes. Physicalism simply says, "It just happens. Put things together in a certain way, and you get consciousness. It doesn't have anything to do with the properties of the things you put together, the way every other macro characteristic or process does. There's no connection between the properties of matter/energy and consciousness."

I think we're going to have to agree to disagree here. I think you're coming at this as a question of 'what we want', then 'what is most likely'. You want there to be something special about consciousness, I get that. Its likely part of our human desire to want to continue to live, even in the face of incredibly adversity. Once you get past that, you realize there's nothing there. But if you can't get past that, you'll likely grab onto anything that supports a continuation. I've been in your shoes, I understand.

Not saying I'm right and you're wrong, just noting where I'm coming from, and that I think we've each said our piece, and nothing more can be said. :) Genuinely, I hope I'm wrong and you're right. I've had a nice conversation with you, and hope to have many more in the future.

Indeed, we disagree, and neither is likely to switch sides. Heck, we even disagree on which of us is more focused on 'what we want' and 'what is most likely'. Hehe. It's that kind of topic, eh?

Not sure it's possible for the two of us to not talk about it, though. If you say something I disagree with, I'll often want the other person to know there is another pov.

Heck, we even disagree on which of us is more focused on 'what we want' and 'what is most likely'. Hehe. It's that kind of topic, eh? — Patterner

Ha ha! True, it is!

Not sure it's possible for the two of us to not talk about it, though. If you say something I disagree with, I'll often want the other person to know there is another pov. — Patterner

And I greatly appreciate it! I've enjoyed my conversation with you Patterner, you write clearly, intelligently, and I always respect your viewpoint. We'll chat again, I'm sure.

I suspect you are making a point that I haven't yet caught on to. I don't know why you say this. I just looked at my blue shirt. As I was looking at it, I said, "I'm looking at my blue shirt. And I am aware that I am looking at my blue shirt." And I was aware that I was looking at my blue shirt as I was looking at it. You can't think I only became aware that I had been looking at it after I looked away from it, can you? You are saying something else? — Patterner

I don't believe it is possible for you to look at your blue shirt and be reflectively aware of yourself doing so in the same instant. Observing my own experience leads me to think that I can't do it at least. You might be more skillful than I. I can't rule that out so I speak only for myself.

'Purportedly self-evident'? Do you doubt that you subjectively experience? — Patterner

I don't doubt that we experience. What I do doubt is that our experience is non-physical. I mean our experience is not a physical object to be sure but I think our intuition that our experience is non-physical is the product of a kind of illusion created by language. An illusion created by reflective thought. The alternative as I see it has to be mind/ body dualism.

I also think that much of the attachment to the idea that experience is non-physical has to do with the wish for immortality which can make us averse to the idea that this life is all there is.

...the hard problem of consciousness is...the paradox it creates when thinking of consciousness as an object in the world. — Skalidris

...the hard problem of consciousness will always remain for those who try to visualise consciousness as an object. — Skalidris

when we ask ourselves “why are these materialistic phenomena accompanied by experience?”, we trigger a self referential explanation that has no other outcome than being circular — Skalidris

...consciousness cannot be viewed solely as an object since it has to be there for the perception of objects. — Skalidris

It’s equally true that consciousness cannot be viewed solely as a subject since objects must be acknowledged in order to establish consciousness.

I see no obvious reason why consciousness cannot perceive itself as an object.

Objects are established by descriptions of what they are and what they do apart from opinions and acts of imagination.

There is a well-known counter-example to your claim:

Consciousness can only be viewed as consciousness (cannot be broken down into something else since it is always there as a whole in our reasoning). — Skalidris

This example is the Measurement Problem.

It gives us a clear example of consciousness observing itself as an object in accord with what an object is and what an object does:

Schödinger's Cat

A thought experiment called Schrödinger's cat illustrates the measurement problem. A mechanism is arranged to kill a cat if a quantum event, such as the decay of a radioactive atom, occurs. The mechanism and the cat are enclosed in a chamber so the fate of the cat is unknown until the chamber is opened. Prior to observation, according to quantum mechanics, the atom is in a quantum superposition, a linear combination of decayed and intact states.

Any future evolution of the wave function is based on the state the system was discovered to be in when the measurement was made, meaning that the measurement "did something" to the system that is not obviously a consequence of Schrödinger evolution.
--Wikipedia

What is consciousness? In our context here, it is a measurement system. This is a fact about consciousness, thus establishing its identity as an object.

What does consciousness do? In our context here, it changes the state of superposition into the state of (well-defined) position.

I see no obvious reason why consciousness cannot perceive itself as an object. — ucarr

Grab your right hand with your right hand and report back.

I see no obvious reason why consciousness cannot perceive itself as an object. — ucarr

Grab your right hand with your right hand and report back. — Wayfarer

RH = Right Hand. Now, let me file my report on my right hand grabbing itself.

Report: RH = RH.

Now, it's your turn to respond to one of my things: I say that when I make a claim about something, intending by my claim to establish an objective fact, I simultaneously treat that something as an object.

You argue in your post above that: consciousness cannot treat itself as an object.

If you're right then you're wrong because in making your claim you've established an objective fact
about consciousness. Isn't that what you're trying to do? Well, what you're trying to do is straighten me out about a certain objective fact about what consciousness cannot do. How are you able to do that outside of knowing that fact?

Conclusion: a) If you're right, then you're smack in the middle of paradox a la "This sentence is false;" b) If you're wrong, as in "Consciousness cannot treat itself as an object is wrong." then you're still smack in the middle of paradox: a) if you're right, then you're wrong; b) if you're wrong, then you're right.

Conclusion The subject/object duo cannot be broken apart. Each always implies the other. That's the bi-conditional, isn't it?

Conclusion. If the previous two conclusions are correct, then the theory the conscious is a non-intersecting parallel to the material must pursue its search for support elsewhere.

I don't believe it is possible for you to look at your blue shirt and be reflectively aware of yourself doing so in the same instant. Observing my own experience leads me to think that I can't do it at least. You might be more skillful than I. I can't rule that out so I speak only for myself. — Janus

What happens when you try? Is it a flickering back and forth between looking at it, and thinking about having looked at it? Or are you unable to think about looking at it at all until it is no longer in your line of sight? Something else?

I don't doubt that we experience. What I do doubt is that our experience is non-physical. I mean our experience is not a physical object to be sure but I think our intuition that our experience is non-physical is the product of a kind of illusion created by language. An illusion created by reflective thought. The alternative as I see it has to be mind/ body dualism. — Janus

Ah. I wasn't sure what you meant. Like you, I can only speak for myself. I thought it must surely be physical. Everything is made of particles, after all. At another site (for a series of fantasy books), a guy and I posted for several pages, me trying to convince him that consciousness must be physical, because everything is made of particles. Well, he ended up convincing me of the opposite. Lol

Still, everything is made of particles, right?? Everything exists because of/is built from particles and the forces. But if consciousness can't arise solely from the physical, which I don't think it can, then maybe there are things in our reality that are not physical. Like an experiential property of matter, in addition to the physical properties. So consciousness arises from matter, but the experiential property is as necessary as the physical properties.

All it takes is for me to accept the possibility that we don't know all the properties of the universe, or matter.

I also think that much of the attachment to the idea that experience is non-physical has to do with the wish for immortality which can make us averse to the idea that this life is all there is. — Janus

I'm sure many people believe it for that reason. I'm not among them. I'm 60. I'm not unhappy, looking forward to death, or anything. But the thought of myself going on forever is veeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeery unappetizing.



My humble thanks. I'm much less well-read than most of you on most of the topics discussed at TPF. I don't always know what anybody is talking about. There's a thread about someone Frege that looks interesting. Problem is, I never heard of Frege. So I'm happy I'm at least writing well about what I think or know.

And right back at you! It's a pleasure.

Report: RH = RH. — ucarr

I’ll need photographic evidence in this case ;-)

I say that when I make a claim about something, intending by my claim to establish an objective fact, I simultaneously treat that something as an object. — ucarr

Fair point. We could say of someone, ‘she has a brilliant mind’. In that case her mind is indeed an object of conversation. I could say of my own mind that at such and such a time I was in a confused state, in which case my own mind was the subject of the recollection.

You can also use ‘see’ metaphorically, as in ‘I see what you mean’. But in both cases the metaphorical sense is different to the physical sense.

A related point - the eye of another person might be an object of perception such as when it is being examined by an optometrist. And I can view my own eyes in a mirror. But I cannot see the act of seeing (or for that matter grasp the act of grasping) as that act requires a seen object and the perceiving subject (or grasping and grasped). It is in that sense that eyes and hands may only see and grasp, respectively, what is other to them. That is the salient point.

So the first use of the term ‘object’ employs a different sense of the term ‘object’ than the sense it is used when we say ‘the eye can’t see itself’.

The subject/object duo cannot be broken apart. Each always implies the other. That's the bi-conditional, isn't it? — ucarr

I agree that subjects and objects are ‘co-arising’. This is a fundamental principle in Buddhist philosophy. Schopenhauer uses it to great effect in his arguments. But it doesn’t address the basic issue, that of whether or in what sense mind or consciousness can be known objectively.

Consider the primitive elements of physics. They can be specified in wholly objective terms of velocity, mass, spin, number and so on. Within the ambit of natural science, then objective judgement is paramount. And with respect to at least classical physics, judgements could always be verified against objective measurement. Nowadays the scope of objective judgement covers an enormous range of subjects. But not the nature of first-person experience, and that is intentional, as the subjective elements of experience were assigned to the 'secondary qualities' of objects in the early days of modern science.

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos

That is the background, if you like, that the 'hard problem' is set against. If you don't see that, you're not seeing the problem.

Report: RH = RH. — ucarr

I’ll need photographic evidence in this case ;-) — Wayfarer

Write the math onto a marking board, put your right hand alongside the math and then take a picture. The math represents the right hand with bifurcation of its identity; this is a two-in-one of identity elaborated. This is picturing for literal sight of the ultimate self-referential grabbing.

We could say of someone, ‘she has a brilliant mind’. In that case her mind is indeed an object of conversation. — Wayfarer

You can also use ‘see’ metaphorically, as in ‘I see what you mean’. — Wayfarer

But in both cases the metaphorical sense is different to the physical sense. — Wayfarer

The radical nature of QM resides in the fact the resolution of Schrödinger's cat paradox is effected literally, not metaphorically. The observational property of consciousness as a) measurement; b) resolution of superposition to simple position is literal, not metaphorical.

These objectified claims about consciousness are not limited to an individual's subjective experience of Schrödinger's cat paradox. QM physics claims it for everyone.

Furthermore, regarding the mind's eye, since our focus is consciousness, within this context even the mind's eye is literal. We're literally talking about the observational property of consciousness and it's mathematical and experimental verification in physics: public, measurable, repeatable.

The stunning revelations of QM arise from it having already objectified consciousness.

In order to deny this objectification, you must defeat both: a) The Copenhagen Interpretation and b) The Many Worlds Interpretation of QM with counter-examples. That means doing science, not philosophy.

Since thought, language and mind do not occur apart from brain, how can you claim brain and mind are parallel?

Regarding emergent properties of the brain, they exemplify the differential circularity of the higher-orders of thermo-dynamics: morphodynamics, teleodynamics.

...the subjective elements of experience were assigned to the 'secondary qualities' of objects in the early days of modern science. — Wayfarer

It seems to me that here you're tipping into phenomenology.

But I cannot see the act of seeing (or for that matter grasp the act of grasping) as that act requires a seen object and the perceiving subject (or grasping and grasped). It is in that sense that eyes and hands may only see and grasp, respectively, what is other to them. — Wayfarer

As I claim, brain is integral to thought, language and mind, not parallel.. So, again, the mind's eye in our focus upon consciousness is literal, not figurative. You exemplify this with your prescription for perception: "eyes and hands may only see and grasp, respectively, what is other to them."

You could not deliver this prescription with authority if your perceptual eyesight were not literal. In the context of consciousness, perceptual eyesight is just as literal as optical eyesight. Were this not the case, you would not be writing declarative sentences about what perceptual eyesight can and cannot do: "...I cannot see the act of seeing." This clause, like the sentence: "This sentence is false." simultaneously declares what it denies. (At the level of perception, in order to make a declaration that you cannot see the act of seeing, you must see it.)

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos

That is the background, if you like, that the 'hard problem' is set against. If you don't see that, you're not seeing the problem. — Wayfarer

You're trying to set boundaries for the context of the HPoC debate.

The central question of the HPoC goes as follows: How is it the case that subjective experience is associated with the physical processes of the brain?

Apparently, you accept the Galileo_Descartes binary of brain/mind as the proper structure and scope of the HPoC debate. Modern physics, with the backing of QM and the measurement problem, rejects the binary as falsity. If you want to defend immaterialism via the binary, then I think you must firstly defend it scientifically. I don't think facile references to emergent properties will be enough.

This is picturing for literal sight of the ultimate self-referential grabbing. — ucarr

I’m afraid that is word salad. The fact that a hand cannot grasp itself is apodictic.

You're trying to set boundaries for the context of the HPoC debate. — ucarr

Not setting - describing. I don’t accept the Cartesian division but it is a real factor in culture, which the hard problem argument is intended to reveal.

Modern physics, with the backing of QM and the measurement problem, rejects the binary as falsity. — ucarr

You might enjoy a recent essay I have composed on that topic.

Grab your right hand with your right hand and report back. — Wayfarer

Report: RH ≡ RH. — ucarr

This is picturing for literal sight of the ultimate self-referential grabbing. — ucarr

I’m afraid that is word salad. — Wayfarer

I'm not going to let myself confuse incomprehension with unintelligibility. I think I understand the logical connections linking grab right hand with right hand_self-reference_identity operator.* This triad might be unorthodox, but the attempt to express a logical sequence is intelligible even if incorrect.

*The three parts of the triad mirror each other as parallels.

The fact that a hand cannot grasp itself is apodictic. — Wayfarer

I think the apodicsis of your claim is context specific. Since our focus is consciousness, grab becomes "grab." Following from this, I can counter-claim that in the context of consciousness:

Grab your right hand with your right hand and report back. — Wayfarer

posits the physical dexterity of a body part into a false parallel with the cognitive dexterity of the mind.

Using your own mind, you conceive the command: "Grab your right hand with your right hand and report back." Then, you command me to carry out the command, not with my mind, as you did in conceiving the command, but instead with the body part which is my physical hand. This is a gross mis-match.

When I carried out your command with my mind, as you did in configuring the command, my cognitive dexterity easily matched your cognitive dexterity.

Furthermore, the bifurcation of: "Grab your right hand with your right hand and report back." is a feature of the mindscape, not of the landscape. You challenge me to treat one unified whole as if it's two independent wholes. In leveling your challenge, you were confident I would fail in the task. But the cheat you enacted took recourse to a feature of the mindscape not found in the landscape.

I've pointed out the false-paralleling of the two modes (mindscape vs landscape). What also needs to be pointed out is the fact you utilized your cognitive dexterity to conceptualize one unified whole as if it's two independent wholes. Your doing this is evidence you yourself don't really believe in the impossibility of reconceptualizing one unity as two independent wholes. This evidence casts doubt on any suggestion you don't understand: grab right hand with right hand_self-reference_identity operator.

Well, if you understand as well as I that the cognitive dexterity of the mind easily bifurcates hands towards word games of context-specific impossibility, then it follows your mind easily bifurcates itself into itself as subject looking at itself as object.

Now we proceed to understand your argument about the subjective self always seeing but never seen makes the same mistake of false-parallelism argued above: the physical self cannot look directly at itself; the cognitive self of the mindscape, on the other hand, has no problem doing so. Since our focus is consciousness, we're contextually concerned with the cognitive self, not the physical self.*

*This distinction is not intended to imply the cognitive self is not also physical. It is true, however, as made obvious in these arguments, that the two modes are not identical.

The subject/object duo cannot be broken apart. Each always implies the other. That's the bi-conditional, isn't it? — ucarr

I agree that subjects and objects are ‘co-arising’. This is a fundamental principle in Buddhist philosophy. Schopenhauer uses it to great effect in his arguments. — Wayfarer

Here's evidence in your own words of your belief that upon the mindscape, the subject/object duo cannot be broken apart.