Can you say more as to why determinism undermines truth or falsity?

Can't why I say something still be true or false, I'm just determined to say what I say? I realize this was a month ago so I understand if you don't recall what you were thinking about this topic.

:lol: good point!

I think the analogy to water breaks down because water just is that arrangement; it is that physical thing. On a physicalist ontology it is acceptable. Because oxygen and hydrogen and water are all physical things, it makes sense, in principle at least, how O and H could form H2O.

Not so with consciousness.

Why?

Because, again, consciousness is not a physical thing. I am happy to grant that, physically speaking, there are entire organisms, there are atoms, there are neurons and brains, etc. But where in the physical world is consciousness? Answer: it's not there, it is nowhere to be found in the physical world. So how does something physical (brains neurons etc.) cause/result in/produce something non-physical (and in a very limited circumstance)?

Besides, the problem is not only about not knowing what it is like to be another kind of being — Wayfarer

I just want to point out that I think this is not exactly the hard problem, rather it is what Ned Block has articulated to be the "harder" problem of consciousness. I could be mistaken about that.

There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — The Core of Mind and Cosmos

:up:

Physicalism only excludes non-physical concepts from modeling (i.e. explaining) how observable states-of-affairs transform into one another. In this way "the paradigm" is epistemologically modest, or deflationary, limiting its inquiries to only that which can be publicly observed – accounted for – in order to minimize as much as possible the distorting biases (e.g. wishful / magical thinking, superstitions, prejudices, authority, etc) of folk psychology/semantics. — 180 Proof

If physicalism is just an epistemological paradigm and not an ontological commitment, that takes a lot of the wind out of its sails, don't you think so?

No, the point of the argument is the hard problem. The hard problem has never claimed that consciousness is not physical, if we are regarding physical as matter and energy. Matter and energy has the capability to be conscious if organized right, just like water and hydrogen has the capability to be water if organized right. That's the point of the easy problem, to show that yes, they understand that consciousness is a physical manifestation of the brain. But will we ever be able to map consciousness objectively to what it is like to subjectively be conscious? That seems impossible. — Philosophim

I think the hard problem is not answering why consciousness is a physical manifestation, but why a physical manifestation should result in consciousness. And, it is quite unclear why any physical matter/energy arrangement should result in anything like consciousness. The consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms because consciousness is not a physical thing.

Consciousness...

describes the organism as a whole. sure
is a mode of biology. sure
is what he is doing. sure

I'm happy to concede all of those points and moreover to add that consciousness as we know it would not exist if not for the physical system that it is constituted by.

The problem though, the hard problem, is that when we consider the entire organism, or when we consider it at the physiological level, or at the neuronal level. or at the atomic level, or whatever level, we can't give an account of why that matter is conscious. It's obvious that there are conscious people, but why are they conscious? What, in physical terms, accounts for their consciousness. Again, we can't just point to the physiology. In fact, we can't point to anything physical. Why? Because as you said that will only amount to a description of the system in physiological or physical terms; it will not answer the question of why the matter considered is conscious.

Okay, but then I would ask you what about organisms is so special and different than other matter/energy arrangements that makes organisms conscious? Because of the physiology, right? But then, what about the physiology entails consciousness? It would make sense if organisms contained "consciousness atoms" and that is why they are conscious, but they do not; they are made of the same atomic material as other non-conscious matter.

I would think that the difference is that one is a subjective experience while the other is objective biological material; seems to me like a significant difference.

So I say, "how does physicalism account for consciousness?" And you say, "look, you have a brain and brain's are conscious! Therefore you are conscious NotAristotle! That's how we determine what things are conscious, by whether they have brains or not."

But then surely my reply is: "perfect, Nosferatu, now why is the brain conscious?" And how would you answer that in physical terms?

My understanding of the hard problem of consciousness is that it is a problem for a physicalist. Why is it a problem? Because the physicalist has not forwarded a physical account of why any physical system is conscious. Even if, as you suggest, some waveform of energy is responsible for consciousness, a natural question arises: why does that energy produce consciousness, while some other energy does not produce consciousness?

I think a wise person will seek wisdom. They will strive to know wisdom and to learn it. A mathematician strives to know math and excels in math. So, a wise person strives to know wisdom and excels in what is wise. And they seek wisdom because they love wisdom and enjoy wise actions.

"Nobody would call one just who does not enjoy acting justly." (NE, I, 1099a, 15-20).

This is in what being a philosopher consists.

Metaphysics, Book I, 981a (25-30).

According to The Philosopher,

"...yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience...and this because the former know the cause, but the latter do not. For men of experience know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know the "why" and the cause."

It seems to me that if anything has extension, or is solid, then it must be infinitely divisible. But I don't see why that's a problem.

I hope you do not mind if I am a bit argumentative, but if space is something in the universe, then it must be somewhere, right? But where is space?

When I wrote these two objections, I thought to myself, "well these objections are quite good." But now that I reflect on the first I think to myself, "perhaps Zeno is confused about the difference between nothing and empty space." For surely there can be empty space between things without there being nothing there. But I must now admit that were Zeno to press the issue and say, "NotAristotle, what is the difference between empty space and nothing?" I will be at a loss to answer. How might we answer him?

If Zeno is engaging in mere sophistry, then he must only be appearing to say something true, but is not saying something true. But he either says something untrue because he does not know the truth or wishes to deceive us as to what is true. But then we have two reasons to answer the question, because by answering we may either avoid deception, or we may help Zeno know the truth. So let us re-examine the matter in earnest. Again I ask, how might we answer Zeno?

Here is another objection to ancient atomism that I think I came up with, but maybe I heard it somewhere I don't really recall...

Atoms are either something or they are nothing. If atoms are nothing then there is nothing, not something. But there is something, so atoms must be something. But if atoms are something then they must be made out of something. Since everything is made out of atoms, that means atoms must be made out of atoms. But if atoms are made of atoms then atoms are not indivisible. Therefore, by the definition of atoms, there cannot be any atoms.

Here is an objection against ancient atomism that I have heard:

Ancient atomism postulates two things - 1. atoms, and 2. void.

Now, between atoms there are two options that may obtain. Option 1 is that there is something between the atoms. Because everything is made of atoms, this something must be just other atoms. Therefore, on option 1, there are only atoms, not void. Option 2 is that there is nothing between the atoms. However, if there is nothing between the atoms, then those atoms are in direct contact, and again, there is no void, only atoms. Either way, there can be only atoms, not atoms and void.

I think this objection was proffered by Zeno.

Here is an interpretation of Aquinas' first way in argumentative format:

1. There is motion.
2. Motion is a kind of change.
3. Change is the actualization of a potential.
4. Something cannot actualize its own potential.
5. The actualization of something's potential must be done by something else.
6. There cannot be an infinite series of potentials that need to be actualized in order to actualize some potential (otherwise, no change could occur by the definition of infinite and by the definition of what it is to be an actualized actualizer).
7. Therefore, there must be a first unactualized actualizer (unchanged changer or unmoved mover).
8. This everyone understands to be God.

I find it to be a convincing argument. If you have objections, I can try to answer them.

Well, what do you say wonderer1, is the BiV brain different than a real brain by having more parts or by having fewer parts?

wonderer1: I should rather think that a BiV brain cannot be compared to a real brain; they are completely different.

NotAristotle: As you say wonderer1, but then neither you nor I are a brain in a vat. We may be utterly deceived by our senses, but it is not by being a brain in a vat.

wonderer1: But I insist that we are brains in a vat; it must be so.

NotAristotle: Well then when we say brain we must mean something like a real brain.

wonderer1: Very well.

NotAristotle: Let us return then to our original inquiry: you seem to have said that a real brain is different than a BiV brain. But is it different by having more parts or fewer?

wonderer1: Surely it is by having fewer parts NotAristotle.

NotAristotle: Well put wonderer1, for if it had more parts, then it could be placed in a vat, just like a real brain. However, we are saying that it is impossible to place a BiV brain in a BiV vat. And this must be the case on account of a BiV brain having fewer parts than a real brain.

wonderer1: Indubitably.

NotAristotle: And what of our neuroscientists? Will they not be very much surprised to find that parts of our brains are missing?

wonderer1: Perhaps not.

NotAristotle: How do you mean wonderer1?

wonderer1: Perhaps the parts of the brain that are missing are not essential to perception, but are extra parts.

NotAristotle: Ah, I see, so these extra parts are excised, leaving behind the parts that are necessary for BiV perception.

wonderer1: Precisely.

NotAristotle: But if the parts that are necessary for perception are left intact, then once again, it should be possible to place a BiV brain in a BiV vat. But again, we have said this is impossible.

wonderer1: That is so.

NotAristotle: Then the problem arises once again, that our neuroscientists will likely find that parts of the brain are missing that are necessary for perception.

wonderer1: As you say NotAristotle.

NotAristotle: It stands to reason then, that if we are brains in a vat, the evidence will amount to saying that it should be impossible for us to perceive, given that we would be missing parts of the brain that are necessary for perception. In short, if we are brains in a vat, we will be missing parts of our brain, and neuroscientists will be quite perplexed by that.

wonderer1: Surely what you say is true NotAristotle.

NotAristotle: Well then wonderer1 that is good news. For, unless you and I are missing parts of our brains, we are most certainly not brains in a vat.

wonderer1: Good news indeed NotAristotle.

Yeah might as well be flexible and say we can't know what a BIV actually is, but under the scenario what you think of as real perception would necessarily be the same as BIV perception. — wonderer1

That sounds right to my ear wonderer1; BIV perception would have to be the same as real perception, given that BIV perception is the same neuronal activity as real perception.

I will summarize our discussion as it appears to me so far. We both agree, I think, that if it is physically impossible in the real world to put a brain in a vat and simulate reality, then BiV is impossible. But your point of contention is to say that it may be possible to put a brain in a vat and simulate reality in the real world, although a brain in a vat may falsely think that BiV is impossible. In such a case, a BiV brain would have to be constituted differently than a real brain, given that putting a BiV brain in a BiV vat is impossible, although putting a real brain in a real vat is possible.

Now, let us suppose that BiV world has some neuroscientists in it. That seems like a plausible assumption, unless your position is that BiV world cannot contain any neuroscientists. But if that were your position we would have proven that our world is not BiV world. So for now, we may suppose that BiV world contains neuroscientists, and these neuroscientists have a lot of knowledge about brains.

That brings me to the next question I would like to ask you: is BiV brain different than real brain by having more parts or by having fewer parts?

The thing is, if the fact is that you are a brain in a vat, who has been fed all of your perceptions by a mad scientist, then your belief that a brain in a vat is physically impossible is a result of the way your beliefs developed in response to what the mad scientist has been feeding you. So under this scenario you believe what the mad scientist caused you to believe, and so your belief that a BIV is physically impossible doesn't have an informed basis, and would in fact be false. — wonderer1

You are saying that a BiV brain is different than a real brain, I think. But then tell me this, is BiV perception the same as real perception?

Exactly. That's what I am thinking too -- if the empirical evidence that establishes BiV is accepted, then why is any other empirical evidence ignored?

If a neuroscientist gave you evidence that a brain could not be stimulated in such a way so as to produce simulated percepts, would you be convinced that the brain in a vat hypothesis is impossible?

Let's suppose I am a brain in a vat, but I have fully functioning eyes. In front of me is a green screen. Still, a scientist stimulates my occipital lobe to see green. What do I see? The real green or the simulated green?

It seems to me that having an experience of eating pizza cannot be simulated. That is because my experience of reality requires more than BiV, it requires sensory organs that can experience the reality. The proof is in the pudding, or in this case, the pizza. I think that if you remove the sensory abilities of the organism, you remove phenomenal consciousness too, or at least you remove the phenomenal consciousness of what is sensed. Experience is a more integrated process than just brain processing, in my opinion. — NotAristotle

I do not believe BiV is possible. I believe semantic externalism doesn't prove that BiV is impossible; I think BiV is impossible for other reasons.

To be the same principle the body would in some way need to be silenced, or asleep, or unconscious, as in the movie Matrix. — NOS4A2


Sure. The point is that its experiences are elicited artificially by a computer directly manipulating the sense organs. — Michael

I think the point NOS4A2 was making (correct me if I'm missing the mark NOS4A2) is that someone arguing for BiV faces a dilemma. If the person is awake, they are aware that they are BiV. If the person is not awake then they are sleeping or dreaming and are not aware of BiV. In either case, the person is not fooled by BiV.

If it's a body in a vat we're getting a lot closer to reality. And is this body actually fed pizza, etc. But then it would just be experiencing reality.

The point still stands that if semantic externalism is true then none of the words in the brain’s language can refer to the vat. — Michael

I agree with you, but that's different than saying that if semantic externalism is true then we cannot be brains in a vat.

It’s a real tree given what “real tree” means in my language. — Michael

Except that the "real tree" might actually be referring to a BiV tree and that's the issue. As you said, if semantic externalism is true, no attempts by us to refer to a "real tree" would be successful if we are in BiV world.

Yep, so let's say you unvat the brain and give them eyes, a nose, etc. And you say to them "that is a tree." And they're like, "yeah, I know." And then you say to them, "no, that's a real tree." They'd be like "yeah, I can see that, but what do you mean by a 'real' tree." And you'd be like, "a real tree is not a BiV tree." But of course you'd be assuming that the tree you were pointing to was not a BiV tree. And that's the problem. There's no reason that you, the scientist, are not also a brain in a vat. The semantic externalism argument against BiV only goes through by assuming not BiV.

The assumption that the body only keeps the brain alive and does not factor into phenomenal experience is a materialist form of dualism that ought to be dismissed as nonsense. — NOS4A2

Agree.

Would you mind laying out the argument as you see it, and we can both evaluate whether it is valid (or unsound by being question-begging)?

In the earlier argument you gave, I objected to premise 2. I don't consider the argument invalid, but I do consider premise 2 a faulty assumption.

Again, if you lay out the argument, I think we will both have an easier time evaluating Putnam's argument.

But he assumes that we are not BiV in proving it. Isn't that begging the question?

2 is question begging. If semantic externalilsm is true, we could still be BiV.

It seems to me that Putnam's argument is question-begging. SEP seems to basically agree. https://plato.stanford.edu/Archives/spr2009/entries/brain-vat/

I agree with everything you quoted. I admit it is a high bar. But no, I do not think it is advocating for pacifism.

"Do not resist an evil person" is an assertion that is made in the context of discussing "an eye for an eye." I think it is important to properly interpret scripture. According to Wikipedia, the original text may have legal connotations.

Here's a question: does anyone nowadays actually believe in "an eye for an eye?"

I'm a Catholic Christian and here are my views. Christ is unique; Christ is unlike anyone. His mission was to save, no matter what the cost, even at the cost of His own life. I am not sure I can fully explain salvation, but I do believe that salvation is through Jesus.

I also believe it is right and just to defend yourself or another from an attacker, and a war may be justly waged. I think Saint Thomas Aquinas commented on what constitutes a just war. The ability to wage a just war is not beyond the scope of what tradition has revealed.

I see no problem between Christ's mission and self-defense. Does that answer?