When it comes to omniscience, I'm unwilling to claim that I even understand what that means. I don't think it means that all of the content of what humans believe they know is known by an omniscient mind, in that it's feasible that what we think we know might be illusory and so not a real object of knowledge. — Wayfarer

That's an interesting perspective, but it doesn't really address the point. The point is really just that it is impossible to improve upon a perfect and complete being, and therefore God can't possibly derive any benefit from creating the world. He can do if he wants to, it doesn't affect him either way, but it's still completely arbitrary.

As to why evil is possible at all, I think the orthodox answer is that it is because we are free agents, able to choose to do good or evil, otherwise our freedom would be pointless - we'd just be animals, or automatons. — Wayfarer

But that is what I mean by a greater purpose. This is a lesser "pseudo-evil" in the service of the greater good of free choice. In this case, the real evil would apparently by for humanity to be "just animals" (horrible to contemplate).

As to 'why creation in the first place', one philosophical answer is, that through the process of 'descending' into organic existence, the Deity is able to discover horizons of being that could otherwise never be explored. — Wayfarer

The problem of evil is an argument against the omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent God of mainstream Christian theology. What is there to discover for God, an omniscient being?

What I mean is that God might allow suffering in the service of some greater purpose, in other words he would regard suffering as good in certain circumstances. But there is no reason an almighty being would permit something he fundamentally disapproved of. Why would God be "tolerant" in this way?

God is not the author of suffering but its adversary — not the architect of the “charnel house,” but the sure refuge beyond. — Wayfarer

But is a view that really seems to struggle with the problem of evil. God is supposed to be the author of everything, something that he sincerely opposed would never exist in the first place. Really this only makes sense if you consider God to be a limited being who is not in full control of the cosmos.

You mean, not created the world? — Wayfarer

Yes, exactly. Its something I've always had trouble with, why would a perfect, infinite and self-sufficient being bother with such a thing? Seems completely arbitrary.

It's one answer, although suffering that is inflicted, or intentionally brought about, is generally regarded as evil (although to explore that topic would require further consideration.) — Wayfarer

We think it's evil when it "crosses the line", but most people are fine with child scuffing their knee (builds character), or a criminal having a bad time in jail (it's a punishment, after all).

Anyway, why should God be concerned with what a bunch of ignorant, fallen beings consider to be good or evil?

The argument is simple and emotionally powerful: if God is all-powerful and all-good, then why does He allow terrible suffering? — Wayfarer

This is a bit of an understatement, if God is understood to be the creator of the cosmos he is also the creator of all suffering. He didn't merely "allow" it. The more pessimistic among us would condemn God not for "allowing" suffering but for creating a world for suffering to occur within in first place. Couldn't he have left well enough alone?

Anyway, I think the obvious answer to the problem as you put it is to conclude that suffering is in fact not evil. Equating evil with suffering specifically seems like a very modern idea, God might think that the occasional suffering is a good thing.

I suppose if you don’t find that significant, there’s probably nothing that can be said. — Wayfarer

Recall that this was what I originally said was the problem: you argue from the position that your view is intuitive, but when people do not share your intuition you have nothing to say. Basically you can only convince people who in a sense already agree with you.

Yes, but how does that prove I belong to an ontologically distinct species? Why isn't it just one interesting animal ability among a thousand others?

I'm sorry, I don't understand your point at all. I am using all kinds of different faculties to conduct this conversation, what does that prove?

But I don't see what makes our ability to reason relevant here, other than that it a unique ability to h. sapiens, just like the the pistol shrimp has it's own unique ability. What is your basis for saying some faculties are "trivial" while others are ontologically important?

So - in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, the distinction between humans and animals is not merely one of degree—it is an ontological distinction. Animals are sentient, but their consciousness is bound to immediate experience. Humans, by contrast, possess rational intellect, allowing for abstract thought, self-reflection, and moral reasoning. This places humans in a separate category, traditionally referred to as animal rationale (rational animals) rather than merely sentient beings. — Wayfarer

I think the problem with this argument has been pointed out to you before: I could make the same case for the pistol shrimp and say that it is an ontologically distinct species because it has the unique faculty of shooting shockwaves out of it's claws. It's easy to prove that humans are different, but you have yet to prove that this is "a difference that makes a difference" as I believe you like to say.

I don't think my view is obvious — Wayfarer

I'm really surprised to hear you say that, I've seen you explicitly invoke obviousness several times to defend your views. Here is a very clear example:

It never ceases to amaze me, the ease with which people seem to assume that 'we're just animals', when the difference between h. sapiens, and every other creature is so manifestly and entirely obvious. It's kind of a cultural blind spot, an inability to recognise the obvious. — Wayfarer

Although, you wrote it a long time ago. Maybe you've since changed your mind?

The reluctance to acknowledge what I take to be a clear ontological distinction between homo sapiens and other species seems to stem from a broader philosophical commitment—one shaped by the widespread influence of Darwinian naturalism on our conception of human nature. — Wayfarer

Rather than fear of religion or the cultural hegemony of materialism, I think your biggest problem is that you think that your view is obvious. I think you should put more energy into making a positive case for the ontological distinction you're introducing to other people, rather than attacking perceived obstacles (darwinism, modernism, etc.) as if that alone were enough. After all, what is "clear" to you might be completely counterintuitive to others.

Doubt, insofar as it is a relative judgement, presupposes logical thought, of which the subject himself must be conscious. — Mww

This isn't obvious to me at all. I see doubt only as a kind of abstract epistemological "move", similar to a move in chess. It isn't something inherently mental.

I’d go with self-consciousness myself, rather than self-awareness. — Mww

Why is that? I know the term "doubt" is sometimes used to refer to an emotional state, but here I think it just means demanding justification for a proposition.

You're welcome to correct me, but self-awareness doesn't seem like a strict requirement for doubt.

On the same grounds as Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’: even if you suffered complete amnesia and forgot your identity, you would be aware of your own being. — Wayfarer

That seems like an over-interpretation, all the cogito says is that in order to doubt you have to think and in order to think you have to be real, thus doubting your own reality results in contradiction. This doesn't automatically imply self-awareness or awareness of being.

In the context of artificial Intelligence development, there is danger of AI becoming a determinant of how intelligence is decided and judged. Machines may become the yardstick of how the concept of intelligence is viewed and assessed. — Jack Cummins

This would surprise me, I believe that as AI develops and we continue to be confronted with the counterintuitive strengths and weaknesses of its various types we will be forced to critically evaluate the concept of intelligence and conclude that it always was just a nebulous cultural construct and that it is not productive to apply it to machines.

Intelligence is and always has been an anthropocentric concept, it is really just an arbitrary cluster of abilities which have strong correlation in neurotypical humans.

In my opinion it is used these days as an existential shield to protect our egos against the ever more capable machines, which are a threat to human exceptionalism.

What is a Philosophy Forum for, it not for sharing subjective Ideas & Feelings encapsulated in artificial words? — Gnomon

It sounds like what you're looking for is a poetry circle. The point of a philosophy forum is solving philosophical problems through cooperative effort and communication. This can only happen given a basis of shared understanding, which in turn means your "subjective ideas" only matter insofar as you can justify them to other people.

How do you justify a preference for parsimony? Does it allow you to summarily eliminate the entities you don't like? — Gnomon

Everyone has a preference for parsimony, until it's their turn to put something on the chopping block.

Perhaps the most parsimonious way to eliminate Qualia is suicide. — Gnomon

I'm starting to suspect you're not taking me entirely seriously.

I think 'qualia' in its subjective sense as opposed to its 'sense data' sense is a kind of reification, and maybe the latter is too. — Janus

I always thought that was the whole point, if qualia does not refer to something with its own ontology above and beyond the physical process of an experience there's really no use to the word at all.

At the very least, no qualitative experience. I think only the Churchlands would be brutal enough to propose we get rid of the concept of experience in all its forms.

my first impression is that both Materialism/Eliminativism, and Mentalism/Positivism --- or whatever the opposite theory is called --- are metaphysical conjectures, not scientific facts. So, lacking slam-dunk physical evidence pro or con, the argument could go on forever, as in this thread. Therefore, the contrasting views seem to be based on a personal preference for one kind of world or another. — Gnomon

A preference that can't be justified has no place in a discussion. In this case the justification for eliminativism would be parsimony.

the Eliminativist position seems to be lacking any notion of a mechanism by which conceptual Qualia, such as Redness & Love could emerge from perceptual Matter by natural means. — Gnomon

But of course. Qualia is the very thing to be eliminated, there will be no Love and no Redness. That is not the problem but the solution.

What you're describing (qualia "emerging" from matter) is called emergentism and is an altogether different view.

the best overall take-down is The Illusionist, David Bentley Hart, in The New Atlantis, in which he says some of Dennett's arguments are 'so preposterous as to verge on the deranged' — Wayfarer

But this is exactly what I mean, harsh words to cover up the lack up substance in the reply. There is no need to argue anything if you can just insist that your thesis is "obvious" and the other is "absurd", "ridiculous" and "preposterous". Strawson is the master of this approach, utterly shameless in my opinion. At least Chalmers used polite words like "counterintuitive".

Dennett didn't do this situation any favors either by being so willing to play word-games with mental concepts, always saying "I don't doubt X, I just don't think X is what you think it is", as if that's not substantively the same thing.

This is to say every reply or critical review of Dennett's books have been a disappointment to me, and that includes the two you posted, which I read long ago.

If the philosophical approach of the OP is "trivial, uncontroversial", then why has it evoked polarized controversial arguments for over a year? — Gnomon

I can't speak for other people but I found it quite provocative at first glance, and to his credit @Wayfarer still gives substantial responses to other posters which I'm sure helps keep the thread active.

The debate is about how to reconcile that apparent Cartesian duality within a general worldview. Strawson has one solution, and ↪Wayfarer another. What's yours? — Gnomon

I wouldn't call myself call myself an eliminativist, but substantively I'm close enough to resent Strawson calling it "absurd", "great silliness", "dumbest thing ever", etc.

Apparently, you like nice neat Either/Or dichotomies. — Gnomon

Yes.

Did you interpret Strawson's position as an attack on Physicalism? — Gnomon

No, you tend to overinterpret what I write somewhat. I only know Strawson as a critic of eliminativism, and that's the role he plays in the article.

DEATH EATER : gluttonous gourmand or moderate-idea consumer? — Gnomon

In the game I think he ate souls or something. I was twelve when I came up with this handle.

I have a long history of posting critical comments about Daniel Dennett, who is the main representative of eliminative materialism. — Wayfarer

I agree that he essentially was, although he never admitted it himself. But do you believe I can find in your critical comments something more insightful than the willful non-engagement I've found in Strawson, Nagel, Searle, etc.?

Bernardo Kastrup is strident in his criticism of materialism, with titles such as Materialism is Baloney. But he’s not well-regarded on this forum — Wayfarer

I like him fine, but to my knowledge he never took eliminative materialism seriously either.

Yes, ↪Wayfarer is not the type to make arrogant or aggressive attacks on debatable philosophical positions. He's usually more subtly nuanced. And his "humble" approach may seem less impressive than the more arrogant assertions of Scientism. — Gnomon

There is nothing arrogant about advancing clear arguments. And I ever said his approach was humble, I said his claim was humble. Meaning: trivial, uncontroversial.

It's less an attack on Physicalism/Realism than a presentation of alternative views of the Mind/Body relationship. — Gnomon

What a shame. I'd love to read an attack on physicalism, especially of the eliminativist variety. Though I wouldn't expect much from an article that quotes Galen Strawson, the lamest critic I've ever read.

it's not an attack on 'realism' per se. It's a criticism of the idea that the criterion for what is real, is what exists independently of the mind, which is a specific (and fallacious) form of realism. — Wayfarer

In other words, it is a claim that is compatible with some forms of realism.

I'm sure that's true, but it isn't obvious to me from the OP or from what I've read in your other posts. The proposition that "reality is created by the mind" at first seems like an attack on physicalism/realism (whichever term you like), but when I look at your explanation in detail the term "reality" instead seems to refer to "our particular conception of reality", which is amounts to a rather humble claim, not really an attack at all.

That's interesting to me. I think conceptualization of any kind is quite remarkable, even proto-conceptualization. — Manuel

The way I see it conceptualization per se is not even an ability or a behavior, it's an abstraction that only makes sense in a particular context. It's like the "ability" to make a move in chess.

It's tricky to know where the cut-off point between explicit consciousness (such as elephants or monkeys) stops and mere reaction kicks in, maybe a fish or an oyster. But I do believe there is such a point. — Manuel

I really do not believe there is such a point, and I don't think consciousness is relevant to the issue at all.

My spontaneous response is that I think classical philosophy had the insight that we do not, by default, know what anything actually is. — Wayfarer

This doesn't exactly answer my question. What I want to know is if you substantively disagree with the realist worldview or if you merely dislike the way it frames or conceptualizes reality (or maybe, just the fact that it's been privileged with a kind of conceptual hegemony).

To use Kastrup as an example again, I am convinced that he substantively disagrees with mainstream physicalism. He doesn't just look at the same things in a different light, he has a radically different worldview. So are you like him in that respect?

The issue I wanted to highlight is that I think it's kind of hard to imagine having perception without some minimal intellectual capacities, because then it seems to me it would be hard to retain the perception. — Manuel

I can't imagine why anyone would want to deny animals even a minimal amount of intelligence. I have to stress I don't believe that conceptualization is some amazing special ability. The amazing ability here is syntactic language, conceptualization is merely a part of describing language-use.

Examples of animals suffering from abuse and being fearful of humans for a while seem to suggest some degree of association, which goes slightly beyond "mere" perception. — Manuel

The thing is, if you go down this road of "creating associations always involves the use of concepts" I believe you will end up attributing powers of conceptualization to very simple organisms, including machines.

'According to metaphysical realism, the world is as it is independent of how humans or other inquiring agents take it to be. The objects the world contains, together with their properties and the relations they enter into, fix the world’s nature and these objects [together with the properties they have and the relations they enter into] exist independently of our ability to discover they do.' — Wayfarer

I have to agree with you that this is too much baggage, I think the concept of reality/the world is a necessary primitive, but I don't know if it has to be conceptualized in terms of objects, properties, relations etc.

But do you not make a distinction between disagreements about how the world ought to be conceptualized and disagreements about how the world actually is? When people speak of mind-independent objects is believe I understand and agree with their meaning, even if I realize their conceptualization of reality is not the be-all end-all.

My take on collective consciousness more akin to Hegel's 'geist', which describes the way geist (usually translated as mind or spirit) manifests collectively in culture, history, and shared institutions. — Wayfarer

Kastrup is my go-to example because his is the only version of idealism I believe I've somewhat managed to understand. I certainly don't understand Hegel. One thing I particularly like about Kastrup is his immense commitment to parsimony.

Bingo. You win the lucky door prize. I have no objection to there being a shared reality, in fact, I think consciousness is collective in nature, even though each of us only ever experiences it in the first person. — Wayfarer

But isn't that a form of metaphysical realism? And is this "collective consciousness" how you conceptualize reality? If so, what does it signify? Is it like Bernardo Kastrups "Cosmic Mind"?

For example? — Wayfarer

Well it's impossible to give you a specific example of pre-conceptual reality, because that itself would involve conceptualization. But I think it is necessary to invoke the idea of a shared reality to, for example, explain how we're having this conversation.

I think that amounts to a kind of illustration, doesn't it? — Wayfarer

No, I don't think it's necessary to invoke the idea of conceptualization in geese in order to explain the behavior you're describing.

I think there has to be a minimal intellectual component in terms of memory, otherwise I don't see how a creature could perceive without constantly forgetting. — Manuel

Of course animals have intelligence and memory, but how does that necessitate the use of concepts? Memories are just impressions made by particular events, for example an animal doesn't need the general concept of a "child" in order to remember that they have children to feed.

They very likely have some primitive concepts. I don't think it makes much sense to postulate a creature having perception absent some minimal amount of conception. — Manuel

I think that is a very strange claim, why are the use of concepts necessary for perception? I would not invoke conceptualization for any reason other than to describe the use of syntactic language, which is an ability only humans and arguably one or two other animals have.

Thank you for such an extensive write-up. My question is, do you not believe there is some component of the world/reality that, even if it is not captured in some particular concept, is still singular and shared across all these "constructed worlds"? And if so, wouldn't that also make you a kind of metaphysical realist?

But no to the suggestion that matter can be observed without any conceptualization at all. — Manuel

So you believe non-human animals are all engaged in conceptualization? Or that they do not observe anything?

So are you just making the trivial claim that reality can be observed and conceptualized in different ways, or for that matter observed without being conceptualized at all?

I am saying that each animal species (ants, birds, tigers, whatever) interpret the world the way each species does — Manuel

They interpret the same world in different ways, in other words?

Thank you, I'm sorry for leaping in without due diligence.

Is there any term you would accept as referring to what we observe prior to generating propositional knowledge? Like "pre-conceptual reality", for example?

I don't know what else to say other than to ask why you don't think the examples I give suggest that we see the same things animals do. — Janus

Maybe you would have better luck if you were to say that all animals observe the same reality instead of saying they observe the same "things", since to @Wayfarer and @Manuel that seems to necessarily imply that other animals conceptualize reality in the same way we do (which is clearly not your intended meaning).

we are so far from being on the same page as to make responding pointless. — Janus

It doesn't surprise me to hear you say that! My entire problem with your view as on philosophy is that it makes discourse pointless. To make progress, you would have to be willing to question assumptions which your interlocutor does not agree with, but it seems that is just not an option for you. You are what I would call a dogmatist.

It doesn't stop there, though—the most salient question for me then would be "how best to live?" — Janus

That is strange, because asking that question involves a lot of presuppositions, chiefly that there are better and worse ways of living. So it seems after you realized you barely know anything you proceed to ignore that realization and just believe whatever you like?

The only potential universally held assumption (or is it a realization?) that I can think of is that we know and can know very little. — Janus

The important thing isn't to know, but to assume. Assumptions are fine as long as they are not questioned, that's why only universally held assumptions are acceptable within a discourse.

Once this is realized we still need to work with provisional hypotheses in order to live — Janus

"As the example of Socrates shows", living isn't the goal of philosophy.

I would include as rational persuasion both practical and pure reason — Janus

I have no idea what persuasion through "practical reason" looks like.

You speak as though that purported "end goal" is a given. — Janus

I'm sorry for implying that, it's just how I've personally always seen it. Philosophy is of course an activity, people might have different goals in doing it, I just can't understand what they are.

How would any philosophical truth ever be demonstrable such as to gain universal assent? — Janus

You'd have to show the truth to be a necessary consequence of a universally held set of assumptions. But well, I didn't literally mean "everyone", just everyone who participates in philosophical discourse.

Discussion would still allow for folk to be influenced by others. — Janus

What is desirable about "influence" per se? I mean that word runs the gamut from peer pressure to lobotomy. What is desirable to me is only the possibility of rational persuasion.