The core of this theory is that ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’ are not determined by mind-independent states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality but, rather, are abstract categories, or forms, of conduct. The (mind-independent) states-of-affairs, or arrangements of entities, in reality inform us of what is right or wrong in virtue of being classified under either category. — Bob Ross

Just like how I can separate triangles into one pile and squares into another, and more generally shapes into one pile and non-shapes into another, I, too, can put generous acts into one pile and respectful acts into another, and more generally good acts into one pile and bad acts into another. — Bob Ross

Physicalism/materialism is in massive trouble if it can't find a way to get out of p-zombie open-mindedness. — RogueAI

Indeed, and yet a necessary condition for denying the existence of my mind is the existence of my mind. — RogueAI

I cannot be wrong about not being a zombie. — RogueAI

Do you think you're a zombie? — RogueAI

It would be wrong in doing so, since I'm not a p-zombie. — RogueAI

Possibly, but only if it doesn't have mental states of its own. If the alien is not a zombie, it would know mental states cannot be expressed in purely physical terms. — RogueAI

Could the alien figure out, from that purely physical description of my rage-induced red-light running behavior, that I am not a p-zombie? — RogueAI

Justification is for suckers, and if someone hassles you over it just give them my name. — Ludwig Wittgenstein

That's what they deserve. — Banno

Yet one cannot wait until our ethical considerations are all settled and our morality derived from a foundation of certainty before one acts; That you choose not to eat babies - to return to your example - shows that you act ethically, and this despite not having the firm foundation you crave.

Not at all. But this is where Wittgenstein was heading - that at some stage the justifications have to end, and we say: "This is what we do!"

How are such tokens (historically contingent black glyphs on a white background) even invented or exchanged by the non-inferentially blind (by us, I mean, as opposed to the traditionally blind ) ? — plaque flag

Can you live your life as normal with your eyes closed ? — plaque flag

Are you committed to a p-zombie approach to human existence? So that the meaning of your own claims doesn't exist for you first-person ?

As far as we can say from experience, the world is only given perspectively to different sentient creatures. Denying subjectivity is just denying the being of the world.

I say this as a direct realist who doesn't think consciousness is more than awareness of this world. I see the world and not the inside of a private bubble. — plaque flag

But like I said before this topic is a waste of time. — Darkneos

But what I was trying to clarify here is whether you grant (basically) that life/experience involves a 'nonconceptual surplus.' — plaque flag

I think red functions structurally and inferentially in a way that makes knowledge of red possible for those born blind, but I don't think the referent of red is exhausted by or as its role in this structure. — plaque flag

I hope I haven't been rude. — plaque flag

I'm challenging what I see as your psychologism (rationality is just rationalization) — plaque flag

and your functionalism (your version seems to deny the qualitative aspect of experience) — plaque flag

You mention your curiosity. Is that something you feel ? And do you not see color or feel pain ? — plaque flag

Overall you seem to be saying that you are an unfree-irresponsible meatbot or the algorithm inside it. You basically claim that pain don't hurt. You also reject the founding claim-constraining normativity of rational conversation.

Try to see this pose you are offering from the outside. Why should one trust an amoral robot programmed by its environment when 'it' claims to be such an amoral robot ? 'I am a liar.' ' I don't care about truth.' — plaque flag

I don't mean to be rude. I'm just pointing out the strangeness of you offering your opinions with a certain confidence while eroding any possible authority or interest they are likely to have. Like a drunk at a bar, satisfying with something that sounds edgy, 'unsentimentally' numb to the lack of coherence. — plaque flag

To be clear, I think you do care about truth, which is to your credit. And you are just trying to see around your culture to that transcendent truth by avoiding sentimental attachment to norms that might get in the way of that truth-seeing project. Nietzchean stuff. — plaque flag

The issue is whether you ought to believe whatever I tell you. In short, I'm trying to get you to account for the normative dimension of the project of establishing beliefs rationally. — plaque flag

Another way to put it: why would a person be proud of being a scientist ? of trusting science ? Why would a person be proud of living an examined life ? — plaque flag

Why don't you just take my word for my claims ? Why don't you just believe what I tell you to believe ? — plaque flag

I'd say they couldn't do so rationally. Recall what I actually claim. — plaque flag

Note that you are asking me to justify my claims (which also involves their clarification) as an expression of your autonomy. — plaque flag

I would not have thought that I have been giving the impression that that’s what I believe. I was stating a position that some people believe that makes no sense to me. — Patterner

Did you the sign the 'member of the English speaking community' contract ? Or did you absorb its semantic norms mostly without trying ? — plaque flag

Autonomy means [ approximately ] self-rule. Rejecting the unjustified claims of other is part of that. — plaque flag

The notion of being 'rational' is essentially normative (ethical). One prides oneself on not being credulous, on [autonomously] thinking for one's self. One is ashamed to contradict oneself, embarrassed to find oneself caught in a performative contradiction. One resents being described as a kind of 'machine' that did not reasonably (autonomously) decide but was rather 'programmed' by its environment. 'You are just saying that because you are white/black, male/female, rich/poor, straight/gay.' — plaque flag

Rationality is universal. It applies to all of us in the rational community. You don't get your own logic. Neither do I. It's an aspect of a humanism which has liberated itself from scripture. Both the species and its individuals are grasped as autonomous beings, ideally subject only to the laws they themselves recognize as legitimate. Basically, rational people all agree that they have a sort of better self in common, namely a rationality that binds them all. 'May the best human win [ may we fallibly defer for now to whoever makes the best case.]' — plaque flag

If the same events would take place due to the laws of physics if I did not have the false belief that what I think is at all relevant, then why have the false belief that what I think is at all relevant? It is difficult to understand why evolution would select for this. — Patterner

Phantom pains exist. Those aren't functional. — Marchesk

It actually does contradict what we know, you know need to know how light works to know that's an illusion. This is just wrong and we know the water is fooling us by "bending" the stick. — Darkneos

I don't resent functionalism as a mapping strategy, but on a more serious ontological level it looks absurd to me. — plaque flag

You seem to imply that your words are as empty of meaning as those of a stochastic parrot. — plaque flag

Do you not see that you are making the bold controversial claim here ? — plaque flag

You seem to miss that science and philosophy exist within a 'field' of normatively. Speaking of human speech acts as merely causal is a self-subverting psychologism. — plaque flag

Contentious claim indeed, sir ! Could you justify it carefully with one hand in an open flame ? — plaque flag

It doesn’t matter what the origin of thunder is. You can claim it’s an act of god. That doesn’t stop an atheist from hearing thunder. — Patterner

Have you looked into Popper's idea of basic statements ? — plaque flag

I don’t think I feel pain. I feel pain. — Patterner

If you think I don’t, I would like to hear your argument. — Patterner

If you think I am laying claim to the words, I would like to hear what you think a more accurate claim for them is. — Patterner

I think Husserl is correct in that we have a sort of categorial intuition. As humans, we live among concepts as much as colors. — plaque flag

You do not experience blueness or pain? — Patterner

I did. We can explain things like perception, language, behavior, and memory in terms of things like neurons, circuits in the brain, feedback loops, and algorithms. Neurons, circuits in the brain, feedback loops, and algorithms explain it all without the need conscious experience, like blueness and pain. And they don’t explain blueness and pain. Blueness and pain are qualia. They are unnecessary subjective experience. and unexplained. — Patterner

1. If qualitative element/subjective experience doesn’t do anything, and everything works without it, why does it exist? — Patterner

And for any given cc of matter I suppose? Anyway, all of those things are the steps/building blocks of, in this example, taking my hand away from the fire. How are those physical events/processes also the steps/building blocks of the subjective experience of feeling pain and pulling my hand away from the flame? — Patterner

Do you mean that I'm using tricks of the mind to express my doubts? — Ludwig V

What do you mean? Why do I think I see blue? And taste sweetness? — Patterner

Not sure I am following you. Are you saying Ludwig V is a Jedi? — Patterner

H'm. We're talking about slightly different things. "Phenomenological properties exist" and "Phenomenological properties do not exist" are indeed contradictories. Whichever is true must be a contingent, empirical statement. Right? So where does the evidence that they exist, or not, come from? — Ludwig V

An illusion can only be defined by its difference from reality. — Ludwig V

If the deliverances of consciousness are illusions, what is the reality? Oh, yes, physics. — Ludwig V

You still have the appearance of colors, pains, etc that need explaining. Claiming they don't have phenomenal properties doesn't explain away their appearance — Marchesk

What Chalmers argues is that if the hard problem is an illusion (that we have phenomenal experiences), then this illusion needs to be explained. How does the brain produce such an illusion? — Marchesk

But the very fact of having an inner experience is evidence in favor of the hard problem. — Marchesk

Calling them interpretive illusions doesn't dissolve the matter. Just shifts it over to explaining how the brain accomplishes these illusions. — Marchesk

It is better (i.e. less misleading) to say that when we see an illusion of a bent stick in water we don't see an image of a bent stick, but we see a straight stick as bent. No image is required. I think this is what ↪goremand is saying. I also think that disposes of illusions. — Ludwig V

It is very hard to maintain that when Macbeth hallucinates his dagger he is misinterpreting something that he is really seeing. — Ludwig V

we have consciousness, and the physical interactions are accompanied by subjective experience/phenomenal properties. — Patterner

I don't think it's trying to lay claim to words inappropriately. (Love your last sentence!) — Patterner

It is only an illusion to those of us who know the stick is straight, but see the image contradicting what we know. — Patterner

If consciousness is an illusion, then what is it that knows what's really going on, but perceives a contradiction? — Patterner