What is a Philosophy Forum for, it not for sharing subjective Ideas & Feelings encapsulated in artificial words? — Gnomon

It sounds like what you're looking for is a poetry circle. The point of a philosophy forum is solving philosophical problems through cooperative effort and communication. This can only happen given a basis of shared understanding, which in turn means your "subjective ideas" only matter insofar as you can justify them to other people.

How do you justify a preference for parsimony? Does it allow you to summarily eliminate the entities you don't like? — Gnomon

Everyone has a preference for parsimony, until it's their turn to put something on the chopping block.

Perhaps the most parsimonious way to eliminate Qualia is suicide. — Gnomon

I'm starting to suspect you're not taking me entirely seriously.

I think 'qualia' in its subjective sense as opposed to its 'sense data' sense is a kind of reification, and maybe the latter is too. — Janus

I always thought that was the whole point, if qualia does not refer to something with its own ontology above and beyond the physical process of an experience there's really no use to the word at all.

At the very least, no qualitative experience. I think only the Churchlands would be brutal enough to propose we get rid of the concept of experience in all its forms.

my first impression is that both Materialism/Eliminativism, and Mentalism/Positivism --- or whatever the opposite theory is called --- are metaphysical conjectures, not scientific facts. So, lacking slam-dunk physical evidence pro or con, the argument could go on forever, as in this thread. Therefore, the contrasting views seem to be based on a personal preference for one kind of world or another. — Gnomon

A preference that can't be justified has no place in a discussion. In this case the justification for eliminativism would be parsimony.

the Eliminativist position seems to be lacking any notion of a mechanism by which conceptual Qualia, such as Redness & Love could emerge from perceptual Matter by natural means. — Gnomon

But of course. Qualia is the very thing to be eliminated, there will be no Love and no Redness. That is not the problem but the solution.

What you're describing (qualia "emerging" from matter) is called emergentism and is an altogether different view.

the best overall take-down is The Illusionist, David Bentley Hart, in The New Atlantis, in which he says some of Dennett's arguments are 'so preposterous as to verge on the deranged' — Wayfarer

But this is exactly what I mean, harsh words to cover up the lack up substance in the reply. There is no need to argue anything if you can just insist that your thesis is "obvious" and the other is "absurd", "ridiculous" and "preposterous". Strawson is the master of this approach, utterly shameless in my opinion. At least Chalmers used polite words like "counterintuitive".

Dennett didn't do this situation any favors either by being so willing to play word-games with mental concepts, always saying "I don't doubt X, I just don't think X is what you think it is", as if that's not substantively the same thing.

This is to say every reply or critical review of Dennett's books have been a disappointment to me, and that includes the two you posted, which I read long ago.

If the philosophical approach of the OP is "trivial, uncontroversial", then why has it evoked polarized controversial arguments for over a year? — Gnomon

I can't speak for other people but I found it quite provocative at first glance, and to his credit @Wayfarer still gives substantial responses to other posters which I'm sure helps keep the thread active.

The debate is about how to reconcile that apparent Cartesian duality within a general worldview. Strawson has one solution, and ↪Wayfarer another. What's yours? — Gnomon

I wouldn't call myself call myself an eliminativist, but substantively I'm close enough to resent Strawson calling it "absurd", "great silliness", "dumbest thing ever", etc.

Apparently, you like nice neat Either/Or dichotomies. — Gnomon

Yes.

Did you interpret Strawson's position as an attack on Physicalism? — Gnomon

No, you tend to overinterpret what I write somewhat. I only know Strawson as a critic of eliminativism, and that's the role he plays in the article.

DEATH EATER : gluttonous gourmand or moderate-idea consumer? — Gnomon

In the game I think he ate souls or something. I was twelve when I came up with this handle.

I have a long history of posting critical comments about Daniel Dennett, who is the main representative of eliminative materialism. — Wayfarer

I agree that he essentially was, although he never admitted it himself. But do you believe I can find in your critical comments something more insightful than the willful non-engagement I've found in Strawson, Nagel, Searle, etc.?

Bernardo Kastrup is strident in his criticism of materialism, with titles such as Materialism is Baloney. But he’s not well-regarded on this forum — Wayfarer

I like him fine, but to my knowledge he never took eliminative materialism seriously either.

Yes, ↪Wayfarer is not the type to make arrogant or aggressive attacks on debatable philosophical positions. He's usually more subtly nuanced. And his "humble" approach may seem less impressive than the more arrogant assertions of Scientism. — Gnomon

There is nothing arrogant about advancing clear arguments. And I ever said his approach was humble, I said his claim was humble. Meaning: trivial, uncontroversial.

It's less an attack on Physicalism/Realism than a presentation of alternative views of the Mind/Body relationship. — Gnomon

What a shame. I'd love to read an attack on physicalism, especially of the eliminativist variety. Though I wouldn't expect much from an article that quotes Galen Strawson, the lamest critic I've ever read.

it's not an attack on 'realism' per se. It's a criticism of the idea that the criterion for what is real, is what exists independently of the mind, which is a specific (and fallacious) form of realism. — Wayfarer

In other words, it is a claim that is compatible with some forms of realism.

I'm sure that's true, but it isn't obvious to me from the OP or from what I've read in your other posts. The proposition that "reality is created by the mind" at first seems like an attack on physicalism/realism (whichever term you like), but when I look at your explanation in detail the term "reality" instead seems to refer to "our particular conception of reality", which is amounts to a rather humble claim, not really an attack at all.

That's interesting to me. I think conceptualization of any kind is quite remarkable, even proto-conceptualization. — Manuel

The way I see it conceptualization per se is not even an ability or a behavior, it's an abstraction that only makes sense in a particular context. It's like the "ability" to make a move in chess.

It's tricky to know where the cut-off point between explicit consciousness (such as elephants or monkeys) stops and mere reaction kicks in, maybe a fish or an oyster. But I do believe there is such a point. — Manuel

I really do not believe there is such a point, and I don't think consciousness is relevant to the issue at all.

My spontaneous response is that I think classical philosophy had the insight that we do not, by default, know what anything actually is. — Wayfarer

This doesn't exactly answer my question. What I want to know is if you substantively disagree with the realist worldview or if you merely dislike the way it frames or conceptualizes reality (or maybe, just the fact that it's been privileged with a kind of conceptual hegemony).

To use Kastrup as an example again, I am convinced that he substantively disagrees with mainstream physicalism. He doesn't just look at the same things in a different light, he has a radically different worldview. So are you like him in that respect?

The issue I wanted to highlight is that I think it's kind of hard to imagine having perception without some minimal intellectual capacities, because then it seems to me it would be hard to retain the perception. — Manuel

I can't imagine why anyone would want to deny animals even a minimal amount of intelligence. I have to stress I don't believe that conceptualization is some amazing special ability. The amazing ability here is syntactic language, conceptualization is merely a part of describing language-use.

Examples of animals suffering from abuse and being fearful of humans for a while seem to suggest some degree of association, which goes slightly beyond "mere" perception. — Manuel

The thing is, if you go down this road of "creating associations always involves the use of concepts" I believe you will end up attributing powers of conceptualization to very simple organisms, including machines.

'According to metaphysical realism, the world is as it is independent of how humans or other inquiring agents take it to be. The objects the world contains, together with their properties and the relations they enter into, fix the world’s nature and these objects [together with the properties they have and the relations they enter into] exist independently of our ability to discover they do.' — Wayfarer

I have to agree with you that this is too much baggage, I think the concept of reality/the world is a necessary primitive, but I don't know if it has to be conceptualized in terms of objects, properties, relations etc.

But do you not make a distinction between disagreements about how the world ought to be conceptualized and disagreements about how the world actually is? When people speak of mind-independent objects is believe I understand and agree with their meaning, even if I realize their conceptualization of reality is not the be-all end-all.

My take on collective consciousness more akin to Hegel's 'geist', which describes the way geist (usually translated as mind or spirit) manifests collectively in culture, history, and shared institutions. — Wayfarer

Kastrup is my go-to example because his is the only version of idealism I believe I've somewhat managed to understand. I certainly don't understand Hegel. One thing I particularly like about Kastrup is his immense commitment to parsimony.

Bingo. You win the lucky door prize. I have no objection to there being a shared reality, in fact, I think consciousness is collective in nature, even though each of us only ever experiences it in the first person. — Wayfarer

But isn't that a form of metaphysical realism? And is this "collective consciousness" how you conceptualize reality? If so, what does it signify? Is it like Bernardo Kastrups "Cosmic Mind"?

For example? — Wayfarer

Well it's impossible to give you a specific example of pre-conceptual reality, because that itself would involve conceptualization. But I think it is necessary to invoke the idea of a shared reality to, for example, explain how we're having this conversation.

I think that amounts to a kind of illustration, doesn't it? — Wayfarer

No, I don't think it's necessary to invoke the idea of conceptualization in geese in order to explain the behavior you're describing.

I think there has to be a minimal intellectual component in terms of memory, otherwise I don't see how a creature could perceive without constantly forgetting. — Manuel

Of course animals have intelligence and memory, but how does that necessitate the use of concepts? Memories are just impressions made by particular events, for example an animal doesn't need the general concept of a "child" in order to remember that they have children to feed.

They very likely have some primitive concepts. I don't think it makes much sense to postulate a creature having perception absent some minimal amount of conception. — Manuel

I think that is a very strange claim, why are the use of concepts necessary for perception? I would not invoke conceptualization for any reason other than to describe the use of syntactic language, which is an ability only humans and arguably one or two other animals have.

Thank you for such an extensive write-up. My question is, do you not believe there is some component of the world/reality that, even if it is not captured in some particular concept, is still singular and shared across all these "constructed worlds"? And if so, wouldn't that also make you a kind of metaphysical realist?

But no to the suggestion that matter can be observed without any conceptualization at all. — Manuel

So you believe non-human animals are all engaged in conceptualization? Or that they do not observe anything?

So are you just making the trivial claim that reality can be observed and conceptualized in different ways, or for that matter observed without being conceptualized at all?

I am saying that each animal species (ants, birds, tigers, whatever) interpret the world the way each species does — Manuel

They interpret the same world in different ways, in other words?

Thank you, I'm sorry for leaping in without due diligence.

Is there any term you would accept as referring to what we observe prior to generating propositional knowledge? Like "pre-conceptual reality", for example?

I don't know what else to say other than to ask why you don't think the examples I give suggest that we see the same things animals do. — Janus

Maybe you would have better luck if you were to say that all animals observe the same reality instead of saying they observe the same "things", since to @Wayfarer and @Manuel that seems to necessarily imply that other animals conceptualize reality in the same way we do (which is clearly not your intended meaning).

we are so far from being on the same page as to make responding pointless. — Janus

It doesn't surprise me to hear you say that! My entire problem with your view as on philosophy is that it makes discourse pointless. To make progress, you would have to be willing to question assumptions which your interlocutor does not agree with, but it seems that is just not an option for you. You are what I would call a dogmatist.

It doesn't stop there, though—the most salient question for me then would be "how best to live?" — Janus

That is strange, because asking that question involves a lot of presuppositions, chiefly that there are better and worse ways of living. So it seems after you realized you barely know anything you proceed to ignore that realization and just believe whatever you like?

The only potential universally held assumption (or is it a realization?) that I can think of is that we know and can know very little. — Janus

The important thing isn't to know, but to assume. Assumptions are fine as long as they are not questioned, that's why only universally held assumptions are acceptable within a discourse.

Once this is realized we still need to work with provisional hypotheses in order to live — Janus

"As the example of Socrates shows", living isn't the goal of philosophy.

I would include as rational persuasion both practical and pure reason — Janus

I have no idea what persuasion through "practical reason" looks like.

You speak as though that purported "end goal" is a given. — Janus

I'm sorry for implying that, it's just how I've personally always seen it. Philosophy is of course an activity, people might have different goals in doing it, I just can't understand what they are.

How would any philosophical truth ever be demonstrable such as to gain universal assent? — Janus

You'd have to show the truth to be a necessary consequence of a universally held set of assumptions. But well, I didn't literally mean "everyone", just everyone who participates in philosophical discourse.

Discussion would still allow for folk to be influenced by others. — Janus

What is desirable about "influence" per se? I mean that word runs the gamut from peer pressure to lobotomy. What is desirable to me is only the possibility of rational persuasion.

The question was posed to J. — Janus

Yes sorry, I didn't see that at the time. What matters to me though is that it's a reasonable question to ask.

Well, for those presupposed to doubt it, there are plenty of grounds for doubt. For those predisposed to believe it, there are plenty of grounds for belief. — Wayfarer

In other words the believer and the doubter are both justified? This is very perplexing to me, I wouldn't feel comfortable doubting a justified belief or vice versa.

"To each there own philosophy" I say, because that takes proper account of human diversity. Would you have it any other way? — Janus

I certainly would. I mean, the theoretical end goal of philosophy is for everyone to believe the same thing, that thing being the truth. In my opinion this idea of private justification instead promotes a static kind of diversity, where a bunch of dogmatists each stay in their respective camp and engage in discourse only performatively.

Science typically provides no such axis, as it is generally assumes that the universe is devoid of intrinsic meaning and/or value, so a claim to 'higher knowledge' is often challenged on the grounds that there is no objective justification for it.

For example:

what do you mean by "highest"? Most comprehensive or overarching. most critical, most meta-cognitive? Or most spiritual, most enlightening, wisest?
— Janus — Wayfarer

In this case a more innocent framing would perhaps be that Janus is asking questions because he doesn't understand what you mean? The way I see it, what you're saying is that you shouldn't have to explain yourself because we would automatically understand you if only we hadn't grown up in scientistic western society.

I don’t think Conze says or implies that. — Wayfarer

To me he very clearly implies it, but I guess I can't insist on my own interpretation.

The purpose of my quoting the Edward Conze text was simply an illustration of the idea of there being a higher truth - something for which I am generally criticized for suggesting. But to get down to basics, this is because I don't think our culture possesses a vertical axis along which the description of 'higher' makes any sense. — Wayfarer

This is such a strange way of framing what you're doing. Of course if you want to introduce people to a new idea ("the axis of quality") you must be prepared to justify it, this is quite normal. Saying you are "criticized for suggesting" your ideas makes it sound like you're being persecuted, is that how it feels to you?

And of course it would be so nice if your ideas were culturally embedded in your society so you didn't have to argue for them at all, a lot of us probably wish for that.

Well here is a critical difference in what Conze is saying and what Plato is saying:

there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge — Plato, The Republic

Whatever happened to the "rare and unordinary faculty" of perennial philosophy?

I hope you understand, that what it is that I find "bleak" in Conzes text is not the idea that philosophy requires effort or that some people are better at it than others, but the idea that it is a hopeless endevour unless you belong to a privileged class of people.

That was an excerpt. The entire essay is Buddhist Philosophy and Its European Parallels, Philosophy East and West, 1963. — Wayfarer

Thank you, but does the additional context modify the meaning of the quote in any relevant way?

Aside from Conze, the principle of monastic lineage in Buddhism and other spiritual traditions assumes the transmission of insight. — Wayfarer

Well I'd like to discuss his text, so let's not put him "aside". But either way, if there really is such an unbroken lineage this could be explained by sages being replaced by other sages without any muggles ever being elevated to sage-hood.

I think you're very much viewing it through the lens of the rejection of dogmatic Christianity and its 'blind faith' — Wayfarer

That's quite presumptuous, I think my reading is pretty straightforward. You clearly have your own preconceptions about Buddhism and the like, maybe you're viewing the text through that lens?

Or in insight. That was, for instance, the basis of the Buddha's authority - one which was never imposed on others — Wayfarer

I'm having a really hard time telling if this is your interpretation of Conzes text or just you laying out your own opinions. I think Conze makes it very clear: insight can not be transmitted or taught to people who lack it. Instead the best we get is submission to a charismatic sage, who we trust to guide us despite our inability to understand the underlying principles of their teachings.

If you think Conze is saying something else, I'd like to hear your reasons.

Those insights are communicated to the student by the teacher. As well as what is learned by their deportment and presence. — Wayfarer

Ok, well, I understand now that is what you believe, but it really is not what I think Edward Conze is saying in the text you quoted. He is talking about wise men with a "rare faculty" whose teachings are based on authority, not personal understanding.

Of course it's radically un-PC for liberal democracy — Wayfarer

Teachers teaching their students is not particularly "un-PC". Neither is the idea of trusting authorities for that matter, but I grant you that it might raise eyebrows in a philosophy forum.

It would be bleak if you take such a bleak view. If you were a piano student, presumably you would select a teacher who was an expert in teaching piano, and you would admire and hope to emulate excellent pianists. — Wayfarer

This is not at all what I took Conze to be saying in your quoted text, the so-called sages here are not "teachers", they can't teach you the truth any more than a person with vision can teach a blind man how to see. They have insight that they can't communicate to lesser minds, all we can do is submit to their authority as presented through charisma.

I recognise that it is something often exploited by the unscrupulous to exploit the gullible — Wayfarer

Yes there is clearly a problem with putting so much faith in a "charismatic" authority, but aside from that it's possibly the bleakest thing I've ever read as far as philosophy is concerned. I've always thought of philosophy as a personal pursuit of knowledge so to speak, the idea that it's a hopeless effort unless you belong to a chosen elite is quite depressing. It's yet another field where we the plebs must defer to the experts, like we already do with scientists, doctors, lawyers etc.

(...) true teaching is based on an authority which legitimizes itself by the exemplary life and charismatic quality of its exponents. — Wayfarer

I have to ask, is this what you yourself believe?

As if that is the sum total of our achievements…. — Wayfarer

The analogy holds, any contest or hierarchy we've ever used to put ourselves above other beings has also been of our own invention. To my mind it's really quite a pathetic thing to do, inventing a game just to win it.

It seems a bit self-congratulatory to invent a concept (like "value", "meaning", whatever) and then pat ourselves on the back for being the only animal to make use of said concept. Might as well brag about being the only animal to play checkers.

Obviously when a guy like Dawkins denies "design in nature" (if he ever did), he is talking specifically about biological lifeforms, even if technically he does believe everything is natural (including a human crafting a clay pot). From that perspective "the ability to design" is just another funny little trick cooked up by natural selection, alongside the ability to walk on two feet and the ability to digest food.

I am not really sure what you're trying to to get at here. What counts as intuitive might be debated, but certain statements like "a line of points cannot be simultaneously continuous and discrete," or "2+2=4," can largely be agreed upon. Are you claiming we lack good warrant for believing these sorts of things?

Eliminativism, in its most extreme form, does violate these sorts of intuitions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What is "these sorts" referring to here? Eliminativists do not reject 2+2=4 or other mathematical a priori stuff, that sort of thing is not in doubt here. It seems you are bunching some intuitions together into a group, but I don't understand the criteria for membership.

This would be the claim that "you don't actually experience anything, see blue, hear sounds, etc." But does anyone actually advocate this? — Count Timothy von Icarus

In my opinion, any eliminativist worth the name would of course advocate this. And why not?

Dennett himself calls this type of eliminitivism "ridiculous," in "Conciousness Explained." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't know that Dennett is an eliminativist, if so I think he is in the closet about it. I've always found him to be strangely diplomatic and "soft-selling" in expressing his views, it makes sense to me that he would disavow what you describe as "extreme". Maybe this partly explains his success, his books do seem to sell.

Something is intuitive, a noetic "first principle," if we cannot conceive of it being otherwise. 2+2 is intuitively 4. It is intuitive that a straight line cannot also be a curved line, that a triangle cannot have four sides, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I didn't realize the bar was set so high, so then all it takes is for someone to claim that they can conceive of something being false, and it ceases to be intuitive? Presumeably the eliminativist has already done this, so are the claims they deny then dethroned? Or are they not included in this "we"?

But "things are only extension in space and motion," or "all that exists can be explained in terms of mathematics and computation," are not basic intuitions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not sure exactly how you make the distinction between "basic/core" and "regular" (historical popularity maybe?), but those ideas of space and motion are certainly products of intuition.

It's obvious that if you frame something as "intuition vs X", then X will always lose. But the neuromaniac eliminativist perspective is also the product of intuition, intuition isn't a big happy family to be collectively dismissed or embraced.

If our core intuitions can be this wrong, and there is "nothing to explain," then I have no idea why we should be referring to neuroscience for explanations in the first place. We only have a good reason to think science tells us anything about the world if our basic intuitions have some sort of merit. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The problems of phenomenal consciousness are to begin with the result of tension between different intuitions. It's like you have a bunch of witnesses and their testimonies don't add up to a coherent story, one of them has to be wrong. It's no good saying "if you doubt one, you have to doubt them all, so let's just not".

And I'd would say that at the very least, higher order animals certainly experience fear as they attack when cornered. That is "self preservation" and as the term would suggest it would seem to necessitate a "self" in which to defend. A certain expectation or demand to survive. An "I" that wishes to live on. — Benj96

In my opinion, your thinking here is the result of rationalizing (as opposed to explaining) animal behavior in comfortable terms. The mechanisms of fear and self-preservation in, um... "higher order animals" I believe can be explained without imparting ideas of "self" on them.

I do not understand how you make the distinction, but do you not see patterns of self-preservation in what I suppose you would call "lower order" lifeforms?

MUI theory states that "perceptual experiences do not match or approximate properties of the objective world, but instead provide a simplified, species-specific, user interface to that world." Hoffman argues that conscious beings have not evolved to perceive the world as it actually is but have evolved to perceive the world in a way that maximizes "fitness payoffs". — flannel jesus

Conceptually at least, it seems we could not be further apart on the issue of perception. I believe we can only perceive the world as it is and argued as much in my thread about Illusionism:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14459/on-illusionism-what-is-an-illusion-exactly/p1

Critical for me is the distinction between perception, which is pre-propositional, and interpretation, which is the generation of propositions.