Thank you for unpacking your view - I see now you’re drawing on a phenomenological line of thought where ethics arises directly from Being, not from rules or doctrines.

I think I understand your point that suffering itself is the ethical injunction (‘do not burn the hand’ precedes theory, rules, or society). And you’re saying this injunction is what you call ‘God.’ That’s clearer to me now.

Where I still struggle is with the word redemption. You describe existence as ‘meta-redeemed,’ but for the billions of animals in factory farms, or for children dying of preventable diseases, I don’t see how their suffering is redeemed simply because it issues an ethical command. Isn’t it just there - brute and tragic - unless someone actually relieves it?

So my lingering question is: if God is this eternal ethical injunction, does God do anything beyond obliging us? Or is it really up to us alone to respond, and the word ‘God’ is simply a way of naming the ultimacy of the demand?

Thank you again for such a detailed engagement with each of the positions I listed. I appreciate that you are trying to find a more holistic framework rather than getting stuck in one perspective. I am replying to you again because I have some additional thoughts that I didn't have during my first reply four months ago.

I agree that solipsism and cosmic solipsism look ego-centric, and that pantheism/panentheism often rely on redefining words. I also agree with your point that simulation theory, whether true or not, makes little practical difference - if this is the only reality we can access, it is our reality.

Where I’d like to push back a little is on panpsychism and nihilism. On panpsychism, you treat it as mostly untestable, but I wonder if you’re open to the possibility that even if we could measure gradients of consciousness, the deeper question of what it feels like to be matter will still elude science. And on nihilism, you suggest that it’s just “depression before we create our own meaning.” But what if the human capacity to invent meaning is itself fragile and contingent - isn’t that a reason to take nihilism seriously as a persistent condition, not just a passing phase?

I also like your suggestion that empiricism, rationalism, phenomenology and pragmatism are not mutually exclusive. Maybe the question isn’t ‘which is right?’ but ‘how can they work together?’ to give us the most complete account of reality.

For me, the open problem is: if all our approaches (empirical, rational, phenomenological, pragmatic) remain within the limits of human cognition, how do we ever know we are not simply locked inside those limits rather than perceiving reality as it is? Do we need to accept that reality-in-itself will always remain partly unknowable?

I appreciate the clarification, but it seems to me your reply doesn’t really answer the questions I raised. If “God” is simply another name for “the inescapability of ethics” or “the ground of value,” then my challenge about extinction, predation, and mass suffering still stands.

Because if God = metaethics, then this God is not protecting anyone, not reducing harm, not preventing injustice, and not promoting well-being. It seems indistinguishable from saying “ethics exists,” which is true, but doesn’t explain why harm, cruelty, and death dominate so much of life on Earth.

So I’m left wondering: does calling the ethical dimension “God” actually add anything beyond rebranding metaethics? And if so, what work is the word “God” doing that “ethics” or “value” cannot? Also, no dictionary defines the word "God" the way you have defined it. I don't think your definition is correct.

What God and ethics? God IS ethics. — Constance

If God is ethics, as you claim, why are at least 99.9% of all the species that have existed on Earth already extinct? Why do non-vegans cause pain and death to 80 billion sentient land organisms and 3 trillion aquatic organisms per year? Why do humans cause harm and death to other humans? Why do living things have to consume other living things to live? Why didn't the God, who is allegedly ethics, prevent all harm, injustice, and death and make all living things forever happy? I posit that God, if it is real, is the source of all evil.

I like the way you frame suffering and well-being as the shared ground of our moral experience - I agree that this is where ethics takes root. Where I hesitate is when the language of “divinity” comes in. To me, that seems like a metaphor that some people use to capture the depth and seriousness of these experiences, but not something that adds explanatory power.

People may well have experiences of awe, transcendence, or radical transformation that they interpret in religious language, but it seems more parsimonious to call these profound human experiences rather than “divine” ones. The risk, as you noted, is that once divinity is invoked, interpretation tends to drift into dogma.

That said, I don’t think the sincerity or transformative depth of those experiences should be dismissed. What matters is how they connect us back to the ethical fact you began with: the reality of suffering and the reality of well-being. For me, that is grounding enough without having to posit an “unknown X” within us - though I understand why others feel drawn to that language. Your "unknown X" reminds me of what Richard Dawkins called the "God of the gaps".

I appreciate the depth and range of your reflections. Where I find common ground is in the idea that ethics has to be grounded in something more than language or convention - in something apodictic, as you say. For me, suffering provides that ground. The experience of pain, joy, fear, compassion, etc., is not reducible to definitions or analyses - it is lived and felt.

That’s why I don’t think we need to invoke divinity to account for ethics. The “otherness” you describe, which religion often clothes in the figure of God, can also be understood simply as the givenness of being - the fact that suffering is bad in itself and joy is good in itself. This “absolute reality” is accessible to all of us, without appeal to metaphysical theology.

So I would put it this way: suffering and well-being are not just contingencies of language, but the shared, universal ground of our moral experience. Whether one interprets that as divine or not, I think we agree it is where ethics takes its root.

But that doesn’t make suffering reducible to “just a judgment.”
— Truth Seeker

No, I certainly didn't intend that reduction, especially the 'just'. Pain is real, and judgements are real, and suffering is real. The point I want to emphasise though is that the idea that suffering is not bad is contradictory, and thus that the reduction of suffering gives a necessary and real foundation of morality.

And compare this to my earlier suggestion, in relation to communication:

Consider the proposition, "Falsehood is better than truth."
If it were true, then it would be better to believe that truth is better than falsehood.
If it were false, then it would be better to believe that truth is better than falsehood.
'Therefore, 'truth is better than falsehood' is the only tenable moral position on truth.
— unenlightened

To be alive as a human, is to make judgements of oneself and of the world, between edible and poisonous, true and false, friend and foe, and so on. And though one can be mistaken, one cannot actually prefer foes to friends, falsehood to truth, poison to food, or suffering to comfort. — unenlightened

That’s beautifully argued. I like how you’ve shown that some values are not arbitrary but built into what it means to be human. Just as “truth is better than falsehood” cannot be coherently denied, the same seems true of “suffering is bad and reducing it is good.”

To exist as humans is indeed to make judgments - about nourishment, danger, truth, comfort, trust and so on. These aren’t optional preferences, but conditions of survival and flourishing. The contradiction comes when someone tries to deny them while still living within them.

So morality, at its root, doesn’t need to be imported from outside - whether from religion or abstract metaphysics. It arises from the unavoidable reality that suffering presses itself upon us as bad, and well-being presses itself upon us as good. Ethical systems differ in details, but they converge here because this is the ground we all stand on.

Pain is not the same as suffering. One might say that pain is the alarm system of the body's damage control function. Sometimes the alarm can go off because there is a fault in the system.

Suffering is a response; an attitude one takes to pain or to other experience; a judgement. One can suffer from guilt, from ennui, from despair, as well as from pain.

So the essence of suffering is the negative judgement of the sufferer. Thus the endurance athlete has to learn to withhold that negative judgement and thus overcome the 'pain barrier' that would otherwise limit their performance.

But this means that suffering is totally in the experience of the sufferer, and it makes no sense to say, therefore, that suffering is good, because suffering is constituted by the judgement that it is bad.

I can still say, though, that your suffering is good for me, if I find it amusing or consoling, or gratifying in some way, but it is not the suffering that you feel, but the idea thatI have (of you suffering) that I am gratified by.

3) Talk therapy for managing pain.
Psychotherapy includes different methods to help you understand and change unhealthy feelings. It also helps you to understand unhealthy thoughts and actions. It can help you manage or change how you feel the pain.
https://nursesgroup.co.uk/pain-management-in-nursing — unenlightened

That’s an interesting distinction. I agree that pain and suffering aren’t identical - pain can be a biological signal, while suffering often involves the added layer of how consciousness registers and appraises the unpleasantness. But that doesn’t make suffering reducible to “just a judgment.”

The endurance athlete shows that mindset can modulate the degree of suffering, but the fact that it takes so much training to endure pain without suffering suggests that suffering is not simply optional. And in cases like torture or sadism, we see why: the deliberate infliction of suffering is universally condemned, precisely because suffering is intrinsically bad for the one who endures it, regardless of whether someone else finds it gratifying.

So therapy and mindfulness can help people manage suffering, but they don’t show that suffering is illusory. They show it’s real enough that both ethics and whole fields of medicine and psychology are devoted to alleviating it.

That’s a beautifully put reflection. I think you’ve touched the heart of the matter: suffering is not merely a social construct or a linguistic convention, but a fundamental experience that resists reduction. When we ask, “What is bad about suffering?” the most honest answer might be that it needs no further justification - it reveals its badness in the very act of being endured.

Language and culture may frame or contextualize suffering, but the raw experience of agony, despair, or anguish is prior to those frames. That’s why so many ethical systems, despite their diversity, converge on minimizing suffering and promoting well-being. They are built on the foundation that suffering is not an arbitrary preference but an undeniable reality, and well-being is its natural counterweight.

In that sense, good and evil are not metaphysical mysteries but responses to the lived fact of suffering and flourishing.
— Truth Seeker

Yes, prior, logically prior, meaning if this dimension of our existence were to be removed, then the very concept of ethics becomes meaningless. So here, one has to step out of language andlogic entirely for the logical ground to be what it is. Now, the same canbe said for science, I mean, remove, well, the world, and science vanishes, but science only cares about quantifications and causal connections and works entirely within the structure of thought of its paradigms. It doesn't ask about the nature of scientific observation, say, because it doesn't care since this kindopf thing; it doesn't have to. After all, the color red, say, just sits there. It is nothing without the language that discusses it analytically. The phenomenon itself has no qualities that are not reducible to the categories of language contexts.
But that sprained ankle, not like a color (as such) at all. The very salient feature of its pain is the very essence of the category! This empirical science cannot deal with this, and analytic philosophy simply runs away, because to admit this is ,like admitting an actual absolute. Like admitting divine existence in their eyes.
But are they wrong? After all, this IS the essence of religion: an absolute in the metaethical analysis. — Constance

That’s very well put. I think you’re right that suffering is not like the color red, which only becomes “red” in relation to our perceptual and linguistic frameworks. The sting of pain is not dependent on cultural categories - it is what it is in a way that forces itself upon us prior to analysis.

That doesn’t mean it becomes some kind of metaphysical deity, though. It simply means that suffering is an undeniable experiential absolute in our lives, much like gravity is a physical absolute in our environment. We don’t need religion to acknowledge it; we only need to pay attention to lived experience.

From there, ethics is built not on arbitrary rules but on responding to this reality: suffering is intrinsically bad to the one who endures it, and well-being is intrinsically good. Ethical systems differ in how they propose to minimize suffering and maximize well-being, but they converge on this foundation because it is pre-linguistic and universal.

In my view, recognizing suffering as fundamental doesn’t point us to the divine, but to the very real ground of our shared experiences, such as pain, pleasure, fear, love, hate, grief, sadness, rage, happiness, compassion and so on.

Is right and wrong just a matter of thinking something is right (e.g. it is right to save and improve lives) and something is wrong (e.g. theft, fraud, rape, robbery, enslaving, torture and murder are wrong)?
— Truth Seeker

This claim can be cashed out in many ways. I will focus on one common way. I will take the claim to be:

X is right = I have a positive attitude towards X.

I think this view of 'right' is incorrect (and the same for 'wrong'). When discussing ethics, that simply does not seem to be what is meant by the terms.

For instance, it makes sense to hold the thought "I think death penalty is right, but is it right?" Under the view above, this would translate to: "I think I have a positive attitude towards the death penalty, but do I have a positive attitude towards it?" This makes ethical reflection seem trivial, when it does not seem to be trivial. So that is a problem for the theory.

It also fails to handle disagreement. If I disagreed with the previous speaker, and said: "No, the death penalty is definitely wrong", it seems like I tried to contradict them. However, this would not be the case if I'm just reporting my own attitude. To illustrate:

A:"I have a positive attitude towards the death penalty!"

B:"No, I have a negative attitude towards the death penalty!"

A and B are not making contradictory propositions. Both can be true simultaneously. But in these exchanges, we are often trying to contradict the other person. So there is something problematic with the subjectivist theory.

Is there any way to know for sure what is right and what is wrong?
— Truth Seeker

Knowing for sure might be difficult for any form of potential knowledge. Can one know for sure that one is not currently living in a simulation? Probably not. Can we still be justified in our beliefs about the external world? I think so.

One should be humble about many ethical beliefs, given that there are often clear uncertainties. Still, one must also take it seriously. Even if it is unfeasible to be absolutely sure, that does not mean we should compromise ethical beliefs, at least not fully.

If someone kicks a dog, even if I cannot be 100% sure that it is wrong, I think I'm justified to take it as such, and prohibit people from abusing their pets. One can be uncertain and serious at the same time. — GazingGecko

I agree with you that reducing right and wrong to “just my attitude” makes ethical reflection seem trivial and misses how we usually use those words. Ethics isn’t just about reporting preferences, it’s about evaluating them and testing them against reasons, evidence, and the lived reality of sentient beings.

I also think you’re right that we can’t get 100% certainty about morality (any more than we can get certainty about whether we’re in a simulation). But just like in science, we don’t need absolute certainty to act - we need justified beliefs based on the best available evidence.

For me, the clearest anchor is suffering and well-being. If someone kicks a dog, the dog suffers. That suffering isn’t a matter of attitude - it’s a real experience in the world. And since suffering is universally aversive, preventing it gives us a solid grounding for calling something “wrong.”

So maybe we don’t get certainty, but we do get enough clarity to live by: wrong = actions that inflict unnecessary suffering, and right = actions that prevent or reduce suffering and promote well-being. That keeps ethics from collapsing into “just my feelings,” while still leaving space for humility and reflection.

Good = actions that prevent or reduce suffering and promote well-being for sentient beings.
Evil = deliberate actions that cause unnecessary suffering or destroy the capacity for well-being in sentient beings.
— Truth Seeker

Yes, I think you are closing in. But there does remain the final question: what is there that is bad about suffering? You may, as I do, hold that this is self evident, though this gets lost in our entangled affairs, where competing goods and bads struggle. But the question is now momentous, not mundane: Suffering is now not a convention of the language and culture that talks about it, talk that leads to variability because suffering is inevitably caught up in uses and purposes. Suffering is the bare manifestation of that terrible pain in your ankle, and this, if you can stand it, transcends the finitude that language that would hold it down, keep it familiar, contained in reduction to the ordinary. But suffering is not ordinary, not an institution. It is that original that institutions of ethics have their foundation in. — Constance

That’s a beautifully put reflection. I think you’ve touched the heart of the matter: suffering is not merely a social construct or a linguistic convention, but a fundamental experience that resists reduction. When we ask, “What is bad about suffering?” the most honest answer might be that it needs no further justification - it reveals its badness in the very act of being endured.

Language and culture may frame or contextualize suffering, but the raw experience of agony, despair, or anguish is prior to those frames. That’s why so many ethical systems, despite their diversity, converge on minimizing suffering and promoting well-being. They are built on the foundation that suffering is not an arbitrary preference but an undeniable reality, and well-being is its natural counterweight.

In that sense, good and evil are not metaphysical mysteries but responses to the lived fact of suffering and flourishing.

I already defined good in my post. Evil is the opposite. — MoK

Human nature is good; by good, I mean humans prefer pleasure over pain. — MoK

Humans do evil things, such as murder other humans and other organisms. If human nature is good, why do they do evil things?

What is right depends on your alignment, good or evil. Humans have evolved socially and physiologically over the Ages. Human nature is good; by good, I mean humans prefer pleasure over pain. The social laws that everybody is talking about are the result of the social and physiological evolution, which is, of course, biased by human nature. — MoK

How do you define good and evil?

Good is saving and improving lives. Evil is deliberate harm and the murder of sentient beings. How do you define good and evil?
— Truth Seeker

I wait until the argument settles. What good is saving lives? Saving a life is one thing--there, you saved me from injury, but there is nothing in the term "saving" that has any ethicality to it. I can save this cup of coffee from being tossed down the drain. And life? what is it about life that makes it part of a moral conversation? — Constance

It’s true that “saving” by itself isn’t always ethical — saving a cup of coffee from being spilt doesn’t have moral weight. But when we talk about saving and improving lives, the ethical significance comes from the fact that sentient beings can experience suffering and well-being.

A cup of coffee has no capacity for suffering, but a sentient being does. That’s why saving a life (human and nonhuman) carries moral weight: it preserves the possibility of future experiences, prevents suffering, and maintains the capacity for joy, connection, and flourishing.

So for me:

Good = actions that prevent or reduce suffering and promote well-being for sentient beings.
Evil = deliberate actions that cause unnecessary suffering or destroy the capacity for well-being in sentient beings.

Life matters morally not just because it exists, but because it is the vessel of sentience — the ability to feel, to suffer, to love, to flourish. Without life, those possibilities vanish.

I'm sorry, but I see contradictions here. — Astorre

Please let me know what contradictions you see.

Thank you for the links and for the clarification.

So your system is valuable to you, but just an empty template to others? — Astorre

I don’t see Compassionism as just “my personal template,” but as a principle anyone could adopt because it’s grounded in something universal: the capacity to suffer and the desire to avoid harm.

Of course, people may or may not value compassion as highly as I do — but that doesn’t make it empty. It’s like honesty: not everyone practices it, but most would agree it’s better than dishonesty when building trust. Compassion works the same way — it has value beyond me because suffering and wellbeing are real for everyone who can experience them.

Stones, as far as we know, don’t have any capacity to feel pain or pleasure, so they wouldn’t be included.
— Truth Seeker

I hope the stone consciousness supporters will pass by and not look in here :lol:

Compassionism isn’t about self-destruction — it’s about balance. I
— Truth Seeker

The balance offers a scale. This is Relativism again. Maybe this is an unsolvable problem.

By the way. There are systems of views (ideologies) in which what is good and what is bad is prescribed in advance, and the choice is practically prescribed to the person (for example, Chu che). You don't need to think about what is good or bad. It has already been written for you. In my opinion, most people in the world don't even think about it; they simply believe in their ideologies (including those that emphasize personal responsibility for one's choices).

Going back to the question: does a person really need to have their own choice, or is it easier to follow a pattern? (For example, if you get on a full bus and there's only one seat available, you'll sit there instead of searching for a better spot if the bus is empty) — Astorre

On balance and relativism: I think balance isn’t the same as “anything goes.” Relativism says all views are equally valid, but Compassionism does not say that. It is about reducing the suffering of all sentient beings and helping oneself and others flourish. It gives us a clear direction, even if the details vary depending on circumstances.

On your bigger question: I agree that many people just follow ready-made systems. It feels easier, like taking the only open seat on a bus. But I think there’s value in choosing consciously instead of outsourcing morality. Even if we borrow ideas from traditions or ideologies, ultimately, it’s our compassion and responsibility that give them meaning. Following a pattern blindly might be simpler, but it risks causing harm without ever asking whether it could be avoided.

You write compassion for all sentient beings. Ok. Let's define who is sentient and who is not. Here on the forum there are many adherents of the idea that stones also have consciousness. Or again set boundaries - these are sentient, these are insensitive. Then what can this be based on? Just believe you or someone else?

then what is the limit of compassion? Sell a kidney and feed starving children with the proceeds? — Astorre

Great questions. For me, sentience means the capacity to feel pain and pleasure. That usually includes humans and non-human animals, and possibly conscious aliens from other planets. Stones, as far as we know, don’t have any capacity to feel pain or pleasure, so they wouldn’t be included. The boundary isn’t arbitrary — it’s based on whether there is scientific evidence of consciousness and the ability to have painful and pleasurable experiences.

As for the limits of compassion, I see it less as an all-or-nothing demand and more as a guiding orientation: do what you reasonably can to help, and avoid causing harm where possible. Compassionism isn’t about self-destruction — it’s about balance. It includes compassion for self and compassion for others. If I act with compassion within my means, I contribute to less suffering and more well-being in the world.

I don't like any of the approaches. That's how we live.
In the deontological approach, you have to believe in something (but what about non-believers?)
In the utilitarian approach, everyone can have different values, which leads to chaos
In the existential approach, if you are a maniac and act in accordance with your aspirations, things don't work out very well either

Nihilism is also not a solution

What would you suggest for people like me? — Astorre

I can understand your frustration — every ethical system seems to run into problems:

Deontology can feel too rigid or tied to belief.
Utilitarianism can clash when values differ.
Existentialism can be misused to justify harmful actions.
Nihilism leaves us without direction at all.

That’s why I’ve found it helpful to think in terms of Compassionism, which is compassion for every sentient being. Instead of relying on rigid rules or endless calculations, the guiding question becomes: Does this choice show compassion, or does it cause harm?

Compassionism doesn’t depend on religion, and it works even when people’s values differ — because compassion is something we all understand as a sentient being. It’s not about being perfect, just about orienting ourselves toward helping rather than harming, moment by moment.

Attempts to answer these questions historically led to the creation of the Deontological (correct is what is prescribed) and Utilitarian (correct is the least of two evils) approaches and their combination. — Astorre

How would we know which is correct? The deontological approach contradicts the utilitarian approach.

Veganism is more ethical than non-veganism because it reduces suffering and death by a massive amount. [ ... ] Now that I have provided argument and evidence, is it now the truth?
— Truth Seeker
Yes, but that "truth" does not entail that "non-veganism" is immoral or necessarily so. Imo, eating either non-industrial or vat-grown/3-d printed meats is no less ethical than a strictly plant-based diet.

How can consciousness be an illusion when I am experiencing it right now and you are experiencing it right now?
— Truth Seeker
Given that the human brain is transparent to itself (i.e. brain-blind (R.S. Bakker)), it cannot perceive how the trick is done and therefore that consciousness is an illusion (i.e. not the entity it seems to be or that one thinks it is).

Also, as Libet's experiments have shown, one is not "experiencing right now" but rather conscious perception occurs up to 550 milliseconds after a stimulus. And what one is conscious of is a simplified representation of the salient features of the perceived object; thus, "consciousness" is only a simplification of a much more complex process that one cannot be conscious of (like e.g. a blindspot that enables sight).

Consider Buddhist no-self, Democitean swirling atoms, Humean bundle theory, Churchlands' eliminativism ... Nørretranders' user-illusion, Hofstadter's strange looping, Metzinger's phenomenal self model, etc: some philosophical cum scientific 'models' of the entity-illusion of consciousness. — 180 Proof

Thanks for your thoughtful response. I’d like to engage with both parts of what you said.

On veganism:
You’re right that lab-grown or 3D-printed meat could potentially be just as ethical as a plant-based diet, since it wouldn’t involve animal suffering. That’s an exciting possibility for the future. But in the present, the overwhelming majority of non-vegan consumption comes from industrial and even small-scale animal farming, both of which involve suffering and killing that veganism avoids. So while non-veganism could be ethical in theory, in practice it mostly isn’t.

On consciousness:
I agree that our conscious experience is a simplified, delayed model of reality. Libet’s experiments and theories like Metzinger’s self-model do show how much is happening outside of our awareness. But calling consciousness an “illusion” may go too far. An illusion is still an experience — like a rainbow. The rainbow isn’t what it seems, but it’s still real as a phenomenon. Similarly, consciousness may not be what we intuitively think it is, but the fact that we have experiences at all means it isn’t unreal.

In short: veganism reduces real suffering today, and consciousness, while not what it seems, is still a real phenomenon of experience.

How do you define good and evil? — Constance

Good is saving and improving lives. Evil is deliberate harm and the murder of sentient beings. How do you define good and evil?

Veganism? A fine topic, I suppose, but hardly the yardstick by which morality is measured. — LuckyR

I am not measuring morality with veganism. Veganism is an example of a moral position.

I agree. Thank you for your detailed reply.

good consists in maintaining, promoting, and enhancing life, and that destroying, injuring, and limiting life are evil. — Truth Seeker

Albert defined good and evil. Veganism is good because it saves and improves lives. Vegans value all sentient lives - not just human lives.

What is the ground of ethics? — Constance

"Ethics, too, are nothing but reverence for life. This is what gives me the fundamental principle of morality, namely, that good consists in maintaining, promoting, and enhancing life, and that destroying, injuring, and limiting life are evil.” – Albert Schweitzer, “Civilization and Ethics”, 1949.

↪Truth Seeker

You can observe brain activities corresponding to pleasure, pain and even consciousness on functional MRI scans.

We know these states "correspond" to pleasure or pain because people tell us they do. A huge amount of neuroscience in this general area presupposes that people are accurate reporters of real, private, mental states. If we didn't assume that, did not presuppose it as fact, then all of our "measurable, third person data" would only tell us about how different stimuli cause different responses in different parts of the body, e.g., "do this and people emit this sort of sound wave." This is why some philosophers and neuroscience argue that we should declare consciousness a sort of unscientific illusion.

Anyhow, if this counts as "observing" inner life, how is goodness not observed? Isn't medical and vetinary science incoherent without the good of the body, health? Isn't most of the field of psychology incoherent with the assumption of a mind and what is good for it? "Psychology" is itself the "discourse of the soul." So too, engineering as a science, architecture, etc., all sorts of arts and sciences, are quite incoherent without a notion of goodness. How can one decide between a good bridge and a bad one, or a good water treatment plant and a bad one, without ends you want to achieve? If a building that falls down is just as good as one that stands, or a treatment that kills patients just as good as one that heals them, these disciplines disappear.

Hence, the good (ends, desirability, choice-worthyness) seems to be everywhere. Further, if it is in the mind, and the mind comes from the physical, then ends, desirability, etc. come from the physical.

I guess that's my point. Your division here seems to beg the question, and I don't think it's actually a wise thing to just assume. IMHO, it's unclear exactly why pleasure should be so different from goodness, one "real" the other illusory for instance. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You have raised valid issues. Just because morals and laws are mental constructs, it does not mean that they are not real. I think morals and laws matter because they have real consequences for real sentient organisms. We have no way to directly access the sentience of another organism. You can't know what it is like for me to be me, and I can't know what it is like for you to be you. As we are both humans, I imagine that we have similar pleasures and pains. How can consciousness be an illusion when I am experiencing it right now and you are experiencing it right now?

Indeed, but does it reduce suffering? My local population of wild goats is controlled by fertility management. But all the goats still die eventually of old age. Is it preferable to be killed by a bear or a human? But what I want you to see is how we agree about the moral foundations while we dispute the practicalities. Nobody thinks that falsehood is preferable to truth in principle; nobody thinks that suffering ought to be inflicted for its own sake; there are some who think that life itself is not good because it always involves suffering - they would say that we ought not to reproduce at all. But again the argument proceeds from the same roots - that suffering is bad. — unenlightened

I think being killed by a bear is worse than being killed by a human because humans can shoot a deer in the brain and kill it with minimal pain, but a bear can't do that. A bear has to claw and bite the deer while the deer is still alive and conscious, which causes more pain to the deer compared to a bullet to the brain. Nonexistence is the only way to prevent all suffering. When we use contraceptives to prevent the existence of a sentient organism, we prevent all suffering, all enjoyment and the eventual death of the sentient organism. Antinatalists argue that humans should stop having babies because that is the only way to prevent more suffering and death.

I think morals and laws matter because they have real consequences for real sentient organisms.

Veganism prevents harm and promotes the well-being of trillions of sentient organisms. Yet, more than 99% of the humans currently alive (8.24 billion) are not yet vegan. Non-vegans kill 80 billion land organisms and 1 to 3 trillion aquatic organisms per year. Why isn't veganism legally mandatory in all countries?
— Truth Seeker

This is not entirely true, Truth Seeker. All life must consume something, and all life must at its end be consumed. If it were not so, life would choke itself. The most organic of gardeners rely on this; my own garden has a pond to encourage frogs that eat the slugs that would otherwise eat my vegetables. Vegans also kill, and 'natural controls of pests are by no means devoid of suffering, commonly involving being eaten from within by nematode worms or the larvae of some insect. Not to mention the mice and squirrels and rabbits that have to be kept from the harvest by some means or other.

The deer in Scotland have no natural predators, and left to themselves would breed until their numbers exceed the capacity of the land to feed them and having destroyed their own environment, would die en mass of starvation. It is a kindness for humans to control the population by acting as the top predator and keeping their numbers limited. there is less suffering in being shot than starving to death.

This is not to defend current livestock practices, or the overconsumption of meat. And particularly at the moment, I agree that one ought not to eat meat in general, given the choice. But certainly one cannot condemn those obligate carnivores, because they do a necessary job. And the scavengers also do another job of tidying up the creatures that die, and we all die, vegans and carnivores alike.

But what I see is our agreement as to the terms of the moral argument. We agree that truth is better than falsehood, that suffering is bad, and so on. And this is the same moral foundation that motivates the punishment of heresy. If one believes one has the truth of how to live, one ought to defend it from being lost, and ignored. The whole reason for human law, and especially punishment, is to persuade people who are inclined to do wrong not to do it, by making it disadvantageous. And again, it seems that we agree that this is what the law should do. But life is complicated and it is not so easy to tease out the consequences of our actions, including our law-making.

There are regions of the world that cannot produce enough non animal food for the human population. Perhaps we should leave such places wild. But perhaps we can find a place there as herders of reindeer, or buffalo, or goats, and form a sustainable way of life. If there is more life, there must be more death and more suffering, but life is good. — unenlightened

In an ideal universe, all organisms would be made of energy, instead of matter, and live forever without consuming any air, water or food. We don't live in an ideal universe. I am not condemning obligate carnivores or scavengers. Veganism is not perfect, but it causes much less suffering and death than non-veganism. Please see: https://www.vegansociety.com/go-vegan/why-go-vegan

Dairy cows: Killed at about 4–6 years old, but could naturally live 15–25 years. They live only 20% of their natural lifespan.

Beef cows: Killed at 9–14 months, though they could live 15–25 years. That’s only 5% of their natural lifespan.

Turkeys: Killed at 12–26 weeks, but naturally live 10–12 years. That’s just 5% of their natural lifespan.

Calves (veal): Killed at 1–24 weeks, but naturally live around 20 years. That’s 3.1% of their lifespan.

Pigs (for meat): Killed at 5 months, but could live 15 years. That’s 2.7% of their lifespan.

Chickens (egg layers): Killed at 14 months, though they can live 10 years. That’s 2.7%.

Ducks: Killed at 7–9 weeks, but naturally live 6–8 years. That’s 2.6%.

Lambs: Killed at 3–5 months, but naturally live 15 years. That’s 2.2%.

Chickens (male, in egg industry): Killed at just 1 day old, even though they could live 10 years. That’s only 0.03% of their potential lifespan.

Deer overpopulation in Scotland isn’t a natural problem — it’s a human-made one. Humans killed their natural predators (wolves, lynxes and bears), cleared forests, and now even manage land to keep deer numbers high for hunting. Shooting them isn’t “kindness,” it’s perpetuating the harm. Real solutions are restoring ecosystems, rewilding predators, or using non-lethal population control like fertility management.

Assertion without argument or evidence – an opinion. — 180 Proof

Thank you for explaining. Veganism is more ethical than non-veganism because it reduces suffering and death by a massive amount. Non-vegans cause suffering and death to 80 billion land organisms and 1 to 3 trillion aquatic organisms per year. Now that I have provided argument and evidence, is it now the truth?

Imho, "opinions" are usually not "right or wrong" and, in most circumstances, more useless than useful. Btw, sophists concern themselves with "opinion" (i.e. doxa), but philosophers, according to Plato, ought to concern themselves with truth (i.e logos, alêtheia). — 180 Proof

What is opinion and what is truth? "Veganism is more ethical than non-veganism." Is this statement an opinion or is it the truth?

A vegan diet requires significantly less land than an omnivorous diet, as livestock consume large amounts of crops and pasture that could otherwise be directly consumed by humans. Shifting to a vegan diet could reduce global agricultural land use by as much as 75% because land is used much more efficiently to grow plants for direct consumption than to grow crops for animal feed. Animal agriculture, in particular red meat and dairy production, is the largest contributor to agricultural land use in omnivorous diets.

Why Vegan Diets Use Less Land
Inefficient Food Chain:
Animals convert plant-based food into meat, dairy, and eggs, but this process involves significant energy loss at each step of the food chain. This means a large amount of land is needed to grow crops for animal feed to produce a relatively small amount of animal products.

Direct Consumption:
A vegan diet avoids this inefficiency by consuming plant-based proteins like legumes, grains, and soy directly.

Here's a relevant post from 2022 ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/702431 — 180 Proof

Thank you very much for the link.

Your original question was: "Is right and wrong just a matter of thinking something is right (e.g. it is right to save and improve lives) and something is wrong (e.g. theft, fraud, rape, robbery, enslaving, torture and murder are wrong)?"

But here:

Different because scientific theories, e.g. the theory of gravity, are about something physical outside one's mind... Morals and laws are psychosocial constructs.

aren't you presupposing the answer to this question. It seems to me to get close to: "Facts about morality are different because morality is only in the mind." Or, "moral anti-realism is true because moral anti-realism is true."

There is no objective measure of right and wrong in the universe, the way we can objectively measure the gravity on Earth and on the Moon.

There is no objective way to measure pleasure or pain, nor consciousness itself. Are these illusory too? Are the only things that exist that which can be measured (presumably quantified)? Yet if nothing really exists except for that which can be quantified, then it would still seem that the illusion that such things exist must itself truly exist. For surely we experience values, beauty, pleasure, etc. And yet is "illusion" something that can be quantified? If not, then we must reject the idea that morality, beauty, etc. are illusions, and must simply say that most of our experiences aren't even illusory, they are nothing at all.

Our morals and laws arise out of the dynamic interactions of our genes, environments, nutrients, and experiences.

Ah, well the things you've mentioned morality arising from are "physical things outside the mind," no? So how does something that is not a "physical thing" (e.g., goodness) arise from physical things? There must be some sort of convertability, or else such an arising would not be possible. But if physical things relate to value in this manner, then it seems to me that there is no reason why value should be exclusively "in the mind." What is in the mind "arises" from the "physical" and so the physical seems to somehow contain, at least virtually, values, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Morality and laws originate in the mind and get written down for others to read. If I didn't have my genes, environments, nutrients, and experiences, I wouldn't be a vegan. I consider veganism to be much more ethical than non-veganism, while non-vegans see nothing wrong with being non-vegans.

Genes, environments, and nutrients are physical things, but experiences are mental things. Without the right genes, environments and nutrients we can't get to having experiences. For example, if my human genes were replaced by the genes for apple trees, I would no longer be conscious because apple trees are not conscious.

You can observe brain activities corresponding to pleasure, pain and even consciousness on functional MRI scans. Pleasure, pain and consciousness are not illusions. However, we can't yet experience the pleasure, pain and consciousness of another sentient being with current technology.

That's a great response!

Thank you for your reply. I will think about what you quoted.

Different how? Are scientific theories not "mental constructs?" What about understandings of history? Now if morals are "mental constructs" what causes them? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Different because scientific theories, e.g. the theory of gravity, are about something physical outside one's mind. You can measure the gravity on Earth and measure the gravity on the Moon, etc. You can have delusional beliefs about physical objects, e.g. believing that the Earth is flat, but these beliefs won't change the shape of the Earth. Morals and laws are psychosocial constructs. You can believe that blasphemy is wrong and should be punished by the death penalty. There is no objective measure of right and wrong in the universe, the way we can objectively measure the gravity on Earth and on the Moon.

Our understanding of history is selective because history is written by the winners and reflects their agenda rather than objective truths. For example, the New Testament makes extraordinary claims about someone called Jesus e.g. he was born of a virgin, he is the son of God, he did miracles, he was crucified and was resurrected. Christians believe that the Bible is true, while atheists consider the Bible to be fiction.

Our morals and laws arise out of the dynamic interactions of our genes, environments, nutrients, and experiences.

If you're culture thought the Earth was flat, you probably did too. But surely this doesn't give us grounds to believe that there is "no fact of the matter," or that the shape of the Earth varies depending on which cultural context you are currently in. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I totally agree that the shape of the Earth does not vary, regardless of what people believe about it. Morals and laws are different from physical things like the shape of the Earth. Morals and laws are mental constructs which come from our beliefs, e.g. apostasy and blasphemy are considered wrongs in Islam and are punishable by the death penalty in some Muslim-majority countries, while apostasy from Islam and blasphemy against Islam are not considered wrongs in Western countries and are not punished.

The worst part for me is the suffering these animals go through - for many it is a living hell. It's disgusting that animal agriculture is still legal. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Yes, the suffering they go through is truly awful.