Great. You think it's "chimerical". Wow. Everyone take note, Leontiskos thinks moral subjectivism is chimerical.

Like so many of your "devastating critiques" or whatever you like to call them, this is empty of content. — hypericin

Buddy, are you just a troll? Feel free to go back into the thread and read the arguments, and do some actual philosophy for once.

This feels like a narrow account of subjectivism that few would endorse. — hypericin

See:

But the other difficulty is that I don't think anyone in this thread has taken morality to be a form of consensus... — Leontiskos

Still, I think @Michael's account of moral subjectivism is more plausible than any other account on offer in this thread, sans @AmadeusD's. Like 'subjective truth', 'moral subjectivism' is chimerical.

↪Leontiskos I provide a different explanation of the difference between objectivity and subjectivity here. — Michael

In my estimation the account you gave in that post is the same account you gave in the post I responded to. I decided to respond to the earlier post because I thought it was a clearer case. My point was that, "The diamond is worth $1,000," is not made true by everyone saying so.

Perhaps a more suitable question for the consequentialist is to explain the difference between these worlds:

1. Causing pain has no moral value
2. Causing pain is morally good
3. Causing pain is morally bad

A possible response is that "causing pain is morally bad" is true by definition, and so (1) and (2) are not possible worlds, but the question stands for any consequentialist who doesn't think consequentialism true by definition. — Michael

I think such a consequentialist would say that (3) is self-evidently true, because to feel pain is to suffer; suffering is undesirable; and what is undesirable should—ceteris paribus—be avoided. "Suffering ought to be sought" is a sort of synthetic contradiction.

One of the deeper problems that I perceive is the separation between oughtness and motivation, as noted in the other thread (). Along the same lines, as long as the consequentialist (or anyone) has a reason to ground their moral claim, they will have a response to your questions, for the possible worlds will differ vis-à-vis that reason. By pushing further, you are effectively saying, "But what if there is no reason for your moral claim?" Or, "But what if there are no 'brute moral facts'?" If there were no reason then the possible worlds could not differ, and the morality in question would be otiose. But there always is a reason. "X is moral/immoral for no reason at all," is not a coherent claim. I don't think moral claims can be stipulated in the way you are stipulating them.

This is purely confusing. If the point is that it could serve as a non-moral fact, why would it be suggested it is a further moral fact? — AmadeusD

I think everyone has consistently maintained that it is not a moral fact! ...lol

When I said, "I don't think it is," I was saying, "I don't think it is a moral fact." Maybe I should have clipped the second sentence in your quote. ()

I'm home now. Its quarter to 7pm. Which is early for me tbf LOL. I prefer wasting away here, now that i've found it! Or the mats. — AmadeusD

Well have a good night. I'm out.

So, this is the crux of my issue. No, it's not an 'obvious moral truth'... — AmadeusD

The point here was not that you must believe it, but rather that Banno is not presenting it as a brute moral fact. He is presenting it as an obvious moral truth. Your argument above requires that he be presenting it as a brute moral fact.

Hmm. Noted, But, I don't see that they've failed. — AmadeusD

Well the OP admitted their arguments failed, so that's a pretty significant consideration.

The fact that I don't see morality as truth-apt, and that no one can give me any reason to think it is other... — AmadeusD

This is the shifting of the burden of proof that I spoke about. This thread is not about proving moral realism, and in fact no one has really tried to do that in any significant sense.

I don't think either that statement of itself, or the resulting harm/hurt impart 'truth' beyond it being empirically true that a puppy is hurt by being kicked. — AmadeusD

Right. Never said you did. Again, the point is that, "It hurts the puppy," is not a moral fact, even though it could function as a non-moral premise in a moral syllogism.

Anyway, go do your work you procrastinator. :razz:

Banno. — AmadeusD

Where? That one ought not kick puppies for fun is an obvious moral truth, not a brute moral truth. I don't think you've grasped Banno's line.

This has not been clear to me. And having now gone back over the thread I see no fatal flaw - if the objection goes : person A is a moral realist and the objector (B) simply considers morality subjective; what’s the catch? — AmadeusD

That's not an argument against moral realism. I said, "In different ways we have all been trying to show that the schema upon which the arguments against moral realism depend is fatally flawed."

When I said that moral anti-realists lost the day in this thread, my point was that the thread is about disproving moral realism, and the arguments have failed. The OP explicitly admitted that his arguments have failed in his new thread. You keep trying to shift the burden of proof. See:

What's happening in this thread and in your threads generally is a shifting of the burden of proof. What begins as, "I am going to argue for moral antirealism," always ends up in, "Prove to me that moral realism is true!" — Leontiskos

-

Can you explain how “it hurts the puppy” is a moral fact? It seems to just be the actual result of kicking a puppy. — AmadeusD

I don't think it is. See: .

Thank you very much for this. Hmm. Maybe I'm conflating what's being rebutted then and missing that entirely.. because I just reject this entirely as to what i've attempted to do (stick with me, lol).. So: would it make sense of what i've been saying if it were transposed to be a rebuttal to that claim viz.

Claim: "One ought not kick puppies" (as a brute fact, ostensibly supporting the ethical position)
Response: Hey, that is actually not a brute fact (because XYZ underlying facts/data)

would be a rebuttal of that claim, but not the ethical framework? If this is what it appears to be, that would solve any issue i had with the exchange previous. — AmadeusD

Yes, that's right. The position is not, "Every moral statement cannot be reduced to deeper facts." It is that, "Moral statements cannot be reduced to non-moral facts." See: .

showing that they cannot, surpasses this though, surely.
I guess what i mean to say here, is that I am claiming that the position that Moral facts are brute consists in them not being reducible. But if they are necessarily reducible, they are not brute facts.

Assume that's true - Am i just fucking up on applying this to the framework rather than any particular claim? — AmadeusD

In this thread the anti-realists are misunderstanding the intentions of the realists in a variety of ways. None of us have tried to concretely justify a brute moral fact. The examples are attempting to illustrate the coherence and integrity of moral realism, repelling the arguments which attempt to detract. So if someone tried to justify a brute moral fact, and you showed that it was not brute, then that would be a meaningful objection to the example. But no one has attempted such a thing. In different ways we have all been trying to show that the schema upon which the arguments against moral realism depend is fatally flawed.

Suppose someone asks me to justify some claim and I provide an explanation. If they object again, and their objection is rooted in the belief that <every explanation requires a further explanation>, then my task becomes something quite different from the task of justifying a claim. It becomes an attempt to show them that their underlying presupposition is untenable. The difference in threads like these is that those of us who are familiar with these debates know, a priori, that aggressive moral anti-realists already hold a similar presupposition. So we know our task from the very beginning, and that it is mostly futile. "They know as well as he that the challenge he has provided is logically impossible to fulfill" ().

I'm with @Banno again (doh!). "Subjective truth" is chimerical, and has been a consistent problem in this thread. From what I can tell, only Michael has presented an argument:

1. The diamond is made of carbon
2. The diamond is worth $1,000

We can all be wrong about (1) but can't all be wrong about (2). (2) is true because of social conventions/intersubjective agreement, etc. whereas (1) is true even if we all believe otherwise.

Are moral truths like (1) or like (2)? — Michael

Isn't this like voting? If I vote for Washington then I believe it is true that, "Washington would be the best president." The outcome of the election reflects the opinion of the majority, but it does not make anyone's opinion true or false. It only decides who the president is. A vote and a prediction are two different things.

It seems to me that a similar equivocation occurs with respect to "worth." If we are speaking about worth as market value, then (2) is a form of speculation, and in that case we can all be wrong about (2). If we are speaking about worth in the sense of simple valuation, then the market does not determine worth, and the market value can deviate from worth. If we are speaking about worth in the sense of an offer made during the act of bartering (or a bid at an auction), then we are talking about an offer rather than a simple valuation, and these offers will of course affect the price it fetches. "Worth" is therefore a complex and equivocal concept, but in no case is there a subjective truth. Truths about subjective states, or consensuses, or poll results, or auctions, or agreements, are all objective truths.

I think all such arguments in favor of "subjective truth" fall apart in similar ways. But the other difficulty is that I don't think anyone in this thread has taken morality to be a form of consensus, and this is presumably because we all know that consensus is not per se binding. I still think <"bindingness"> is the better way to think about this subject. Morality is binding; that which is subjective is not binding; therefore that which is subjective is not morality.

Oddly enough, it may be @AmadeusD who is most consistent on this point. His approach is that it is only true that he should not torture babies. Someone might want to call that "moral subjectivism," and if we call it moral subjectivism then I think it is the only coherent form of moral subjectivism in this thread.

Rebuttal: Moral statements necessarily rely on deeper facts, whether you engage them or not (i.e they cannot be brute, fundamentally). — AmadeusD

If the "deeper fact" is itself moral, then this is not a rebuttal. If the "deeper fact" is non-moral, then this is a response to ethical naturalism, which no one here is promoting (ignoratio elenchi).

But more simply, to rebut "moral statements are brute," with, "moral statements cannot be brute," is obviously ad hoc. See , or Monty Python's <The Argument Clinic>.

There is no relevant difference in moral behavior between realists and non-realists I am aware of. — hypericin

And the person in my analogy perceives no difference between himself and those who claim they can see. For those who can see the difference is enormous.

How so? I don’t see a problem with knowing that I ought to do one thing but choosing to do another because, say, it’s in my self interest. — Michael

I think oughtness correlates to motivation. So your word 'prove' made me think of the limit correlation: necessary action. But if that's not what you meant I can soften it: if it is "proved" to you that you ought to eat babies, then you will necessarily be less opposed to eating babies than you were prior to the proof. Speaking of personal obligation ("I ought") independently of motivation doesn't make sense to me. If someone really believes they ought to do something, then they are motivated to do it in one way or another, to one degree or another.

An inapt analogy. Moral non-realists hold the same moral values, feel the same moral feelings. — hypericin

Nah. This fiction is somewhat believable on an individual level, but if you draw out the timeline and look at cultural moral beliefs and cultural moral practices, as well as the way these shift over time, you are plainly wrong. The Aztecs sacrificed children to their god, Tlaloc. Christianity doesn't even permit abortion. The notion that we all act the same regardless of what we believe is a load of nonsense.

All you seem to be saying here is that moral realism is incorrect.

Obviously this is begging the question. — Michael

Aye, you can say that again. And I'm sure you will. :grin:

The question is one about motivation. Knowing that I ought to do something isn't always enough to convince me to do it. Sometimes I do things I know I ought not do.

If it could be proved that I ought eat babies I still wouldn't. — Michael

I'm more with @Banno on this one. Obligation and motivation can't be fully separated. If it were proved to you, then you would eat babies. If you refuse to eat babies, then the argument simply hasn't convinced you, probably because you find your own moral claim more compelling than the argument.

(The "weakness of will" pertains to your first sentence, "Knowing that I ought to do something isn't always enough...")

- I think there are a number of different interrelated questions at play, but I will try to stick to the course you chart on the first page of the thread.

Sure, but are moral facts the sort of facts that can lead to measurable consequences if we act in light of false moral beliefs? For example, if I falsely believe that killing babies is (im)moral then what sort of outcome could I expect?

[...]

Is there any empirical difference between a world in which killing babies is moral and a world in which killing babies is immoral? If you found out that killing babies is moral then would you kill babies, or would you act immorally and not kill babies? — Michael

I'd say that the consequences of false moral belief will depend on the moral system in question. For example, if a consequentialist holds that killing babies is evil on account of inflicting pain, then the possible world in which the killing of babies is permissible would be a world where babies feel no pain (or where one can kill painlessly). For this consequentialist, the negative consequence of false belief is an increase in pain, or unnecessary pain, or the pain of innocents, or something like that.

The more a moral system is either empirically derived or rooted in consequences, the easier will be its task in answering your question. Someone like Kant would have the hardest task, for he seems to avoid empirical derivation and consequence-reasoning as far as possible. More generally, though, if morality pertains to living well, then false moral beliefs will be bound up with impoverished living.

I would respectfully ask that you wait and respond when you do have time, because I appreciate responses with substance over quick responses. — Bob Ross

Then I will just end the conversation with an analogy. Consider the case of a fellow who, for whatever reason, does not currently engage in the act of visual sight. We can leave aside the question of 'why' (maybe it is because he has his eyelids closed and has never learned to open them; maybe he was born without eyes or without sight; maybe he has gouged out his own eyes; maybe there is some other reason).

He hears others argue and speak about so-called "visual objects." Impatiently, he says, "What are you talking about!? There is no such thing as visual objects! Prove to me that they exist. I admit that there are auditory, sensory, olfactory, and taste-based objects. I absolutely deny any other sui generis category of object. Prove to me, on the basis of these four objects, that visual objects exist." The others don't know what to make of the challenge. Perhaps they tell him to open his eyes. Perhaps they attempt an eye-surgery. Perhaps they try for some manner of artificial sight. They know as well as he that the challenge he has provided is logically impossible to fulfill. He has painted himself into a corner, and he cannot be gotten out on his own terms. Either something breaks through his logical system from without, or else he remains in darkness.

Good luck.

- Mmmk then. :roll:

@Michael, I saw you pointed to this thread in A Case for Moral Anti-realism ().

It seems to me that the only difference is that in the second one we would be correct in believing that it is immoral to kill babies. But what difference would being correct make to being incorrect? — Michael

Has your position on this remained the same over the intervening years?

Why on earth would I waste time on a philosophical account of truth... — hypericin

Because this is a philosophy forum, and when you critique someone else's definition of a term such as 'moral' or 'truth' while simultaneously refusing to offer your own definition, you come off as a petulant child who hacks away with their naive intuitions, incapable of rigorous thought or reflection.

- I do appreciate these long and detailed posts of yours, but if I tried to engage them in detail I would soon run short on time. I cannot responsibly enter into such long-form discussions at this point. This seems to have been a difficulty throughout: you have much more time than I do, and that discrepancy becomes problematic.

I will say, though, that the central problem is that you mistake states of affairs with physical reality, and Michael has addressed this in detail in the other thread. Of course if you assert an ontological position which denies the possibility of normative realities then normative realities will be excluded from your ontology. But as I have noted, beginning with totalizing, abstract, categorical systems is just a poor way to do philosophy, or to think in general. If you are not able to consider individual propositions independently of your a priori system, then you have walled yourself off from new data, information, and insight.

This question isn't a piggy-back, its totally askance from the thread - Are you using the word 'impose' here to include 'encourage', or is it more definite? — AmadeusD

It is more definite. It is my ice cream case ().

The vast majority I have ever talk to or heard of have held that preferences can be imposed on other people. — Bob Ross

They do not hold that tastes can be imposed on other people, and that is what you have consistently held.

why do you enforce and care about the moral facts?. Because you simply like it—not because there is a fact of the matter — Bob Ross

You're obviously begging the question.

But this is true of yourself as well — Bob Ross

No, because what I "want" flows from my "subjectivity," and what I am bound by (morality) flows from something that is objective. To say that I can do whatever I want would require abandoning moral realism, hence my point. I cannot do whatever I want, for I am bound by what is objectively moral and right.

If there is a speed limit of 55 mph that I am bound to obey, then I cannot do whatever I want. Suppose you repudiate the speed law. I conclude, "You can drive as fast as you want!" You respond that you have certain subjective inclinations that tend to limit your speed to 55 mph, and that, after all, we are both in the same boat with regard to a speed limit. But this is patently false, for we are not in the same situation at all. I can expand if you disagree.

Your point is presumably that either I could also choose to repudiate the speed limit, or else that I am lying about my belief that the speed limit binds me. If I am lying then we are in the same boat, but of course I am not lying. I could choose to repudiate the speed limit, but I have not done so, and therefore we are not in the same boat.

Then, positively, if I saw someone imposing his ice cream taste, I would deem him irrational. It wouldn't matter at all if he really cares about that ice cream flavor. I would still deem him irrational. And if I saw someone else imposing a taste, that would also be irrational. Namely, if I saw someone imposing something like an ice cream taste, that would be irrational. You say that you are willing to impose things that are like ice cream tastes, and therefore I deem you irrational. You say, "Ah, but the difference is that I really care about it." It makes no difference. You are still irrational. Tastes don't become imposable when someone cares about them a lot. Imposition requires more than that. I suspect that you know this. You know it is irrational to impose ice cream tastes, even if one cares about them a great deal. And you know that if X is not imposable, and Y is like X, then Y is also not imposable.

If someone thinks imposing tastes is justifiable, then in my estimation the conversation is at an end, and they have reduced their own position to absurdity. — Leontiskos

I see. So, for you, anyone who isn’t a moral realism is thereby absurd, irrational, and stupid...this seems like you have straw manned your opponent’s position(s) with a false dilemma. — Bob Ross

Actually, as I already noted, I have never encountered someone who believes it is rationally justifiable to impose tastes. "I have never heard anyone, on this forum or elsewhere, argue for this stupid position" (). Your claim that all moral non-realists hold your same position is false. "Moral subjectivism" is likely the most unendorsed form of anti-realism, and the variety of subjectivism that you endorse is virtually unheard of.

Your argument seems to be, "Moral realism is false, therefore I can do whatever the heck I want! If moral realism is false, then I'll impose my tastes whenever I please!" So sure, on that account you can impose your tastes, or contradict yourself with impunity, or send millions of Jews to the gas chambers. Everything is fair game! I admit I wasn't prepared for the doubling-down on sociopathy. I was sort of hoping for more than that.

But the notion that your view is in some way rational is surely problematic, and you did admit this in your own way (). In this post () you attempt to give four steps that would precede coercion in matters of taste. Regarding those, I would invite you to ask yourself whether <one ought not have false beliefs>, <one ought to have consistent beliefs>, etc. Logic and reasoning is inherently moral, and the things that we reason about have an inherently objective quality. Your rebuke about "charity" and "hate" is a moral rebuke (). The ideas that we ought to seek truth, or be consistent, or mean what we say, are all moral claims ().

Your quote/s from Bob don't touch what i've said. — AmadeusD

If you don't think moral anti-realism lost the day in this thread, then you simply don't understand the OP or the purpose of this thread.

From Bob and I's perspective, the exact opposite is true. — AmadeusD

Oh, really?

With regards to my previous positive argument for moral anti-realism, I no longer accept it (thanks to the useful critiques by fellow moral realist members). — Bob Ross

The philosophical one is. Having not resolved anything hehe. — AmadeusD

It's pretty rare for someone who is deeply committed to some position to reverse themselves in a short time, such as the lifespan of a thread. In this thread I'd say we see a large number of failed attempts to establish moral anti-realism, and a large number of failed attempts to overthrow moral realism. Just consider the number of times the OP was revised, or the number of times arguments backtracked. Again, what inevitably happens in these threads is that a naive epistemology derides moral realism; the complex and non-empirical nature of epistemology is demonstrated; and then the naive epistemology recognizes that it is naive, and begins to back off.

In the intractable world of argument, I would call this a success. I wouldn't aim for more in a thread like this. The doubling-down on something which is commonly accepted to be absurd (that tastes are a proper subject of dispute) is a bonus, and is a strong sign of the weakness of the position. It seems like a successful thread to me.

You not liking my position is not a forfeiture of my position. If you can provide a contradiction or incoherence with the view, which you have not done as of yet, then I am more than happy to concede my position (or amend as necessary). I am not looking to stay ten toes down for the sake of dignity or pride: I seek the truth. — Bob Ross

I think your toes are much stickier than you realize. If someone thinks imposing tastes is justifiable, then in my estimation the conversation is at an end, and they have reduced their own position to absurdity. You think imposing tastes is justifiable (when "[You] care about it enough to impose it on other people"). Hence, the conversation is at an end.

Also, I am going to go ahead and report you to the logic police!

Oh? I thought you just clarified a few days ago that claims about chess, the most arbitrary sort of system, were true? — hypericin

You're not following. A chess claim is true, but not because it follows from an arbitrary system.

They are not alike. The truth of the apple claim depends on knowing what the words mean, and access to my pocket. Sure, language is a system, but not the sort we are discussing here. Every proposition depends on language, so considering it as a "system" akin to a moral system just confuses the discussion.

"Do not execute that innocent man" is a command, and has no truth value. Consider rather "Innocent men ought not be executed". I know what the words mean. But to know whether it is true, I have to know: According to whom, or what? Without the implicit moral system which makes the sentence seem obvious to us, it is no more comprehensible than "Innocent eggplants ought not to be eaten." Why not? I'm hungry. — hypericin

And without the taxonomical system that makes the apple sentence seem obvious to us, it is no more comprehensible than, "Bloofas are common in ariondus." Your notion of a "system" is arbitrary, and it is supporting your question-begging.

Stop right there. We cannot expect a productive discussion if you abuse language that way. You cannot presume your own eccentric usage will be adopted by anyone else, offhand reference to the categorical imperative, or no. Moral claims, commonly understood, are about moral right and wrong. Not about surgical technique. Not generally about getting out of bed. The word "ought" is not sufficient to make a claim moral. We're not discussing claims such as "I ought to get two cheeseburgers today". — hypericin

Oh, I gave my definition of a moral judgment (). I noted that I hold to a correspondence theory of truth. You are the one running around making wild assertions without defining your terms. You say that I am not talking about truth, but you won't define what you mean by truth. You say that I am not talking about morality, but you won't define what you mean by morality. "Moral claims... are about moral right and wrong," is about as helpful and substantial as, "'True' as in factual."

It is no conspiracy to point out people mistake their values for reality. It is the same error, the same parochialism that regards one's own culture as "true" and absolutely "real". — hypericin

It is a conspiracy to hold that moral philosophers who understand the various positions are doing such a thing. But hey, you're probably just laboring under your parochialism, right? You've grown up in a culture of moral anti-realism, and you aren't able to understand that your moral claims are supra-systematic. You intend to assert that your moral claims are system-bound, but you are unable to understand that your intention is actually supra-systematic. How's that sound?

There is no limit in principle where scientific explanation ends. — hypericin

Arguendo, why can't the same hold of morality? Again, your non-parity continues to struggle. One could attempt to answer the question, "Why are electrons negatively charged?," but the attempt is only worthwhile if the interlocutor accepts that, in practice, there is a limit to explanation. Once it is recognized that the interlocutor will not admit this (and is not therefore not being serious), one will not attempt an answer.

"True" as in factual. Not likeness. Not the alignment of wheels. — hypericin

"Factual"! :groan: Heaven help us! If you had read either of the current threads on this topic, you would know how question-begging this response is. In any case, it's nowhere near a philosophical account of truth.

Presumably if traffic laws were "brute facts" they would exist with or without traffic. — hypericin

It depends on how one conceives of a brute fact. Michael's counterfactual point of course holds, but the problem is that, like Bob Ross, you are just begging the question. "Truth" is "factual," and "factual," among other things, means, "Non-moral." "Brute facts" can only be supported by the physical or natural world, and are therefore non-moral (i.e. they cannot be supported by truthmakers or states of affairs that are non-physical).

The difficulty for me is that you guys don't even understand that you are begging the question. You're blinkered in your own worldview, unable to see a different view. You also aren't able to see how inconsistent your arguments are. I haven't published a thread on morality because there are so many naive moral anti-realists here. I don't want to wade through all of those responses, especially if there is no one who is able to provide a response from the perspective of critical moral anti-realism.

So, to me, both of these statements have the same truth-maker — Bob Ross

The post you are responding to already addressed this claim (my emphasis):

That there is no ball in your room is a truth maker.
That there is no elephant in your room is a different truth maker.

This must be the case otherwise it would be the case that "there is no ball in your room" is true iff there is no elephant in your room, which is of course false.

If your room is the only thing that exists then it is the case that a) just one thing exists and b) there are (at least) two different truth makers. — Michael

So in a world without minds, would a complete taxonomy of this world included oughts and values? — hypericin

No, because moral claims are about the behavior of "minds" (to use your word). Similarly, a world without traffic would have no traffic laws.

I answered this in detail in my response, and you can even find it in the quotes you have of me in your response. I said that the difference is that I care about it enough to impose it on other people... — Bob Ross

How does caring about a taste make it imposable? This makes zero sense. There are people in this thread making real arguments, so this conversation is liable to get short shrift. If your only argument is, "My tastes are imposable because I care about them a lot!," then I am going to end this conversation. I am not going to argue with someone who thinks the burden is on me to show that de gustibus non est disputandum. As far as I am concerned such a move is a forfeiture of your position. I have never heard anyone, on this forum or elsewhere, argue for this stupid position. :groan:

(It's actually sort of fascinating because you have basically provided a per se description of irrationality or <"stupidity">. "I care, therefore I am justified. My passions justify me." It is truth or imposition by sheer willpower. This is precisely what irrationality is on a classical Platonic account. It is caring more about your passions than about what is true, and letting your passions override reason. The fellow I described <here> is at least rational.)

I gave the analogy in axiology that commits you to the same line of thinking — Bob Ross

I answered your tu quoque:

Nope. I say, "This is a moral truth [a "fact" if you prefer], and therefore I treat it as a moral truth." You say, "This is a taste, but I do not treat it as a taste." My action matches my perception, whereas yours does not. Even if someone wants to say that I am irrational (because they believe my perception is mistaken), they would have to admit that you are significantly more irrational, because you do not even act according to your perceptions. You have a sort of first-order irrationality going on. — Leontiskos

I don't agree. "I ought to get out of bed" is not independent of the context. Sure, you can incorporate the context and say "I ought to get out of bed in x context" but then that leads me to ask why I ought to get out of bed in x context. I don't see how such a reason cannot depend on my personal desires and personal goals.

I will then end up asking the question: "why ought I perform behaviors that fulfil my goals?". I see no putatively objective statement about the world that makes it true that "I ought to fulfil my goals". — Apustimelogist

Well, that's because nobody gets out of bed "because I ought to fulfill my goals." You are floundering in abstractions. People get out of bed because "otherwise I will be late for work" (). People don't want to be late for work because they don't want to lose their job. They don't want to lose their job because they have children to feed, and here we arrive at a more basic moral judgment: "I ought to feed my children." This is one example of a personal goal that is widely accepted to be "moral," and so your "personal goal" distinction turns out to be no more relevant than the pragmatic or psychological distinctions that others have given. There is no mutual exclusion, here.

So if, "I ought to get out of bed," is grounded in the belief that one ought to feed their children, and the actor takes this belief to be objectively true (and moral), then, "I ought to get out of bed," is also objectively true and moral.

So again:

Is the reasoning that grounds that moral judgment purely hypothetical, with no reference to, or support from, objective values or 'oughts'? I really, really doubt it. When people make decisions they do so on the basis of the belief that some choices are truly better than others, in a way that goes beyond hypothetical imperatives. — Leontiskos

The basis belief is, "I ought to feed my children," or, "It is better that I feed my children than that I not feed my children." I take it that this is an objective moral truth, but more importantly, it is affirmed to be an objective moral truth by the hundreds of millions of parents who got out of bed this morning.

Mundane claims: It would be too much of a stretch to claim that "I have an apple in my pocket" depends on this or that system. For our purpose lets say these are system-free claims. — hypericin

Okay. Well the first thing I want to say is that your system/claim distinction is somewhat arbitrary. For example, you say that Kant's categorical imperative explains why something is the case, and therefore the categorical imperative is the brute fact, not the prescription. This is fine as far as it goes, but I think it is wrong to go a step further and claim that explanation implies a system. All claims, including moral claims, depend on a categorical premise, but it does not follow that all claims are system-based. Your claim here is similar: <All apples are such-and-such; the thing in my pocket is such-and-such; therefore I have an apple in my pocket>. Earlier I noted that some moral claims are presumably system-based, such as utilitarian claims (). But not all are. "Do not execute that innocent man," is much like, "I have an apple in my pocket."

More generally, arguments for moral antirealism in our scientific age usually take the following form:

• All truths must be accessible via the methods of natural science.
• Moral claims are not accessible via the methods of natural science.
• Therefore, moral claims are not truths.

More precisely, it is the idea that there is not parity between moral epistemology and the epistemology of natural science, and that only the latter is legitimate. I usually point out that the non-parity claim is false, or at least it is not supportable on my interlocutor's framework. This theme recurs in our conversation. Presumably you would say that the claim about the apple is system-free but the claim about the innocent man is not system-free. @Michael has done a good job laying the groundwork in this thread and the other thread regarding things like brute facts and @Bob Ross's "(moral) facts."

That calculation may be true or false according to the systematic rules of special relativity. These systematic rules themselves may be true or false, to the degree that they accurately predict all the parts of empirical reality that they ought to. — hypericin

Okay, but I think it is somewhat confusing to call that which follows from a system "true." It is simply not the case that things are true insofar as they follow from any arbitrary system. In effect you are offering a false concession to moral realism with this sense of "true."

So a surgeon learning how she ought and ought not to wield a knife, is learning "morality"? This is not the "morality" I am familiar with. — hypericin

Yes, exactly. You are familiar with a Kantian morality, of (exceptionless) categorical imperatives, no?

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Every "should", "ought", and value proposition, may be perfectly truth-apt, but it must explicitly or implicitly include an "according to" clause, just to be structurally correct. — hypericin

I agree with .

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I don't follow your point. Making moral claims seems voluntary, one is under no obligation to make them. And I don't see why voluntary/necessary is an important distinction in this discussion. — hypericin

The simpler point is that everyone on this forum did get out of bed this morning, therefore everyone on this forum does make moral claims or judgments. The same is not true of chess. Presumably we do not all play chess. So I reject the notion that anyone, practically, does not engage in moral judgment.

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You are just playing with words. This is not the same meaning as the "true" we are discussing. — hypericin

Well, what is the notion of "true" that we are discussing? You have never defined it.

If moral claims aren't true by virtue of moral rules/systems/etc, what are they true by virtue of? Is "one mustn't hurt cats" a brute fact, just as "one mustn't hurt dogs"? Or is there some rule they flow from? — hypericin

If "One musn't hurt cats," is a system-based claim, then so is, "There is an apple in my pocket."

My point is to challenge the idea that

* people make moral propositional claims
- therefore
*moral propositional claims are truth-apt
- or
*everyone is running around making mistakes.

My argument is that there is a third way: people make propositional moral claims, but they are claims within systems of ideas, not claims about the world. And that you can make true or false, therefore truth-apt claims within systems of ideas which themselves may be true, false, not truth apt at all, or nonsensical. — hypericin

I think anyone who claims that those who intend to make a truth claim are not doing so has a very odd notion of truth, propositionality, and intention. The claim that most everyone, including some of the most competent philosophers who have ever lived, have been plagued by first-order deception at the level of their very intention, is just a weak theory. It reads like a conspiracy theory. I'm not even sure it is coherent to claim that one can be deceived about their intention. (@Michael has also covered this topic in various ways.)

Indeed, I believe this. But, how do I know it? What tells me it is true? If it were false, how would I know it? How do I reality test it? How did I or anyone discover this fact? These are the questions that seem to bedevil any moral proposition, and it is in this sense that they aren't truth-apt: not only do we not know they are true, we don't even know what knowing they are true, or knowing they are false, looks like. — hypericin

As @Michael pointed out, I think this is a separate consideration. I claimed that it deserves its own thread (). But as I pointed out to you early on, discursive reason/justification must end at some point. The same holds of the epistemology of natural science.

The moral rules/systems I have in mind aren't necessarily prescriptions. They may be something like, "all sentient life has value". Indeed, I believe this. — hypericin

What does it mean to say, "I believe this," other than, "I believe this to be true"?

Moral claims may indeed be true, but only in that they are true representations of the moral system within which they operate. — hypericin

H If moral claims aren't true by virtue of moral rules/systems/etc, what are they true by virtue of? — hypericin

Hypericin, I hope to respond to your posts tomorrow, but let me ask a preliminary question. You have given an argument against the truth of moral claims, such that, <Moral claims can only be true in virtue of moral systems, and moral systems cannot be true. Therefore, moral claims cannot be true in a supra-systematic way>. (In my post, "in the strong sense" = supra-systematic)

Do you have examples of non-moral truth claims that are true in a supra-systematic way? Is any system true or false? Does your argument prove too much? Namely, that truth itself is always system-constrained? (This is the question that my initial responses have addressed.)

Generally not. "I ought to get out of bed because otherwise I will be late for work" is not a moral judgement, it is purely pragmatic. — hypericin

See:

You distinguish the pragmatic from the moral (in law). Ross distinguishes the psychological from the moral. I think this sort of separation is part of the problem, and it comes from being in the shadow of deontologists like Kant.

Earlier I gave you an account of moral judgment, "To judge an action is to hold that it should have occurred or should not have occurred, with reference to the person acting." This can be pragmatic or psychological, but it is still moral. The whole purpose of law is moral, because it is meant to influence behavior. — Leontiskos

However, with the diremption of philosophy and science since Bacon, and the ever-increasing hegemony of science (technology), has philosophy moved from being an "outlier" to a superfluous branch of study? — Pantagruel

Now that @Banno has introduced me to existentialcomics.com I should be able to avoid dialogue altogether! Here's one for your thread: "On the Usefulness of Philosophy."

- Haha, these are great. I will have to check out existentialcomics.com.

- That's great. :lol: I downloaded a copy.

Yes, something along those lines. Any theory that requires differing senses of truth is to my eye dubious. I'd apply Searle's analysis, using status functions - "counts as" sentences. Moving along a diagonal "counts as" a move in chess, and so on. No need to re-think truth in order to play chess, which strikes me as a huge advantage. — Banno

Quite right. Your post about chess-deductions made me thing of something similar, where any restrictions on the movement of the pawn depend on whether the pawn "counts as" a chess piece or just a piece of carved wood, and statements about chess pieces will have different truth conditions than statements about pieces of carved wood.

But if you and @hypericin engage one another on these points I will be interested to look on.

I can see how chess would be a useful example to hypericin's position. I think the problem is that chess is a voluntary activity, whereas morality is not ().

For example, you got out of bed this morning because you believed that the proposition, "I ought to get out of bed," was true. On my reckoning that is a moral judgment, pertaining to your own behavior. Is the reasoning that grounds that moral judgment purely hypothetical, with no reference to, or support from, objective values or 'oughts'? I really, really doubt it. When people make decisions they do so on the basis of the belief that some choices are truly better than others, in a way that goes beyond hypothetical imperatives. After all, in real life a hypothetical imperative needs to be grounded in a non-hypothetical decision or imperative in order to take flesh.