You're again doing that thing where you ignore the central conversation where you are having the most difficulty:

Sure, but I never contested that and it doesn't intersect with what we were discussing in that line of the conversation. My question to you was literally, "Without builders what do you say that the critics criticize?" Do you have an answer to that question? — Leontiskos

We can't just paper over your invalid objection to my claim that without builders there can be no critics. That is the central and older part of the conversation, and it is the part that an auto-didact will have an easier time with. I focused on it for a reason.

"This sentence is false" seems to fit to me, but I'm not allowed to use it. :D — Moliere

Note too that in the past you have claimed that, "This sentence is false," is an example of a sentence that is both false and true simultaneously. So in that case it fails the criterion of presupposing no truths. If you now want to change your analysis to say that it involves falsity but no truth (and therefore does not violate the LEM after all), then that looks like an ad hoc attempt to try to answer my challenge. The Liar's Sentence can't be true and false when you want to disprove the LEM, and then merely false when you want to object to a claim about the primacy of truth. Changing your mind in this ad hoc way is unprincipled reasoning.

Do you see how it's correct for the critic to still say that they don't know? — Moliere

Sure, but I never contested that and it doesn't intersect with what we were discussing in that line of the conversation. My question to you was literally, "Without builders what do you say that the critics criticize?" Do you have an answer to that question?

So you want a circumstance where bill said some statement is false, and there is no truth that needs to exist in order for Bill to say that the answer is false.

Correct? — Moliere

Yep. I am saying that, "If you claim that something is false, then you must already hold to some truth in order to say so." The counterexample would be, "Here is an example where someone claims that something is false even though they do not hold to any truth in order to say so."

Sorry, I chose it for a reason last time and it's still the one that fits now. — Moliere

If you have to resort to the extremely controversial example of the Liar's Paradox then your answer is going to be highly implausible and controversial. I've already given you my thoughts on the Liar's Paradox and I obviously think your analysis is incorrect.

While they are contrary opposites, on the view of truth as a transcendental property of being, falsity is parasitic on truth for the same reason that evil is parasitic on good—it is an absence. If truth is the adequacy of the intellect to being then its lack is a privation. Likewise, without ends, goods, the entire concept of evil makes no sense, since nothing is sought and so no aims are every frustrated. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think that's right, but I think it is even easier for an Analytic to see that falsity presupposes truth by looking at arguments which attempt to demonstrate falsehoods.

I just don’t give analytic dissection the priority. We need to assert, and then dissect. — Fire Ologist

Right. Chronologically and logically, assertion precedes dissection. :up:

If nothing is built there is nothing to criticize. Without builders what do you say that the critics criticize? If the critics are to criticize themselves, they will first need to learn how to build. Hence my point. — Leontiskos

That's not true. Suppose you hire someone to build you a house. You don't know how to build the house, but your criticism is important to how the builder proceeds.

Now the builder could tell you "Look, if that's what you want, I'm telling you you aren't going to get a house, it will collapse" -- but the person would still be justified in their claim that they don't know how to build a house. — Moliere

I asked you what a critic is supposed to criticize if there is no builder, and in response you pointed to a critic who criticizes a builder. Do you see how you failed to answer my question?

This began when I said that if there are no builders then there can be no critics, and you responded by saying that in that case the critics would just criticize themselves. So again, your example of a critic who criticizes a house-builder is in no way an example of critics criticizing themselves, sans builders.

There's one solution to the liar's paradox which says there is no problem -- "This is false" is straightforwardly read as a false sentence, and not true.

For the other I'd point to our previous discussion on the dialetheist's solution to the liar's paradox where the solution is to recognize that the liar's sentence is both true and false.

Now, that's just co-occurrence to demonstrate a dyad between the two to the standards you laid out. But I think that "...is true" and "...is false" presuppose one another to be made sense of. That is, there is no "...is true" simpliciter, but rather its meaning will depend upon the meaning of "...is false", and vice-versa.

So there is no prioritizing one over the other. — Moliere

There is no prioritizing truth over falsity because of some obscure gesturing towards the Liar's Paradox?

I'm just asking you to give me an example of an assertion of falsehood which presupposes no truths. Can you do that?

"John wrote 2+2=5 on his paper. Bill said that his answer was false. But no truth needs to exist in order for Bill to say that the answer is false."

Something like that. Something straightforward. An example.


You seem to be saying that without a counterfactual understanding of falsehood there can be no claims of truth, and without a counterfactual understanding of truth there can be no claims of falsehood. That's fine, but it doesn't establish parity. I am saying that every claim of falsehood presupposes at least one actual truth, but not so with claims of truth. I am saying that if Bill does not know some truth then he cannot say the answer is false. So even if there is parity on the counterfactual consideration, there is still a lack of parity on the consideration I have presented.

The builders can exist without the critics. The critics cannot exist without the builders. — Leontiskos

But the critics can criticize themselves! — Moliere

If nothing is built there is nothing to criticize. Without builders what do you say that the critics criticize? If the critics are to criticize themselves, they will first need to learn how to build. Hence my point.

"This is false" presupposes some truth, whereas, "This is true," does not presuppose any falsehood. — Leontiskos

Though if this be the analogy I'd just say truth and false form a dyad: You don't understand the one without the other. — Moliere

Then provide a response to my argument. Provide an example where "this is false" presupposes no truth, and explain why "this is true" presupposes falsehood.

But I think it's important to maintain the ability to say "I don't know", and reassess our beliefs because of our ability to make errors, or at least miss some things. — Moliere

Sure, but dissection is not the same as saying, "I don't know."

But I find "I don't know" to be a far more productive realization, because it'll lead me to something else. — Moliere

Exactly. It is productive. "I don't know," leads precisely to building. "I know that you are wrong," (dissection) is an opposite of, "I don't know."

Note too that the act of dissecting is an intrinsically negative act, insofar as it is a search for falsehood. The dissector is therefore someone in search of error; a kind of inquisitor who comes to fall in love with the discovery of error in others.

I'd make the case that the builders need the critics -- else you get back arguments. — Moliere

Even on your premises, it remains true that bad arguments are better than nothing at all. The builders can exist without the critics. The critics cannot exist without the builders. So I think my thesis stands.

This is related to what I said to you here:

Okay, interesting. Such negatives are pretty slippery. I won't speak to practical prohibitions, but, "This is false," is an incredibly difficult thing to understand. Usually we require, "This is true" + PNC in order to arrive at a judgment of falsehood. I am not at all convinced that a falsehood can be demonstrated directly. — Leontiskos

Just as the critic lacks parity with the builder, so too does falsehood lack parity with truth. "This is false," presupposes some truth, whereas, "This is true," does not presuppose any falsehood. This is why your fundamental approach to knowledge based on judgments of falsehood is mistaken:

In a lot of ways I think of knowledge as the things I know are false -- don't do this, don't do that, this is false because, this is wrong cuz that... — Moliere

Note too that the act of dissecting is an intrinsically negative act, insofar as it is a search for falsehood. The dissector is therefore someone in search of error; a kind of inquisitor who comes to fall in love with the discovery of error in others.

and I'd say you can't have one without the other, really. — Moliere

Right, which turns out to be a problem for an OP that wants to prefer one over the other.

While world-building is part of philosophy, so is the skeptics. Pyrrho comes to mind here for me as a kind of arch-nitpick, with a moral cause to justify it even so it fits within that ancient mold of philosophy as a life well lived, even. — Moliere

First, I would point back to the twins. Again, one's activity is parasitic and one is not. Philosophy does not exist without those who construct, but it does exist without those who deconstruct. Therefore deconstruction is not as fundamental to philosophy as construction; falsity not as central to philosophy as truth.

Picking-nits is very much part of philosophy, and one need not have a replacement answer -- "I don't know" is one of those pretty standardly acceptable answers in philosophy. Aporetic dialogues having been part of philosophy as well. — Moliere

I don't think it is plausible to combine "nitpicking" with "aporia." Aporia requires more than nitpicking.

I think this thread was partially motivated by my emphasis on something represented in my bio, "And don't just say why [he's wrong]; say what you think is right" (Hopko). I think it is incorrect to try to place nitpicking on a par with providing constructive alternatives. "It takes a plan to beat a plan." The Monty Python argument skit is apropos, where someone engaging in sheer contradiction believes that they are engaging in argument, or in our case, philosophy.

When someone is doing the Monty Python thing their telos is a kind of agonstic opposition, and this is not yet philosophy. Of course, there is a very significant difference between these two options:

• "After dissecting your claims I have found that you are wrong, and I utterly refuse to try to say what I think is alternatively right."
• "After dissecting your claims I have found that you are wrong, and I am open to trying to constructively work out a better option."

"I don't know" could represent the first or the second. The Monty Python thing is a comical instance of the first.

Only things which have parts have potency; otherwise, there is nothing that can be affected. So Angel’s must have parts if they have potency. — Bob Ross

In his reply Aquinas says that material things have a twofold composition, and immaterial things (namely creatures) have a "onefold" {my word} composition. So he is explicit that an angel possesses a kind of composition.

Such arrogance. — J

It's the same "arrogance" at play when you decide not to read or respond.

Trouble is of course that if something is beyond discursive thought then it cannot be said. — Banno

Why?

Does poetry exist? Film? Music?

The leap from aporia to closure cannot be justified. — Banno

The irony is that you are a highly "mystical" thinker. Analytic philosophy allows so little to be said that analytic philosophers often "leap" to saying things that their own approach does not support. The claim here is an example of that. According to your own criteria, there is no justification for your claim that such a leap can never be justified. Russell's performative self-contradiction was not incidental, nor are the performative self-contradictions of those who follow his tradition. If one were to limit themselves to what can be said according to the analytic approach, then there would be precious little that they could to say.

Did you have a point to make, or are you just gesturing without taking the risk of saying anything substantial?

Edit:

Thus, running roughshod over most of the previous comments. — AmadeusD

Ah presumably you are talking about the previous comments within my post, not the previous comments within the thread?

If the objection is that someone holding such a belief is immune from counter-argument, then my post is coherent. If the objection is that someone holding such a belief is amenable to counter-argument even though the proposition itself, considered independently of their belief, is unfalsifiable, then my post is contradictory. But obviously I take the former view, and I think that view correctly captures this thread at large. The complaint/crux has been that the belief is irrefutable, not that the proposition upon which it bears is unfalsifiable. If the objector were to see that an unfalsifiable proposition is refutable qua belief then presumably they would be satisfied, and that is what my post endeavors to argue. The unfalsifiable/irrefutable equivocation is not uncommon. Indeed, it is arguable whether, upon convincing someone that their belief is not true, we should have "falsified" their belief. If they move from "true" to "not true" without going all the way to "false," has falsification occurred?

The thread required more energy and research than I possessed, but this synopsis was helpful. This post will be a bit tangential, and inevitably simplistic in comparison with the OP.

There is an interesting trend on TPF of late which focuses on the notion of true/beneficial freedom vs false/detrimental freedom, along with the societal and political implications. This topic is something that I am interested in.

In each case it becomes particularly difficult for the author to generate motivation in favor of the true/beneficial freedom, given that the false/detrimental freedom is both taken for granted and viewed as good. Baden's essay stands out in the way that it packages this difficult task into the "EKM."

First, suppose the EKM does exist. Would it help us? I am thinking of two questions here. First, would we be able to make a strong case that the EKM should be utilized and "obeyed"? Second, would the tools at our disposal be sufficient to "shift the tide" with respect to nominal freedom and move the society in a significantly better direction? A third question might ask whether success on these fronts would create meta-problems of its own (and the OP seems to be sensitive to this question).

Second, given that the EKM does not exist, what is the best way forward? How should it be approximated?

A theory as EKM then is an epistemic protective that aims to catalyze active reflection against passive reflexivity. In doing so, it offers resistance to subsumption by higher level systemic processes through the establishment of thought and behaviors that enhance and intensify contextual understanding and creative activity on the autopoietic level of subjectivity. This creative activity, or ethic, amounts to subjectivity taking a stand as a system in the hierarchy of systems by consciously situating itself as a locus around which other systems ought revolve rather than submitting fully to their pull. Here, freedom is leveraged to protect against its instrumentalization at the level of hierarchy in which it sits as system. It resists hijacking by technocapitalist consumerism to maintain its ontological force in its refusal to be defined by “freedoms” whose exchange-based forms merely stage us as players in a game that is not played for our benefit and that we can never win. — Moliere

I read this as the idea that the EKM promotes individual agency and sovereignty. Is that completely off or just partially off?

And is capitalism bad because everything which overpowers individual agency and sovereignty is bad, or is there some further reason that capitalism is bad? I ask because there are all sorts of things that seem to overpower individual agency and sovereignty, but many of them are not seen as bad (e.g. culture, traditions, intermediate institutions, law, etc.). It seems like the OP is saying that capitalism is bad precisely because it reduces human value to a single criterion in a way that is not organic or natural with respect to the human mode of being. If that is right, then presumably the EKM must be able to identify things which overpower individual agency and sovereignty in this particular way.

But this is a philosophy forum, not a Vanity Press. If you present your thoughts here you must expect them to be critiqued. In a very central and important sense, this is what we do. — Banno

I have a friend with twins. One loves to build things and the other loves to destroy things. The second is parasitic, and is out of luck if no one is building.

I mostly think that a philosophy forum should require users to make new threads occasionally, and not just dissect and criticize the threads of others. That practice seems important both individually and communally.

I am not saying that you never build anything or that you never make new threads. But the tendency towards criticism rather than construction is pretty easy to understand on a number of different levels. In fact that tendency seems more intelligible than any connection between discourse/construction and foolhardy comprehensiveness or completeness. I am not convinced that such a connection holds.

Dissecting vs. comprehensive seems like a false dichotomy. True dichotomies would include things like analytic/synthetic, hedgehog/fox, forest/trees, cased-based*/systematic, or critical/constructive.

What I find is that many users on TPF aren't capable of close readings of texts, and this means that they lack a capacity for dissection. They focus on big themes ("forest-thinking") and are not really able to respond to more precise points or critiques ("tree-analysis"). The first thing I would want to teach them is how to "table" an objection; how to say, "I see and understand your tree-based objection; I don't know how to answer it; I will have to think more about it and get back to you." Or else something like, "I see that you have a valid objection, but I don't currently have the energy to try to address it." Once they can do that then the fear of countenancing such objections dissipates, and they can begin to contemplate them more seriously.

* I.e. casuistry in the true sense

Thanks, that seems fair to me. Sorry if I was impatient - I did not appreciate that you were thinking through some of this for the first time.

As an endnote I just want to note that there is a parallel to the point I am making. The parallel is this: if something "undecidable" bears on something which is decidable, then the former thing is decidable (via the latter). For example, something that cannot be directly decided (Jesus' resurrection) can often be indirectly decided (via, for example, historical arguments, even if these arguments are limited to probabilistic reasoning).

These sorts of points are really the crux of why someone like @Janus is mistaken. We can take it a step further by noting that whenever someone believes something, they have a reason for believing, and that reason will (almost) always be falsifiable. Ergo, given that the psychological PSR holds, there is no such thing as an unfalsifiable belief. The notion of an "unfalsifiable belief" turns on prescinding from the psychological manner in which beliefs are formed.

So for example, if someone believes in Russell's teapot, then on my theory the belief is not unfalsifiable. This means that we can falsify the belief even if we cannot falsify the proposition. So instead of independently investigating whether there is a teapot between Earth and Mars, we would ask the person holding the belief why they believe it, and by falsifying their reasons or inferences for belief we would have undermined the belief. So perhaps it would be better to say that the belief can be shown to have insufficient grounds, rather than be falsified per se.

- I agree. Good points and good posts. :up:

The OP made me think of Isaiah Berlin's idea of, "The Hedgehog and the Fox," although it doesn't fit quite right. Berlin is separating the "forest from the trees," not discourse from dissection.

What you can do instead is to check if your interlocutor formulates their reasons to believe via logic implications and go from there to review your interlocutors’ claims.
But even in this case we should not confuse reasons to believe with logic implications. — neomac

Why not? Do you have any valid arguments for this thesis? You say:

Indeed, one can use logic implications to convey the idea of a dependency between claims (and that is what you seem to be trying to do with your highlighting). But that doesn’t mean that our reasons to believe are all “claims” over how things are. Experiences are not claims over how things are. Concepts are not claims over how things are. Logic and arithmetic functions are not claims over how things are. Yet experiences, concepts, arithmetic and logic functions are very much part of the reasons why we believe certain things. For example, I believe true that if x is a celibate, then x is not married. What makes it true? The semantics of “celibate”, but “celibate” is a concept not a claim over how things are. — neomac

Suppose I ask someone why they believe P. They answer, "Because I hold to S and S implies P," where S is a "way of life."

What is your objection? Apparently it is that S is an "experience," and, "experiences are not claims over how things are."

So while I would say to them, "If P is truth-apt then S must also be truth-apt," you would say to them, "S is an experience, not an assertion, and therefore it cannot imply P." They would probably just tell you that they hold to S because they believe it is true, or else that they hold to it because it is good and what is good is true. S is not merely an experience; it involves a volitional and normative choice.

The reason I find this conversation so bizarre is because you are basically denying empirical facts. People do justify propositions on the basis of ways of life, including religions. It seems like you are committed to denying this fact. In Western countries with a right to religious freedom it is commonplace in law for someone to justify a belief or an action on the basis of a religious "way of life."

Judging from your reference later on, you classify mathematical propositions as a priori. — Ludwig V

Not true.

But since we seem to agree that "S implies P" is sometimes valid and sometimes not, depending what we substitute for S and P, I don't think there is any need to pursue that any further. — Ludwig V

No, not at all. My argument was never, "Every S implies every P." This is a strawman.

"Creation is good" is an evaluation. I expect you are an objectivist about ethics and so would claim that the statement is true. I won't argue with you. But value statements are a distinct category from factual statements such as "God exists", so I don't see how this helps your case. — Ludwig V

Is it decidable? That is the question we are asking.

"Care for the widow and orphan" and "Do not commit abortion or exposure" are not statements of any kind; they are imperatives and not capable of truth or falsity. They don't help your case. — Ludwig V

So you are a moral anti-realist? Most people aren't, so for most people these are decidable propositions.

"Jesus was resurrected from the dead" does appear to be truth-apt and, in principle, decidable. But it is not decidable now, so it doesn't help your case. — Ludwig V

"Decidable but not decidable now." Looks like more confusion. There are all sorts of arguments for and against historical events, but apparently you are forced to deny this fact.

I doubt if it is possible to equivocate with a phrase as ill-defined as "way of life". It's almost completely elastic and plastic. — Ludwig V

Why would it be hard to equivocate with a phrase that is "completely elastic and plastic"?

That's not quite what I meant. I meant that he did not abandon his way of life as a human being when he abandoned his way of life as a Jew. He cannot abandon his way of life as a human being without ceasing to be a human being. It is because he did not abandon the human way of life that he could preach the Gospel and be understood. — Ludwig V

And there is no reason I must claim that he abandoned his life as a human being as opposed to his way of life as a Jew. Why would you think that? It's pretty clearly a strawman. If he can abandon his way of life as a Jew, then my thesis is secured. You are falling into the same some/all fallacy here. "He didn't abandon every way of life, therefore he didn't abandon any way of life."

Let's pretend for a moment that the OP is not another diatribe against your bogey of “monism.”

What I want to propose is that there are two different ways of doing philosophy. — Banno

Does your OP give any reason to believe that there are only two ways of doing philosophy, and that you have identified them? It doesn’t. There is no argumentation to this effect. You’ve simply pulled two things out of a hat and declared that they are the two approaches to philosophy. It’s as if I made a thread, “The two approaches to exercise” (biking and swimming).

So what if we amend this problem? Then we would be talking about, “Two ways of doing philosophy, among others.” Well now the question arises: Why are we looking at these two ways in particular, and not others?

The rationale for your unsupported claim about completeness in identifying the two ways was a disjunctive syllogism: <There are two ways to do philosophy: the good way (my way) and the bad way (other people’s way). Choose the good way!>. Once we fix the false completeness of the disjunction the conclusion must be weakened to something like, “The ‘dissecting’ way of doing philosophy is better than the ‘discourse’ way of doing philosophy. Or it is at least defensible and choice-worthy.” That’s fine, for at least we now have a clear and coherent thesis. You want to argue for one way and against the other, and that is why you picked those two ways out of the hat.

But the deeper problem here is that the “dissecting/disagreeing/critiquing” way of doing philosophy presupposes the “discourse” way of doing philosophy. This is because in order to disagree philosophically one must provide an argument, and arguments will require positive claims and at least some level of discourse to support those claims. The possible exception is to merely charge someone with self-contradiction, in which case one needs only commit to the PNC, and this is usually taken to be a minimal commitment.

Less technically, the problem is that disagreeing and naysaying are not self-supporting. One cannot run around constantly disagreeing with others while pretending that they have no positive and substantial positions of their own. They cannot pretend that they argue only against positions and never for positions. Even if they somehow managed to only presuppose the PNC and never to disagree with anything that is not self-contradictory, their choice of what to disagree with would still reflect their own positive positions and predilections. No one is a robot which only disagrees on the basis of self-contradiction, and does so completely randomly. Indeed, no one on TPF comes anywhere near the approach which disagrees only on the basis of self-contradiction.

---

In my defence, the aim of those who's engagement with philosophy is primarily a discourse is completeness, while whatever world view I accept is certainly incomplete. My aim, in writing on these forums, and in applying the analytic tools we have at hand, is to achieve some measure of coherence. Those of us who see philosophy less as a doctrine and more as a practice of clarification—of untangling the knots in our shared language—inevitably work with fragments, revisable insights, and partial alignments.

While some approach philosophy as a quest for a complete worldview, my interest is in the practice of philosophical inquiry itself—how our language reveals, limits, or reshapes the positions we take. In that sense, coherence—not completeness—is my measure of success. — Banno

What does it mean to say that you seek coherence and not completeness? I think "completeness" is a pejorative representing a kind of strawman. If I'm wrong, then feel free to clearly lay out what it means to seek coherence and not completeness. Does the "coherentist" not seek to know more than they already do? Do they limit themselves to making the things they already know cohere?

One might be tempted to conclude that the best option is to return to the belief that tradition is good and reason omnipotent. — Ludwig V

What epoch do you believe we would be "returning" to in that case?

General question: I have the idea that Aristotle's biology is what we would call 'holistic'. He identifies that there is an animating principle which determines how all of the parts are organised for the benefit of the whole. Is that fair? — Wayfarer

Yes! See what I say <here> about David Oderberg's, "Reverse Mereological Essentialism." But your phrasing is quite good.

The idea that matter is eternal seems false in the sense that prime matter could ever exist (yet alone eternally): if Aristotle thinks, as Leontiskos pointed out, that matter is eternal in the sense of never being created then he is using the idea of matter as if it is a separate substance and this eternal matter would be prime matter. — Bob Ross

Whether or not prime matter is said to exist, it could still function as a theoretical entity representing the conservation of matter (or in our terms, energy). Any such conservation principle requires something which is conserved, even despite the fact that everything observable changes. That "something" could be said to be prime matter for Aristotle. The most obvious objection here would be to say that there is no such thing as a conservation principle, but that objection does not seem overly plausible.

In this sense, Aquinas' idea of a pure form that is not purely actual is patently false; for parts have the potential to receive form and all beings other than the actus purus have parts. So Angel's have matter: just not material matter. — Bob Ross

It might be fun to consider a similar objection that Aquinas gives:

Objection 3. Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act. But an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore an angel is not form only, but has a form in matter.

Reply to Objection 3. Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and "what is," or "existence," and "what is," as Boethius says. For "what is," is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the runner runs. But in God "existence" and "what is" are not different as was explained above (I:3:4). Hence God alone is pure act. — Aquinas, ST I.50.2.ad3 - Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?

I think I've clarified it now: let me know if I am missing anything. — Bob Ross

I think that's good progress. I don't actually read Aristotle or Aquinas as having anything near the focus on "parts" that you have, so I wouldn't attribute such an emphasis on "parts" to them. Apart from that, I think you're beginning to understand Aristotle's matter/form hylomorphism better. :up:

I got to take a class once with Richard Bernstein, and I remember his credo, which was something like this: "You have to restrain your desire to respond and refute until you've thoroughly understood the philosopher or the position you're addressing. [And boy did he mean "thoroughly"!]. You really don't have a right to an opinion until you're sure you've achieved the most charitable, satisfying reading possible. Otherwise it's just a game of who can make the cleverer arguments." — J

There are at least two problems with Bernstein's advice. The first is that there are thousands of philosophers, and if we could not critique and dismiss any of them until we had "achieved the most charitable, satisfying reading possible," then we would be bound to read only a handful of them, precisely the ones we were accidentally introduced to first.

The second is that the quality of philosophical engagement is a mean, not an extreme. Bernstein errs in thinking that it is merely a function of the philosophical author, but in fact it is a mean between the reader and the philosophical author. Thus someone who is less intelligent ought to have a less stringent criterion for critiquing. To deny this is to misunderstand the nature of quality philosophical engagement, and it is also to hamstring the development of philosophy students. To simplify, if you are reading something that seems really dumb, then you should call it dumb and go find something that you find more intelligent. There is no need to lie to oneself and pretend that it isn't dumb. Maybe you will later find out that it wasn't dumb, but the better decision is still to admit what you believe to be the case and move on for now. To cling to that which has no rationale that you are able to articulate is a form of intellectual dishonesty. The capacity to admit that a position is irrational—whether your own or an author you are reading—is crucially necessary for intellectual honesty. If one cannot identify such irrationality in others, then, a fortiori, they will be blind to it in themselves. As always, there are errors on both sides: it is erroneous to fail to give credit where due, and it is also erroneous to give credit where it is not due.

What Bernstein is trying to do is to get his students to avoid sophistry, and that is a noble cause. If we pick up an author who we have reason to believe is worthwhile, then any refutation we give must be the refutation of a substantial thesis. If the author is worthwhile, then for anything we refute, it must be understandable why the author would hold to it.

Do you read what you write? “putative” means that the implication that is believed to hold, in fact it may not hold. So no implication. What’s so hard to understand? — neomac

If you want to distinguish so strongly between believed logical implications, and other logical implications, then why don't you point me towards a logical implication that is not believed? Because you seem to think that if "the implication is believed to hold, in fact it may not hold. So no implication." What this means is that in order for there to be a real implication it must not be believed to hold. You will have to point me towards that real implication, the kind that is not believed to hold. Where can I find that?

Stating a logic implication doesn’t make it true. — neomac

So you say:

Namely, 23 does not result from the arithmetic sum 2+3. — neomac

You stated an implication, but that doesn't make it true. So what does make it true?

Note that your focus on "objective implication" is beside the point. Here is my argument:

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. — Leontiskos

We could write this as a conditional, "If S → P and P is truth-apt, then S is also truth-apt." That is "objectively true," if you like. We could adapt it for belief, "If someone believes that S → P and that P is truth-apt, then, logically speaking, they ought to believe that S is also truth-apt." Of course this is redundant, given that whenever we present an argument we are attempting to influence the beliefs of others.

Originally you were arguing that if S → P then both S and P must be truth-apt. Sure, I agree with that, but I want to specifically highlight the independently-derived truth-aptness of P given my interlocutors and the positions they are holding. In any case it seems that some of them would be tempted to say that if P is undecidable then it is not truth-apt.

That's what makes Aquinas, while very similar in some respects, quite different. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, Aquinas does depart from Aristotle occasionally. On this occasion he is hyper-aware of his departure. Metaphysically, when it comes to material existence Aquinas stays very close to Aristotle, whereas at the extremes he departs a bit (e.g. prime matter, God, angels, etc.).

(@Bob Ross)

I would agree that advocates of a worldview that hold skepticism in high regard would be better received if they portrayed their position as aspirational as opposed to already being on a higher plane. As in, they can believe skepticism is the best approach, although they admit the standard is rarely fully achieved. — Hanover

I agree. And it may be that their thesis of skepticism is so broad that it is hard to produce concrete arguments in its favor, but I nevertheless think that we want rational arguments rather than moral preferences when deciding whether skepticism is the best approach. The skeptic can be construed as humble or at least as possessing "epistemic humility," and that is deemed morally valuable within our culture, but presumably on a philosophy forum we want to ask whether skepticism is rational, rather than asking whether it is moral.

I still don't find the position sustainable just due to the impossibility of not having bias toward certain foundational standards, but direct declarations of superiority while claiming no one standard inherently superior strikes me as facially inconsistent as well. — Hanover

:up:

I'm sorry I made a mistake. I was trying to do your work for you. I should have just asked the question. Given that "3>1" is not empirical (even though it is truth-apt), how do you classify it? — Ludwig V

A few posts ago I wanted to clean up the conversation because you had created so many different tangents, and now I fear the same thing is happening. You claimed that what is truth-apt is empirical, I pointed out a counterexample, and you seemed to agree. But now you want to go on another tangent, this time about how exactly we should classify mathematical propositions. Why the tangent? What purpose of ours does it serve to answer such classification questions? I simply cannot afford so many new tangents every few posts.

Summarizing, I said this:

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. — Leontiskos

You have offered what I see as two basic responses. Your first response was that there are some things that do not imply any propositions, and you gave the example of Wittgenstein's hinge propositions. My response is that if we cannot suppose that S → P then there is no objection to my claim, but that this only holds for some S's.

Your second response is something like the idea that, entirely apart from the question of truth-aptness, there are some P's which are not decidable, and those P's will not be sufficient to falsify S. My response is to concede the point, but yet claim that this only holds for some P's. So we are running into Square of Opposition difficulties:

• Leontiskos: Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is.
• Ludwig V: Some S's do not imply any P.
• Leontiskos: That is not sufficient. Unless all S's do not imply any P, my point will hold for those S's which do imply some P. Do you hold that all S's do not imply any P?
• ...
• Ludwig V: Some implied P's are undecidable.
• Leontiskos: That is not sufficient. Unless all implied P's are undecidable, my point will hold for those P's which are decidable. Do you hold that all implied P's are undecidable?

That's an interesting thought. Do you have an example? — Ludwig V

An example of a decidable P which follows from your chosen example of the Christian way of life would be, "Creation is good," or, "Care for the widow and orphan," or, "Do not commit abortion (or else exposure of infants)," or, "Jesus was resurrected from the dead."

Again:

In fact I would say that if a way of life lacks all such implications, then it is altogether otiose. — Leontiskos

A way of life which implies nothing at all hardly seems to count as a way of life.

I agree that remark would not help their case. One cannot just announce that a proposition is protected from refutation. One protects a proposition from refutation by the moves one makes in the argument. In the case you give, I would expect the Christian to reject the second premiss "God does not exist". — Ludwig V

But if they must engage in argument to protect P from refutation, then P has already been taken to be truth-apt and decidable. We were talking about a priori ways to protect P from refutation, such as denying its truth-aptness or its decidability.

I'm sorry. I was under the impression that when a philosopher uses the arrow of implication, by convention they are talking about material implication. But you are right, modus tollens etc. are much older than Frege's logic. — Ludwig V

Okay, then we understand each other.

St. Paul might be a good example.

...

But the point here is that although St. Paul did radically change his way of life, he still managed to live in the same world as the rest of us, so did not abandon large parts of the way of life he was living before his conversion.
The critical role for standard philosophy of ways of life is that they establish and enable our practices, including our ability to formulate propositions, evaluate them and so forth (and I include making judgements of value in this). St. Paul may have modified his beliefs, but the fundamental abilities were not touched. They were differently applied. — Ludwig V

We could simplify the story and categories a bit and just say that St. Paul encountered something which caused him to decide to abandon Judaism and embrace Christianity. Your objection is something like, "Ah, but Judaism and Christianity have a lot in common, therefore he did not abandon his way of life; he just modified it."

You're still claiming that, "The scope [of changes to one's way of life] is limited." Well, what limits it, and why? What counts as an abandonment and what counts as a change, and why can humans only change but never abandon their way of life? All of that looks rather arbitrary to me.

And what if we look again at your chosen example, the Christian way of life? People obviously abandon the Christian way of life, so it sure looks like abandonment of things that you deem ways of life is possible.

I've got very confused about whether it is the Christian way of life that demonstrates the existence of God or God that demonstrates the Christian way of life. Perhaps even both? — Ludwig V

Implication can be two-way, even though the various reasons will be chronologically limited.

As we get deeper into this, it is necessary to question your use of "validate" here. Ways of life do not, in themselves, validate anything. They are the foundation on which we build our practices of validating things. — Ludwig V

What is happening is that you are equivocating on "ways of life." The equivocation was present even when you were talking about Wittgenstein, for even there you referred to both non-justificatory schemas and justificatory schemas as ways of life. But your chosen example of the Christian way of life certainly does validate certain propositions.

Here is the place where you spoke about justificatory schemas:

As Wittgenstein is worrying about the foundations of rationality, there is a much quoted moment when he comes to the end of the justifications that he can offer and exclaims "But this is what I do!". An example of this point in argumentation is concluding that, since S implies P and S is true, P is true. There is no more to be said. — Ludwig V

Obviously, given what you say here, S implies or "validates" P.

But all of this goes back to the some/all problem. Do you really think that all S's imply no propositions?

(Believe it or not, this is new territory to me, and I'm thinking on my feet. So things may change.) — Ludwig V

Okay, thanks for letting me know.

The horseshoe effect connects megalomania solipsism and Carl Rogers listening-relativism. In both cases one arrives at a flattened and arid landscape, just by different routes. With the first the whole class listens to one person who expounds their ideas, and no one else gets to talk. With the second it is exactly the same, except that each person is given their solipsistic opportunity to speak before everyone walks home in isolation and silence. The choices are "monism" or "pluralism," where the common individualistic rule is that argument and contention is not permitted. No distinction between argument and imposition is possible. To argue is to impose, and to do this is to be an immoral exclusivist who does not judge all ideas equal. It is to fail the criterion of democracy in the realm of ideas. Influencing another individual's thoughts and beliefs is off-limits, because it presupposes the inequality of ideas.

Of course, thankfully most of the resident "pluralists" do not do this consistently. But if Banno's philosophical summum bonum of disagreement is to function, then there must be a legitimate motive for disagreeing. If we do not presuppose that error exists, then we would never disagree; and error cannot exist without truth going before it.

we needn't kid ourselves — Hanover

We needn't kid ourselves, but so many do. So many pat themselves on the back, "He is so sure of himself with his truth-claims and propositions. I am unsure of myself, and I just knock things down. I take nothing for granted. How much better I am!" They do not understand that the wrecking ball presupposes its own truth-claims and foundations, but when the goal is virtue-signaling it doesn't much matter.

I just find the very concept of anti-worldviewism hopelessly paradoxical because it's a worldview unto itself. — Hanover

I would call it a performative contradiction rather than a paradox.

If we apply this insight philosophically, we see that striving for a complete worldview may not only be impossible—it may be misguided. — Banno

But what's interesting here is that the religious thinker usually holds that God is inexhaustibly intelligible, and therefore they actually have a reason for openness to reality. Hence the reason why secular thinkers like Banno's Logical Positivists are so enclosed upon themselves and parochial: their premise is that there is nothing in-principle inexhaustible about reality; and their failure leads to a despair that then leads to vacillation between various forms of irrational optimism and various forms of despair and deflationism. Note too that the formalistic and theory-laden approach to explanandum and explanation has already trapped itself before it has begun. In reality there are no hard and fast divides between the so-called "object language" and the so-called "meta language." Both are artificial constructs needed to uphold a Great Divide that in truth does not exist.

Even the pragmatist should be able to see that in order to avoid both despair and presumption one needs a legitimate object and reason for hope. One needs movement afresh without cynicism towards the past or despair of true progress in the future. In today's climate what is needed is philosophy rather than diatribes, ideology, and virtue signaling (i.e. the reduction of thinking to public moralizing - the "comprehensive views are naughty" propaganda of liberalism).

You seem to think that there are truth-claims apart from beliefs. If I question P and someone says that P is justified on account of S (or that P is true because of S), then we have a putative logical implication between S and P. This shouldn't be as hard as you are making it.

You seem to think that the person is not asserting a logical implication between S and P, but I really don't follow your reasoning. If some onlooker said, "They don't believe P because of S; rather, they believe P because of T," then we would have to talk about beliefs, causality, and all of the other tangents you want to bring in. But there is no need, because we are talking about people who are claiming justification for their own beliefs, and that's what logic always is. There is no such thing as logic apart from minds and beliefs.

But by ‘matter’ he is not referring having mass but, rather, a substrate of
potential—right? — Bob Ross

One place where Aristotle defines matter, he says the following:

For my definition of matter is just this-the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be, and which persists in the result, not accidentally. — Aristotle, Physics 192a31

If so, then how does this seed’s actuality (form) conjoined with its potency (matter)? If it is potential, then it is nothing (non-actual); which would entail there is nothing conjoined with the form (the actuality). Otherwise, there is something that is real which is mere potential (matter) that is conjoined with what is actual (form); and this admits of a nothingness that is something—doesn’t it? — Bob Ross

I think you are conflating matter with potency. There is a relation between the two, but they are not the same thing.

More generally, for Aristotle matter and form are not two substances that must be added together and conjoined by way of some third thing. Hylomorphism is the doctrine that substances are matter-form unities.

But isn’t it the actualizing principle that actualizes something already actual in a way that that actual thing (which was changed) could have been affected that accounts for change? Why posit some real potency which receives the form? — Bob Ross

Material form is not subsistent apart from matter. That's just not how reality works. We don't say, "The round," we say, "The basketball is round."

Likewise, if God is pure actuality because He has no parts (and thusly no possibility of receiving any actualization) and actuality actualizes what is actual and matter is a substrate of potency, then how could God create matter? Wouldn’t the existence of matter, in this sense, necessitate that that which can receive actuality (i.e., matter) must be so different than what actualizes that it is coeternal with it? — Bob Ross

I think that’s basically what Aristotle thought. He certainly did not think God creates matter.

But note that Aristotle in no way wants to begin with God. Aristotle wants to begin with things that we naturally understand, like stones and animals. Aristotle would not accept your presupposition that we should begin our inquiry with God.

I guess one way of thinking about it would be that Aristotle would say there’s a substrate of potency conjoined with actuality; whereas I am thinking about it as an imposed arrangement (form) conjoined with actuality. I don’t see what this ‘magical substrate of potentiality’ is doing.

Likewise, potency is nothing: it is not actual, but what could be actual relative to the nature of a thing—relative to what its parts can receive. Therefore, real potency is a contradiction in terms: a substrate of potential is a nothingness that is real. — Bob Ross

I think you are getting closer here.

I would actually recommend looking at Physics I.8, given that your objection to matter (but really potency) is so close to the view that Aristotle examines there.

You are saying something like, “What use is potency if it doesn’t do anything?” Aristotle begins his dialectical portion by looking at those who denied the existence of change:

The first of those who studied philosophy were misled in their search for truth and the nature of things by their inexperience, which as it were thrust them into another path. So they say that none of the things that are either comes to be or passes out of existence, because what comes to be must do so either from what is or from what is not, both of which are impossible. For what is cannot come to be (because it is already), and from what is not nothing could have come to be (because something must be underlying). So too they exaggerated the consequence of this, and went so far as to deny even the existence of a plurality of things maintaining that only what is itself is. — Aristotle, Physics I.8

Aristotle’s answer to this puzzle seems to be the same answer to your own quandary. You will have to read it, but the key is that matter is not merely “what is not” and form is not merely “what is.” In fact Aristotle will go on to distinguish matter from privation in chapter 9.

I think it is right to say that proximate matter and form are the same thing, but seen from a different angle. Proximate matter is the thing qua potency and (substantial) form is the thing qua actuality. In these characteristic examples of material substances there is no such thing as (proximate) matter apart from form or form apart from matter. For example, when we talk about the form of a bronze statue we are not talking about something apart from the bronze. We are talking about something that the bronze possesses within itself; something that inheres in the bronze.

This gets at the heart of my confusion: hopefully you can help clarify it. If the intellect, or anything, has no matter but has potential; then matter is not the substrate of being of a thing nor the parts which comprise it. So may main question to you is: what is matter? — Bob Ross

Yes, I think this is the question you are asking. I want to say that for Aristotle "matter" and "form" begin as common terms that are then fleshed out philosophically. So if we look at a bronze statue then the matter is the bronze and the form is the shape. And then we could look at the bronze itself, which is proximate matter (i.e. matter conjoined with form), and say that the matter of bronze is the various compounds of the alloy, and the form is their configuration and proportion.

The form is something like the "shape" or intelligibility of the thing, whereas the matter is that which receives the form, or that in which the form inheres. Again, they are not separable, but rather two principles of unified being. So bronze is matter qua statue, and the various compounds of the alloy are matter qua bronze (and then we could go on and on, examining the proximate matter of the compounds, etc.).

Matter is something like that in which the form inheres; the non-accidental substratum of the matter-form unity. It's not a layer cake where matter is on the bottom, form is on the top, and you need an intermediate layer to conjoin the two.

If you want to talk about reasons to believe, then they shouldn’t be confused with logic implications. If I believe that an apple is on the table because I see an apple on the table, that doesn’t mean that there is a logic implication between my belief and my experience of the apple, not even between their descriptions (if S = “I believe that an apple is on the table” and P = “I experience an apple on the table”, then “S → P” can be false, because S can be true while P false). — neomac

Reasons given for truth or true belief are logical implications. "There is an apple on the table because I see it" - <See → exists>. The implication need not be infallible or necessary, so it matters not that it "could be false." Belief is always implicit in truth-claims and logic claims. No one says, "S → P, but I don't believe S → P."

If I believe that an apple is on the table because I see an apple on the table, that doesn’t mean that there is a logic implication between my belief and my experience of the apple, — neomac

If you believe that your vision of the apple implies its existence, then you believe the logical implication. Of course believing something does not eo ipso make it true, but there are no truth-claims apart from beliefs.

If I am right, then it seems like we can get rid of 'matter' (in Aristotle's sense) and retain form (viz., actuality). — Bob Ross

I want to say that Aristotle's view is based on his belief that change occurs. So suppose a seed (along with the soil and moisture) changes into a seedling. There is both something that is common to the seed and the seedling (matter) and also something that is different (form). Aristotle does not think it is right to say that there is only a change in form, with no underlying matter which accounts for the continuity between the seed and the seedling. To say that would be to deny the existence of change (because in that case the seed never changes into a seedling, despite the fact that the two phenomena are juxtaposed).

But the view is difficult to understand insofar as neither form nor matter are separate substances. They are more like explanatory principles of material reality. So you say:

Matter (i.e., real, pure potential) is posited as real, instead of merely positing actuality shaping actuality — Bob Ross

Pure potency is "prime matter," which is a contentious topic. Yet for the most part Aristotle will say that all matter is informed—certainly all the matter that we encounter has form within it. So we can never point to formless matter. Matter is a principle of material being, not a species or substance.

- You are literally pitiful. The depth at which your head is buried in the sand is unprecedented.

I think what a lot of people are stuck on is "undecidability," so to speak.

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. — Leontiskos

You want to say, "Ah, but there are cases where S and P are both undecidable, even if they are truth-apt." You seem to think this is one of those cases: <[Christian way of life] → God exists>.

I grant you that if P is undecidable then S will not be falsified by P. Note that in that case what I say still holds, it's just that no modus tollens is practically possible.

In a practical sense I am thinking of P's which are decidable, and I think that all substantial ways of life will imply P's which are commonly recognized to be decidable. So if our age thinks God's existence is undecidable, then a better P for the Christian way of life would be historical, political, or ethical propositions which are thought to be decidable. The Christian way of life implies all sorts of propositions like that. In fact I would say that if a way of life lacks all such implications, then it is altogether otiose.

Yes, I hoped you would want to add propositions like that. Do we call them necessary or analytic? Or both? — Ludwig V

I don't follow your disjunctive syllogisms here. You said:

because it is said in philosophy that all claims of existence must be empirical. The alternative (unless all religious beliefs are pseudo-propositions) is that they are analytic or meaningless. Neither of which really make much sense. However, empirical or analytic are not the only options. — Ludwig V

"All philosophical existence-claims must be empirical. The alternative is that they would be analytic or meaningless, which is not right. But empirical or analytic are not the only options."

I don't follow any of that. And now you are saying, "'3 > 1' is not empirical, therefore it must be necessary [inclusive or] analytic."

Yes. I don't think this is a key idea at all. It goes nowhere. — Ludwig V

Why?

First, it is statements or propositions that substitute for the variables in a formula like that. You cannot substitute the Eiffel Tower for either S or P. But ways of life and practices are about what you have to know - be capable of doing - before you can make a statement, never mind draw an inference from it. — Ludwig V

If that's how you define a "way of life," then apparently there is no way of life that implies any proposition. But in that case, what are you supposed to be disagreeing with? Nevertheless, Wittgenstein would never say, "It's just what I do," about a way of life understood in that sense.

Apparently you are trying to say, "Yes Leontiskos, I agree with you. And I don't think ways of life ever imply propositions."

It looks like you want to substitute the Christian way of life for S and God's existence for P. Or is it the other way round? Never mind. — Ludwig V

Sure, if you like. Here is an atheist argument:

1. [Christian way of life] → God exists
2. God does not exist
3. Therefore, the Christian way of life is false or invalid

That's a perfectly valid argument, and the Christian can't say, "Oh, but ways of life are not truth-apt, so your argument is illegal. My way of life is, 'protected from refutation.' "

Yes. That was a pragmatic decision. But it's scope is limited. The idea that a fact about the world might persuade to wholesale change in our way of life misunderstands what a way of life is. But amending or revision does not seem impossible to me, though I have no idea what Wittgenstein would say about the idea. — Ludwig V

Why would anyone amend or change their way of life, on your view? Isn't it precisely because the way of life is undermined in whole or in part by something they come to understand? Do you have any principled way of "limiting the scope" of the idea that P can invalidate S?

Subject to the restriction that propositions emerge from ways of life via practices, so the changes will be changes of detail.
But it is worth remembering how much Christianity has changed in the last three hundred years. — Ludwig V

They can be changed in part or in whole. New discoveries can lead to modification of ways of life or full-scale refutation of ways of life. When Darwin wrote his book some Christians modified their Christianity and others abandoned their Christianity (while others were uninterested altogether). There was no "limited scope" preventing the wholesale abandonment.

"Holding P because of S" does not necessarily refer to a logic implication between P and S. — neomac

Yes, it does, in precisely the way that is required for the relation I have pointed out. If someone holds proposition P because of S, then S is truth-apt. It doesn't matter if, for instance, S is one conjunct within a conjunctive antecedent (i.e. if S is only jointly sufficient along with other conjuncts).

Can you quote the claims which triggered that comment of yours I quoted in my first post? — neomac

Why insert yourself into a conversation if you do not understand the context?

I was thinking of know-how mainly, but yes I know he's fine with inference that's informal. — Moliere

Well you said, "But what if I called something that was not categorical knowledge?"

we may be wrong about it, but there is some kind of essence to be right about — Moliere

Right: like "water is H2O." Again, Darwin, Lavoisier, and Kripke all believe that there is something to be right about.

Kant's cognitivism is empiricist, like Aristotle's, but he cuts off metaphysics as scientific knowledge, unlike Aristotle. — Moliere

Yes, but people will argue until the cows come home whether Kant is an empiricist. Whatever he is, Kant is a strange hybrid.

But I'd go further there and say there are rational passions -- just not eternally rational passions. They're developed within a particular community that cares about rationality. — Moliere

Okay, I can see how you would run that.

I think this is now becoming very diffuse. Thanks for the discussion, Moliere.

One way we might retort back is that reality is wider than exhaustive disjunction, yeah? — Moliere

Sort of, but my point all along has been that if we say that then we must also say that Hume is wrong. If we believe something that contradicts Hume's argument—such as that his disjunction is not exhaustive—then we must hold that Hume's argument is unsound, i.e. (3). It seems to me that you do not understand this. You do not understand that when you contradict Hume's conclusion you must also hold that his argument is unsound.

See, this is the bit I think we clash on the most. Soft neo-Aristotelianism makes enough sense to me, but if we start talking about Aristotle Aristotle then I have to say that I don't think he already did that. — Moliere

But why do you claim that Aristotle did not do something when you have such a lack of familiarity with Aristotle? That's the problem I have with anti-Aristotelians: they ignorantly dismiss Aristotle on all manner of topic. Myles Burnyeat identifies the precise place where Aristotle does what you think he did not do in his article, "Enthymeme: Aristotle on the logic of persuasion." (See also his, "The origins of non-deductive inference.")

I'm not opposed to tutorship at any time -- I'll never learn it all. Someone else will always know more than I. And likewise I know more than others on certain things and in the right circumstances I'll tutor them. — Moliere

Well when I said I recommend tutoring, I meant that I recommend that people tutor. But learning or being tutored is also good. Were you to tutor children I think you would soon realize how false is your idea that knowledge is about guess-making.