I agree that there is a kind of circle happening here, or perhaps better, there are two possible paths toward understanding what the dictator is doing, and we keep going down first one, then the other. Down the first path, Dictator 1 remains in communication with others, and tries to justify himself. He attempts (with what sincerity we can't say) to stay within communicative rationality. According to Habermas, this is a performative contradiction because the dictator can't rationally do this. Like it or not, whether he acknowledges it or not, his performative contradiction takes him outside communicative action. — J

I would want to say that if he sincerely attempts to stay within communicative rationality then he isn't a dictator; and that a dictator is precisely someone who does not sincerely attempt to stay within communicative rationality. If someone is sincerely attempting to stay within communicative rationality, then they could not be engaged in performative contradiction, right? If this is right, then to say that his sincerity is unknown is also to say that his status as dictator is unknown. This is a large part of what is tripping me up. Additionally, assuming that he is not sincerely attempting to engage in communicative action, then it would seem that for our purposes he is in the same boat as Dictator 2.

(For Aquinas this relates to the subtle question of when one becomes culpable for a rational omission - it relates to the question of negligence. In this way the dictator is someone who is culpable for their irrationality, and this culpability would represent a sort of second-order irrationality.
It is the second-order irrationality that presumably concerns Habermas, for it is this that constitutes an intentional (or negligent) deviation from the rules of reason themselves.)

Down the other path, Dictator 2 makes no attempt to justify himself -- or perhaps, his justifications make no use of rational argument. Here we want to say that this person has never even entered the arena of communicative action. He might just as well refuse to respond at all (another type of Habermasian irrationality, as we know). — J

To reiterate, if the crucial question is whether one is truly engaging in communicative action, and Dictator 1 is not sincere, then both Dictator 1 and Dictator 2 fall on the same side of that question. It's just that Dictator 1 is more skillful or persuasive in his sophistry (given that Dictator 2 is giving irrational arguments, he is also trying to be persuasive to some extent).

I think we do have definitions, or at least descriptions, of what "rational" and "irrational" mean. We just have to constantly bear in mind that for Habermas, communicative rationality is not the same thing as standard strategic or goal-oriented rationality -- but nor does it replace it. It's an expansion of what it means to be rational. — J

Okay, that makes sense.

But I see a difference between trying to make a case for first-person dictatorship, and simply trying to be one. What I don't know is what kind of difference -- that is, whether the distinction is trivial or irrelevant to the overall conception. — J

Okay. I think the difference is interesting in the sense that it seems that the sincere Dictator 1 is on one side of Dictator 2, and the insincere Dictator 1 is on the other side. Or: | Sincere Dictator 1 > Dictator 2 > Insincere Dictator 1 | ...but again, I'm not sure someone who is sincerely engaged in communicative action can be called a dictator.

Can you say more? I'm not quite following. — J

Well, if you consider your "apophatic approach" above, it seems that his judgment will be to a large extent inscrutable. It surely cannot be arrived at by any guaranteed decision-procedure, any ready-made method.

(again, with what sincerity we can't say; see the discussion with Number2018 above) — J

Yes, it seems that things could get a lot more complicated in this case. I think some of what I am saying does get at 's points about verification procedures.

If Aquinas is right then we can talk about the ontology of the "dictator's" intention or negligence without committing ourselves to the possibility of verifying it epistemologically, and I have been taking this for granted. Intention and negligence are, of course, in principle capable of infinite recursion, and this is why they are not reducible to "naturalistic" decision procedures.

I alluded above to their different conceptions of how practical reason operates. Habermas opposes what he calls "monological" reasoning toward universality. He claims that Kant (and Rawls) do this. Instead, he favors actual dialogue, not thought experiments, an "actually carried out discourse." He wants, for instance, a genuine attempt to learn what exchanging roles would mean when we discuss fairness or justice, not merely the Rawlsian imagining of an Original Position. I would call this an improvement because it truly opens the discussion to the unexpected, and thus emphasizes the equality (not egalitarianism) of communicative action. — J

I find this interesting but engaging it may lead us too far astray. If we were to engage it the first question I would ask is whether Rawls could be seen as providing the first move in a dialogical exchange; or on the other hand, whether a dialogical exchange will always require a Rawlsian- (or Kantian-) like argument to set it into motion; or finally, whether a dialogical exchange will always ultimately conclude in a Rawlsian- (or Kantian-) like argument. Again, feel free to ignore this if it is too far off topic.

(I wanted to squeeze this in, for now I will be offline until Friday.)

Despite spending time on the forum, you’ve chosen to make your reply rather late. The weekend has now passed, and I now have real world duties in need of tending. — javra

Yes, I forgot and should have responded earlier. Sorry about that.

You are again freely strawmanning, inventing truths, putting words into my mouth that I've never spoken, spinning realities, whatever terminology best gets the point across. In this case, I only said that violence is a wrong in an ultimate sense from an ultimate vantage-point, but never that it is "prohibited". And I have neither the time nor the inclination to correct every strawman you've so far made.

[...]

… Which I can’t help but find intellectually dishonest. — javra

Ad hominem is what one often resorts to when they find themselves unable to address the arguments at hand. Clearly you've devolved into this state with abandon. You were doing much better towards the beginning of our conversation. Granted, the absurd things you claimed, which I have highlighted and specifically asked you to address, are indefensible, and so it's no coincidence that you refuse to defend them. But the intellectually honest person would simply retract such statements instead of playing the victim.

In your primary counter, you are conflating the end aimed at of “the Good”, however you prefer to imperfectly exemplify it (you’ve so far alluded to it being an unobtainable utopia of no real consequence), with the means toward approaching it (this assuming one deems the Good as their primary purpose to begin with) as though the Good were somehow already obtained. — javra

You keep rewriting your system without admitting it. My response to your first rewrite should suffice, "Now if you rewrite your system and say that you're only trying to..." ().

And again, Kant's "Kingdom of Ends" is not without consequence. It is meant to aid the moral actor's imagination in understanding how to act in the here and now, in approximately the exact opposite way that you utilize it. It is not meant to justify using other people as a means in order to arrive at the Kingdom. Kant does not fall into such contradictions.

In your equating of right/good action to necessary action you, for example, remove all choice from the equation — javra

Yours is the strawman. To say that "resorting to violence is necessary," is not to say that it is logically necessary in itself. That would be a very silly and incoherent claim. As context should have made abundantly clear, it means that violence is necessary in order to achieve the end, in this case the end of survival.

And you have chosen to ignore both of the following — javra

To the first: I am arguing with you, not with Kant, and if you can't even respond to the points I make in dialogue do not expect me to respond to the random papers you are Googling to try to support a strange thesis. If ignoring parts of posts is intellectually dishonest, then you would seem to be in a great deal of trouble. To the second: to my knowledge this was added in an edit, and was not ignored. Regardless, my answer is simple enough:

I am not a Kantian — Leontiskos

Good luck, then.

But here the point is that really, reading everything from a phone, tablet or computer is at least for me very uncomfortable. — ssu

I agree with your thesis in general, but I have found that e-ink devices do the trick (Kindle, Nook, etc.). I still buy books and prefer them in certain ways, but as notes, there is a difference between the eclipse of paper books and the eclipse of reading.

I think the real problem is if people simply don't learn to read a lot of books. They surely can read, but to read long books is the challenge. — ssu

I think books are the highest intellectual medium, and that as they begin to go by the wayside there will be a more homogenous intellectual landscape. But if you look at the stuff that the average person reads, this has already been happening for a very long time. Magazines, radio, television, and the internet have all cut into the real estate of books.

To give one example, in the 19th century John Henry Newman initially published his Apologia Pro Vita Sua in installments as a series of pamphlets (opposite Charles Kingslry, who opposed him). The general public ate it up. Granted, it was juicy and appealing in its own way, but it was also extremely high English prose, which most modern-day English speakers would simply be unable to read. Don't even get me started on "literacy." Ironically, I don't think we any longer know what the word even means.

Whether this somehow benefits the universe in any way other than it possibly leading to you directly benefiting other proximal beings and/ or your environment, remains obscure to me. — Janus

I think "cosmic philosophies" turn on interdependence and symbiosis. The common example is the violinist in the orchestra who is contributing a small part to a beautiful whole, a whole which depends on each of the small, interdependent parts. For the ancients this was usually captured in the balanced, cyclical motions of the heavens.

I marked them for you. — Banno

Do you think that the meaning of the word "purpose" entails that all purpose is bestowed by human intention? Yes or no?

I find that you, inadvertently or not, have often strawmanned the arguments I've make. Which makes this conversation with you quite unpleasant. For example, I don't recall every saying "it is necessary to resort to violence" but only that the use of violence within certain contexts can be the right/good thing to do as a means of optimally approaching the Good - "necessity" having nothing to do with it. — javra

First, consider this quote:

"Do not commit violence" holds no meaning or significance in the complete absence of agents. In order for violence to not be committed, there must be agents present which do not commit violence. — javra

You use the word "must." <In order to follow the rule "Do not commit violence," there must be agents present which do not commit violence; therefore we must commit violence against those who would threaten our survival>. "Must" indicates necessity.

Beyond that, there is little difference, morally speaking, between saying, "It is necessary to commit violence," and, "It is right to commit violence" (in some circumstance). I don't see how this is a strawman given that if I used the term "morally right" instead of "necessary" all of my arguments would hold just the same.

I am furthermore not in this thread regurgitating Kant's thoughts. But have instead made reasoned argument for oughts and ought nots given an intended proximity to the Good as ultimate end, for which Kant's notion of the Kingdom of Ends was intended to serve only as one possible example among others. — javra

Good. Then I'm not sure why we are so interested in Kant. It is your theory that I am critiquing, not Kant's.

To address this first point you make that Kant's notion of a Kingdom of Ends is only (an inconsequential?) ideal — javra

I don't say it is inconsequential; I say it does not support the sort of things you have in mind. I think there is a good reason why Kant always qualified it as an "ideal."

At this point the conversation is dotted with unanswered counterexamples that I have given. Let's just revisit one of those instead of needlessly exegeting Kant:

Again, I see two ends, and in this case I think both are simultaneously aimed at:

1. Do not commit violence (because violence requires treating the object as a means)
2. Survive as a community

These are both involved in the goal to, "Arrive at a Kingdom of Ends."

But in this case it seems that (2) is given precedence over (1), and I'm not sure if it is possible to arrive at a "Kingdom of Ends" so long as (2) is given precedence over (1). When would you ever "get there"? Obviously the alternative would be strict pacifism: giving (1) precedence over (2).

Secondly, in light of (2) does (1) need to be revised to (1a): "Do not commit violence except in extremis"? It seems like this is the rule that is actually in play, although there is simultaneously a desire or telos towards (1). — Leontiskos

"Do not commit violence" holds no meaning or significance in the complete absence of agents. In order for violence to not be committed, there must be agents present which do not commit violence. So I again find the presented dichotomy of ends to be inappropriate.

Aside from which, as stated (1) gives the impression of an absolute commandment. ... Whose goodness or rightness as such would be itself justified in which manner?

Moreover, the "strict pacifism" mentioned would leave all peace aspiring people to die at the hands of violent people, thereby resulting in nothing but violence-loving people to populate the world in its entirety. How might this bring about or else be in the service of a "Kingdom of Ends"? — javra

On this reading you must think that the pacifist could not agree to the rule, "Do not commit violence," which is of course strange to say the least. "Do not commit violence" simply does not mean, "Do not commit violence unless your survival is threatened." People do not generally say, "In order to not-commit violence we must be alive, so therefore in order to obey the rule 'Do not commit violence' we must use violence against this aggressor who is trying to kill us." I don't think this is plausible at all. It strikes me as common sense that use of violence will be contrary to a rule against violence.

[...]

It was not absolute. The rationale was provided: "because violence requires treating the object as a means." The idea was <We are not to treat others as a means; violence treats others as a means; therefore we are not to use violence>. — Leontiskos

The point I made is that in order to accomplish (2), it may be necessary (or "morally right") to transgress (1) by using violence in self-defense. Hence the contradiction and the perplexity.

And in response you said something like, <Well there are not two ends; there is only one end; and therefore there can be no contradiction. The rule to commit-violence-in-extremis is implicitly contained within the rule to not-commit-violence>. Again, you have said that violence is prohibited because it treats another person as a means. My last, unanswered response, quoted here, explains why your response is inadequate. You never responded. If I am right and your response is inadequate then your account will involve contradiction and perplexity. If you wish to defend your account from contradictions, then you should answer the argument I gave to that effect.

- Good post. :up:

- The proper human purpose is a relation to God, but there are other stepping stones for those who cannot countenance such a thing. If you get married and have kids you will tend to find purpose, because this is bound up with the human end. If you develop deep friendships or find a stewardship role in creation you will tend to find purpose, etc.

- Ah, so you don't know the difference between a noun and a verb. It's fun watching Wittgenstenians flub linguistics. Apparently the tired claim has now morphed into, "Purpose is use."

So, in answer to your title, purpose is the use to which something is put, and comes from our intent. It is grounded in our intentional explanations for our actions, and has worth only in terms of those intentions and actions. — Banno

"Proper function for which something exists" (EtymOnline). Linguistically 'purpose' does not imply something that is human-intention-derived. The purpose of a knife is to cut because humans made knives, and they made them to cut. It doesn't follow that the purpose of a human life "has worth only in terms of [human] intentions and actions." Your linguistic analysis is off and your logical inferences are faulty, and of course your conclusion is unsound.

"Ultimate underlying meaning and significance" is found in use. — Banno

Only for the anthropocentric.

Good point, well said! But if not boot-strapped, then from what? Religion? Faith? Belief? Knowledge? Hope? Reason? That is, I disagree, and "finding" one of the great deceptions, often from those selling something. Purpose, then, has to be made, but no easy way to figure out how, or exactly what. . Ex nihilo because there is no other possible source - or do you know of such a source? — tim wood

I think the fact that it cannot be made is what makes it elusive. If purpose could be made then it would make sense to ask for the recipe.

Please make your case. Or, of your certainty, such as it is, if it is, may I have some? Or if you mean psychologically, then, absent further argument, I don't think it's a useful point. — tim wood

Haven't I offered just as much "further argument" as you have? My primary point was that your claim flies in the face of general consensus. Claims that do that require more "further argument" than claims that don't.

What I would say, though, is that if you talk to anyone who is reputed to know about purpose, and how to help people find purpose, they will not follow your lead of "bootstrapping" or conjuring up purpose ex nihilo. The phrase itself is informative, "I am having trouble finding purpose," not, "I am having trouble making purpose."

I'm sorry if I wasn't clear about the difference between the two. Dictator 1 makes a genuine argument for his ethical stance -- he tries to show why it's rational to get others to do what he wants -- and in the course of making that argument, he mentions (not uses) the shabby pseudo-arguments that are part of his tactics, and perhaps explains why there's nothing wrong with using such rhetoric in service of his rational ends. Dictator 2 merely deploys the bad arguments. Does that help? I'm trying to highlight the difference between making a rational case for using irrational arguments, and actually using them. One could be quite sincere in the first case, but never in the second. — J

Okay, thanks for clarifying that. I suppose they flow together insofar as, if the rational case for using irrational arguments turns out to be successful, then the arguments cannot be said to be irrational. Similarly, it is perhaps more truly said to be, "the difference between making an irrational case for using irrational arguments, and [using irrational arguments]," but in both cases irrational arguments are being used. Would we say that Thrasymachus begins by giving irrational arguments, and then after being called out he moves into the meta-space where he tries to defend his use of those arguments? Even if this is not what we think happens in the case of Thrasymachus, it would be a natural progression.

But what happens next? That's the "enforcement" part, I suppose. What you say about the dangers of not enforcing rules is no doubt true, but it's a bit outside the scope of what Habermas is arguing for. To carry that thought further, I think we would need to get more precise about what sort of group is engaged in this communicative action. — J

I don't see a great deal of difference between invoking a rule and enforcing a rule, as invocation seems to be a form of enforcement. But you are right that more aggressive things would also be forms of enforcement. My point is that Habermas does not even seem capable of invoking the rule:

Two answers suggest themselves. The first is, Yes, of course he can. That is exactly what a performative contradiction is -- a violation of the rules. — J

But didn't we agree that it is not at all clear that the first-person dictator is engaged in communicative action? (See: and your response). In that case he couldn't be engaged in performative contradiction.

I suppose this brings us back to the same question of what the "first-person dictator" even is, and it feels like we are going in circles. I think the problem is that we have no definition of what 'rational' and 'irrational' are supposed to mean, or else that there are two different kinds of irrationality at play.

Let me explain why I don't think the first-person dictator is involved in communicative action. Communicative action seems to involve egalitarian cooperation. Whatever the first-person dictator is doing, he is not interested in egalitarian cooperation. He is unwilling to put himself on equal footing with the other participants, and in fact he thinks that they should bend to his will in one way or another. So when Habermas says that the dictator has obligations if he is involved in communicative action, I would say that he isn't involved in communicative action (and therefore does not necessarily have obligations).

Now you keep raising the possibility that the dictator rationally justify his actions. The problem is that if his actions are rationally justified then he isn't a dictator, he's just a smart guy who we should listen to (perhaps a philosopher king). But your implicit premise is that rationality is itself bound up with communicative action, such that they cannot be separated. If this premise is correct then the dictator could never be rationally justified (in his claims which prescind from egalitarian cooperation or communicative action).

Habermasian communicative rationality begins from the intersubjective origins or constraints of rationality itself. — J

(Rationality is itself bound up with communicative action, or vice versa.)

Habermasian communicative rationality begins from the intersubjective origins or constraints of rationality itself. So Ref Habermas, in appealing to rules like "no performative contradiction," isn't appealing to something that transcends intersubjectivity itself. Nor is it something he could have discovered by himself, in solitary transcendental reflection (that would be missing the pragmatic turn). But nor is he saying, "Well, you guys decide and we'll go with the majority opinion." If "definitive" can describe this, then I think a Habermasian judgment can be definitive. — J

I think what you are saying is that Habermasian judgment is bound up with transcendental reason itself. Your account actually looks a lot like negative (apophatic) theology, where we list all the things that God is not and the implication is that God is therefore some inaccessible transcending of all of these things that he is not. The implication here would be that the first-person dictator is fundamentally irrational, and that therefore his use of reason is really a faux-use of reason; a performative contradiction.

Personally I think Habermas is more or less correct in this, but the Kantian approach seems more straightforward, and I am still unclear about how Habermas is supposed to have improved on Kant.* Still, there is no way to pragmatically test whether a "Habermasian definitive judgment" is true. This doesn't bother me, but I suspect it might bother you, given that the truth which the judgment discerns will presumably be 'incorrigible'.

In virtue of the dictator's desire, if they have one, to be rational. This sounds weak, but we have to remember that Habermas doesn't think you can just remove yourself from dialogue. That too is, for him, unreasonable. Stephen K. White puts it well: "A refusal by the first-person dictator or the free rider to justify himself requires a systematic renunciation of communicative action which throws his rationality radically into question." — J

In this case we would have an ethical principle derived from reason alone, and then the secondary question would arise of whether one is obliged to "desire to be rational." At least in principle I am on board with such derivations and obligations.


* More precisely, I think Habermas is right that a tyrant is corrupt (and irrational), but I don't think "communicative action" maps to rationality itself, because I don't think that rationality is equally distributed in the egalitarian sense. As an Aristotelian I am not as democratic as Habermas. I think the philosopher king and the tyrant will both balk at "communicative action," but I only think one of them is irrational. Democratic (or egalitarian) rationality is rational in a certain sense, but it is inferior to the practical reason of the higher forms of government or association.

And purpose comes with – or is invented by – mind. Bottom line, purpose is boot-strapped. — tim wood

I think we can say with some certainty that whatever purpose is, it is not bootstrapped. It is something that precedes and goes before us; something that transcends us; something that beckons to us; something we participate in. It is not something we invent or produce; it is something we discover or encounter.

Perhaps that us the crux if the issue itself. — Benj96

On my view philosophy is twofold: disposition and competence. The philosophical disposition has to do with wonder and inquiry, and this can be inculcated even from a very young age. Philosophical competence has to do with the intellectual virtues and the knowledge that they then make possible. In oneself, it has to do with the ability to learn new knowledge, and both extend and transcend one's philosophical framework(s). In relation to others, it has to do with the ability to engage and bridge different paradigms, and to cooperate, challenge, and act as midwife. This competence requires more maturity and cannot be achieved in any substantial way at a young age.

The disposition precedes the competence, but we find individuals of all different kinds. Some lack both disposition and competence; some have both; some have only one or the other (to various degrees). Critical thinking is but one part of philosophical competence, as is logic.

Philosophical disposition and philosophical competence are vaguely related to Pierre Hadot's ideas of philosophical praxis and philosophical discourse, but disposition is meta-praxis and competence is meta-discourse, in the sense that they are not restricted to a single school of philosophy.

If we say that a "moral decision" is one based on what is right and wrong, moral or immoral... — Judaka

To say that a moral decision is based on what is moral or immoral is tautological, and does not tell us anything. Beyond that, it simply ignores the way in which a moral act or a moral judgment is understood in the OP.

By "non-moral decision", I take you to mean the parallel of a "non-financial decision" to buy a phone, so, a "non-moral decision" which leads to a "moral judgement" being made. — Judaka

No, that is not even necessary, for I take it that the example is so disanalogous that even a decision which is non-moral simpliciter would suffice.

I would suggest sticking with Thesis 1 and leaving Thesis 2 to the side for the time being. There is of course an interesting question about whether the person who sits down on a bus without intending to render justice acts justly. If this truly interests you then have a look at Objection 4, where I provided a point of departure for an answer.

While I'm waiting for your reply: This quote addresses means, but not the stipulated end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony" which, as end pursued, would be more properly expressed as "a state of being wherein harm is minimal, if at all yet present, and harmony is maximal, if not ubiquitously applicable". An idealized future state of being as that intended which, by my best appraisals of your previous statements, you deem to be different in nature to that state of being Kant terms "the Kingdom of Ends". * — javra

Sure, but this doesn't change the point I've made. I recognize that you are aiming for an end-state. I was not intending to say otherwise.

But again, I'm waiting to discern what you interpret Kant to mean by the term "Kingdom of Ends" ... such that it, as realm of being, is not equivalent to a realm wherein minimal harm and maximal harmony is actualized. — javra

The main problem with your interpretation is that none of the texts that you have provided support it, and this is because Kant is explicit that the "Kingdom of Ends" is only an ideal, or in your quote, "merely possible." If it were more than an ideal and it were—as you seem to conceive it—an actualizable utopia, then all of the problems I have pointed out would come to bear. In that case the utopian end-state would be liable to justify the sort of violence you have in mind, all in order to achieve it. That you think it is actualizable is obvious from the fact that you think we are required to resort to violence to bring it about (when that violence is a form of self-defense). You have even gone so far as to claim that "do not commit violence" entails using violence to ensure that there exist agents to not-commit violence ().

I actually don't see anything in Kant's ethical writings that tracks your idea. For Kant the Kingdom of Ends is an ideal, and where he probes its actuality he moves into theology and eschatology (which is a standard Christian move regarding such ideal realities). I grant that such a notion is, in a sense, teleological, but it is not meant by Kant to be the sort of end or goal that justifies things like acts of violence.

My main point to these quickly produced references being, what you have taken to be "my view" is neither idiosyncratic nor original in its analysis of Kantian ethics. — javra

According to your source such interpretations are certainly atypical, deviating from the received view. Still, none of the sources you cite are promoting your view that it is necessary to resort to violence to bring about a Kingdom of Ends. That strikes me as a grievous departure from Kant.

I would be interested to know how Kant justifies punishment or capital punishment or defensive war, but I can guarantee that it is not by appealing to a utopian end. He will inevitably say that such punishments do not fail to treat the individual as an end in themselves.

But philosophy did not stop at Aristotle, or even Aquinas. They are interesting, even fun, but not necessary. — Banno

Do you think there are philosophers who are more necessary than Plato and Aristotle?

It's interesting to me that you often complain (with Midgley) about the sorry state of philosophy, but I'm not sure you have a remedy to hand. Now, I've no doubt that folks like Hare and Wittgenstein are better at resisting the problems than their contemporaries, but they are at the same time enmeshed in the same sorts of problems that tend to plague 20th century English-speaking philosophy.

But teaching this stuff formally, as part of the curriculum, is unnecessary and probably counterproductive. Only some folk will have the stomach for it. The rest will reject it. — Banno

As an analogy, a society without cabinetmakers will tend to be comparatively lacking in all that relates to quality cabinets. Sure - others can fill in the gaps. General carpenters and those who specialize in other disciplines can manage to throw together a cabinet in a pinch, and these cabinets will be more or less passable. But without the specialization and its outflow into the society a lacuna will form.

Actually in our age of hyper-specialization overarching disciplines like philosophy become especially important. I think you are over-associating philosophy with logic, but even in the case of logic the analogy holds. For example, Scientism is full of scientists who "throw together logic in a pinch," and it's not so much that their logic is incorrect, but rather that it's incomplete, and they end up mistaking logic for scientific logic. When those disciplines which anchor all disciplines—such as logic—become unmoored and conflated with sub-disciplines, then all of the sub-disciplines that rely on the anchor suffer.

For the sake of argument: Why couldn’t the dictator genuinely believe that it’s rational to advocate dominance over others? In that case, he’d be offering what he perceives to be genuine arguments in his favor. The other case is the one you’re imagining: The dictator tries to get the better of others by using rhetoric, specious arguments, etc.

In fact, the more I think about it, the more I think Habermas wants us to imagine the first, “genuine” type of dictator. Remember, the key point is the rationality of the position. Anyone can try to dominate others by false rhetorical tactics, and those tactics needn’t be rational in the least. What we want to know is, if the dictator is willing to argue for his actual ethical stance, and claim that his use of shabby, irrational pseudo-arguments is a completely rational means to his ends, could he do it without contradiction? — J

You place on the one hand the dictator who "tries to get the better of others by using rhetoric, specious arguments," and on the other hand the dictator who uses, "shabby, irrational pseudo-arguments [as] a completely rational means to his ends." They seem like the same thing, not two different things.

More precisely, I would say that the one who is willing to argue for his position in good faith is not a dictator or a sophist. But then there is Thrasymachus:

This would be the dissimulating type, above. But consider Thrasymachus again – is he dissimulating? (He’s not a sophist, of course.) I read his arguments as entirely sincere. Indeed, if he’d thought about them more carefully, and taken a better measure of Socrates, he’d have either kept silent or come up with another plan to get his own way (or show off his rhetorical chops!); being sincere didn't work. I’m not too comfortable saying that Socrates reveals a performative contradiction in Thrasymachus’ position, but he certainly reveals that position as undefendable, at least by Thrasymachus, and even causes him to blush with shame. — J

Thrasymachus begins by dissimulating, but he gets called out. He is the sophist who proves unsuccessful in the face of Socrates' strength, and what occurs is a partial reformation (with the blushing and whatnot). Also, at 344d the group self-polices Thrasymachus' sophistry, and this is one of the things that injures the sophistic tactics. By pushing Thrasymachus into the defense of sophistry (a kind of meta-sophistry) Socrates ends up achieving a small victory. But sophists don't usually meet such skillful or generous interlocutors.

The end of self-flattery and the end of manipulation are both injurious to the end of the love of wisdom, and are therefore contrary to ethical discourse. For Thrasymachus the manipulation gets opposed and cut short, but I think it is clear that it would normally be in play.

Very interesting. For me, this raises a characteristically modern ethical problem: To what extent is this kind of judgment possible? The analogy with a basketball game places the referee above the intersubjective system (the game), but is this really the case? In one sense, he’s the judge, and his call on a particular play is authoritative; he doesn’t require everyone to agree with him. But in another sense, the referee is completely at the mercy of the rules, to the extent that he’s an accurate and fair judge. — J

Well that's just it: the sophist is not an accurate or fair judge. He permits himself to do what is impermissible, and unless others are able to shift into the role of the referee the game will dissolve. When sophistry reigns unchecked entire nations can be swallowed up in corruption and strife. The rules need to be enforced, else they may as well not exist.

Habermas wants the rules of his “game” to arise from “transcendental/pragmatic” intersubjective agreement. The transcendental part is important. This isn’t just a matter of consensus. We’re supposed to understand communicative rationality as invoking certain background conditions that are necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) for rationality to exist. It then becomes pragmatic, because we agree on ways to apply such rationality in our time, in our circumstances. — J

I would welcome the idea that Habermas is open to transcending intersubjectivity and/or consensus, but it remains true that if Habermas is not able to definitively judge someone like the first-person dictator then I don't see how the transcendental part will help him. The transcendental part must be brought to bear, and Kant does bring it to bear in his prohibition on lying. Kant gives a valid argument for why the sophist cannot lie (whether or not it is sound). That sort of thing is what is required. And so the question recurs, "In virtue of what does Habermas' obligation apply to the dictator?"

What is the difference between the end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony" and Kant's Kingdom of Ends? — javra

As I have pointed out numerous times, Kant has no "Kingdom of Ends" in the way that you use that term. Kant is not a utopian who thinks that we need to resort to violence to bring about his utopia. This is, again, the opposite of what Kant thinks. Therefore your question makes no sense to me. You are taking a consequentialist maxim and trying to make it Kantian.

And how do you view this stipulated end as differing from Kant's Kingdom of Ends? — javra

It is the end that you stipulated. To minimize harm and maximize harmony is obviously not the same as treating everyone as an end in themselves.

Again, your "Kingdom of Ends" seems to be internally contradictory. You want to have a kingdom of ends in which not everyone is treated as an end. If you really think this is Kantian you will have to provide the quote from Kant, for it is prima facie implausible to think that Kant would hold that a "Kingdom of Ends" can justify the means of, say, violence. Kant's whole system is based on the idea that the end does not justify the means. Your whole system is based on the idea that the end justifies the means.

- Means toward the end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony."

(I added an edit to my last post to try to more directly address your question about contradictions.)

Perplexity does not equate to the occurrence of contradictions — javra

Sure it does. "An agent is perplexed if she is unable to avoid acting immorally" (). It is to find oneself in the situation where what is right and what is wrong converge into one thing, and given that "right" and "wrong" are mutually exclusive this produces a contradiction. The very fact that your system results in perplexity shows that it involves contradictory principles.

Yet an affirmation of X does not of itself justify X being true. — javra

On the contrary, to affirm X is to say that X is true.

And I so far find no contradictions in what I’ve previously stated: Again, given the exact same distal intent of, say, minimizing harm and maximizing harmony, the use of violence as means of obtaining this very same distal intent can be simultaneously right in proximal application (wherein far greater harm/disharmony is thereby avoided) and yet remain wrong in distal terms (for an absolute harmony cannot be of itself produced via violence); therefore being simultaneously right and wrong but in different respects. — javra

You have two ends: to survive, and to not-use violence. To use violence as a means to survival is to contradict your second end.

Now if you rewrite your system and say that you're only trying to "minimize harm and maximize harmony," then these two things which were formally ends now become means. You are of course free to retract your earlier system and do this, but on your earlier system you claimed that do-not-use-others-as-a-means was an ultimate end. Given that you transgressed this ultimate end (with violence), you were contradicting yourself. Note too that the rewriting dissolves the perplexity along with the contradictions.

Am I mistaken in understanding the quote to conclude that my arguments make use of contradictions? And does not a contradiction require that incongruent givens simultaneously occur in the same respect? — javra

To never-use-violence and to use-violence-as-a-means contradict one another in the same respect. If they don't then I would suggest that on your view such contradiction is logically impossible, and could not occur in any circumstance. Similarly, the perplexity-contradiction is a contradiction of non-hypothetical ought-judgments, and two contradictory non-hypothetical ought-judgments contradict one another "in the same respect."

If we agree that indeed, wanting to buy a phone for non-financial reasons may lead to the financial decision of buying a phone, then we can apply that to "moral judgements" defined in the OP. "Moral judgements" are non-hypothetical ought-judgements, and would parallel with the financial decision of buying a phone. If we non-financial motivations can lead to a financial decision, can't non-moral motivations lead to us making a "moral judgement"? — Judaka

The question at hand is whether your analogy is apt. Perhaps you should attempt to give an example of a non-moral decision.

I more or less agree with this, though as I say, I don't know if I'm agreeing on Habermas's behalf or not. — J

Right, and I have more familiarity with your own thinking than Habermas, although I recognize that it was formed by Habermas.

But only some, unless we take a very cynical view of "reaching an understanding." — J

Right.

Also, the term "first-person dictator" can be a little misleading. The dictator is not imagined as doing what real-life dictators mostly do, which is, as you say, commanding and threatening. The first-person dictator position is an ethical stance, which claims that it's perfectly rational for me to try to get other people to do what I want, as far as possible. This desire needn't be fulfilled only by standard dictatorial tactics. In part this is why I think it's plausible that Habermas might be picturing the first-person dictator as being willing to stay engaged in communicative action. — J

Good. Yes, I understand this, and I think my points apply to this more specific kind of dictator, but I wanted you to enunciate the more specific kind. I take it that this more specific kind of dictator is a sophist or propagandist, engaged in duplicity or dissimulation, which are often included as a form of lying.

Staying with Plato, Thrasymachus could be said to espouse the first-person dictator position. It's often been asked, Why does Thrasymachus, given his views, bother talking in the agora at all? (Pride in his rhetorical skills, perhaps.). For Habermas, I think Thrasymachus is an example of a first-person dictator who wants to convince others that his views are correct, but is in performative contradiction by doing so. — J

Yes, but I think the motive you gave is more substantial: "To get other people to do what I want." Of course in Plato's time the two came together: the sophist got what they wanted (money) by way of teaching "philosophy" (rhetoric).

The difficulty with the sophist is that they are slippery, namely because they wish to appear to be engaging in "communicative action," when in fact they are not, and thus their modus operandi is dissimulation. Their very words are a kind of Trojan Horse capable of undermining ethical discourse.

On my view the democratic man holds intersubjectivity as the democratic virtue par excellence, and Habermas is a democratic man (and there are important ways that Kant is not a democratic man). The democratic man is thus concerned with fair, cooperative play. But what the democratic man has difficulty accessing is The Judge, and this relates to "the paradox in ethics" I gestured towards above. Now, if ethical discourse is a game of basketball, then while the democratic man will be zealous that everyone should follow the rules, his worldview gives him no power to enforce the rules. Enforcement requires a judge who is above the intersubjective system (a referee) and whose judgments are not accountable to the canons of intersubjectivity.*

Without a judge the sophist can play to the crowd, generate an intersubjective "understanding" (in the cynical sense), and have The Philosopher executed. Obviously Aristotle, and especially Plato, are good at pointing to the shortcomings of democracy. Note too that the judge need not be externalized. The participants can self-police, but it remains true that the act of policing or judgment is categorically different from an act of communicative action. In effect, communicative action depends for its existence on the non-communicative action of judging (in both the sense of policing and in the broader sense of judging truth-claims; judging intent and judging assertions). The integrity of the intersubjective project will paradoxically depend on the ability of participants to make definitive—and to that extent non-communicative—judgments. This is basically Kierkegaard's distinction between the crowd and the church in his Attack upon Christendom.


* Adverting to our private conversation, the judge's assertion is the assertion of an individual apart from an intersubjective consensus, and thus requires an internalist epistemology. The intersubjective participants are accountable to The Judge, and the judge is accountable to internal criteria of truth, such as justification. This is also the case whenever an individual engages in everyday judgments, even though they use a common language to form those judgments.

Facts are not skills. Which is why I support philosophy as a fundamental pillar of education. And yet many nations or education systems do not offer philosophy as a primary or secondary level module. If it were up to me it would be mandatory and fostered from an early age.

I think the issue is that many assessments are based on an objective points based system. If "Fact X,Y or Z" is mentioned then assign 1, 2 or 3 points to said exam response.

This is not learning, it's a memory test. — Benj96

I do think the U.S. is too opposed to philosophy, but the problem with your proposal is that "philosophy" is an incredibly elusive term. I would follow Lloyd Gerson in defining it in terms of Plato's wake, but many would disagree with me. So perhaps philosophy is a prophylaxis against propaganda; it's just that we will never be able to agree on what "philosophy" should mean.

At the risk of being deemed Godless thus evil (or, far worse, a socialist), I strongly feel that the wellbeing and health of all children needs to be of genuine importance to us all. — FrankGSterleJr

I don't know that anyone would disagree with you. It is always a question of how to achieve such a goal.

Yes, this is similar to the first point that White raises when he pushes back on Habermas's communicative action schema: "Is the obligation to provide justification really a necessary one (does it have to follow from the idea of communicative action itself)?" I think you're pointing to an ambiguity in Habermas (or Habermas as I've been presenting him; I may be the one who doesn't read him clearly). It's this: Are we being asked to imagine the dictator, say, simply stating their position and then refusing further discussion? Or are we supposed to imagine this person arguing for the position? This would seem to make a big difference along the lines you're wondering about. At what point does the schema begin? If I say, "I am not making a claim within the context of communicative action," have I already performatively contradicted myself, according to Habermas? — J

I am thinking of something even more basic:

• Communicative action is "speech-action oriented to reaching an understanding among participants in a dialogue..."
• The dictator is not engaged in any speech-action oriented to reaching an understanding among participants...
• Therefore, the dictator is not engaged in communicative action, and does not bear the obligations that communicative action incurs.

To advert to Plato, the tyrant or the sophist does not "play by the same rules" as the others. The very word, "dictator," belies something foreign to Habermas' presuppositions. To dictate is not to dialogue or argue, and so if communicative action has to do with dialogue then it seems that the dictator is not interested. In virtue of what does Habermas' obligation apply to the dictator? Does Habermas believe that the dictator's use of language to command or threaten, rather than to dialogue, is a legitimate use of language?

(What's curious to me in the phrasing of the OP is not so much that Habermas' ethical principle seems to lack teeth, but rather that it doesn't even seem to self-consistently apply to the dictator. In order to apply to the dictator it would need to apply to speech-acts which are not self-consciously communicative/dialogical acts, and this is precisely what it cannot do. Kant's ethical principle against lying is relevant precisely because it manages to logically apply to the dictator, and this is because the genus to which Kant applies his principle is 'statements', which in no way depend on the speaker intending a "communicative action." Crucially, Kant is willing to appeal to a higher order than intersubjectivity, and he is willing to invoke a higher moral theory than intentionalism. Because the dictator is only required to state or assert, and a lie is a statement, therefore it follows (on Kant's logic) that the dictator's lies are impermissible regardless of intention. Habermas seems to be coming up short against the paradox in ethics whereby prohibitions would seem to be unethical insofar as they tend to go beyond their own seemingly-absolute rules. Namely, to enforce or even assert the obligation that Habermas wishes to assert is, in some sense, to already have gone beyond communicative action (and intersubjectivity/intentionalism). I would suggest that this is a significant problem, and one which leads to an undue "softness." Note that this also represents a practical problem on TPF insofar as moderators must decide what is beyond the pale, and who should be banned.)

If someone had constant thoughts and fantasies about raping, torturing, killing etc people that they may or may not enjoy but were perfectly moral in the real world (either for its own sake or from fear of consequences of acting on said fantasies) is it reasonable to describe such thoughts as evil? — Captain Homicide

Classically one becomes culpable for an evil thought to the extent that one wills it. So a thought of rape that is in no way willed or assented to is not an evil act, but to assent or intend such thoughts is an evil act. Even on materialism, although the evil act does not harm another, it does harm oneself and inclines oneself towards acts of rape.

Interesting thread, . I am not overly familiar with Habermas, although I understand some of this broad themes.

This is because, as Habermas writes, there is a “speech-act-immanent obligation to provide justification” for any claim raised within the context of communicative action. — J

I am wondering what reason we have to think that the first-person dictator and the free rider are engaged in what Habermas calls "communicative action."* It seems to me that such persons are explicitly intending to not participate in "communicative action." They wish to be uncooperative, not cooperative. Therefore they don't seem to have the obligation you speak of. They would say, "I am not raising a claim within the context of communicative action, and therefore I have no such obligation."

Coming at this from a different angle, I am curious to see an argument you would give in favor of the Habermasian position, and I am specifically interested to see how (if at all) it deviates from Kantianism. For example, Kant's justification for the impermissibility of lies seems to be nothing more than an appeal to "communicative action."

* You define communicative action as, "speech-action oriented to reaching an understanding among participants in a dialogue concerning practical or prudential ends."

Say I've got the option to buy a new phone to replace my old one, but don't wish to, and claim "It's not due to financial reasons". Though the act of buying a phone is clearly related to my finances and would be a financial decision, I'd have meant that my decision was motivated instead by other factors. — Judaka

The question is then whether one can say that, "My decision was instead motivated by non-moral factors," which according to the OP would entail that it involves no non-hypothetical ought-judgment.

To keep things short, I don't find that my account of ethics would make any sense whatsoever were it to in fact incorporate "contradictions", which I do not find my account to incorporate: At no juncture in my account can there ever be something that is both right and wrong at the same time and in the same respect. — javra

Here is what I said:

The problem is that your system contains internal contradictions, and framing Kantianism in terms of consequence-ends is already a contradiction that Kant would not have accepted. These contradictions are producing further contradictions, such as the idea that violence is compatible with a "Kingdom of Ends." — Leontiskos

So, for example, on your scheme violence is simultaneously right and wrong. It is right qua survival and it is wrong qua using-another-as-a-means. The problem is that your principles are not necessarily in sync, and in certain cases they oppose one another (and lead to perplexity). So you could do what most perplexity-views do and weight your principles, but before that you would need to admit that you have two principles in the first place (i.e. that "survival" is distinct from a prohibition on violence).

It doesn't matter that something is not right and wrong in the same respect; such is not needed to produce perplexity. It only matters that something be simultaneously right and wrong.

I see that I was addressing many presumptions which are not shared. This for instance. By "obstacle" I naturally assumed that that which stands in the way and thereby impedes is/was unforeseen. Otherwise I'd simply view it as part of the terrain to be traveled. If I see a house between me and the house's backyard to which I want to get to, I don't then discern the house to be an obstacle in my path. But if I expect the backyard gate to be unlocked when in fact it is, this I might then consider something that impedes my intended progress. — javra

On the contrary, in charting a path to a destination one will be apt to identify obstacles. So if I chart a path that must cross a river, and I look for a bridge, I am already considering the river as an obstacle which must be overcome. Obstacles are not necessarily unforeseen. Often we consider obstacles before deciding whether to "travel."

Every voyage toward a destination is, consciously or unconsciously, idealized to go as expected or planed, i.e. for the circumstances to be as one best foresees, and thereby idealizes, them. If I take a flight from A to Z, unexpected weather conditions might have it that I get detoured and delayed. Or that I never arrive. Nevertheless, I will take the flight expecting to arrive on time as per the ideal circumstances of so arriving as scheduled. — javra

It is only idealized within certain parameters, and your "idealization" was straight-line travel. Straight-line travel is never expected, except in the case of air travel, and most forms of transportation are not air travel. If you had stipulated that you were talking about air travel then this would make more sense, but you did not do so and there was nothing in your analogy that would cause one to conclude that you were in an airplane or helicopter. Thus the obstacles to straight-line travel should have been, at least in a certain vague sense, foreseeable (partially foreseen and partially unforeseen). Whenever I go somewhere I try to go in a straight line (the ideal), and I know with certainty that it will not be possible unless I am flying (or perhaps traveling by water).

"Do not commit violence" holds no meaning or significance in the complete absence of agents. In order for violence to not be committed, there must be agents present which do not commit violence. So I again find the presented dichotomy of ends to be inappropriate. — javra

On this reading you must think that the pacifist could not agree to the rule, "Do not commit violence," which is of course strange to say the least. "Do not commit violence" simply does not mean, "Do not commit violence unless your survival is threatened." People do not generally say, "In order to not-commit violence we must be alive, so therefore in order to obey the rule 'Do not commit violence' we must use violence against this aggressor who is trying to kill us." I don't think this is plausible at all. It strikes me as common sense that use of violence will be contrary to a rule against violence.

Aside from which, as stated (1) gives the impression of an absolute commandment. — javra

It was not absolute. The rationale was provided: "because violence requires treating the object as a means." The idea was <We are not to treat others as a means; violence treats others as a means; therefore we are not to use violence>.

Moreover, the "strict pacifism" mentioned would leave all peace aspiring people to die at the hands of violent people... — javra

Pacifists are vulnerable, yes. That's part of what it means to be a pacifist. You seem to think that pacifism is logically impossible...? Part of my difficulty with your examples is that they erect false dilemmas. The pacifist has an option other than fight or die: it is to run. The German has an option other than tell the truth or give up the Jews: it is to mislead, or to fight, or to equivocate; etc.

How might this bring about or else be in the service of a "Kingdom of Ends"? — javra

It won't, but neither will your approach, as I already noted, 'I'm not sure if it is possible to arrive at a "Kingdom of Ends" so long as (2) is given precedence over (1). When would you ever "get there"?' The problem is that your system contains internal contradictions, and framing Kantianism in terms of consequence-ends is already a contradiction that Kant would not have accepted. These contradictions are producing further contradictions, such as the idea that violence is compatible with a "Kingdom of Ends." Again, the ends with which one begins will determine whether contradictions (and perplexity) are possible.

The problem of using violence to achieve a violence-free society is the Marxist problem of having to "Break a few eggs to make an omelette." It is paradoxical, and for those who adhere to the classical doctrine wherein the end does not justify the means, it doesn't work.

Aside from certain parts of the second counterexample I've provided, where have i done so? — javra

It happened in both counterexamples, the evil genius and the tyrant king. In the case of the evil genius (which example I initially raised) you said that the attribution-footstep was not a moral/human act.

I am now getting the sense that you might uphold a moral code of duties via systems of deontology that traditionally have made little sense to me. Namely, those which uphold a strict duty or obligation to absolute oughts and ought nots irrespective of consequence. — javra

Rather, I think duty/obligation is built in to your attribution of "immorality," which you refuse to forfeit even in cases of necessity. Given that you hold that there are immoral actions which are necessary (and therefore permissible), I conclude that you are working with a form of moral perplexity. You explain this in terms of "departing from the ideal," but it seems clear that there are conflicting duties at play when, say, a quasi-pacifist must resort to violence. I thought this was the very point of your analogy; that it was meant to highlight the tensions that must be worked out.

So if we wanted to tailor-fit the definition of perplexity to your own verbiage we could say that "An agent is perplexed if she is unable to avoid acting immorally."

If so, I would rather not continue this conversation, being fairly confident that it will result in disagreements without resolution. — javra

That's fair enough. Thanks for the interesting conversation. :up:

I hope I didn't give the impression that perplexity-views such as your own are beyond the pale. I think they make a certain amount of sense given the complexity of the moral landscape. Beyond that, following Aristotle and Aquinas, my style is much more terse than your own, but that doesn't indicate a lack of effort. I just think that many of the relevant arguments can be said in few words.

I’ll for now address the following last portion of your first reply since I see this as pivotal to most all of the other replies I might myself give. I know there is a lot left for me to address, but, before I do, please let me know if the following is something that you find fault with. If this leads to an insurmountable difference of perspectives, then I doubt you’d find any of my other further replies cogent. — javra

Okay, thanks.

I want to say that there are two ends or a twofold end rather than just one. First let's take your analogy:

Via one analogy (which as analogy can only go so far), say that one strives to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible so as to win a prize. Were it at all possible to do so, one would then rationally follow a straight path from point A to point Z, this being the shortest path to travel. But there is an intractable obstacle in the way at point K. — javra

What are the two ends?

1. Strive to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible.
2. Strive to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible, in ideal circumstances.

Obstacles only present a problem if I am doing (2) instead of (1). This is in many ways related to hypothetical and non-hypothetical ought-judgments. "If there were not a rock in my path, then I would not need to use precious time circumventing it" (hypothetical judgment). "There is a rock in my path, therefore I will need to go around it to achieve my goal" (non-hypothetical judgment). More precisely, "as short a time as possible" increases each time you encounter an obstacle, and therefore the obstacle does not impede (1). But "as short a time as possible, in ideal circumstances," does not change when you encounter an obstacle, because an obstacle is a non-ideal circumstance. So the question is: Are you trying to do (1) or are you trying to do (2)? Or perhaps you are trying to do both? Or perhaps the more pertinent question is, "What happens when we encounter unforeseen obstacles or dilemmas?"

To then ask whether violence is moral or immoral will depend on the vantage taken: relative to the very actualization and thereby eventual actuality of Z, it will always be immoral. Yet relative to what is on occasion pragmatically needed to best approach the actualization of Z, it will in certain circumstances be moral. As was illustrated, this strictly contingent on—not its application per se—but the intention with which it becomes applied. — javra

Again, I see two ends, and in this case I think both are simultaneously aimed at:

1. Do not commit violence (because violence requires treating the object as a means)
2. Survive as a community

These are both involved in the goal to, "Arrive at a Kingdom of Ends."

But in this case it seems that (2) is given precedence over (1), and I'm not sure if it is possible to arrive at a "Kingdom of Ends" so long as (2) is given precedence over (1). When would you ever "get there"? Obviously the alternative would be strict pacifism: giving (1) precedence over (2).

Secondly, in light of (2) does (1) need to be revised to (1a): "Do not commit violence except in extremis"? It seems like this is the rule that is actually in play, although there is simultaneously a desire or telos towards (1).

For what its worth, it might be cumbersome to explain, but I all the same so far find it conformant to the living of a virtuous life (this as best one can, with the occasional mistake granted). — javra

Yes, and I want to try to be respectful of the fact that you are giving analogies, which will of course limp. Hearkening back to the OP, my difficulty is the way that you are apt to class exceptions as non-human acts. I want to stress that the exceptional act of violence is still a human act, and by recognizing it as a human act we are able to recognize its rationale, namely (2). Moral systems almost always come up against this problem of exceptions, and the case is sometimes termed "in extremis" (at the point of death).

Still, to class exceptions as "amoral" does make sense in a certain way, but I think I would stick with my analysis in terms of what is "understandable" as opposed to what is amoral ().

More generally, I think moral systems that do not take account of obstacles or dilemmas are to that extent poor moral systems. For example, in sanctioning certain legal forms of violence I think your community should have already considered the relation between (1) and (2). In speaking to J about a similar topic in private, I sent him a book review, "Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought from Gratian to Aquinas." Our difference seems to be over whether moral "perplexity" (simpliciter) is possible.* For older thinkers like Aquinas perplexity is not possible, whereas for thinkers in the modern period perplexity seems to be unavoidable.

If you wish to continue, it seems to me that we would need to discuss this issue of moral perplexity. It seems that on theories such as your own, which admit of perplexity, one must either transgress duties or else redefine those duties as being in some way non-obligatory. Still, I think the question of ends is intrinsically bound up in these taxonomies, for the possibility of perplexity seems to depend on the ends in play.

I hope this reply makes sense. I was a bit tired when I wrote it, so hopefully I didn't run roughshod over the analogous nature of the analogy. It's possible that to parse the ends separately is to lose their essential cohesion.

* "An agent is perplexed if she is unable to avoid acting against an obligation" (404).

P.S. The other elephant in the room is something that the modern tradition often overlooks: akrasia. But I will leave it be for now.

Harm, or suffering, is not merely subjective (as I've sketched previously ↪180 Proof) whereas "happiness" is whollly subjective (e.g. hedonic set-points are not the same for everyone or constant through time for each individual); the latter, therefore, is not as foreseeable, or reliably known, as the former such that reducing harm / injustice is a more realizable and effective moral strategy than trying to "maximize happiness" (whatever "happiness" means).

However, it's my position that on avarage – all things being equal – we optimize well-being, or "happiness", in any situation where harm / injustice has been prevented and/or reduced as much as possible such that it's not a binary choice but rather is a matter of priority whereby the "secondary" consideration (positive utility/consequence (e.g. more sex)) is a function, or opportuned by, the "primary" (negative utility/consequence (e.g. less illness)) and yet not the other way around (e.g. health-wealth-fame-power-pleasure "maximizing" itself cannot prevent or reduce suffering, misery or (self)harm).

Some primary influences on my moral thinking are Epicurus, Spinoza, K. Popper, D. Parfit & P. Foot. — 180 Proof

Okay, thanks. That makes good sense, and I think I agree with you that happiness is more subjective than harm. I certainly agree that safety from harm provides a strong condition for the seeking of happiness.

Regarding your idea that happiness is "wholly subjective," there seems to be an interesting counterargument at hand:

Have you had such an experience? If not, then isn't it more reasonable than not to conclude that everyone is vulnerable to and can recognize the kinds of harm you've experience because they are objective phenomena? :chin: — 180 Proof

@Lionino has posited that both harm and benefit are somewhat subjective, and in response you challenged him to provide a kind of harm that is not recognizable by others. Could the same be said of happiness? Could we say that the kinds of happiness that I experience are also recognized by others as kinds of happiness? (For example, food, sex, comfort, knowledge, etc.)

- Good post. I am pressed for time so I will just offer a short response.

I can think of one reason to preference the reduction of the negative over the maximization of some positive principle (e.g., pleasure for J.S. Mill). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, and as I told @Lionino a few times: I accept that harm is more potent than benefit.

Minimizing harm seems to be less likely to fall into the "min/max" trap. We are inclined to think of disease, dysfunction, etc. as a variation from some stability point or harmony. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think much of what you say makes good sense. Still, I think one of your implicit premises is that harm correlates to a disruption of harmony or a deviation from homeostasis, and I am not convinced that this premise is sufficiently developed. It seems to involve a specialized meaning of harm. In my opinion, in these debates the crux is to somehow introduce objective normativity, and this is where things always get difficult. Your post focused on this idea quite a bit.

However, when it comes to the acquisition of positive things, we often tend to look to maximize the good. For example, Mill wants to maximize pleasure (and we might consider here Plato's distinction of which pleasures are better than others in the Philibus or Aristotle's in Book X of the Ethics as counter examples). This makes a certain sense to me, because when it comes to the acquisition of external goods, food stores, money, etc., it is always nice to have more as a sort of "backup." More won't hurt, we can always just not use a resource we have "extra," of, or share it in exchange for some other good. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Actually I think the maximization of pleasure will be detrimental to organisms, and this seems like an important problem in Mill's view. More really can hurt, and the classical virtue of temperance will to some extent simply curb an excessive desire for pleasure simpliciter. The Philebus enters into the "objective normativity" question, attempting to refine the manner in which we ought to desire pleasure (and Mill tries to do this too, in his own way). So at first glance your argument does seem to hold, given that negative utilitarianism seems to favor homeostasis more than classic utilitarianism does.

I don't understand the question. :confused:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_utilitarianism (I interpret this reducing harm-caused-by-personal-conduct / judgment as normative morality ↪180 Proof) — 180 Proof

When I heard about negative utilitarianism I thought of that clause in the Hippocratic Oath, "First, do no harm..." But this implies that there is a "second," and I am wondering about that "second." I am wondering why only harm considerations are moral considerations. From your Wikipedia article:

Negative utilitarianism is a form of negative consequentialism that can be described as the view that people should minimize the total amount of aggregate suffering, or that they should minimize suffering and then, secondarily, maximize the total amount of happiness. — Wikipedia | Negative Utilitarianism

So apparently some negative utilitarians think there is a "second," namely, to "maximize the total amount of happiness." The question could then be rephrased: why choose the first form of negative utilitarianism over the second form?

From a 2023 thread Convince Me of Moral Realism, by 'harm' (in some of its various forms) I mean this...

And by 'injustice' I mean harm to individuals as a direct or indirect consequence of a social structure, or lack thereof, reproduced by customs, public policies, legistlation, jurisprudence or arbitrary violence. Thus, utilitarianism is a kind (or subset) of consequentialism.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_consequentialism (I interpret this reducing injustice (i.e. reducing harm-caused-by-social-structure / violence) as applied morality ↪180 Proof) — 180 Proof

Okay, this is helpful. :up:

Leontiskos – Assuming you intend to reply, I've just edited my previous post so that (hopefully) my statements are clearer. — 180 Proof

Sounds good.

---

Because the word "quality" here is often up to personal preference, as I note: If I am shooting someone, I am making them lose qualities (health) that we hold universally as desirable. However, if I offer someone drugs, there will be wide disagreement about whether I am harming or helping them because what the drug is supposed to counteract may or may not be held positively, or may or may not be held more negatively than the other effects of the drug. — Lionino

Okay, sure.

Well, being fat would not be a quality — so would everybody say prior to 2013.

In most cases no, because being addicted is something that (almost) all would agree is not a quality but the inverse of it. — Lionino

When you were using the word "quality" earlier I assumed you were using a value-neutral term, because that is how that term is often used. In that sense to possess something, such as weight or alcohol, would be a quality. But it now seems that by "quality" you mean "good quality," such that an alcoholic cannot have the quality of "possessing a bottle of alcohol," because the alcohol is not good for him. Yes?

I skimmed through the paper. The principal example given - that of killing one person to save five - has always been irksome to me due to its ambiguity/non-specificity: ought one kill a Mother Teresa to save five Hitlers or, else, ought one not kill one Hitler and allow five Mother Teresas to die instead? — javra

I'd say the idea is that it doesn't matter who's who, as long as they are innocent. It will always be wrong to kill "one innocent person to save two or five innocent persons from being killed by someone else" (1).

I think the basic idea here is fairly straightforward. It is the question, "Does duress excuse?" Or, "Is one still culpable when they act under duress?" — Leontiskos

But the issue to this hypothetical, within its own context of argument, is as follows: must the person in this case then be answerable for the goodness/badness of the deed they brought about?

In other words, are they in any way morally responsible for their choice (a choice which they now are attributively responsible for)? Specifically, this for having insulted a stranger rather than having done a far worse bad/evil/wrong against this same stranger. — javra

For me the important question is whether they are responsible for (a). I can agree with everything else you say as being fairly straightforward (e.g. it is good that they chose a.i rather than a.ii ; it is at least understandable that they chose (a) rather than (b)).

As an aside, was the bolded here a typo?

(unlike the choice between (a) and (b) - which, due to being made under extreme duress, the person can be argued to not be attributively responsible for) — javra

By "attributively" did you mean to write "morally"?

It's not about the choice or deed being excusable due to the duress - there was no duress in the two alternatives of the second choice that was taken (there was only a necessary choice between a fixed set of alternatives, with complete liberty to choose either). It's about the individual not being answerable for the goodness or badness (depending on perspective) of the choice of insulting a stranger rather than beating them unconscious. (In contrast, were the person to choose not to insult but to instead beat the stranger unconscious, then they would be morally responsible for their choice - for, in this case, they would now be answerable for the goodness/badness of their choice.) — javra

This strikes me as the same issue I tried to address earlier in my paragraph that began, "I think you are right that the comparison will itself be an act of deliberation..." (). What is happening in both cases, I believe, is that you are conflating two acts with a single act.

Here are the two acts as I see them:

1. Choose between (a) and (b)
2. If (a), then choose between a.i and a.ii

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think you are saying that you are "attributively responsible" for both (1) and (2), and morally responsible for (2) but not for (1) (because of the duress involved in (1)). Similarly, you think (2) is a human act but (1) is not (because of the duress involved in (1)).

If this understanding is correct, then the response that I already gave should be on point. If this understanding is incorrect, then the response that I already gave may be missing something. Again, it seems to me that the central question is whether the duress involved in act (1) makes it non-moral and non-human, and this is the question I tried to address in my last response.

I should add that, in the same way that you think lying to the Nazi is praiseworthy, presumably choosing (a) is deemed praiseworthy. If it is praiseworthy, then it must be moral in the OP's sense.

(It is possible to parse the acts differently than I did, but I think that in any case there will be multiple acts.)

I'm myself finding it a good means of honing my reasoning skills (or lack thereof :smile: ) — javra

Yes, it is a good exercise! - haha.

Myself, I so far find the idealizations of what should be which are presented in this reply contrary to "deliberate reason ... directed to the due end" which Aquinas also makes mention of. Were this due end, for example, to be that of completely obeying or else holding duty to a set of rules set up by some supreme rule-maker, this might then make sense to me. But consider this hypothetical: either one tells oneself a white lie (say, that today the appearance of one's clothes is decent when, in reality, one does not feel this to be so) or, else, all of humanity perishes (one can affix whatever daemon scenario on pleases to this). If the end pursued is absolute obedience/duty to the rule-maker's rule that one does not ever lie, then it might be correct, or right, to destroy all of humanity by not lying. Yet - not only does this intuitively seem very wrong - but, in changing the end one directs one's actions toward to that of, say, maximal eudemonia, it would then necessarily be rationally incorrect, or worng, to do so as well. — javra

But now you're saying that not-lying is immoral, and this seems to prove my point. If I think lying is immoral and you think not-lying is immoral, then we are in agreement that lying is not amoral.

That said, any system of consequentialism that does not look upon such literally ultimate long-term goal but, instead, focuses one merely intermediate goals will, to me, necessarily be less than moral. One here deems eating candy a good due to the intermediate goal of satisfying one's sweet-tooth despite so doing leading to tooth decay and the loss of one's teeth ... sort of mindset. And I don't find that typical utilitarianism holds any such ultimate long-term goal in mind - just a generalized heuristic that might or might not eventually lead to such goal (depending on its interpretation and administration). — javra

But doesn't classical utilitarianism hold to the long-term goal of maximizing pleasure? In this case pleasure is the goal or telos, and it is appraised in terms of consequences (i.e. "Will this act lead to maximal pleasure?"). On first blush it would seem that you simply have more goals than this utilitarian, but that all of your goals are similarly appraised in terms of consequences. I wouldn't call your system deontological because none of your goals are immune to being overridden on account of consequences. Kant does have such immunities, and for this reason he seems to be interested in rules, not goals. He has rules which must be universally applied, not goals which must be worked toward. So Kant's rules preclude him from lying, and they preclude him regardless of any alluring consequences that could be foreseen. Unlike consequentialism, Kantianism is therefore not quantitative or calculative. It seems to me that his system is intended to be a priori in the sense that it does not advert to consequences and inclinations (but I am not a Kantian).

Yes, language is important, and I was clumsy in how I applied it. To try to better explain, an important synonym for good is "beneficial", which can be interpreted as being of proper fit. One then can further interpret good as that which is of proper fit to one's goal, or telos. There are always different teloi we actively hold at the same time: some proximate, some distal, some intermediate (and, in my own musing, as per what I mentioned above, one's ultimate telos, which I shall here address as "the Good"). That which fits the Good is always good/right in an ultimate sense. That which is antithetical to the Good is then always bad/wrong in an ultimate sense. Then, if one's actively held ultimate goal "X" is antithetical to the Good, one's intentions will always be bad/wrong in an ultimate sense. This even if, to further approach or actualize goal X, one needs to engage in acts that are of themselves a proper fit to the Good. Example: one wants to sadistically destroy humanity at large but finds that in order to do so one needs to rescue an innocent baby from drowning; one than is compelled to save the baby from drowning (something one would not have otherwise done) in order to destroy humanity and then so proceeds to do. The deed of saving the baby is good, for it of itself as deed is fit to the Good, but the intentions with which this deed is done are bad, for as intentions they are of proper fit to goal X. Otherwise expressed, the saving of the baby does not hold intrinsic value to the saver or the baby - as it would for anyone whose ultimate telos is the Good - but, instead, is strictly of instrumental value in allowing for goal X. In brief, the deed of a saved baby is of itself moral but the intention with which it was saved is immoral. — javra

Okay thanks for explaining that. It makes sense to me and I can agree to much of it. The question I would have—and this may be somewhat tangential—is: What is the difference between intrinsic value and instrumental value? If both baby-savers are saving the baby for the sake of their goal, then why is only one of them acting instrumentally? I think this question may also help get at the consequentialism inquiry.

My beating some complete stranger to a pulp strictly out of the pleasure to do so directly estranges my from the Good. However, where I to be aiming to remain optimally aligned to the Good, and were a horrendous attack on an innocent to occur right in front of me, my then beating to a pulp the assailant so as to prevent the innocent's death (were I to be so capable of doing and were this to somehow be the only viable alternative to take) would be vitiated as an intentionally performed bad/evil/wrong. Here, (were I to be so capable) I would be proud of risking my own life to save the innocent despite the violence I willfully engaged in - and would feel very deep shame and guilt, i.e. profound culpability, where I to do nothing while the innocent died right before me with me doing nothing about it (though, in the latter case, I would not have engaged in any violence myself).

I know things can get more complex, but maybe this serves as good enough explanation? — javra

Hmm. We are considering my thesis that on your system "a bad deed does not vitiate a good end/goal." The qualm I have with your explanation is that the "bad deed" is arguably not a bad deed at all (i.e. defending the innocent by fighting an aggressor). I would rather take something that we commonly accept to be a bad deed, such as raping a woman. If my thesis is correct, then on your view it would be reasonable to say that, in some cases, raping a woman is not only not immoral, but is morally necessary and praiseworthy, if it achieves some proportionately good end (such as avoiding "the perishing of all humanity"). The idea here is that any deed, no matter how evil, is always justifiable in principle. There is apparently no deed of which we can say that it is impermissible in all circumstances (except for "deeds" which are abstractions, such as "causing maximal suffering").

You are right, it's not easy to phrase these disparate notions of wrongness in common speech. But to try to clarify my position: X is not a wrong (an incorrect or else unfit) course of action to take as a necessary means of achieving Y which is itself optimally fitting to an eventual achieving of the ultimate good goal Z - this even though, in direct respect to ultimate good Z, X can only be ascertained as ultimately being a wrong (this because it does not allow for the ultimate achievement of Z). More concretely, let Z = Kant's Kingdom of Ends; Ukraine's engaging in war against an unjustly invading Russia is then something that cannot of itself directly achieve a Kingdom of Ends and, so, is a wrong in this ultimate sense (I do have trouble calling Ukraine's war of self-deference an evil, though, even when termed a "lesser evil"); nevertheless, Ukraine's engaging in war is necessary to achieve Ukraine's maintaining of autonomy, which is itself optimally aligned to an eventual Kingdom of Ends. As regards common speech: although we all know that war is ultimately bad, it is good for Ukraine to engage in war against an unjust invader rather then allowing itself to be decimated by not engaging in such war. — javra

As above, I have a hard time with this attempted reframing of Kantianism in terms of consequences—even the consequence of a Kingdom of Ends. Let me therefore leave Kantianism to the side for the moment.

Regarding your X, Y, Z analysis, I would want to say that if X is necessary to achieve Y and Y is necessary to achieve Z, then X is necessary to achieve Z. In fact this would seem to prove that it is false to claim that, "[X] does not allow for the ultimate achievement of Z." Or am I underestimating the work that your term "optimally fitting" is doing? (Note that if, as you seem to say, Z precludes X, then it cannot simultaneously be true that X is necessary to achieve Z)

In my post there was a paragraph that began, "I think you are right that the comparison will itself be an act of deliberation..." (). Given that this had to do with your counterexample to the OP, I am curious if you agree with it.

Best,
Leontiskos

- Sounds good, Bob. Thanks and take care.