- A common thread in all of these positions is the idea that knowledge is not merely cerebral and abstract (e.g. the Hebrew, Indian, Platonic, and Christian traditions). If you consider our modern landscape from that point of view it is highly idiosyncratic, and in fact there is something very odd about the way we conceive of knowledge. If someone from the past visited our time they would be utterly baffled until we showed them the historical genealogy of how we got here.

I don’t know if you’ve read Walker Percy. He makes an interesting distinction between “knowledge” and “news.” Knowledge would be the sort of thing that, broadly, science investigates. News, on the other hand, is information that you can’t deduce or discover for yourself; someone has to tell you. This would include religious revelation, for Percy. And he says that the “credentials of the news-bearer” are important evidence for whether to trust the news.

This may be too black-and-white, but I see what he’s getting at and I think it’s a valuable insight. I wonder what Aquinas would say, getting back to the OP. He made a distinction between natural and revealed religion, didn’t he? And I'm sure Kierkegaard, that champion of subjectivity, would agree. — J

I really enjoy Walker Percy, but it's been a few years since I've read him. Recently I have been reading Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Johann Georg Hamann: three nice counterbalances to the rationalism of this forum. Here is a characteristically polemical utterance from Hamann, haha:

Christianity believes, that is to say, not in the doctrines of philosophy, which are nothing
but an alphabetic scribbling of human speculation, and subject to the fluctuating cycles of
moon and fashion! – not in images and the worship of images! – not in the worship of
animals and heroes! – not in symbolic elements and passwords or in some black figures
obscurely painted by the invisible hand on the white wall! – not in Pythagorean-Platonic
numbers!!! – not in the passing shadows of actions and ceremonies that will not remain
and not endure, which are thought to possess a secret power and inexplicable magic! – –
not in any laws, which must be followed even without faith, as the theorist somewhere
says, notwithstanding his Epicurean-Stoic hairsplitting about faith and knowledge! – –
No, Christianity knows of and recognizes no other bonds of faith than the sure prophetic
Word as recorded in the most ancient documents of the human race and in the holy scrip-
tures of authentic Judaism, without Samaritan segregation and apocryphal Mishnah. — After Enlightenment: Hamann as Post-Secular Visionary, by John R. Betz, p. 283

(The context here is a metacritical response to Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem.)

I wonder what Aquinas would say, getting back to the OP. He made a distinction between natural and revealed religion, didn’t he? — J

Aquinas is more or less in agreement with Percy. Here is the body of an article on whether theology (sacred doctrine) is a matter of argument:

As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences: so [sacred doctrine] does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else [...] . However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his objections — if he has any — against faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered. — Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, Q. 1, A. 8

For Aquinas an article of faith cannot be demonstrated or refuted by natural, philosophical reasoning. Thus someone who denies an article of faith cannot be argued into the position, even though their positive objections can be met. The difference between Aquinas and Percy would seem to be that, for Aquinas, revelation ("news") is not restricted to things that are in-principle indemonstrable. For example, Aquinas believes that "the universe had a beginning" is a revealed truth. Aristotle argues from natural reason that the universe had no beginning, and so Aquinas sets himself to meeting and nullifying Aristotle's arguments.

Aquinas also makes a distinction between natural and revealed religion, but his distinction between natural and revealed knowledge seems more appropriate. I tend to agree with him that, in the broad sense, 'religion' is not primarily a matter of knowledge.

Because this won’t work for almost all of our uses of “objective”. It’s objectively true, I presume, that water is composed of H2O. Do we want to describe this statement as a “bias shared among a normative community” -- of scientists, presumably? What would motivate us to call this a bias?

What we want in moral realism, then, is a sense of “objective” that at least resembles what we find in science – or daily life, for that matter. And those who deny moral facts are indeed saying that the best we can do is “biases more or less shared.” But I don’t think that’s a reasonable synonym for “objective.” — J

Quite right and well said! :up:

Maybe? Can you think of an example which isn't culpable? — fdrake

Well, I think the thread branches into those two conceptions: one where stupidity is conceived as inherently culpable and one where it is not. I think Kant's description prescinds from culpability, and hence would equally apply to people with natural mental handicaps. "Stupid" seems to be one of those words that was once used to signify an actual physiological malady, but eventually came to be used as a term of opprobium. Others would include "imbecile," "retarded," etc.

What do you think? — fdrake

It sort of depends on what we are intending to talk about, but in general I would say that stupidity is a consistent failure to act rationally, or to achieve the average level of mental function. More simply, it is the opposite of intelligence. Strictly speaking, I would simply say that the stupid person is prone to err. The question is interesting because eventually one is forced to give their account of intelligence, rationality, or healthy mental functioning. For Kant it is the ability to shape sensory impressions into concepts of reason, and therefore he identifies a malfunction at that juncture as stupidity.

If this is right, then you are committed to the idea that intelligence is fundamentally a willingness to try to learn.

So generally speaking I am claiming that stupidity is a negative or privative concept, and that one must therefore ultimately provide an account of proper mental functioning if they are to give an account of stupidity.

I feel doubt at the proposition that injustice would solve itself. — Moliere

I tend to agree. In my opinion injustice creates a residual disorder in the individual and society, and this residual injustice is very hard to rectify after the fact. As an analogy, an alcoholic might get sober, but if they don't change all sorts of things about their life and their circumstances they will easily fall back into alcoholism.

I think this would depend upon how we'd read the history, honestly. Which facts are we going to emphasize in telling the story of ancient philosophy? In thinking through desire I have reasons to want to find differences -- I'm not really settled on a theory of desire so the differences stand out as important to me as a basis for judgement.

I mean, this is why I emphasize that there's more than one way to read these texts -- my rendition of Epicurus and my rendition of Aristotle definitely disagree :D . Though that does make sense of some things like that they had different schools, rather than Epicurus attending the Lyceum. I had to look up dates on the Lyceum because I wasn't sure, so I thank you for the prodding. Another thing I completely missed is that Cicero's On the Ends features a peripatetic as distinct from both Epicureanism and Stoicism!

So there are some reasons aside from my emphasis to at least think they must be different in some ways. — Moliere

That's fair. To simplify it, as an Aristotelian I tend to think in terms of virtue, and it seems to me that Epicurus would accept some of Aristotle's virtues but reject others. Specifically, they seem to more or less agree on the goodness of temperance (moderation in food, drink, sex, and externally acquired pleasures in general). But I don't think Epicurus will necessarily follow Aristotle when it comes to other virtues, such as courage, or truthfulness, or generosity. So my first impression is that Epicurus is like something of a subset of Aristotle; a simplified scheme.

Cool. So a point of agreement would be that the temperate man does not need a strong will. — Moliere

Right.

But a strong will is not necessary to overcome a disordered soul in the Epicurean philosophy. — Moliere

Well, how is akrasia overcome? I would be surprised if the depraved Epicurean becomes upright without a significant expenditure of effort and will. For example, just because his master tells him to do something, it does not follow that that something will be easy to do.

Aristotle thinks in terms of 'habits', and anyone can see that changing deeply embedded habits takes effort and will.

In part this is probably due to my emphasizing the concepts and how they fit together from the perspective of Epicurus himself; almost always the way ethical concepts fit together and the practices they inspire are not the same. I know there are more cosmopolitan Epicureans who lived after: Diogenes of Oenoanda was rich enough to have land and build an inscription which details the Epicurean philosophy because, so it claims, it lays the path to salvation. So the concepts would lead one to practice a certain way -- a way in which Epicurus did -- but later practitioners found benefit in the philosophy in spite of not following the ascetic way of life that the ideas clearly outline too. My thought on this is that there was a distinction between The Doctors -- like what Epicurus was -- and the people who learn and live the Epicurean philosophy, in a similar way that many religious communities have at least two social layers with different social rules depending upon how much influence you wield within the social organism. — Moliere

Okay, that makes sense. I think I associate Epicureanism with asceticism because Epicureans give up a great many things that most people take for granted. It is a minimalism, albeit not practiced for the sake of a religious end.

A pervasive refusal to try to learn. — fdrake

I think this is a good sense of culpable stupidity. Is all stupidity culpable?

If that's the case, though, why purport to think, or believe, otherwise, i.e. contrary to the way in which you actually live your life? Those who say we should act in one way, and then act in another way, are called hypocrites. I don't say certain philosophers are hypocrites, or even that they're disingenuous when they contend that what we see and interact with every day without question isn't real, or can't be known, but when what we do is so contrary to what we contend, or what we contend is so unrelated to what we do as to make no difference in our lives, I think we have reason to think that we're engaged in affectation. — Ciceronianus

Yes, great point. This is why I prefer philosophers like Aristotle to philosophers like Kant. As others have noted, it is perhaps more common on philosophy forums than among "professional" philosophers. With that said, I think it is also present among professionals, except there it occurs in more subtle ways. For example, Aristotle is quick to remind us that not all matters are susceptible of the same level of certitude, and I think the violation of this maxim is one clear way that philosophers tend to fall into 'affectation'. For instance: the idea that all legitimate knowledge must possess an apodictic kind of certitude, or must be known via the same means as the physical sciences, etc.

I've thought about it, but my thoughts aren't any deeper than what's been presented so far. The best interpretation of Epicurean justice I can muster is that it comes about because people are living happy and tranquil lives -- but that's a lot like an eschatology to my mind which amounts to the thought: if everyone just followed the same ethical creed then everyone would live in harmony and then justice would prevail! But it seems like a weak theory of justice to me because it sort of begs the question in its own way -- it's not exactly a surprising conclusion that if everyone agreed to what is ethical and lived ethically then they'd agree and continue to live a just life. That's pretty unsatisfactory. — Moliere

It seems to me that the deeper idea here is not that ethical homogeneity produces harmony, but rather that injustice is a consequence of unhappiness, and that if people were happy then the problem of injustice would solve itself. This is not such an uncommon idea, nor is it so implausible. Epicureanism always faintly reminds me of Indian religion, and I sometimes hear this idea from that subcontinent.

Then there's the fact that while I think Epicurean desire is an interesting theory of desire I'm uncommitted to it as a universal theory of desire -- basically I'd say I'm still stuck on the structure of desire and describing desire, and anytime I try to think the relationship between desire and justice I find myself thinking about desire again. — Moliere

That makes sense to me. It does represent an important facet of desire, but I'm not sure it captures the whole picture. This is more or less why I said above that Aristotle would accept and incorporate Epicurean premises into his thought as a subset, but Epicurus would probably reject many of the Aristotelian add-ons.

The Epicurean would hold that it is better to have an ataraxic rather than depraved soul... — Moliere

Okay.

I think the uncertainty of the world we inhabit also gives justification to pursue the ataraxic soul over the depraved soul with the means to satisfy them: only the ataraxic soul can say and mean "What is good in life is easy to obtain", where the depraved soul must strive to continue to satisfy their many desires. As you noted above about scarcity: if we lived in a world of infinite resources then perhaps the ataraxic soul would best be seen as a kind of quaint attachment to an ascetic existence, but given the vagaries of a world composed of nothing but atoms and void moving in accord to the swerve it makes sense to want the kind of soul which is happy with anything. — Moliere

Okay, good points.

I'd think that for the working Epicurean administering the cure they'd say that the incontinent man is on a path to the cure, but is still not tranquil and so needing the cure. But this brings out another point of contrast here between Aristotle and Epicurus: it's not willpower which brings about the continent man, but a master who prunes your desires such that you desire to and are able to live tranquilly. — Moliere

Well, for Aristotle the incontinent man is "weak-willed" and the continent man could be considered "strong-willed," but the goal is to be temperate, and the temperate man is well-ordered, not strong-willed. A strong will is only necessary to overcome a disordered soul and disordered passions.

But the centrality of a master might be a difference. Mostly, I'm not sure if anyone—ancient or modern—really understands how to make people virtuous. It seems to always be a haphazard and uncertain endeavor. Aristotle even highlights the problem of the inadequacy of ethical treatises towards the end of the Nicomachean Ethics.

There are lots of things you've said that could be a topic of conversation. Fishing out one of them:

Now if there is truly no human nature then the philosophy is a bit of a fib. If one believes that the Christian way of life will transform people to be better than they are born to be -- or any variation on that theme, which is common enough (It's the warped wood theory of human nature combined with a notion of a cure for the soul) -- then the Epicurean philosophy is anathema as well. In fact I think this could go some way to explaining how it became so unpopular. Stoicism, with its emphasis on the life of the mind, could be married to Christianity, but Epicureanism -- with its emphasis on the human life here and now -- brings about more conceptual tensions. — Moliere

I think there are two distinctions at play, here. The first distinguishes between a focus on earthly life and a focus on the eschaton. The second distinguishes between a conception of human nature and a conception of fallen human nature. I think the second distinction is going to be a bit harsher for Epicureanism, although the first is also significant.

It strikes me that Epicureanism coincides to a large extent with the ascetic traditions of Christianity, particularly the tradition of the desert fathers and the monasticism that grew up out of that. In those traditions exists a Platonism that is agreeable to Epicureanism, whereas the later more Aristotelian strand of Christianity is in many ways more urban and cosmopolitan, and less agreeable to Epicureanism. The irony here is that Epicurean asceticism in certain ways coincides with the more extreme forms of Christian practice, despite lacking some of the motivations.

- Good post :up:

This sort of universalist self-confidence has been badly damaged though. You still see it in later figures though, Erasmus, Cusa, Boheme, Zwingli, Hegel, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, but I think Islam and Protestantism were just precursors to the inevitable pluralistic religious setting we now find ourselves in in the West. Presumably there is a natural ebb and flow between polytheism and monotheism over the millenia, and now the information age has shifted us back towards a more polytheistic orientation. What was once a cultural-religious whole has now become increasingly fractured.

I've become sceptical of Western Buddhism - that is, Buddhism as practiced and propogated in modern culture. And while I have considerable respect for the teaching and principles I don't feel as though I've been able to successfully integrate into them or with them. I did have some real epiphanies associated with meditation earlier in life, but then it's been like a 'seeds and weeds' scenario in the subsequent years. — Wayfarer

Same here.

I get the sense that Buddhism is parasitic on Hinduism, and that trying to attach oneself to Buddhism without the benefit of Hindu culture is something of a non-starter. Similarly, I find interreligious dialogue between Catholicism and Hinduism to be more apropos and compelling than interreligious dialogue between Catholicism and Buddhism. Much like Protestantism, there is something incomplete about Buddhism. It is a religion working from a borrowed culture, and one which is founded on a critique of the more comprehensive religion which is properly attached to that borrowed culture. In both the Buddhist and Protestant cases there is the implicit claim that the cultural divorce is a feature and not a bug, and that's a rather difficult subject to query, but in the end I'm not so sure. I think religion and culture must ultimately go together, and that all attempts to indefinitely separate them are unrealistic.

What follows is that Buddhism and Protestantism do not transplant well. They do not possess the wherewithal to endure a foreign environment without becoming subsumed by it. Or if they do manage to survive, they do not possess the resources to produce and sustain a robust culture of their own. Thus such movements are short-lived on foreign soil.

...Also, in general I am wary of religions started by a single individual (e.g. Buddhism, Islam, Protestantism). Jesus is the exception if we accept the premise that he is divine, although we could also argue over whether he was, strictly speaking, a founder. There is something more organic, comprehensive, and compelling about religions like Hinduism, or Judaism, or even Taoism. But also more messy and unwieldy.

I also realise that I have been very much influenced by Christian Platonism - I think it's a kind of inborn cultural archetype. — Wayfarer

There seem to be a growing number of agnostic intellectuals who favor Christian culture and a Christian worldview, but who remain a step removed from Christian belief. Roger Scruton, Douglas Murray, and Tom Holland come immediately to mind. Part of this seems to be a backlash against the dull iconoclasm of the New Atheism, part of it a response to Marxist ideologies, but a lot of it seems to be a legitimate appreciation of the Christian patrimony and inheritance. This is all rather interesting to me, because Joseph Ratzinger often argued precisely in favor of such a move ("veluti si Deus daretur"). I always found the argument awkward, but apparently it has some purchase. Supposing religion and culture are inextricably linked, it makes sense that some would defend a religion for the sake of a culture.

I just wish there were an association or teacher - not an online one! - that I could associate with in that genre. — Wayfarer

This strikes me as a ubiquitous and perennial difficulty, namely that we are bound by our geography. The ideal of a strong 'guru' figure must often be foregone on account of this.

It's when natural and unnecessary desires are "built up" into groundless desires (that which cannot be satisfied) that we have perverted desire, at least according to the theory I'm offering here. — Moliere

I think the theory of perverted desire holds, and I want to suggest that desire is the reason why injustice prevails. In fact this could be the beginnings of working out how to make this a falsifiable theory rather than a philosophy of desire -- if perverted desire, in the technical sense, is the cause of injustice, then curing perverted desire ought to result in more just relations. — Moliere

This is how Epicurus relates pleasure to justice:

we cannot live pleasantly without living wisely, honorably, and justly; nor live wisely, honorably, and justly without living pleasantly — Letter to Menoeceus

So pleasure requires justice and justice requires pleasure, but there are other factors at play as well, such as wise and honorable living. I myself am not really convinced that perverted desire is the cause of injustice, although it is surely one cause of injustice. For example, scarce resources can lead to injustice even apart from perverted desires. Have you thought any more about this question of justice?

If we simply don't want to change then, in a sense, we're already a step ahead because we are in unity with our desires. That's surely less anxiety-inducing than having desires which conflict, and so I think it'd follow that from an Epicurean perspective it's better to be in unity with luxurious desires which are satisfied than to be in conflict between luxurious and simple desires. — Moliere

I found it sort of interesting that you would say this, as it rings of the idea that the akolastos is better than the akratēs (in <Aristotle's terms>). In some ways this is the crucial difference between ancient and modern ethics, and it might be called the question of the normativity of individual action. The modern idea is that the akolastos and the sophon are equally undivided, and therefore equally good.* I think Nietzsche plays a role in this modern conception. A basic counterargument here is that if the akolastos is to become a sophron then he must pass through the stage of akrasia, and therefore the akratēs is better than the akolastos. The analogy to Epicurus from Aristotle doesn't work perfectly, but it works to a point.

But the second question is whether this really tracks Epicurus. Specifically, you seem to be positing that, for Epicurus, desire which is natural but unnecessary is only disreputable because it is more difficult to satisfy, and that if one were able to satisfy it reliably then there would not be anything problematic about it. If this is right, then it seems to throw a wrench into the Epicurean system, implying that some of the core claims are based on accidental factors. It would be something like, "Live simply, unless you have the means to live luxuriously."

* Kevin Flannery writes specifically on this question in his, "Anscombe and Aristotle on Corrupt Minds."

- :up:

There is a knot of contradictory beliefs for those who hold "cultural relativism" leftist beliefs. — schopenhauer1

Yes, good points. I think we need to keep shining light on that knot until it breaks down. Cultures are porous, and there has always been intercultural exchange and trade. There may be good reasons for distinguishing some exports from others, but the simplistic idea that "all cultural exports are impermissible" is crazy and impracticable.

Another thing to note is that if someone holds that it is unjust to export such-and-such a cultural artifact, then they must forfeit their claim that everything is a power game. That's another thing that irks me about the left: out of one side of their mouth come claims that everything is merely a power game, and out of the other side come claims regarding justice. Granted, they may not use the word "justice," but that is what they are talking about: what is right or wrong (permissible or impermissible) in a manner that is not affected by will or power.

Is “Western Civilization”, the very foundation self-criticism regarding ideas like universal rights, due process, and Western philosophy itself unfairly and unthinkingly maligned by educators and leftists for some kind of relativism or one-way version of rights? — schopenhauer1

Moral relativism of both individual and cultural varieties is in vogue, and it happens to be incoherent in the way it is presented. If someone is an individual moral relativist, then they should not tell other individuals what to do (but of course they do). If someone is a cultural moral relativist, then they should not tell other cultures what to do (but of course they do). That is the underlying vacillation: when the relativist wants someone to do something, they exert pressure. When they see others exerting pressure for a cause with which they disagree, they call foul on account of moral relativism. I think this is the underlying double standard that first needs to be addressed.

To give an example, if someone is against cultural exports then they are not rationally permitted to export their favorite issues to other cultures (e.g. exporting women's rights to the Middle East). If they are going to try to export their favorite issues to other cultures, then they cannot oppose cultural exports tout court and still be consistent.

Textually the easier school to contrast them to is the Stoics, because Cicero's On the Ends is that topic in dialogue form, albeit far after when these were first written. It contains the sorts of back-and-forth you'd expect to see between competing schools of thought. — Moliere

Yes, that sounds like it would be an interesting comparison.

Still, I can't help but see how much the Epicurean theory of the soul contrasts with the Aristotelian one. And he was very much a person of "the next generation" but still was alive at the time of Aristotle (just looking up dates on the 'net, the garden founded in 306, some odd 16 years after Aristotle's death), and one of the most common ways philosophers engage with one another is to disagree and disprove prior philosophers. Furthermore Aristotle was critical of Democritus' atomic theory, and Epicurus goes on to develop that theory further so we have another point within his philosophy that marks a definite contrast. — Moliere

The difference on Democritus is interesting. On the other hand, it is hard to say how Aristotle and Epicurus relate ethically. I want to say that Aristotle would accept Epicurus' positions but Epicurus would not accept Aristotle's, because Aristotle's ethics contains quite a bit more than Epicurus'. In particular it seems like Aristotle would say that exercising our highest faculties brings fulfillment and pleasure, and therefore one must strive to exercise them.

Regarding Epicurus and nature, here is an interesting excerpt:

It was Heraclitus, to the best of our knowledge, who pioneered the thesis that human beings cannot live well if they simply retreat into a private world. In explaining the nature of things, as he laid claim to doing, Heraclitus saw himself as waking his audience up to facts that pertain to everyone commonly—facts about living and dying, and the relation between identity and change. Like Lucretius, Heraclitus often juxtaposes a macroscopic view of things—the way things appear from a non-anthropomorphic perspective—with ordinary human viewpoints. Heraclitus’ purpose in doing so was not, I think, to cast doubt on the propriety of all conventional attitudes to life, but rather to show how they can be informed and clarified and improved when we also adopt a decentred and objective outlook on our position in the world. We can only live with full authenticity, he suggests, by coming to terms with nature and by integrating knowledge of nature’s procedures with our subjective identity.¹³

The mainstream tradition of Greek philosophy, mutatis mutandis, endorsed this position. It is presumed by Parmenides and Empedocles, and accepted by Plato and Aristotle. Socrates was a dissenter, according to the doxographical tradition on him;¹⁴ so too were the Cyrenaics (DL 2.92) and, for obvious reasons, the sceptics. But the testimony for Pyrrho actually supports my point. For according to Timon’s account of Pyrrho, the first question someone who wants to be happy should ask is: ‘How are things by nature?’ The next question, the first having been settled, is: ‘What attitude should we adopt to things?’, and the third: ‘What will be the outcome for those who have this attitude?’¹⁵ Pyrrho’s programme of questions was probably known to Epicurus (cf. DL 9.64) who, in any case, would have agreed with the pertinence of the questions as distinct from Pyrrho’s answers to them. Most philosophers, unlike Pyrrho, thought that they could give definite and demonstrable answers to the question of how things are by nature, and that accommodating oneself to nature, as so disclosed, was the proper policy for anyone interested in a rational foundation for happiness.

The Stoics, of course, are the school of philosophers who articulated this position most explicitly by making ‘agreement with nature’ their formulation of life’s goal (telos). Because Stoic ‘nature’ (physis) makes reference to a divine mind immanent in everything, the implications of their telos may seem to be radically at odds with Epicureanism. That is certainly true with reference to the rational, providential, and teleological properties of the Stoics’ cosmic physis. These properties persuade the Stoic, unlike the Epicurean, that natural events should be accepted as being for the best and divinely mandated. But, as we have already seen, the Stoics’ cosmic physis also signifies natural causation. A Stoic lives in agreement with cosmic nature by virtue of understanding and assenting to the way things happen in the world, by ‘living in accordance with experience of natural events’ in Chrysippus’ formulation (DL 7.87).

It would be difficult to find a better expression than this to describe the ‘rationale of life’ (vitae ratio) that Lucretius praises Epicurus for discovering. As a good Epicurean, Lucretius will not go along with the Stoics in supposing that natural events are for the best; his message is that we need to understand and live in agreement with nature not because nature does things well, but simply because nature’s way of doing things is the way things are and thus constitutes the essential facts and truth. The grasp of nature’s causality underpins our happiness because it teaches us the possibilities and limitations of living in the world as it really is, understanding what can be and cannot be, what it is reasonable and in our power to do and plan for, and what, on the other hand, is irrational and out of step with the way things are.

In the proem of book 5, as he prepares to discourse on cosmology, biology, and anthropology, Lucretius couples eulogy of natura with eulogy of Epicurus: ‘Who is able with mighty mind to build a song worthy of the majesty of these things and these findings? . . . For if we should speak, in the way that the discovered majesty of these things actually requires, he was a god, noble Memmius.’ In these lines Lucretius twice refers to rerum maiestas. Bailey (1947) translates this expression by ‘the majesty of truth’, Smith in the Loeb edition (1975) by ‘the majesty of nature’. In his commentary Bailey comes closer to Smith’s rendering, because he explains the expression as ‘the great- ness of the world’, but ‘greatness’ is much too flat for rendering the marked noun maiestas, with its divine and regal connotations. Lucretius often uses res as a plain alternative to natura, and I think Smith is right to render rerum here by ‘nature’. Epicurus’ discoveries have revealed that nature, and no god of superstition or philosophers’ demiurge, is in charge of the world. — A. A. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus : Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy

- Actually if you read the OP you will see that Epicurus had a strong notion of unnatural human desires. So did Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Christians, to name a few.

Hmm. Who is in the tomb? I say it is Elizabeth Windsor. What say you?

But moreover, I say that, that we say "Elizabeth Windsor" is a question of convention, of fiat, and we might equally say otherwise. — Banno

Let me agree with your last sentence for the sake of argument and pose a related question: Was that we say "Elizabeth Windsor" a matter of fiat when she was still living?

If it was not a matter of fiat when she was living, but it is a matter of fiat now that she is dead; and if this difference pertains to the identity of the object (as names generally do); then the identity has fundamentally changed.

(Note that you are basically arguing that, according to common speech, nothing special or definitive occurs at death. Such is a highly implausible thesis.)

Interesting, but this account uses an essentialism that, as discussed previously, I don't think can be made to work. In dying, the Queen did not cease to be Elizabeth Windsor. Rather, she remained Elizabeth Windsor, but Elizabeth Windsor is now deceased.

The trouble is the presumption that being this or that individual is a result of having certain attributes, an essence; this leads to some interesting problems. Better, I take it, to instead take individuality to be the result of fiat - this counts as an individual. — Banno

But, "Elizabeth Windsor is now deceased," connotes either 1) Elizabeth Windsor no longer exists in bodily form, or 2) Elizabeth Windsor no longer exists, period. More generally, it means that she died; that her life has come to an end. Her tomb will read 1926-2022, indicating the finite span of her life. If we search for her in 2023 we will not find her.

Here is a simple question for you: At her funeral, do we speak of 'Elizabeth Windsor' as if she were present, in the casket, or as if she were absent?

I do not know what to make of ‘from quantity to quality’... — Banno

Presumably he is referring to the movements. An awake person and a sleeping person differ in quantity of movement. An awake person and a corpse also differ in quantity of movement. But the difference between the movements of the corpse and the movements of the person who is awake is not only a matter of quantity, but also a matter of quality. And despite the quantitative similarity, the quality of the corpse's absence-of-movements differs from the quality of the sleeping person's absence-of-movements. This qualitative difference is inferred, for we are easily able to mistake a dead person for a sleeping person, and vice versa.

(Note that this supports my same point about a substantial change taking place. The quality of the death-change differs from the quality of the changes that occur when one is living. The stillness of the corpse is qualitative, and not merely quantitative.)

The idea that we are minds inhabiting bodies is the essence of the kind of dualism I have in mind, and I think this is reflected on our language. We don't say "I am a body" we say "I have a body" — Janus

Fair point. I think in this case (and others) Descartes may have exacerbated a distinction that already existed. First, I do not say, "I have a body," and neither do my peers. Nevertheless, you are correct that it is common usage. Some of this comes from Descartes and some from Christianity, but some of it is also common sense. I will say, "I have a hand," because if my hand is chopped off I will not cease to exist. There is a true distinction between my identity and my hand. Then if we think of the body as the sum of all my bodily parts, and all of my bodily parts are separable from my identity, then it follows that my body itself is separable from my identity. Of course this involves a fallacy of composition, but in the common tongue and mind it makes sense. Ergo: that 'dualistic' as opposed to 'pluralistic' phraseology stems not only from Descartes and Christianity, but also from common sense and intuition.

The term is named after Descartes because of his well-known emphasis on "mind" as different from "body", "self" as different from "other' — Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis, 1983

I think a better word than "different" would have been "estranged." Mind is different from body. Self is different from other. It is a particular form of estrangement that effects the anxiety, not simple distinction.

(@Wayfarer)

Our very language is inherently dualistic and has been all along — Janus

I'm not so sure. The Cartesian sense of dualism is mind/world. The linguistic sense of dualism is me/everything else. For instance, the linguistic inheritance does not presume that my hand is not part of me, whereas for Descartes this is fundamental (i.e. a hand is part of the world and not part of the mind). And of course there truly exists a relevant dualism in the linguistic sense, because I have power and sensation with regard to myself in a way that I do not with regard to things that are not myself.

"Do you have a body"? "Of course I have a body": that's dualism right there. — Janus

But it has little to do with Descartes. On this forum (and elsewhere) there is an allergy to the word "dualism," as if all dualisms are equal and equally bad. But there are all sorts of different "dualisms," and one needs to pay attention to the terms and the doctrine in question. Descartes' terms are mind/world, and his doctrine is rooted in an exercise of radical skepticism.

(A further difficulty is that you have Eastern notions of nonduality moving into the West, and some are liable to mix up the "duality" of "non-duality" with Descartes. That's not accurate. Eastern nondualists of course oppose Descartes, but also much more.)

I'm interested in what the neo-thomists have to say about Kant, but there's much to study in that area, much of it quite arcane. If I could find a brief 'Lonergan Reader' I'd be interested but his books are formidably large. — Wayfarer

It's true. I agree. :blush:

Thomism is actually a very large phenomenon, with lots of different schools and quasi-schools. Not a lot of it engages critically with Kant, but some does. I will keep my eye out for simple inlets. That article by Freddoso comes to mind, although it gets somewhat abstruse in the analytic direction. Freddoso is eclectic and analytic but possesses strong knowledge of Thomas.

Edit: The link I gave to Reality journal in the very last sentence of <this post> is one of the more accessible things I have seen.

So wouldn't that give us an account in which the process stoped, as opposed to the substance of body and spirit being split asunder? — Banno

My earlier post related to this, viz. that we do not suppose that the human and the corpse have the same identity. That is the first question at stake: whether a corpse is the same substance as a living human being; whether it is the same sort of thing. If it is not the same sort of thing, then something more than the cessation of a process has occurred. In Aristotelian terms, the cessation of a mere process is an accidental change (like when one stops growing taller or when one's hair goes grey); whereas death is a substantial change, where an organism/substance that previously existed no longer does.

Well, the interesting thing is that it cannot be put in terms of identity, because the identity of the body comes from the fact that it is a unified organism. Once it dies it is no longer a unity, and it is therefore no longer one thing, possessing a single identity. It will quickly decompose into a million different parts. The disintegration occurs because the "soul" (unifying principle of life) is no longer enlivening the body.

Just for fun I should add that a substantial change takes place at death, an essential corruption. When a human dies the human no longer exists, and only the corpse remains, where the human and the corpse are two fundamentally different kinds of things. Whatever "grandpa" was, he is most definitely not the thing in the casket. It is inadequate to say, "Grandpa is now functioning differently." — Leontiskos

An interesting quote that I saw posted elsewhere. I am not overly familiar with Lonergan (a transcendental Thomist):

Scotus flatly denied the fact of insight into phantasm. Kant, whose critique was [126] not of the pure reason but of the human mind as conceived by Scotus, repeatedly affirmed that our intellects are purely discursive, that all intuition is sensible. Though the point is elementary, still it is so important that I beg to be permitted to dwell on a plain matter of fact...

[126]: The Scotist rejection of insight into phantasm necessarily reduced the act of understanding to seeing a nexus between concepts; hence, while for Aquinas understanding precedes conceptualization which is rational, for Scotus understanding is preceded by conceptualization which is a matter of metaphysical mechanics. It is the latter position that gave Kant the analytic judgments which he criticized; and it is the real insufficiency of that position which led Kant to assert his synthetic a priori judgments; on the other hand, the Aristotelian and the Thomist positions both consider the Kantian assumption of purely discursive intellect to be false and, indeed, to be false, not as a point of theory, but as a matter of fact. — Bernard Lonergan, Insight, 4.1

The claim here is that Kant followed Duns Scotus (via Franz Albert Schultz and Christian Wolff), who opposed Aquinas on this question. He claims that for Scotus and Kant the only non-discursive knowledge is sense knowledge. Everything else is discursive. Thus there can be no insight into reality itself (the "noumenal"). This is interesting, and also plausible. I offer it as a jumping-off point for further investigation, as well as a datum for the relationship between Kantianism and Thomism.

- Great, thanks. I grabbed a pdf copy and will be sure to give it a read.

Okay, that sounds pretty similar to NodeBB. I can neutralize the logic of reputation so that it does not trigger any events or rewards, and I can remove the visible number that would appear under their name in discussions (last I checked), but it remains visible in the user's profile.

I’ll have to read the discussions that were had here about it to remind myself of how it works on Plush and what people didn’t like about it. — Jamal

Sure. Just from my fallible memory, there was a minority of users who "voted" against both likes and visible reputation, a smaller minority of users who "voted" for both likes and visible reputation, and a plurality of users who "voted" for likes but against visible reputation. Plush supports both minority positions but not the plurality position. That is, on Plush if you turn on likes, then a user's reputation is automatically displayed on every post (instead of their post count).

That is a fair post and I can agree with much of it. If I tried to engage the points of your last paragraph in detail I am sure I would quickly move beyond my competence, but if you have an article outlining the Palestinian case in more detail I would put it on my reading list.

At the same time, I don't see how the Palestinian issue can be resolved without a right of return. — Benkei

Citing the Wikipedia page:

The government of Israel does not view the admission of Palestinian refugees to their former homes in Israel as a right, but rather as a political issue to be resolved as part of a final peace settlement. — Wikipedia | Palestinian Right of Return

This seems correct to me, and it goes back to my point to @schopenhauer1 regarding the difference between a right and a legitimate interest. I think what is at stake is a legitimate political interest in need of settlement, not a right in the strict sense.

Incidentally, my Fred Jr. example was clumsy given that it is so close to the broader issue. I was only trying to illustrate the complexity of political disputes, where two opposing causes can both be justified. I was not attempting to make a point about Israel or Palestine's land rights.

Yep, and Discourse would take care of most of the feature requests, I’m guessing? — Jamal

I was thinking of hitches that could be preempted, and one thing did come to mind. It seems that your users aren't fond of the reputation system. For example, they enjoy the ability to 'like' posts, but they won't accept it at the cost of replacing the user's visible post count with their reputation. I agree, and I had already found a plugin to sideline reputation in NodeBB even before I joined TPF.

From what I know of Discourse, they tout their "trust system" (reputation) and their "gamification." Jeff Atwood was a CEO and founder of Discourse, and he was also one of the founders of Stack Exchange. He is big on gamification. My guess is that the reputation system is a cornerstone of Discourse, and is no more avoidable than infinite scroll. It may be worth checking into this and seeing to what extent it can be circumvented. It is one thing that would bear on your users' desires.

Moral rights don't lapse. — Benkei

Even from generation to generation? What if the span of time is 2000 years rather than 200 years? I am a moral realist, but I am doubtful of the idea that Fred Jr. has an indisputable moral right to the land that was stolen from his family 200 years ago.

That doesn't mean Bob has no rights at all of course but to deny the claim in its entirety would be immoral. — Benkei

Right, I agree. I think these intractable political disagreements point to compromise.

Why the lack of agreement? If it were simply a matter of reason there would be no such disagreement. — Fooloso4

"Why is rational agreement so elusive?"

The host says they'll install any plugin we want, including any we write specifically for TPF. — Jamal

Cool. I think that's all you need.

Thanks, your guidance will be valuable since you have all this forum configuration experience, but I won't burden you too much. — Jamal

Sounds good. :up:

I think we are probably in agreement, but in order to argue for your position and propose mediation for the conflict of interests, I would need to descend into the various contingent factors of the situation on the ground. I don't have the time or energy for that descent at the moment. Do I think the Palestinians need to start putting the past behind them and stop justifying the unjustifiable? Yep. Am I willing to argue the details and extent of this with those who are strongly in favor of Palestine? Nope. Not every battle is mine to fight, even when I am in agreement. I wish you luck, though. :halo:

As of today I’ve got Discourse running now on a host that does managed Discourse hosting. Some people on meta.discourse.org say they’re very reliable. I think this is the way to go. I don’t want to deal with hosting. These folks take care of backups, software updates, and all the rest, while I have the power and control of the Discourse admin (e.g., — Jamal

Sweet. :up:

So on NodeBB a lot of the customization comes through themes and plugins, which can be substituted, created, shared, etc. But the access to this customization is somewhat host-dependent (and this is especially true when it comes to hosts that do not allow command line SSH server access). If a similar thing holds with Discourse, then I would suggest double-checking that the hosting company allows that deeper level of customization (and ideally command line access). You could easily leverage the deeper level of customization if you have need in the future, given the many developers among your users.

Yep, and Discourse would take care of most of the feature requests, I’m guessing? — Jamal

Yes, I certainly think so.

It's kind of a small thing, but I use that all the time, including here. — Jamal

Oh, I use it all the time as well. Small things like that can make a difference when two competitors are so close.

I actually set one up there a few years ago and didn’t pursue it just because I wasn’t in the mood or I didn’t want to face the data issue. This time I hope to see it through, some time in the next weeks or months. In the meanwhile I’ll invite testers once I’ve fine-tuned it (this week probably but I don’t know when I’ll get around to it). — Jamal

This sounds great. I am of course willing to help as I am able, although I should say that this is precisely the time of the year that gets busy for me.

Thanks, I did miss that addition. Yes, and those entrenched spats make these political situations exponentially more complex. So I think you are right, but given that I am trying to avoid these "exponentially more complex" facets of the thread lest I get sucked in too deep, I will say no more on this issue of generational grudges. :razz:

Yes, and one way to look at this is the difference between a right and a legitimate interest. Interests can come into conflict and must be balanced, but we usually do not think of rights in that manner. So your example of eminent domain requires a settlement, a balancing of interests based on various contingencies. Both parties have a justified cause, and some sort of compromise must be reached.

...was a joke directed at Metaphysics as an Illegitimate Source of Knowledge, another thread in which Bob questioned Metaphysics on the grounds that it was, at it's core, imaginary stories. The aim, roughly, was to draw attention to Bob's apparent change of heart, given his endorsement of the two-worlds view of Transcendental Realism. It was a crude attempt at asking how Bob might reconcile these apparently incongruous views.

Thank you for not recognising this, Leo, and putting me to the task of making explicit this vital aspect of the discussion. — Banno

That's fair enough. I did not see <this post> before I wrote my first post to you. As soon as I saw it, I edited my first post to ask about it, but you must have begun your reply before my edit went through. Thanks for the clarification. A misunderstanding, then. :up:

(My purpose is of course to try to restore metaphysics' reputation to a certain extent.)

By definition anyone resisting a just cause is acting unjustly. — Benkei

It seems that way, but I think politics gets murkier. Also, I want to stick to your original phrasing of a justified cause rather than a just cause ("the Palestinian cause for independence is justified").

Regarding politics, suppose Bob steals Fred's land in 1800. The land passes on through his descendants until in 2000 Bob Jr. owns it. At that time Fred Jr. demands that the land be returned to his family. He has a justified cause. Bob Jr. resists the claim, pointing out that he inherited the land that has been in his family for 200 years, during which time the land was substantially improved. Whatever we want to say about Bob Jr's resistance, I do not think we can say it is immoral. Two justified causes exist which are in conflict with one another. Such is politics. To reiterate my conclusion, "Not every action taken against a justified cause is immoral, much less punishable."

So we see here it's not the opponents cause that gives rise to a justification to use violence but it arises from how the opponent pursues that just cause. — Benkei

This decision tree is somewhat useful, but if you made it yourself I would suggest reorganizing the three boxes in the bottom right. They don't seem to follow from, "No [your cause is not just], you're not allowed to resist."

There's some room for weighing what is and isn't proportional given the cause of course. The greater the good we're pursuing, the more intense violence we would likely accept. As an example, I think the moral intuition that we are allowed to use more violence to protect our lives then to protect our things, seems reasonably. — Benkei

This question of violence is interesting and important, but I want to avoid it given my time constraints. Generally, though, I would say that violence is only justified by injustice, and therefore more is required than simply a cause. My goal was only to oppose your claim that, "every action [against a justified cause] is already contaminated as something immoral."

Aside from wanting to control the data and code, I'd actually be perfectly satisfied with the way Plush works with just a few changes, like better tools for moderation, "zen mode" post composing, Markdown support, dark mode, and ignore lists. — Jamal

Plush seems like it's working pretty well. I really like the feature where I can click on the title bar and return to the post I just quoted. My concern is that Plush seems near the end of its lifecycle. If you look at the second half of my post <here>, you can see a number of the things Plush hasn't managed, despite requests. Most of that stuff has been standard for years now, along with ignore lists and strong moderation tools. If Plush won't budge on those things, then I have to wonder if they are in maintenance mode, nearing their expiration date. NodeBB and Discourse don't show evidence of this lifecycle issue.

(I know that for dark mode I could just use Stylebot as you suggest, but this is about built-in functionality; as admin I need to see what most people see). — Jamal

Yes, definitely.

This is what makes a decision to move to another platform a big and difficult one. — Jamal

Yes, I understand.

Incidentally, it always sounds odd to me when I see people saying that discussion forums are dead (because Reddit, social media, and Discord). I guess my experience is not normal. — Jamal

I think your experience is not normal because your moderation is not normal. I think that's why your forum is so much better than the alternatives: you have superior moderation and your moderators have a good grasp of philosophy.

Although the Plush folks assure me that PlushForums will be maintained for the foreseeable future, they don't seem very interested in adding new features, perhaps because they've been putting most of their efforts into their new platform https://insta.forum/ (totally moving away from long-form, so not suitable for us). — Jamal

Wow, this completely confirms my doubts.

In my world the framework that's famous for hidden magic is Rails, whose principle is "convention over configuration". On the other side, the Python folks say "explicit is better than implicit." The two are definitely in conflict. — Jamal

My switch from Rails to Python/Django was somewhat painful, and that is another extraneous reason I avoided Discourse. I didn't want to work in Rails immediately after switching from Ruby/Rails to Python/Django.


P.S. One significant feature that NodeBB hasn't yet managed is composer keyboard shortcuts. For example, Ctrl-i won't give you italics.

Yes, you caught me out, I appealed to both metaphysical realism and to common usage. — Banno

Good, that's all I wanted.

One does not generally ask for two cups of tea, the perceptual and the numinous. It's not a knock-down argument... — Banno

It's a fine argument, and I agree. It's just not non-metaphysical.

I get the impression you are not laughing at my jokes. — Banno

I just don't understand why this always has to be like pulling teeth.