Take the question (apparently key to Harman), “What is an object?” Exactly what sort of question is this? Is it akin to a scientific or experimental question, which could be explored and perhaps answered by an investigation of the world? Is it more like a traditional metaphysical question, which might be answered a priori using some kind of transcendental argument a la Kant, or an appeal to logical principles? Or is the question really a pragmatic one – perhaps when we ask “What is an object?” we’re really asking what, out of the many possible uses of the word “object,” is the most useful or helpful one in philosophy – and of course we’d have to specify the uses we have in mind. — J

There is a place in the video series where this is addressed, and it seems that it is a pragmatic matter (link).

In general there seems to be a lot of vacillation between whether an object is real or whether an object is representational, and this relates to the "anti-correlationism." It seems like Harman wants to reject Kant's "Copernican" move but does not have the resources to do so. A bit like the child who wants to use a different color, but whose crayons are all shades of grey.

- You are begging the Kantian question. You are not allowing yourself to see past Kant's axiom.

I agree, a look, and action, a poem, a life may contain meaning, not just signs. I am arguing that meaning is to that which conveys it as the signified is to signs. Sign-signified is one form of the meaning relationship. — hypericin

But aren't looks, actions, poems, and lives all signs? I think they are all signs conveying meaning. I think meaning is conveyed by signs, and the "meaning relationship" is the triadic relationship between sign, signified, and interpreter.

The point I was making is that conveyance or "meaning relationships" does not exhaust the meaning of meaning, and we know this because some signs convey more meaningful things than other signs. For example, a wedding ring is much more meaningful than a crumb on the floor, even though they are both signs which signify a reality.

We could simplify by thinking about meaning in a univocal way, and say that each meaning-transaction utilizes signs, just as each bank-transaction utilizes cash or a check. But this fact does not tell us about the level (or quality) of meaning present, just as the fact about banks does not tell us about the quantity of money being transferred. Then going further, money is meant for more than bank transactions, just as meaning is meant for more than signification.

Then how did we learn it? — hypericin

The same way we learn most things: through experience.

I think it is complicated. — hypericin

It is well-accepted in the field of semiotics that some signs have no inherent connection to their object, while others do. An acorn signifies an oak tree, and this is not arbitrary or human-imposed.

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Yes. I think that sensemaking is key. — Amity

:up:

Signs convey meaning, but not all meaning is conveyed by signs. We can say that a sign is meaningful insofar as it signifies some reality, but at a deeper level some signs are more meaningful than other signs, because the realities they signify are more meaningful. Meaning is more than being signified.

What is the meaning of the usages of "meaning" that unites them? Is there a unitary concept they share? — hypericin

Perhaps something like significance, resolution, comprehension, making-sense-of? "Meaning" seems to be a rather root or simple concept, not easily explicable in terms of other concepts.

What is it about the partial knowledge that

"catalytic converters in cars can break"
"my car has a catalytic converter"

Which goes into

"I think it's the catalytic converter"

which distinguishes it from the website example? — fdrake

I would say that in the website example knowledge is present, and this knowledge also involves knowledge of the referent. If I have a partial description of a website and I want to learn the exact URL, then I can provide my friend with the partial description in order to learn the exact URL. Metaphorically, my partial description is a sufficient key to unlock the door to my desire. In this case my knowledge of the referent is sufficient in order to use the term well and achieve my goal.

In the car example knowledge is not present, and this lack of knowledge also involves a lack of knowledge of the referent. One does not possess knowledge that "There's a problem with the catalytic converter" once they know both that "catalytic converters can break" and "my car has a catalytic converter." The partial description possessed is not sufficient to use the term well and achieve the goal, and this is because there is no knowledge. Or rather, the knowledge present is not sufficient; the description of the referent is not sufficient for the problem at hand. The partial description is not a sufficient key to unlock the door to the desire. One will be wasting the mechanic's time.

(So the difference lies in sufficient knowledge for successful use.)

Now this isn't a complete answer, because it does not spell out the way in which knowledge relates to reference. The rough idea is that some cases require more knowledge of the referent than other cases, and the one who knows the referent perfectly is licensed to use the term in any case whatsoever. The one who has no knowledge of the referent at all will likely not even possess the term.

I don't know what the essence of reference is, so to speak, I broached it the way I did to try to find a speech act containing a successful reference which "piggybacked" on another's successful reference. Can you give me one instead? — fdrake

That's fair. I now understand what you were doing. So is it sort of like the case I set aside above? Where they "have it on someone's authority that the catalytic converter is malfunctioning," even though they do not know what a catalytic converter is?

(I will leave this case aside for the sake of length.)

Aye I agree with you that it's obfuscatory. Where I'm coming from is that I'd have difficulty being able to imagine it as an obfuscation if we didn't recognise that "my car's catalytic converter" indeed did refer to my car's catalytic converter, and that I was bullshitting in ignorance of this fact. If we assumed that "my car's catalytic converter", in this instance, did not refer to my car's catalytic converter, on what basis would we be able to say that the mechanic - when grabbing the converter to check - displays an understanding of the car's catalytic converter which we lack? — fdrake

I think the obfuscation will come home to roost when the mechanic checks it, finds that it's fine, and then asks why we think the problem lies in the catalytic converter. Embarrassed, we might then admit, "Actually I don't even know what a catalytic converter is, or what it does." At that point the mechanic will realize that what I meant by "catalytic converter" is a great deal different than the thing he checked.

And there seems to be a nested obfuscation here. The first obfuscation/ignorance lies in "the problem," which we are ignorant of but pretend to know. Yet in order to feign competence we are required to obfuscate more concretely, by proposing a concrete solution to the problem that we do not understand.

I'm trying to say that how reference works is in some sense orthogonal to communication. Because communicative speech acts, and non-communicative speech acts, both can contain successful references. — fdrake

But what is an example of a non-communicative act that contains successful references? Perhaps we are disagreeing about what constitutes a "successful reference" of the catalytic converter. Would we at least agree that the mechanic would not count it as a successful reference? And that the mechanic is the one who most knows the referent?

I suppose you can successfully refer to the blegbleg in certain ways despite not knowing the referent. But is it a full absence of knowledge, or simply a dearth of knowledge? For instance, I can successfully ask what a blegbleg is with limited knowledge, but I cannot discourse on blegblegs with limited knowledge. That requires a better understanding of the referent, much like my point about Thales ("Suppose, ex hypothesi..." ). The idea is that there is a correlation between one's knowledge of a referent and one's ability to communicate regarding it.

"Speculative Realism" is related to the anti-correlationism I noted (). Here is how Graham Harman describes it:

“Speculative realism” is an extremely broad term. All it takes to be a speculative realist is to be opposed to “correlationism,” Meillassoux’s term for the sort of philosophy (still dominant today) that bases all philosophy on the mutual interplay of human and world. — Brief SR/OOO Tutorial, by Graham Harman

After watching the first video I opined that it was related to the ancient speculative/practical distinction. This seems vaguely true, but it is more about the way that modern philosophy sees the subject as conditioning all forms of knowing, even non-practical knowledge.

So it's the idea that knowledge of the world is possible, and this knowledge is not automatically contaminated, distorted, or even conditioned by the human subject. This draws near to classical realism.

Nope. Further work though - truthmaker semantics. I don't know owt about it and would need to do homework. — fdrake

I tend to understand what Fine is arguing for better than what he is arguing against, and that's where my homework would lie. Ideally if I am going to discuss Fine I would need to interact with someone who is committed to what he is arguing against.

I suppose what I'm saying there is that a sufficient condition for a speech act to contain a successful reference is that the referent of the referring token can be acted upon. And if that suffices for a successful reference, it would thus suffice for a reference (simpliciter).

And where I'm going with that is that because that sufficient condition can be satisfied without an understanding of the catalytic converter, or the website's, essence, a speech act can contain a reference without requiring its doer understand the referent at all, never mind its essence. — fdrake

Whereas I claimed that language is for communication, you seem to be claiming that language (or at least reference) is tied to action ("the referring token can be acted upon"). That's a fairly significant difference.

Let's say you said "There's a problem with the catalytic converter", and you didn't know what the catalytic converter was, the mechanic could go and look for the car's catalytic converter. — fdrake

So in this case I want to say that miscommunication is taking place, not communication. The action is based on that miscommunication, and will therefore be futile (or accidentally lucky). This is because the purpose of the customer's assertion is not being realized, given that they do not know what a catalytic converter is and therefore have no basis for their assertion. It seems to be a kind of lie. The lack of communication would seem to undermine the action. (Unless you are thinking of a case where they have a rational basis for their claim and are not merely feigning competence. For example, perhaps they have it on someone's authority that the catalytic converter is malfunctioning and they are simply conveying this opinion to the mechanic.)

More concisely, in order for someone to respond to a piece of information with action (such as 'checking the catalytic converter'), there must first be reliable information. Yet if your source is not actually communicating, then they cannot be providing reliable information; and if they do not understand what they are saying then they cannot communicate. But I'll leave it there for now. Perhaps you had the rational-basis case in mind, rather than the feigned competence case.

An example I was thinking of is "Can you send me a link to that website you mentioned last night?" — fdrake

I see this as a quite different case than the case of feigned competence, because real communication is occurring. In this case the speaker has real knowledge of the referent, even though that knowledge is incomplete. "That website you mentioned last night" is an adequate description with an adequate referent. The partial knowledge is necessary in order that the friend can supply the remainder of the knowledge, by sending the URL. This gets into Aristotle's theory of knowledge, where new knowledge is always something like a furtherance of knowledge, and that in order to learn some additional thing we must already know some previous thing (i.e. knowledge cannot be grounded in mere tautologies).

The Wikipedia article was helpful in clarifying some things for me, especially this part:

Critique of correlationism
Related to 'anthropocentrism', object-oriented thinkers reject speculative idealist correlationism, which the French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux defines as "the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other". Because object-oriented ontology is a realist philosophy, it stands in contradistinction to the anti-realist trajectory of correlationism, which restricts philosophical understanding to the correlation of being with thought by disavowing any reality external to this correlation as inaccessible, and, in this way, fails to escape the ontological reification of human experience. — Object Oriented Ontology | Critique of Correlationism

(This maps onto what I was claiming about realism in the other thread - .)

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- I think your question is important and foundational. Understanding the starting point and the justification for the account of "objects" that Harman gives will be essential in understanding the theory.

Welcome to the forum, !

Good points. I am not familiar with Bernstein, but I can definitely see what you are saying with regard to Habermas and Peirce, and I admire their dialogical approach.

a self-corrective critical community of inquirers — J

I think this is an important point: that the inquiry is in some way attached to the community itself and not only to the individual, and this fact leads the members of the community to relate to one another in a different way, as partners in a common purpose.

Bernstein has a lot more that’s interesting to say about the connection of rational inquiry with democratic values. — J

I hadn't actually considered that idea, but it does make sense. In a democracy one probably has more modest expectations for their ideas and arguments, and surely dialogue is opened up when the participants are considered equals. What are some of Bernstein's thoughts on the topic?

I've listened to some of his lectures and generally like his survey of the philosophers, though I thought he was a bit too dismissive of Schopenhauer due to his pessimism. But fairly enough, I think he does that to all the philosophers giving his critiques as he goes. — schopenhauer1

I agree. Sugrue is good although overly critical at times, but his criticism is usually evenly distributed.

But anyways, to the broader point, much of philosophy revolves around how it is that the world exists without an observer, or sometimes formulated as a human observer. — schopenhauer1

Yes - much of modern philosophy. :smile:

This video might help as a good jumping off point for a Harman's view of objects. Perhaps we can have a discussion on it? — schopenhauer1

I found this to be good and interesting. I welcome this sort of approach in our day, these realist attempts to overcome the divide that Sugrue talks about. In fact I find myself on the same page as this reviewer, both in his commendations and his criticisms.

There was <a thread> that ended up getting into Lloyd Gerson's work a bit, particularly his paper, "Platonism vs Naturalism." Anti-physicalism reminds me of Gerson's anti-materialism, and anti-smallism reminds me of Gerson's anti-mechanism. The opposition to "anti-fictionalism" and "literalism" don't have parallels in Gerson's article, but I also sympathize with these tenets.

I also think that his idea of "undermining" and "overmining" an object is useful here. Undermining would be reducing to separate constituents. Overmining would be how it is related to every other thing, more-or-less. — schopenhauer1

Right, these were interesting ideas as well, and I think "overmining" relates to Fine's article to some extent. A lot of this resonates with Aristotle.

It is speculative because it obviously can never prove that reality, but it is believed one has the ability to speculate from the perspective of the human. They are not allowing this to hamper their ability to speculate. — schopenhauer1

I wonder if it comes from the idea of speculative knowledge (as contrasted with practical knowledge). His argument against scientism is basically the idea that science is only concerned with practical knowledge, and the obvious alternative here is speculative knowledge. In that sense "speculative realism" could be something like "realism as an attempt to understand reality, with no ulterior motive."

Along these lines, I agree with the author in his wariness of Harman's attempt to see nothing unique in human thought:

Realists are willing to speculate about the world, not caring how representation formulates the empirical evidence, per se. — schopenhauer1

For a classical realist like Aristotle or Aquinas, "realism" means realism with respect to universals (this is Gerson's anti-nominalism and anti-skepticism). The crucial idea here is that the human mind is capable of knowing reality as it is, and this is precisely where modern philosophy in all its forms departs. This inevitably leads to positing certain things about the human intellect, such as that it is immaterial due to its ability to comprehend material realities. (Interestingly, the one point in the video where Aristotle is brought up is with respect to knowledge of singulars, and on my view this is crucially related to this thread. It's a rather complicated topic, though. (link to Aquinas' view).)

Now the Speculative Realist seems to be committed to the view that the human mind can know reality as it is, and therefore I don't see how they can remain neutral on the question of the nature of the human mind (and the uniqueness of the human mind as an object).

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More generally, a problem I see with so many modern philosophies is that they are largely reactionary, reacting to other philosophers' views on very limited and discrete issues. "A related problem is that such individuals basically started with a critique, and then interpolated their more systematic views on that basis of that critique" (). I hope Harman is careful about this, because there is a danger of reacting to current problems in philosophy rather than setting out an ontology that can stand on its own.

The other broad problem in modern philosophy seems to be a simplistic subordinationism. The approach is often mathematical, where one seeks a perfectly stable starting point and then attempts to derive all of the rest from that point. Once the starting point fails the philosophy is thrown into abeyance, and remains in abeyance. Aristotle really doesn't do philosophy this way, and it is a deep merit of his work. I wouldn't call his approach coherentism, but there are all sorts of different footholds, accessible from different directions and different realms of inquiry, and the system is not reliant on a single point or first principle. Neither is there an overemphasis on epistemology.

Anyway, sorry for the choppy and meandering response. The posts deserved more time than I had. Thanks for sharing the video. :up:

Yeah that makes sense. I think we'd proceed better by going into tangential discussions at this point. But I'd not be interested in pursuing them without a detour, onto the original path, through more of Fine's work. — fdrake

Sounds Fine to me. Is there a particular part or aspect of Fine's article that you are interested in discussing?

It seems like I can refer to my friend's blegbleg successfully even though I have no interpretation of its nature... — fdrake

I am inclined to doubt this, although it depends on what we mean by 'refer'. On my view not knowing something prevents you from referring to it. Suppose I get into a conversation with my mechanic and starting using the word "catalytic converter," despite having no idea what it means (I am feigning competence). In this case we are both using the token 'catalytic converter', but in entirely different ways. Now if language is for communication then this is a failure of language. Even if I manage to fool the mechanic for a few minutes, no substantive communication is taking place.

I recognize that Anglo-American philosophy is keen to promote the idea of objective meaning, apart from the mere intention of the speaker. That's fine, but I would say that we can only prescind so far from intention and private knowledge. In my conversation with the mechanic intention and private knowledge come to the fore, and it seems that the term 'catalytic converter' when found on my tongue cannot be referring to a real catalytic converter, because I have no idea what a real catalytic converter is.

At best the ignorant person's working definition of 'blegbleg' or 'catalytic converter' seems to be, "That thing that my interlocutor knows about." It is the same in the earlier example about the novice who inquires about Thales.

I can just tell you. The only philosophy background I have is in scientific inference - so logic and statistical theory + methodology work. The research I've done has been fundamental in that intersection. Not fundamental in terms of importance, of course, but in terms of abstraction. So learning "conceptual analysis" has been useful. — fdrake

Okay, interesting. But you've obviously delved into philosophy given that you are able to discourse on a number of different philosophical topics with relative ease. For example, your interpretation of Fine seems quite apt, and your analysis of the debate between Banno and creativesoul was very cogent. Are there other philosophers or traditions that you have picked up along the way?

Also studied philosophy a bit as a student. Yours? — fdrake

I took an undergraduate degree in computer science, and then later took an undergraduate degree in philosophy along with some graduate work in theology. But the only field I have formally worked in is computer science. The philosophy was in large part a kind of analytic Thomism (Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle often in the sphere of analytic philosophy). But this was years ago and much of it feels rusty.

Observation proves that is the case... — Mww

Whereas I would say that observation proves that we do not do things that we are not inclined to do (things for which we have no inclination). Moral acts are just like other acts in this respect. If moral acts are not caught up in our inclinations, then moral acts do not exist.

So, if one is doubting whether they're acting, then the doubting itself is an act that they're not sure of. This has a funny consequence -- I'm not sure I'm walking, but I'm also not sure that I'm not sure I'm walking, and I really can't be sure at all of anything, which means there is one thing I know non-mediately: that I don't know anything. So, there IS ONE THING I know for sure!!
:sweat: — L'éléphant

Quite right. :lol:

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Sure, when we are aware we feel our body acting, moving and we feel the ease or the effort. — Janus

When we are riding an ass we feel the ass acting, moving, and we feel the ease or the effort. But to act is not to be carried around by an ass. ...Not even St. Francis' "brother ass"!

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Yes, I’m sure I’m acting, iff I’m in the act of doing something and aware of it. — Mww

Okay.

Why, the knowledge that I have walked to the kitchen, is mediated by my understanding of what a kitchen is. — Mww

Of course to have knowledge of a proposition involves having knowledge of the terms of the proposition, but the knowledge of the proposition is not mediated by the terms. The proposition presupposes and is constituted by the terms, just as the knowledge that you are walking into a kitchen presupposes knowledge of the kitchen. I think it would be quite odd to call this mediation, particularly in the sense of the "appearances" of the OP.

And yes, you actually do need a kitchen-type object to hit your eyes, or, possibly but not as definitively, some particular kitchen-like perception, in order to KNOW you’ve arrived in the kitchen. — Mww

But you've confused the topic. We are not talking about knowledge of arrival, we are talking about knowledge of acting. Transeunt acts will be easier (acts that have no exterior term). Kant thinks we should legislate for ourselves the categorical imperative, and it turns out that this legislating is an act. Well how do we know that we have so legislated? That we have so acted?

For the sake of argument, if you know you are acting iff you are "in the act of doing something and aware of it," then when you are consciously walking you have knowledge that you are walking. And if you are consciously thinking then you have knowledge that you are thinking. This knowledge is immediate.

What would you say is the main reason you’ve read Groundwork a few times, but you’re not a Kantian? Would it be that you weren’t persuaded by it enough to investigate other works, or you weren’t impressed with it at all? — Mww

Off the top of my head, I think Kant takes some starting points that are not tenable. For example, that self-legislation is possible and that there is morality apart from inclinations (or that moral behavior and inclination-behavior are conceptually separable).

I think the project is interesting, and when reading Kant in general I can see where he is coming from. It's a fairly tight system, and that's always a nice thing to have. In truth I take an Aristotelian-Thomistic approach and I haven't seen a need to leave it behind (except perhaps in a few recondite areas).

I would be somewhat curious to get my hands on The Metaphysics of Morals and skim through it to see what Kant's moral reasoning looks like at a more concrete level.

- Well, that might be slightly different than what I want to posit. It seems that if Ernie sees Bert flip a coin, then he has knowledge of Bert's action through observation. If Ernie flips a coin himself, then he has knowledge of his own act through observation, but he also has knowledge of his own act qua actor.

So through observation Ernie has knowledge, but he also has a different kind of knowledge when he is the one doing the acting. When Ernie flips a coin he does not need to observe the coin flip—like when he is watching Bert—in order to know that he is flipping a coin. As an actor he is able to act, and when he puts this ability into play and acts he knows he is acting. This is a sort of knowledge that we only have of our own acts.

This is what I mean by the difference between acting and observing. Are we agreed on that difference?

This video might help as a good jumping off point for a Harman's view of objects. Perhaps we can have a discussion on it? — schopenhauer1

If you start a discussion I will watch the video and contribute a bit, but my time is running short at the moment so I can't commit to too much.

I have been pondering Michael Sugrue's claim that Anglo-American philosophy starts from the external world and can never manage to bridge the gap to the mind, whereas continental philosophy starts from the subject/mind and can never manage to bridge the gap to the external world. He makes it, for instance, in this video on Husserl at 44:59. It seems like this discussion is somewhat related.

Okay, thanks. I think that is a common approach to the matter. Wood's thesis (in the preface of his translation of the Groundwork) caught me off guard a bit. He posits that the 13 years between the two works brings with it significant development, and a working out of the problems of the Groundwork.

Sound about right to you? You see it differently? — Mww

I own and have read the Groundwork a few times, but I do not own and have not read The Metaphysics of Morals. I have never heard of "The Metaphysics of Ethics" construed as a separate work.

I am not a Kantian. I was mostly curious whether I would be talking past you if we ever get into a discussion where I have the Groundwork in mind but you have the latter work in mind. It sounds like we wouldn't be.

- Are we agreed that there is a difference between acting and observing, even though it is also possible to observe one's own actions?

We know our actions in a direct way -- no input from the outside world. If I walked over to the kitchen, I knew it without waiting for an object to hit my eyes. My action is within me. My being is within me. A ball is outside of me, I can perceive it. I can perceive its qualities. If I lay down and imagine aliens, only I could know I am imagining. The act of imagining is not something that I perceive like I am perceiving a tree. In fact, compared to the perception of a tree, my imagination can take many forms; whereas a tree is a tree is a tree. Seven billion people could confirm that a pine tree is a pine tree. — L'éléphant

Yes, quite right. :up:

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That was never a contention... — Mww

We're taking baby steps here.

So, yes, we know our own actions in a more immediate way that we know others’ actions... — Mww

Okay great, so we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions. Now we can move to the question of the minor: whether we know our own acts immediately.

Some questions: Do you act? When you act do you know you are acting, or are you not sure whether you are acting? Do you disagree with L'éléphant about his knowledge of walking over to the kitchen? Finally, if you think this knowledge is mediate, then what is it mediated by?

()

Give that system any name you wish... — Mww

Do you think people without "systems" are also capable of knowledge?

Ever tied to explain what hasn’t occurred? — Mww

Knowledge is not an act of explanation.

I guess that goes back to the sense/reference discussion you were having with Banno earlier. Specifically whether/how reference leverages concepts or practices that are (often) exclusively associated with sense. — fdrake

Yes, it does go back to that. Perhaps I should have resisted Banno’s desire to move that topic into this thread, for it is a rather different topic than the one Fine is concerned with. On the other hand, your post was comparing Fine’s Aristotelian essentialism to Banno’s linguistic approach, which is also different than the topic of this thread. I suppose that is what I was responding to.

I agree with that, even though it's outside the scope of the thread. I believe that any speech act which refers does so on the basis of a history of use outside its immediate context, and how the referent is individuated+interpreted is informed by that history and the referent's nature. So I believe that the association of names (like "Socrates") with referents (Socrates) is done through an interpretation+individuation of the referent, and that the discursive contexts which refer to that referent must keep associating a "sufficiently like" (weasel words) interpretation+individuation of the referent to fix+continue that particular sense/referent/reference relation. — fdrake

That seems reasonable, but of course the devil’s in the details.

Though there's a rub. Like if you and your friend are having a disagreement about whether the blegbleg really is a shmooblydoo or a bigglewiggle, another friend observing the disagreement can successfully refer to the blegbleg by aping their reference, even without their own understanding of the blegbleg's sense, conditions of individuation, or its real nature. — fdrake

I would have thought “...and the referent’s nature” was meant to circumvent such a rub. But that rub does bother me when it comes to the Wittgensteinian meaning-as-usage idea. On a related note, meaning-as-usage seems to dovetail with the burgeoning ChatGPT movement, fueling the erroneous notion that because AI is able to mimic usage therefore it is using language in the same way that humans do.

How does that rub relate to the thread? Who knows, it just seems to. — fdrake

Be at peace. It is said that moderators are not held to a higher standard. :wink:

But if we really wanted we could draw it back to the thread by opining that when the modalist assesses the nature of language, his necessary properties miss the mark of a true definition and thus erroneously admit the ChatGPT AI into the group of language users. In a way, usage is a necessary property of meaning, and always attends and reflects meaning, and yet to define meaning in terms of usage is a misunderstanding of the essence of meaning (along with the sources and plasticity of languages). The blegbleg example shows why the meaning-as-usage account misses the mark.

Great posts, by the way. Is there a thread where I can ask about your philosophical background?

Interesting, thanks. I will be visiting my parents soon and will have to dig some of my Heidegger books out of storage.

Hrm! I don't know that I'd accept "we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions" as a true sentence, but it'd be for boring reasons: I simply wouldn't use the predicate "...immediate" with respect to knowledge in general. — Moliere

But what about "more immediate"? Are there different levels of mediation here? I think that question presents the first step.

then, yes, an obligation would presuppose the existence of a moral fact. Nevertheless, this is would incorrect to use your definition in parsing my OP (since I did not use it that way): I mean a fundamental normative statement. — Bob Ross

I did not give a definition, and what I said is, "the existence of moral facts would presuppose the existence of fundamental obligations." I did not say—as you incorrectly claim—that "an obligation would presuppose the existence of a moral fact."

By moral fact I mean a moral judgment which exists mind-independently... — Bob Ross

How could a judgment exist independent of minds? Judgments are judgments of minds.

Good posts. I think that by "essence" is meant the defining feature of the referent. I think those who prefer Wittgenstein would take the latter approach that you outline.

I myself am not convinced that linguistic use can be so heavily separated from metaphysics. After all, much of our language is referring to things in themselves. I recently listened to Gregory Sadler's video on Wittgenstein. One of the things that came across was the idea that Wittgenstein was a sort of towing truck for English-speaking philosophy, helpful for getting it out of the ditch but not a very reliable vehicle in himself. That seems like a reasonable assessment.

- The description of Harman is interesting, and I think there is a lot of overlap with Aristotle. I will have to look into him.

That is to say, for example, in Harman, the "essence" of an object is always "withdrawn" or "hidden" such that it cannot be interacted with. — schopenhauer1

I don't think Aristotle or Aquinas would speak in such a strong way, but the idea is definitely present in their work. Understanding and defining essences is tricky business, always in need of revision and open to further precision or correction.

A basic question here is: What provides the surest starting point? Harman's objects? Aristotle's substances? Wittgenstein's linguistics?

I think object/substance is the prima facie answer, but if someone like Wittgenstein sees Hume blocking that path they will seek a different route. Of course there is no reason we can't have both. Thinkers like C. S. Peirce or John Deely are two examples of men who had both, in spades.

Anything that is an appearance is known mediately,
Action is known only non-mediately
Therefore, action cannot be an appearance.

This makes it clear that the question is whether action is known only non-mediately, and that would seem to be false, which makes the argument as reformulated valid, but unsound. — Janus

Using this approach, you can get true premises in the following way:

Anything that is an appearance is known only mediately
Action is known non-mediately
Therefore, action cannot be an appearance

(The point is not that action is known only non-mediately, but rather that action is known non-mediately (and mediately), whereas appearance is only known mediately.)

(Ever listened to speeches on the floor of the U.S. House? Yikes, I tell ya; one instance of illegitimate reasoning right after another. The more serious the topic, potentially the more silly the logic) — Mww

Ha!

Aristotle calls this an error in scientific reasoning, meaning it only shows up in demonstrations of the premises. — Mww

Well, it means that the error is fatal precisely to a demonstration. My point is that the OP is not a demonstration, and need not be a demonstration (in the Aristotelian sense).

Here, the major premise, that appearances are known mediately, is true as demonstrated by means of some theory, but the minor, an individual knows his actions non-mediately, is demonstrated as false by that same theory. — Mww

A Kantian theory? I would say that if Kant thinks that one's own actions are known by the same mediation that others' actions are known, so much the worse for Kant.

Again I’ll ask….how do you think it is possible to have knowledge of our own actions in a non-mediated manner? — Mww

My point in indicating that everyone in the thread accepts it is to say that this burden is on you. To everyone in the thread it is accepted that we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions, and if you disagree then you will have to provide an argument.

The commonsensical idea is that when I see someone else flip a coin my knowledge is mediated by sense data; but when I flip a coin my knowledge that I am acting is in no way limited to sense data. Because I am the one effecting the act, therefore I know that the act is being effected. The mediation of the former is not present in the latter.

Bottom line….knowledge of any kind, is necessarily mediated by the system which makes knowledge possible. — Mww

I would not say that abstract systems mediate knowledge. "Systemic intellectual methodology" is an afterthought, an epistemic hanger-on that follows after knowledge is already had. It is an attempt to explain what has already occurred.

There are two questions here: first, whether the mediation of the knowledge of appearances and the mediation of the knowledge of first-person acts are different kinds of mediation; and second, whether the knowledge of first-person acts are mediated.

The fact that no fundamental obligation is a moral fact does not negate the existence of moral facts. The point is that the moral facts are not doing any of the work in a rational moral system: its the hypothetical imperative(s) which is(are) the fundamental obligation(s). — Bob Ross

Hypothetical imperatives cannot ground obligation, which is why the existence of moral facts would presuppose the existence of fundamental obligations.

On another note, as argued in the OP, a moral fact cannot be a fundamental obligation, as that would be circular logic. — Bob Ross

I think the OP is nothing more than a circular denial of moral facts, a begging of the question. Positing the existence of moral facts without the existence of fundamental obligations makes no sense at all, and isn't a true positing of moral facts. In reality what you call a "moral fact" is a hypothetical imperative, and what you call a "fundamental obligation" is a moral fact. Thus you are granting hypothetical imperatives while denying moral facts (categorical imperatives). This is the same old consequentialist argument that has been popular for centuries, at least since Sidgwick.

If you think I'm wrong then set out your definition of a moral fact.

(Again, the point here is that @Count Timothy von Icarus' replies are on point. He is defending moral facts because the OP denies moral facts.)

I am still intrigued by this comment of yours, which is quite informative. It seems to be one of those cases where Humean nominalism and British empiricism flow together like oil and water. The attempt to limit oneself to the "discursive context" collapses on itself whenever an act of expression expresses an object. For example, a proper name is a 'rigid designator' which means that the object it identifies is ostensibly unique, and accounting for the manner in which one identifies such an object inevitably draws one outside the "discursive context." The meaning of a proper name is incomplete without some account of the way that proper names are used to reference real objects.

He could feel frustrated by a political decision because it's going to impact his life, but he could also honestly acknowledge to himself that he doesn't oppose that decision from a political standpoint. He wouldn’t label it as detrimental to society, or even to other mathematicians; he would only recognize that it's unfavorable for him. — Skalidris

Is he capable of recognizing political decisions that are unfavorable to others? And if he is capable of the (rational) judgment that a political decision is unfavorable to the vast majority of the society, would he not then oppose that political decision? Because politics is for the polis?

What is your position on the relation between Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and his Metaphysics of Morals (1797)? Some, such as Allen Wood, allow for the possibility that Kant's moral thought developed significantly in the interim, and that the Groundwork was in some ways superseded.

I thought the central focus was about whether H's work is contaminated or undermined by his Nazism. — Tom Storm

Yes, but the argument you give is not the only one by which someone could reach such a conclusion: "because someone may be problematic [therefore] this bleeds into all their activities."

We "feel" our own actions "from the inside" it seems, and we see, or hear the actions of others, but if feeling as well as seeing and hearing is mediated by prior neuronal activity, the immediacy may be merely phenomenological, which then just be to say that knowledge of our actions seems immediate, which is of course true. — Janus

I do not think it is a question of feeling. Feeling is a passion, not an action, and therefore to feel is not to act. Acting goes beyond feeling, and when one acts they know they have done so. The mediacy of perception pertains to the major premise, not the minor.

At least not in its recent revival. I wasn't a member when the thread began six months ago. Again, if Heidegger were a logician it would be different (link), because it is plausible that logic and ethics have no interrelation. The crux of this issue is illustrated by the difference between and .

I think you may have misunderstood the OP (which is totally fine): it is not that moral realism is insignificant because there are no facts but, rather, that if it were true it would be irrelevant. — Bob Ross

I think @Count Timothy von Icarus' reply is on point given that the OP fails to make this argument. The OP grants moral facts with its right hand and takes them away with its left. "You can have moral facts but you cannot have fundamental obligations," is the same as saying, "You can have moral facts but you cannot have moral facts." A fundamental obligation is one kind of moral fact, and if there are no fundamental obligations then there are no moral facts.

I don't hold to a view that because someone may be problematic that this bleeds into all their activities. — Tom Storm

I don't think anyone in the thread has proposed such a view.

What do we wish, by means of proper reason, to extract from a syllogism? — Mww

Knowledge, and knowledge is not univocal.

If it is the case no knowledge is at all possible that is not mediated... — Mww

If this were the case then the minor would simply be false. But it is not false, because we do have knowledge of our own actions in a non-mediated manner. I don't think anyone in the thread has claimed that the minor is false.

It follows that while the major is true in its use of “mediately”, the minor remains equivocal insofar as “non-mediately” has a different relation to knowledge than the relation in the major, hence is a fallacious sophisma figurae dictionis, especially if “non-mediately” doesn’t relate to knowledge at all. — Mww

This is the metabasis that I referred to. Because "non-mediately" does relate to knowledge—as everyone in the thread concedes—the conclusion manages to convey a form of knowledge, albeit not demonstrative knowledge. The relationship between the subject and the predicate of the major is not identical to the relationship between the subject and the predicate of the minor, but neither is it equivocal. A pros hen relationship obtains (between mediated knowledge and non-mediated knowledge).

Having said all that, what do you think “non-mediately” means, and do you think knowledge is possible by it? — Mww

I think the reason no one has challenged the minor is because we all believe that we possess a knowledge of our acts which is not mediated. This is different from our knowledge of the acts of others.

Note: I have in mind the formalized version of the syllogism ().

I’m sure your actions, from the vantage of a century or so hence, will come to be construed as deeply ethically flawed. — Joshs

But how many times does this poor argument need to be unmasked? Here are some places where it has already been done:





(Conflating cases where "a century or so" is required with cases where "a century or so" is not required is inadmissible.)

A syllogism suffering premises with no relation to each other, is a paralogism — Mww

But it is quite odd to claim that the two knowledge-predicates have no relation to each other. Metabasis eis allo genos does preclude a strict demonstration because not all premises apply per se, but it does not preclude a looser and less exact syllogism. I think that's exactly what is happening here. The conclusion, "Therefore, no first-person actions are appearances," is sound vis-a-vis the metabasis. The error or lapse does not preclude a non-demonstrative kind of inference. The genus-predications map to one another in an inexact way, but they are not wholly equivocal. We can quibble about what invalidity means, but I don't think the syllogism is "just a hot mess."

In other words, ' two terms are not strictly equivocal; they are pros hen homonyms.

I see no contradiction between flawed or 'bad' people (however this is measured) who also produce innovative, prodigious work — Tom Storm

Again, I think it depends on whether Heidegger's philosophy implicates the moral sphere. For an ethicist to produce a work of great import and then choose actions which are deeply flawed is incongruous. For a philosopher whose work implicates the moral sphere the incongruity is not as great, but it is still present. For someone whose work has no relation to the moral sphere, there is no incongruity.

And then this gets into 's point about "philosophical nihilism." It is easy to swallow the idea that a logician, for instance, can produce work unrelated to the moral sphere. But Heidegger is doing and purporting to do something much more fundamental ("metaphysics"), and there is much more at stake in considering whether that fundamental sphere is amoral.

Interesting, thanks. I can see how this reflects your view that "the two bodies of work are two aspects of the same thinking," while yet providing room for a correction, and also providing a way of preserving the philosophy. Overall, this seems like a reasonable approach. I would like to read the entire article.