That's the reasoning behind the substitution argument given earlier. If in "Jesus is God" and "The Holy Spirit is God" the "is" is that of identity, then we ought be able to substitute and get "Jesus is the Holy Spirit". But Scripture won't let us. — Banno

The underlying idea that, "'Son' and 'God' are formally substitutable terms," requires an insane ignorance of Christian Trinitarianism. — Leontiskos

-

Are you now denying that Jesus is God? — Banno

You literally don't know what you mean when you say, "Jesus is God." You literally have no idea what you mean by "is," and now you are trying to leverage your ambiguous, bumper-sticker phrase to try to somehow shame me. :lol:

In syllogistic logic, all relations are reduced to single-places predications. “Socrates is taller than Plato” have to be paraphrased into one-place predicates like “Socrates is-a-thing-taller-than-Plato” before entering a syllogism. Something like "Tully is Cicero" has to be treated not as a relation, but as a single-placed predicate. It has to be treated the same way as, say, "Tully is a writer". Tully is a member of the group of writers, and Tully is a member of the group of things which are Cicero. — Banno

This is just more ignorance of history, in this case syllogistic logic. Syllogistic logic is predicative. For example, "Socrates is human," is not the single-place predicate H(S). Pretending it is is a kind of myopic projection of predicate logic beyond its bounds. That's what your strange analysis of "is" is: an awkward shoehorning of natural language into the straightjacket of specialized logical devices.

But all of this is based on your insistence that we must stick with your bumper sticker formulation, "Jesus is God," despite the fact that the theological sources simply do not rely on such bumper sticker formulations. Were we to abandon the bumper sticker, your strawman would fall apart. So we can't do that! :grimace:

- Yes, the analogy limps insofar as it utilizes the idea of separable parts. Yet my point is that an age which accepts (2) will surely reject the Trinity.

One of the great weaknesses of Analytic Philosophy is that it doesn't recognize that logic follows upon being, and that every approach to logic presupposes a metaphysics. Older logicians were better logicians than the Analytics because they understood this.

Thinking now of these metaphysical premises, presumably it is no coincidence that a numerical objection to the Trinity has become popular in an individualistic age. The core argument is something like this:

1. The Trinity is a unified multi-hypostasis reality
2. But there are no unified multi-hypostasis realities
3. Therefore, the Trinity cannot exist

For example, in our day it is commonly believed that a social reality constituted of persons is reducible to persons. So someone in our day might say that a "family" is a fiction, and all that really exists in a family are the individuals.

On that assumption the Trinity is "illogical" (precisely because it contradicts the metaphysical doctrine of (2)). But a negation of (2) is not implausible. Families are arguably multi-hypostasis realities, and not mere fictions. The "superorganism" of a beehive is another example, where the hive is more than the sum of its parts. The Trinity will be seen as possible so long as we see unities which are more than the sum of their parts as possible. The Trinity is a bit like a beehive where the hypostases are in such elegant concert that it is hard to tell where one begins and another ends, and where the bees are nonplussed about this fact. This extreme unification is precisely why Christianity holds that Trinitarian activity ad extra is not differentiable from standard monotheism.

- Oh, dear. :sweat:

The source was openly an LDS source, That's why frank provided the picture of the Mormons on bikes. @Banno then cited another article describing other views on the Trinity. The point then was just to point out there wasn't Christian consensus on the Trinity. — Hanover

Okay...

I've pointed out the problems with appealing to Mormonism on Christian questions. Banno is quoting from SEP and is mistakenly transferring its philosophical authority into a religious authority. SEP is really not a reliable theological source. In that article it is adopting one particular way of ordering very recent logical approaches to the Trinity.

None of that has much to do with consensus. There is a Christian consensus on the Trinity, and it is based in the Councils of Nicea and Constantinople (325 and 381).

Thus approximately 98.5%[59] of the world's Christians are Nicene Christians, adhering to the Nicene Creed's Trinitarian and Christological doctrines. The remaining 1.5% include non-Trinitarian groups such as the LDS Church, Jehovah's Witnesses, Swedenborgians, etc. — Nicene Creed | Wikipedia

If the LDS are to be counted as Christians, then they account for 0.61%, and SEP's logical taxonomy has nothing to do with representation or consensus. So I would say that the OP's focus on Catholicism is representative of Christianity generally, especially if we favor the general Nicene tradition.

The trinity is three entirely seperate personages, not a single entity. They have a common purpose, and they're referred to as the godhead. Such is true Christian theology. https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/comeuntochrist/article/do-latter-day-saints-believe-in-the-trinity

When you say "the Christian narrative" and then start going on about the Nicene Creed which was arrived at 325 years after Jesus' death, you're just taking about your peculiar brand of modified Christianity. — Hanover

I was looking through your posts to try to understand where you are coming from. Maybe part of the problem here is that you are depending on Mormon sources. At least the second sentence of your article is candid:

Like many Christians, we believe in God the Father, His Son Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit. However, we don’t believe in the traditional concept of the Trinity. — Mormon Source

I think it struggles if it's subjected to basic logical demands (e.g., law of identity, law of non-contradiction, etc.). — Hanover

Well we can look at your argument too, which I would say comes down to this:

I don't know where [Hanover's] either/or is coming from. — Leontiskos

-

1. Yahweh is God. Jesus is God. The holy spirit is God.

2. . Hanover is a person, Bob is a person, Frank is a person.

3. Hanover is Banno. Bob is Banno. Frank is Banno.

Is 1 like 2 or is 1 like 3? Clear this up for me.

If 1 is like 2, then you have three things that fit into a single category.

If I is like 3, then you either have 1 person with 3 names or a 3 headed monster. — Hanover

You are giving a dilemma:

4. Either "is God" means something like "is a person" or else "is God" means something like "is Banno"
5. Either way we arrive at an anti-Trinitarian outcome
6. Therefore, the doctrine of the Trinity is inconsistent

As I alluded to, the either/or of (4) is ad hoc and false, and therefore your argument is unsound. Christians say what "is God" means, and it means, "is divine," or, "Homoousios with the Father."

Again, basing the entire discussion on a heuristic diagram which is famous for its oversimplification is not a good approach. Here is a clause from the Catechism of the Catholic Church that most closely approximates the same idea:

262 The Incarnation of God's Son reveals that God is the eternal Father and that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, which means that, in the Father and with the Father the Son is one and the same God. — Catechism of the Catholic Church, #262

We could disambiguate the modern phrase, "The Son is God":

• A. "The Son—in the Father and Spirit and with the Father and Spirit—is God"
• B. "The Son—apart from the Father and the Spirit—is God"

(A) is theologically true whereas (B) is theologically false. The Son is never apart from the Father and the Spirit. What is happening in this thread is that (B) is being claimed as Catholic teaching, and this is false given that (B) is not Catholic teaching. (B) is a hostile translation of a highly compacted and oversimplified diagram.* In the contemporary colloquial idiom when Catholics speak of "God" as a sort of proper name they are talking about the Triune communion of persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. For Catholics the inner life of God is tri-personal, and this creates friction with the standard account of 'God' as mono-personal. The hostile translation (B) is presupposing 'God' as a mono-personal hypostasis, which would place the relata into the same genus and accord with a transitive property of identity. But anyone with knowledge of historic Christianity will know that this is a misrepresentation, that for Christians the generic "God" is triune rather than a single hypostasis, and that "Son" and "God" therefore belong to different genera. was correct in saying that what is at stake is a predication rather than an identity relation. That is a remarkably accurate interpretation of Nicene Christianity.

()


* The misrepresentation is also being used by @frank as a support for the strawman of the OP.

I think there is an explanation of the many instances of “is” in the Triune God. I can provide some of them. Count and Leon have provided some. — Fire Ologist

Again, @Banno's argument is invalid, and obviously so:

1. Son = God(head)
2. Spirit = God(head)
3. Therefore, Son = Spirit {transitive property of identity}

Again, the transitive property of identity requires relata of the same genus:

The presupposition when using the transitive property of identity is that each of the relata are the same kind of thing (i.e. belong to the same genus). So if A, B, and C are all numbers, then we can apply the transitive property of identity to them. But if A is a number, B is an animal, and C is a solar system, then we cannot. — Leontiskos

4. 2+2 = 4
5. 3+1 = 4
6. Therefore, 2+2 = 3+1 (transitive property of identity)

7. 3 = giraffe
8. giraffe = Copernican System
9. Therefore, 3 = Copernican System (transitive property of identity)

(6) is valid whereas (3) and (9) are not.

Count has already pointed this up:

It's "one nature, three persons." Consider the analogous case of human nature:

Mark is human. (A is B)
Christ is human. (C is B)
Therefore Mark is Christ. (A is C) — Count Timothy von Icarus

A nature (ousia) and a person (hypostasis) are not of the same genus, and this is why Banno's argument is invalid.

Analytics like Banno seldom have any idea what they are doing when they say, "x = y," as they assume that anything can be placed into that form. They don't recognize the mathematical context and the single genus of the relata that their formulation takes for granted. This is one example of why Banno's philosophy is so unreflective. In a philosophical sense, "x = y" pertains to epistemic moves, where a single object goes by two different names. There are just too many reasons why this sort of approach is utterly inappropriate when talking about the Trinity. The underlying idea that, "'Son' and 'God' are formally substitutable terms," requires an insane ignorance of Christian Trinitarianism. It is such an unlikely strawman that very little attention is paid to the idea at all.

I fed the last page into Claude and received the following review: — Banno

@Hanover, @Baden - isn't this literally against the rules of TPF? An entire post of AI? Further, Banno is constantly telling us that "I win because AI said so," all the while failing to provide even the prompts he is providing to the AI. Is this really what the forum has come to? Is this rule still being enforced?

AI

AI LLMs are not to be used to write posts either in full or in part (unless there is some obvious reason to do so, e.g. an LLM discussion thread where use is explicitly declared). Those suspected of breaking this rule will receive a warning and potentially a ban.

AI LLMs may be used to proofread pre-written posts, but if this results in you being suspected of using them to write posts, that is a risk you run. We recommend that you do not use them at all — Baden

Making AI say whatever you want it to say is pretty easy. Hanover knows this:

↪Banno Then continue your conversation with ChatGPT and ask it for Jewish interpretations that it stands for repudiation of human sacrifice and then have it compare that to your other post. Then argue with it and have it change its mind.

It has such poor resolve I find — Hanover

Leontiskos's suggestion that analytic philosophy is overly restrictive when evaluating the Trinity because it demands logic is difficult to accept, — Hanover

This is a very strange interpretation given that I said just the opposite:

The Analytic, with his tiny set of norms, must ultimately admit that pretty much everything passes muster, at least on Analytic grounds. — Leontiskos

To the extent we're referencing the analytic tradition as elaborated by Wittgenstein and Davidson, particularly with their dispensing with the idea that meaning is based on an internal referent, I see Leon's point. If the soul is an entity and the love one has for God is a true thing in one's heart, it's entirely inadequate to suggest these words refer to just their use and not some mystical entity.

And we've got to keep in mind that the linchpin of Wittgenstein's enterprise is in denying private language, which is a metaphysical impossibility to the theist because his internal state is publicly shared by God. That is,a theist might see Wittgenstein's theory as a brilliant reductio that proves without God you are limited to an absurdly restricted system of language. Of course, the secular analytic embraces this conclusion and runs with it. — Hanover

I don't see theology as private, even if we are prescinding from the idea that God is part of the group. Theology has always been a public, social enterprise.

But then I disagree with Leon in his hesitation to accept that logical thought (which here I mean logical reasoning, which includes analogizing and the use of precedent as authority) by itself is not a religious act. — Hanover

I said that logical thought can but need not be worship. I would say that the fact of logical reasoning is not itself worship even if the material object is construed as "religious." So for example, if an atheist is logically analyzing Rabbinic literature, he is not engaged in worship.

- Wow, and in 1993. :lol:

Well, yeah, but… Jesus became a man first, and then died on the cross. The father didn’t do that. So it is true to say God died on the cross, because Jesus is God, not because the Father is God. So yeah… — Fire Ologist

These sorts of puzzles arise within Christianity because Christianity is based on natural language, and wherever there is natural language the strict separation between logically distinct categories does not exist. Christianity was not made in a lab.

If one has not studied a great deal of theology, the best rule of thumb when it comes to Trinitarian theology is to use the term 'Godhead' and to simply avoid the term 'God.' The textual ambiguities—not to mention the logical complexities—of the term 'God' are legion. Thus the basis for Trinitarian theology is three hypostases (Father, Son, Spirit) and one ousia (Godhead). When one moves outside of Trinitarian theology that rule of thumb must be dropped, and the complexities of natural language must be embraced.

@Fire Ologist - This ^^^ is a good example wherein one shows that a charge of contradiction is false. An argument that the Trinity is unreasonable is shown to fail, yet without sacrificing the Trinity as an article of faith. The objection objectively fails, and yet the doctrine of the Trinity remains "unerectable" via natural reason.

Oh, Leon. Yes, that's how "=" works. And yes, it follows that you cannot be using "is" in "Jesus is God" to mean "=", and hence you must be using it a different way.

So, how are you using it? How does it work? And why do you need this special use of "is" just for God? Why is this special use not ad hoc self-justification? — Banno

So first, replace every instance of "you" with "the diagram." Second, revisit my initial claim that your focus on the diagram is a dead end.

And why do you need this special use of "is" just for God? — Banno

Your invalid use of the transitive property of identity is not only applicable to God(head). Failing to keep the relata of the same genus is always invalid.

And you asre slipping back into attacking me rather than the point being made here. Bad form. — Banno

Telling you that you should inform yourself before attacking that which you don't understand is attacking you? It's not attacking you, and it's pointing to the real problem here. That problem is why I was so averse to even entering this thread in the first place.

Of course if A=B and A is a number, it follows that B is a number. — Banno

Then you've done what I said:

Now you could build that condition into your definition of "=" if you like... — Leontiskos

And also as I said:

...but it amounts to the same failure; the same invalidity within your argument. — Leontiskos

Your proposition "Jesus = God(head)" is false, given that there is not equality between things of different genera. This is precisely what I said above.

And then you flee back to the diagram. It's not about the diagram, it's about the nature of "is". — Banno

Which, again, comes precisely from the diagram. Your continual insistence makes no sense, "It's not about the diagram, it's about that part of the diagram that says 'is'!" That part of the diagram is obviously a part of the diagram.

...and the issue is, how are we to make sense of this? — Banno

By reading the smallest bit of theology to inform yourself before jumping to attack that which you do not understand?

The Trinitarian term "God(head)" is not a hypostasis; it is an ousia. Christians do not believe that Jesus = God(head).

The transitivity of identity doesn't require relata to "belong to the same genus" - it's a purely logical principle. If A=B and B=C, then A=C, regardless of what kind of things A, B, and C are. — Banno

No, that's incorrect. The presupposition when using the transitive property of identity is that each of the relata are the same kind of thing (i.e. belong to the same genus). So if A, B, and C are all numbers, then we can apply the transitive property of identity to them. But if A is a number, B is an animal, and C is a solar system, then we cannot.

Now you could build that condition into your definition of "=" if you like, but it amounts to the same failure; the same invalidity within your argument.

Again, the deeper problem is that you are relying on a heuristic diagram that doesn't try to be theologically precise. One way to remedy such confusions is to talk about Godhead instead of "God," to remind ourselves that what is at stake is an ousia.

The same sort of error is present in claims like this one:

When folk say that Jesus is god, they mean that when they say that Jesus died on the cross, it was god who died on the cross. — Banno

When you say, "...it was god," you mean, "it was the god-person," and this is precisely what is not meant when a Christian says that Jesus is God. In fact the theologically precise Christian says that Jesus is the Son of God.

transitivity — Banno

Again:

Sure, but did you catch the other half, where viewing "God" and "hypostasis" as belonging to the same univocal genus is also erroneous? — Leontiskos

The transitive property of identity requires that the three relata belong to the same genus. Yet a hypostasis and an ousia obviously do not belong to the same genus. Your argument is invalid.

So you characterized my position on the Trinity as one I “accept it as a mystery, as an article of faith rather than of reason.” That is not what is going on in my mind, or not how I would say it. It is close, but not precise.

I do believe there is one God who is three persons; I also believe there is reasoning that explains this. I also see that I had to accept all of this through faith, because it is mysterious. But again, my reason allows me deeper and better understanding of this (how the Trinity relates to the substance of love, and knowing, but I digress), so I would not simply end my
position on the issue as “it’s a mystery; believe it or don’t if you want.” There is much more to say besides “mystery” about the Trinity and it takes reason and logic to say things. — Fire Ologist

Good stuff. :up:

For example, for Aquinas the doctrine of the Trinity is an article of faith, and what this means is that faith is a necessary condition for belief in the Trinity. For Aquinas, one does not simply figure out the fact of the Trinity all by their lonesome. But this does not mean that the doctrine is divorced from reason.

If an atheist were really interested in the theology of revelation, they would want to start thinking about how an intellectually superior being would reveal things to an intellectually inferior being, namely things which exceed the rational comprehension of the intellectually inferior being. (Note that I am focusing on the "intellectual" for the sake of simplicity.)

All the theist can say is “yes, but then why did you ask me about God and the Trinity - these objects were revealed to me — Fire Ologist

:up:

And as far as “only analogy” can capture our understanding of the Trinity, yes, there are senses to “analogy” where this is true. So my point is, there are other senses to analogy where we must use reason and logic to identify how an analogy points out similarities and how it points out differences; — Fire Ologist

Right.

Agreed. There is a lot of misperception — Fire Ologist

Yeah, and I think a lot of it has to do with a kind of anthropocentrism, where one sees themselves and their own age as the center of the universe. On that conception everything is measured against our current form, and so much the worse for anything that doesn't "measure up." Thus there is no possibility of being measured by something greater than us. No possibility, for example, of being dwarfed by greater intelligences.

Edit: The other general problem is that Trinitarian theology requires the most careful linguistic distinctions, and the objectors are basically using careless or ambiguous words at every turn. For example, pretending that the symbol (or rather function) "=" has some precise meaning, or that "is" is an uncomplicated copula, or that 'incomprehensible' and 'inconceivable' mean the same thing. I could go on. It is but one instance of the sort of lazy critique where one expects their interlocutor to do all of the work, and where one purports to be knowledgeable, ignorant, and critical of some particular thesis, all at the same time.

I'm not sure it's so ... "non-mysterious". ;) — jorndoe

I hope I haven't said that the Trinity is non-mysterious?

The Jews don't put much divine stock in Jesus; he wasn't the Messiah according to them. — jorndoe

Well the first Christians were all Jews. Beyond that, there are different lines of Jewish expectation and prophecy, and the ones which converge on a figure like Jesus actually exclude the unanimity that modern folk seem to expect.

The Christian narrative is not as simple as some would have it:

“Do not think that I have come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; and a man’s foes will be those of his own household. He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he who loves son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me; and he who does not take his cross and follow me is not worthy of me. He who finds his life will lose it, and he who loses his life for my sake will find it. — Matthew 10 (RSV)

- Yeah, I think you're making a really salient point. :up:

I guess no one wanted to take up Hanover's comment? — jorndoe

I don't know where his either/or is coming from.

The perennialists sometimes bring up the parable of the blind men and an elephant.
Might be better suited for pluralism. — jorndoe

Right, and a pluralism thesis is different from an incomprehensibility thesis, although that parable does leverage incomprehensibility. The key difference for a Christian claim or any revelatory claim is that some truth is entrusted to man by God.

So according to the Hindu/Buddhist elephant-parable contradictions are considered acceptable because it is assumed that they resolve at a deeper level. For Christianity there is no "deeper level" which supersedes divine revelation. Thus the phenomenon of contradiction is being approached differently by the two traditions, albeit with the significant caveat that the epistemic reliability of the claims in question is markedly different. Nevertheless, there are similarities insofar as Christians believe that various tensions and confusions will be resolved in the end. Still, the Christian would be careful to distinguish a tension from a contradiction.

Wouldn't it be more a cause for wonderment if it created referential transparency?

Then the Superman of Lois' beliefs could be relied on to share all his properties with the actual fictional one?

Granted that would spoil story-telling, and perhaps also Davidson's proposed intentionality test. — bongo fury

Wouldn't it also mean that the believer is omniscient, lacking no knowledge about identities?

As I mentioned, it's been said that God is like a coffee cup. The handle is an analogy. The mind is the index finger. In other words, the mind can only grasp God in a limited way. — frank

Yes, that's something of the idea. :up:

Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light. — Aquinas, ST I.12.1

This is often captured by the idea that what is infinite (God) cannot be comprehended or encompassed by what is finite (man).

- Interesting points. :up:

So I disagree with the New Advent quote above where it says “can be expressed…only in terms of analogy.” — Fire Ologist

One can understand what that encyclopedia means by 'analogy' by consulting its entry on analogy. It's different from how we now use that term colloquially.

It is precisely the fact that reason is a separate function than belief that one can believe before seeing reason — Fire Ologist

I think a good starting point for this is the quote I gave from Peter L. P. Simpson.

So I agree with you and Banno that the Trinity strains credulity. — Fire Ologist

I think the whole notion that "the Trinity strains credulity" is premised upon the contentious idea that the Trinity is discovered through natural reason. Something which does not pretend to be demonstrated by natural reason cannot really strain the credulity of natural reason.

For example, suppose a highly intelligent man told you, "I have developed technology capable of catching the rocket boosters from a rocket launch." Does that "strain credulity"? It depends on how intelligent you believe him to be. Whether the claim is credible depends on the man. To say that what he says "strains credulity" is to either hold that he is not sufficiently intelligent, powerful, or honest, or else to hold that what he testifies to is logically impossible.

The problem here is that folks like Banno simply haven't asked the question of where the Trinitarian doctrines come from:

One question here is surely whether the Trinity is to be understood as a starting point, as a hinge proposition, not to be doubted; or as a deduction from first principles as Bob Ross would have it; or... — Banno

In fact Christians believe in the Trinity on the testimony of God. It isn't a "hinge proposition"* or any such thing. The implicit premise for Banno which says that God cannot testify is an atheistic petitio principii.

What I said towards the end of <this thread> is very much on point here. There are only two logically valid attacks on the doctrine of the Trinity: 1) The Trinity is self-contradictory; or 2) The Christian's reasons for believing in the Trinity are insufficient. Both attacks require actual work.


* Incidentally, a "hinge proposition" in the way it is usually understood is a philosophically incoherent idea, whether or not Wittgenstein even held to it.

Sure. All cards on the table, the inspiration for the OP was the fact that there were two open threads attacking the OT, one on the basis that some of the folktales in it don't seem possible, and one complaining that the OT deity seems vengeful. I was like, did you guys think the NT makes sense? Because it doesn't. — frank

Do you find it odd that you didn't bother to reference the New Testament? One cannot make arguments against the New Testament without consulting the New Testament, just as one cannot make arguments against Catholicism without consulting Catholicism. So the consultation of the 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia is certainly a step in the right direction, even if it is only occurring on page 19.

If you will, read the following from the New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia, and see if you can understand how a person would get the impression that the Catholic Church holds the Trinity to be beyond human understanding.

...

In other words, they're drawing a distinction between incomprehensibility and inconceivableness. At first glance, it doesn't seem that such a distinction is supportable. Don't these two words mean the same thing? When the topic is mystery, the answer is no. A mystery is incomprehensible, but not inconceivable. They're denying that the Trinity is a contradiction, but they admit that it's superior to reason. Another way to say that is that it is beyond reason. — frank

I think Count already addressed this:

Something does not need to be contradictory to be a mystery. Indeed, I'd argue that if something is contradictory, in a strict logical sense, it is simply absurd, not a mystery at all. To say, in a univocal, properly logical sense, that God is both numerically one and not-numerically one, and that the Father is the Son and also is not-the Son, isn't a statement of mystery, it is nonsense. It is nonsense because we are saying something, and then negating it, and not in the fashion of apophatic theology, where we affirm in one sense, and then negate the creaturely sense, but in the strict univocal manner appropriate to logic, so that we are actually not saying anything at all, because everything we have said has been negated.

But, there is a difference between strict contradiction and merely apparent contradictions, or contradictions that arise through equivocation, or not making proper distinctions. And there is a difference between what is beyond human reason, or beyond the domain of logic and of univocal predication, and what is contrary to reason (contradictory). — Count Timothy von Icarus

What's curious here is that many Analytics would agree with this claim:

all that we know is incomprehensible, i.e., not adequately comprehensible as to its inner being; — Mystery | Catholic Encyclopedia (1913)

Another way to say this is to say that nothing that we know is fully comprehended, or fully comprehensible.

So if you think that "incomprehensible" and "inconceivable" have the same meaning—itself a dubious linguistic claim—then what would follow from this quote is that nothing is conceivable. This too looks absurd.

This argumentation is fallacious, since it confounds incomprehensibility with inconceivableness, superiority to reason with contradiction. — Mystery | Catholic Encyclopedia (1913)

Are you claiming that there is nothing which is superior to reason that is not at the same time contradictory? That everything which is superior to reason is contradictory?

Analysis becomes a form of worship. — Hanover

I disagree with that, but I don't know how far afield this would take us. Analysis can be worship, but it need not be. I suppose much of it depends on what you mean by "asserting the Talmud a hinge belief."

the analytic tradition need not be atheistic — Hanover

Agreed.

I just point out that both sides to our hearty debate are being myopic if they think analytic thought entails atheism. What entails atheism or theism is worldview, which relates to form of life. — Hanover

So when I said "Atheistic Analytic":

Between the Atheistic Analytic and the Catholic... — Leontiskos

...I meant an Analytic philosopher who is an atheist, thus implying that not all Analytic philosophers are atheists. Perhaps that was confusing.

I don't think it's a stipulation in that context. We know what Lois believes because we know the story. It's from the narrator's point of view. That isn't available in real life. — frank

I don't see why it can't be recast as a question of what follows from belief. For example, you could avoid this by rewriting b. "Suppose Lois believes that Superman can fly." It seems that the "God's eye view" comes not primarily in premise (b) but rather in premise (a), yet that too can be recast as a supposition, thus achieving the central Analytic shift from inference to consequence.

It has been fruitful. I've picked up quite a bit about the ancient Greeks from Christians on TPF. — BitconnectCarlos

:up:

Yes. Even recently you've shown me a lot of moves I suspected Jewish theology would make but had never concretely witnessed before.

It almost became a discussion between two sides of an issue a couple times, but earnestness is hard to fake on TFP. — Fire Ologist

Right. I think there are cases where religious discussion can be quite fruitful:

• Interreligious dialogue between contrasting religious approaches
• Responding to critiques from those who are knowledgeable about religion or who are willing to put in the effort to learn (including atheists)
• The application of a religious tenet or concept to another field
• Genuine inquiry

Obviously this doesn't happen too often on TPF, but it is possible.

And this leads to a new question: why the gold is not growing as fast as bitcoins? — Linkey

Because it was already a stable holding long before cryptocurrencies arrived. Therefore the gross investment in gold is presumably much higher than cryptocurrencies, even though a few cryptocurrencies are increasing at a faster pace. When you have millions of cryptocurrencies, each of which starts from scratch, some of them will begin to grow at a fast pace. But the growth factor is a very limited metric.

Beyond that, interest in cryptocurrency is currently a form of speculation, which is why one sees more growth and general variance in that area.

Coming back to this but trying to shorten the length a bit...

In general I see no reason to claim that causality is physical. — Leontiskos

I can't see that it could obtain if not. This is a really weird statement, for me. It's almost like saying "I can't see a reason, in general, to assume that heat causes hotness". I mean, causation happens in the physical world. We don't have other examples (ignoring some "hard problem" considerations that would beg the question on either side). — AmadeusD

I think this is the central point. If there are no good arguments that causality is physical, then we have no reason to claim that causality is physical. Of course if we ignore the ubiquitous phenomenon of mental causation, then we are closer to a physicalism that would favor physical causality. But at the moment I think we're asking whether causality that does not involve mentality is physical.

The way that causality abstracts from objects—physical or otherwise—and is situated in between objects (in their relationality) is another example of the way that two differentiated genera provide us with the power to reason. — Leontiskos

It doesn't obtain "between" the objects, in physical space. It only obtains "between" the objects in thought (like the "relationship" between two corporate entities. In reality, it is the "relationship of them - how the two relate). — AmadeusD

Yes, but even then the relationship between two objects is something that is between the two objects. It is neither one object nor the other nor some third object. Thus to say that causality occurs between physical objects does not seem to prove that causality is physical, unless by "is physical" we only mean, "occurring between two physical objects."

There doesn't seem to be any reason whatsoever to consider a non-physical basis for energy transfer yet. — AmadeusD

Well "basis" is a strange word here. If there is no reason to claim that causality is physical, and there is no reason to consider a non-physical basis for energy transfer, then why not simply abstain from affirming either of those things?

In light of the above, i think I need an elucidation here. It seems this has been answered adequately above: Yes, they are one-and-the-same but in concert, not considered individually. The energy of one ball is part and parcel of itself, and not something "other". The same true for ball 2. They then interact, physically, and pass physical matter between themselves causing "work" to have obtained. — AmadeusD

Note though that if you think energy transfer is the transfer of physical matter, then it seems that you do think energy is a physical object, even though you said, "Energy is not a physical object, and no one claims it is." This is a large part of the difficulty. The concept of "capacity to do work" (energy) is not physical matter, and yet you think the transfer of energy is the transfer of physical matter.

and therefore a mathematical distance-measurement is not physical — Leontiskos

This is wrong as I see. The division is not physical. The division is artificial and, as you say, abstract. The measurement is entirely physical and rests on the actual physical limitations of point A in relation to point B and the physical space between them, along with our measurement methods which are also physical. — AmadeusD

I have a hard time with your claim that measurement is physical. I would say that a measurement of distance and the two endpoints belong to a different genus. The spatial orientation of a physical object, especially relative to something else, is not a property of itself. It is a Cambridge property. This is why points can be dimensionless even while line-lengths are not. In Euclidean geometry a line is always qualitative more than a set of points.

IN fairness, this was rough-and-ready and I'm technically misspeaking, even on my own understanding. Different forms of transfer require different descriptions, but something like this seems to work for your example. A version below:

"At the interface where the two objects meet, the faster-moving, higher-energy particles from the hot object collide with the slower-moving, lower-energy particles of the colder object."

At collision, "energy" which is read essentially as head or speed in this context, passes between the two objects, more-or-less replacing the hotter, faster particles in the moving object with colder, slower particles from the stationary object (again, not quite right - but the net effect is this).

An easier example is something like boiling (convection more broadly): less energetic particles are heated, move faster and spread about over a larger area, which causes them to move (as they cannot be as close to other particles when vibrating so fast, lest destruction occur) upwards and transfer that heat as essentially movement, to the more dense, less hot particles which they encounter. There's a purely physical explanation going on there.

Energy is just an assignment of value to the ability for a system to "do work" or affect other systems and objects. It's not claimed to be a "thing". Its a physical attribute, described very different across different media. — AmadeusD

I agree that the case of boiling water fits your account better than the case of collision. The difficulty here is that if you think every cause is physical, then you will need to defend not only the boiling of water, but also the collision of objects, gravity, etc.

it is hard to see how gravity is itself supposed to be physical. — Leontiskos

I don't find it hard. But then, I include certain assumptions about "fabric" being involved in space-time. That there is a finite set of work that can be done within the Universe leads me to understand that all bodies will be affected by all other bodies. This will represent itself in a ubiquitous force exerted by everything, on everything else. I'm unsure its reducible in any way from that. — AmadeusD

But I think "fabric" is another metaphor being reified. Does the physicist see the "spacetime fabric" as physical? In what sense is it said to be physical? We can surely stretch the word "physical" far beyond what we ever generally mean by it, but I am not much interested in that approach.

I'll go with your example though [but add premise 3]: — AmadeusD

1. Billiard ball1 causes billiard ball2 to move
2. Billiard ball1 and billiard ball2 are both physical
3. There is nothing else involved in the interaction
4. Therefore, the causation that occurs between the two billiard balls is itself physical — Leontiskos

I still don't see that (4) follows. There is no sufficient reason to believe that the (causal) interaction is itself physical.

Consider: <Muhammad Ali causes George Foreman to move; Muhammad Ali and George Foreman are both human; There is nothing else involved in the interaction; Therefore, the causation that occurs between the two boxers is itself human>.

Or: <The cue-ball causes the the nine-ball to move; The cue-ball and the nine-ball are both phenolic resin; There is nothing else involved in the interaction; Therefore, the causation that occurs between the two balls is itself phenolic resin>.

This form of reasoning does not seem to be valid. A kind of metabasis eis allo genos is occurring in the conclusion, where the predicate term is of an improper genus. Causation is not human, or phenolic resin, or physical, etc. We can say that what causes the nine-ball to move is the collision with a phenolic resin object, but words like "collision," "interaction," "relation," are also not amenable to the genera in question. Collisions are not phenolic resin, or phenolic resin objects. Collisions can occur between objects made of phenolic resin; or objects made of phenolic resin can collide, but it is still improper to say that the collision is itself phenolic resin.

I would say that the majority of talk about causation is in non-physicalist terms. — Leontiskos

I agree. I think most of it is doomed to be self-contradictory, empirically untenable or down-right ridiculous (God did it, for instance). — AmadeusD

That's not what I am saying. If two physicists are studying billiards and you ask them, "Are you assuming that the collision is itself phenolic resin?," they will tell you, "No, I am not." Or, "Are you assuming that the collision is itself physical?," they will tell you, "No, I am not." Physics by its very nature has always prescinded from the idea that collisions are themselves phenolic resin or that collisions are themselves physical. I gave the reason why earlier, "explanation and reasoning requires differentiated genera." If everything is reduced to the physical (or to any one homogenous thing), then explanation will be impossible, including causality-explanations.

But I think what you say is right when taken with respect to our cultural "religion" of materialism or physicalism. If we just assume that everything is physical, including causality, then we lead ourselves into absurdities. In this case it is the absurdity which makes interactions the same kind of thing as that which interacts. ("The Physical" is the new Ur-explanation)

Exactly: "that a car could make." It is potential. "Energy, in physics, the capacity for doing work" (Britannica). — Leontiskos

Physically deducible. — AmadeusD

"Physically deducible" is a strange and ambiguous phrase. Better to say, "deducible from physical interactions." And there simply is no valid deduction to the conclusion that the interaction is itself physical.

The point here is that none of us care to argue the esoteric points of Catholicism to determine whether the trinity is sustainable within the dictates of that logical system and to otherwise point out the tensions from within that system. — Hanover

This is the point I have been trying to make from the start. If the two interlocutors do not share an overarching norm then one's critique of the other will not be intelligible. The only real norm that Analytic Philosophy is consciously capable of is the norm of consistency (which is apparently the avoidance of being "illogical").

That's fine as far as it goes. Catholics also hold to the norm of consistency. But to show that the doctrine of the Trinity contains within itself a contradiction is a tall task, and I don't find a serious attempt at it within this thread. @frank's most recent attempt was to skip the "discovery" phrase and just declare that Catholics themselves hold that the Trinity is illogical. The problem with such an approach is basic: Catholics, like everyone else, simply do not hold that their own beliefs are illogical. Frank's claim about what Catholics hold is just false, and obviously so. Note too that in the extremely dense and complex history of Trinitarian controversy, the charge of internal self-contradiction is incredibly rare. The Analytic's desire to avoid metaphysics makes his whole approach extremely impotent in the face of real life philosophies, such as religions.

It is a tug of war between the substantiality of the norm and the communicability of the norm. Between the Atheistic Analytic and the Catholic the communicable/shared norms tend to be insubstantial, and the substantial norms tend to be incommunicable/unshared. This is why the whole approach of the OP is misguided. The Analytic, with his tiny set of norms, must ultimately admit that pretty much everything passes muster, at least on Analytic grounds. This is not so with a Muslim, for example, who has a metaphysical conception of God that is at odds with the Trinity.

Oh Banno - you are always more interested in talking about talking, rather than in what is actually being said. — Fire Ologist

Contrary to protestations and resentment from many, that's what Philosophy is. — Banno

We have yet another equivocation from Banno. What he did was give a strange self-referential account of why it looks like his activity in the thread is stupid but it's really quite smart. He is narrating his own activity and trying to construe it as "performance art" and "Wittgenstenian showing." According to his self-narration, he was trying to sink the thread into a bog of pointlessness! This post of Banno's was a very poor and awkward attempt at what the Germans refer to as "Deutungshoheit."

So whether or not philosophy is talking about talking, this self-narration in order to try to salvage one's past utterances is obviously not philosophy. It's just a vain attempt to save face.

“if x and y are the same object, then x and y have the same properties" — frank

In each case you are dealing with mental or intentional objects, and therein lies the confusion. Things like belief or the number of letters that any given language uses for a word have to do with our thinking, not with objects in themselves. In an Aristotelian sense an accidental property is being confused with an essential property. For example, it is only an accidental property of Istanbul that its English name has eight letters. Leibniz' law was never meant to track accidental properties deriving from mental objects.

Pretty much. The reasoning used in the simple theology hereabouts is low-hanging fruit for an analytic approach. It's the little word puzzles that are interesting, more than that it relates to god - but these threads always get a good audience, and plenty of kick back, which is fun. I'm supercilious and condescending, and despite, or perhaps becasue of that, you, dear reader, are here browsing my posts. Are you not entertained?

That, and that the OP was by Frank, who is at the least earnest in his posts.

Leon is helpful in these threads becasue he is so predictable. When someone disagrees with him he will variously denigrate them personally, misrepresent what they have said and claim to have already provided the answer. It's a pattern seen across many threads and against many different posters, and is the reason that he is ignored by so many of the more competent folk hereabouts.

He also borrows a strategy from Tim, to bury the discussion in appeals to specialised theological metaphysics, to insist that those who do not engage in the same texts as he does cannot understand his profundity. At heart this is an appeal to authority, together with a refusal to engage charitably.

Tim of course has a better background in all this than any of us, and so never descends to plebeian stance of actually presenting an argument. Hand waving and eloquence is sufficient for him to maintain his circumstance.

Fire Ologist presumes that the posts here are trying to learn about Christianity. That's not something I'm much interested in, given it's ubiquity. Olo is right that what is said in this thread is pretty irrelevant to the beliefs of the faithful. It's apparent that it's equally irrelevant to the beliefs of us Pagans.

So is this just performance art? Public onanism?

What if Banno's point is more Wittgensteinian, or Davidsonian - that there need be, indeed is, no explicable final answer in the way that theology presupposes? Then the arch of his assault here is in showing that all Leon and Tim and the others are doing is also a distasteful display of inappropriate behaviour? That in the face of the ineffable and the infinite, any finite discourse must fail?

But he's not cleaver enough to be doing that, now, is he.

Perhaps it's not a good idea to post these musings. But I'll do it anyway. These interminable threads make my point far more eloquently than I ever could. — Banno

No, this sort of ad hominem psychologizing and self-portrayal that you often resort to reveals how desperate you are to try to spin a narrative that has gotten away from you, in yet another thread where you have embarrassed yourself. In this case the embarrassment stems from your refusal to move beyond a diagram.

(I quoted your whole post so there's no need to try to edit it away. It's a gem.)

Again, you are confusing identi[t]y relations with predication. When I say "The Son is God" I am not referring to something analogous to "S = G". — Bob Ross

:100: :up:

These uses of "=" have caused confusion, not clarity.