- Thanks - I concede your point. I keep reading the OP in terms of a dialogue between two people, probably because of some reading I have been doing on non-deductive reasoning.

They imply ~A. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Then give your proof.

- In your concision you conflated 'algorithmic' with 'principled', and ended up confusing an exception with a rule (by using "Buridan's Ass" as the foundation for your theory of choice). Even decisions which are, "often biased, or heuristic, or made under pressure, [or] not the result of optimal rational deliberation," are still the result of rational thought, the result of thinking according to principles and practical rationality. The principle of double effect is one such principle that can be used in reaching decisions.

No.

What relevance is this question? — Michael

It is relevant because, like you so often do on these forums, you whip up an imaginary problem. You have no difficulty understanding the obligation that a promise creates in real life, but when you hop on the philosophy forum you magically forget what you know. It's no wonder that philosophy is so often associated with foolish pretense. "A promise means not only that you intend to fulfill it at the moment it is made, but also that you intend to fulfill it up until the time it is fulfilled, barring the intervention of unforeseen impediments" ().

Nowadays, if a philosopher finds he cannot answer the philosophical question ‘What is time?’ or ‘Is time real?’, he applies for a research grant to work on the problem during next year’s sabbatical. He does not suppose that the arrival of next year is actually in doubt. Alternatively, he may agree that any puzzlement about the nature of time, or any argument for doubting the reality of time, is in fact a puzzlement about, or an argument for doubting, the truth of the proposition that next year’s sabbatical will come, but contend that this is of course a strictly theoretical or philosophical worry, not a worry that needs to be reckoned with in the ordinary business of life. Either way he insulates his ordinary first-order judgements from the effects of his philosophising.

The practice of insulation, as I shall continue to call it, can be conceived in various ways. There are plenty of philosophers for whom Wittgenstein’s well-known remark (1953 §124), that philosophy ‘leaves everything as it is’, describes not the end-point but the starting-point of their philosophising. — Myles Burnyeat, The Sceptic in his Place and Time

That seems of no use to people who write/philosophise in other languages. — Lionino

I'd go farther and say it is of no use to anyone, period. :grin:

Dictionaries should solve it, but they won't for Michael. Michael will sooner deny every form of future accountability rather than abandon his strange position. He will deny promises, oaths, contracts, marriages - you name it. The more reductio that is applied, the muddier he is willing to get.

A contradiction is of the form "P ^ ~P" — Moliere

Your presupposition here straddles the two definitions of a contradiction in an interesting way. Using the same example I gave privately:

"The car is wholly green." "No, the car is not wholly green."

This is a contradiction on all definitions.

"The car is wholly green." "No, the car is wholly red."

This is a contradiction classically but not according to symbolic logic, and your method would not find it to be a contradiction.

I think the third way to give a contradiction, besides the two already noted, is to use symbolic logic and say, "Assume P and suppose Q. If an absurdity results on Q, then P and Q are contradictory." This gets closer to the classical definition. It shows that they cannot both be true, but it does not show that they cannot both be false, and it does not show that the trueness or falseness of one results from the falseness or trueness of the other.

The two statements are not contradictory. They simply imply ~A. — hypericin

You think the two propositions logically imply ~A? It seems rather that what they imply is that A cannot be asserted. When we talk about contradiction there is a cleavage, insofar as it cannot strictly speaking be captured by logic. It is a violation of logic.

It is troublesome to talk about these things if one is not using very specific terminology. What does "contradictory" really mean? — Lionino

Yours is the best post in the thread imo. It is especially interesting that what I called fallacious your source explicitly calls a contradiction (). There are two different notions of contradiction occurring in the thread.

But OP is asking are the two contradictory with each other?

I think what is being asked here is whether one is the denial of the other. And the answer is no. Putting it in logical tables, denial would be whenever (A → B) yields True (A → ¬B) yields False. — Lionino

A classical definition says that two propositions are contradictory if the denial of either entails the affirmation of the other, and vice versa. So there are materially four different relations, given that each of the two propositions can be denied or affirmed. This is what I was trying to get at in my first post.

What's interesting is that it is not possible to contradict a material implication even on the classical understanding of contradiction. This is why I think the more interesting question prescinds from material implication:

NB: Given the way that common speech differs from material implication, in common speech the two speakers would generally be contradicting one another. — Leontiskos

Depends on what is meant by 'negligence'. — Janus

Well here is the first sentence of the article I linked above:

The moral significance of negligence is regularly downplayed in the legal and philosophical literature. — Shiffrin, The Moral Neglect of Negligence

You seem like someone who just hasn't thought or read about this topics much at all, to the extent that in order to discuss them on a philosophy forum you would need to do some homework first. I'm happy to talk after you do some homework. If you don't want to, that's your call.

My promise was sincere because I intended to fulfil it when I made it. I was being honest at the time. I just happened to change my mind after the fact. — Michael

And that is the sort of thing you tell your professional clients?

Sufficient for what? I don’t really understand the question or how it relates to my comments to Banno. — Michael

Sufficient to avoid the conclusion that your promise was insincere.

No, because I may choose not to. — Michael

So you responded, "No, because I may be prevented from doing so." But then you deleted that post and wrote a different one after thinking more carefully about my parenthetical remark. That's good.

Now a promise means not only that you intend to fulfill it at the moment it is made, but also that you intend to fulfill it up until the time it is fulfilled, barring the intervention of unforeseen impediments.

So suppose that yesterday you told a client that you would meet with him today at 2:30. But today comes around and you "choose not to." You choose not to, and instead go golfing. Your client waits for you at the coffee shop and eventually leaves, frustrated. On his way home he drives past the golf course and sees you teeing off on hole #3. What will he say to you? What will you say to him? Will it be sufficient to tell him that you "chose not to" meet with him?

Because a promise is sincere only if one intends to do as one promises. — Michael

Right, and is it not also true that if a promise is sincere then one will do what they promised (unless some unforeseen impediment intervenes)?

↪Michael Do you think that one can sincerely say "I promise to answer you but I intend not to answer you".

I'll let you work through it. — Banno

No. — Michael

Why can't you? Why do you answer, "No"? Banno is right, you need to work through it. The problem with your position is found in those two little letters you would sweep aside unnoticed. They show that you are not as ignorant of promises as you pretend to be.

('s karmic law requires me to agree with Banno here for disagreeing with him elsewhere.)

- :up: ...and now a forgotten pm comes to mind. :blush:

A contradiction is of the form "P ^ ~P" — Moliere

Presumably you could also run a truth table on this form. If neither conjunct is inherently fallacious and yet the truth table comes out fallacious (i.e. the composite proposition is always false), then presumably there would be a contradiction. The composite proposition would be:

(A → B) ^ (A → ~B)

Two propositions contradict if the truth or falsity of one entails the falsity or truth of the other (i.e. (P ↔ ~Q) ^ (~P ↔ Q))*. Formally, then, they contradict if it is true that:

((A → B) ↔ ~(A → ~B)) ^ (~(A → B) ↔ (A → ~B))

...Which turns out to be false (link). Given material implication, they do not contradict when A is false, and therefore the two are not full-on contradictory. There would only arise a contradiction supposing A.

(NB: Given the way that common speech differs from material implication, in common speech the two speakers would generally be contradicting one another.)

* I think the second conjunct is redundant, but it illustrates the principle of contradiction.

So if I've understood, what the ass does should not properly be called making a choice, because the ass does not indulge in ratiocination or deliberation.

And yet we would say that, for instance, the ass chose the trough on its left.

So I'm suspicious. It looks to me as if you are obliged to discount the ass's choice in order to avoid your thesis being falsified. — Banno

Why are we still talking about asses? We could say that the earthworm made a choice to cross the road, and yet we would clearly be using the word 'choice' in a highly metaphorical sense. The most basic confusion would be cleared up if we started talking about humans rather than non-rational animals. I don't know if Buridan ever actually spoke of an ass, but the idea seems a non-starter for our purposes.

But maybe that's just me. Or just you. — Banno

Yes, I think so. But you missed the heart of the post where I noted that the temporal aspect is unnecessary.

I suggest that we do make decisions - even most of our decisions - without such "deliberation or ratiocination". — Banno

That's an interesting assertion, but you didn't really engage anything I said in that last post.

Our justifications tend to be post hoc. — Banno

It's odd that you would peruse an ethics forum if you think practical rationality is post hoc.

-

When speaking to Banno, I would just clarify that by "choice" I am referring to what they call "deliberate choice". At the end of the day, I don't think such a dispute amounts to anything but semantics, but maybe I am misunderstanding. — Bob Ross

I would say that the substance of the dispute lies in whether rationality is involved in choice. For Banno it would seem that we make choices no more than donkeys or earthworms make choices, and that deliberation does not even exist except as post hoc rationalization. This is an exceedingly odd view.

Banno latched onto the part of my post where I spoke about deliberating "for a number of seconds" (I had in mind a child and their grandmother). He ignored the latter part of the post where I explicitly noted that extended deliberation is unnecessary. We choose for reasons, even when we make a fast choice. In the example I gave we swerve away from the deer for reasons, and our habits and actions are informed by our rationality. For instance, we know that by turning the steering wheel the car will turn, and that by turning away from the deer the car will turn away from the deer, and that by pressing the brake the car will decelerate. The way we use tools is highly rational, pertaining to ratiocination. Further, a person who has had a stroke or who is very old may press the gas pedal instead of the brake pedal, and this is a rational failure on their part.

In modern English we would not usually say that we deliberated in order to swerve the car, but we would say that the swerving was a deliberate choice. This is the kind of thing Aristotle is concerned with: deliberate choice. And it is the kind of thing that differs from the cookie situation. With the deer a choice was made for reasons, and the choice is potentially justifiable via those reasons. With the cookie none of this holds, and consequently there is no real responsibility that attaches to the "choice" between the two cookies. Whether grandma makes the "choice" for me or I make it myself, that 'opting' is not something that comes from anything within me.

Many on this forum labor under the idea that where there is no duration there is no ratiocination, and this is why they conflate humans and animals. For Aristotle or Aquinas even a human act which is not preceded by a temporal duration of deliberation is a rational act and the consequence of a deliberate choice. In essence, our inferential apparatus can be instantiated into habit, and this is the heart of virtue ethics.

-

To some extent it underpins my preference for virtue ethics over deontology. — Banno

I don't think it has anything to do with virtue ethics vs. deontology. Virtue ethicists don't generally deny rational deliberation. The idea of deliberation that I am positing comes from Aristotle, the father of virtue ethics.

You are now claiming that hardly any of our choices involve deliberation (before they are made). I think you are just being contrarian, as is sometimes your way.

--

E.g., I find it hard to envision how a person could deliberately cultivate a character such that they are kind, if it were not for the fact that they knew that they generally or absolutely should be kind (which is itself a moral principle). Likewise, e.g., having instilled a disposition (i.e., a habit) of being kind is not enough to know how to act kindly in every situation; or, if it is, then it is impractical for the common man with an average intelligence. It seems like, to me, a person who holds moral compasses primal over principles still will have to, as a secondary aspect of their theory, accept the necessity of the latter. — Bob Ross

Strong points. :up:

Bringing up abortion to make one's point is akin to bringing up Hitler to accomplish the same thing. — LuckyR

You're a shill. :roll:

I've put you on ignore. You reek of the ideology of OnlinePhilosophyClub.

You are conflating the legal with the moral. — Janus

So you think negligence pertains to the legal order but not to the moral order?

That's not a definition of the concept of good — Bob Ross

Here's J. A. K. Thomson's translation:

Every art and every investigation, and similarly every action and pursuit, is considered to aim at some good. Hence the good has been rightly defined as 'that at which all things aim'. — Nicomachean Ethics, I.1, tr. J. A. K. Thomson, Penguin 1976

Here is W. D. Ross:

The keynote of the Ethics is struck in the first sentence: ‘Every art and every enquiry, every action and choice, seems to aim at some good; whence the good has rightly been defined as that at which all things aim.’ All action aims at something other than itself, and from its tendency to produce this it derives its value. — W. D. Ross' Aristotle, Routledge 1995

Secondly, even if he would have elaborated on what is supremely good... — Bob Ross

The Nicomachean Ethics is precisely this elaboration.

Aristotle makes zero attempt to define what the concept of good refers to — Bob Ross

Again, it's pretty clear that Aristotle does this at the very beginning of the book. You may take exception to his definition, but it is there all the same.

Aristotle's definition straddles the line between "objective" and "subjective" and this rubs us the wrong way, but to fault him for involving what we call "subjectivity" in his definition would be anachronistic.

I didn't follow this part: what do you mean by that? — Bob Ross

The word "abortion" is for ideologues what a squirrel is for dogs. When they see the word they forget themselves immediately and are compelled to make a pro-choice argument. It cannot be denied that they have been well trained. Yet it's at least lucky Lucky didn't launch into a violin solo. :grin:

There is a more serious and pertinent quandary underlying this recent discussion with @Joshs and @Janus, one closely tied to the moral decay of our age. It is that we have largely forgotten how to philosophically justify moral fault. The rejoinder to blame is not so much, "I was trying my best," as, "I didn't do it on purpose," which in a more technical sense is the idea that the evil which resulted from their action was not aimed at. The stumbling block here is the Thomistic doctrine that evil is never aimed at per se, and in seeing this truth our age erroneously concludes that moral fault is impossible. For Aquinas the key is to understand that moral fault is always ultimately a matter of negligence (i.e. culpable ignorance).

I say this more as a bookmark than anything else, for I do not want to enter into the topic here, but an example would be the man who is pulled over for speeding, and who attempts to make an excuse for himself, "I wasn't speeding on purpose!" "I wasn't trying to break the law!"

Are you arguing that rationality consists in following rules? — Banno

I am saying that a choice or a decision only properly exists when it is a consequence of deliberation or ratiocination.

More generally, I am saying that the argument I am attributing to you fails, <Buridan's ass makes a "choice" without a principle, therefore our choices require no principles>. I think we can opt for an alternative without that opting being a consequence of deliberation or ratiocination.

Buridan's ass always strikes me as a bit off given that we are almost always concerned with rational agents in these sorts of discussions, not donkeys. I am saying that in such a situation a rational being is capable of flipping a coin, either literally or metaphorically, and that they are so able to opt without ratiocination does not prove that choices do not involve ratiocination. Strictly speaking I would not call such a thing a choice, but if it is a choice it is a meager shadow of what we usually mean by the word 'choice'. The argument which uses this idea to make a generalization about choices or decisions surely does not hold.

As for 's point, for me it is not a matter of conscious deliberation. Suppose grandma asks me to pick one of two cookies that she offers, and they appear to me identical. I enter into deliberation or ratiocination for a number of seconds, trying to decide. In the end there is nothing to decide given that there is nothing to differentiate the two. I say, "Grandma, I can see no difference. Give me whichever one you like." I am letting grandma flip the coin in this case, but whatever form the coin flip takes, it is not a consequence of deliberation. The deliberation had no effect on the outcome (except perhaps in an indirect way, by failing as an exercise of deliberation).

To use an example I have given before, suppose I am driving and I quickly swerve when a deer darts out in front of my car. Was I involved in deliberation or ratiocination? For the Thomistic school of Aristotelianism, I surely was. Perhaps it was not conscious, but there was deliberation and the discursivity of the rational intellect. It was "quick thinking," perhaps a kind of rationality infused into my driving habits. In this case a choice or decision was truly made, and this is different from the case of the cookie because in the case of the deer there is legitimate matter for the rational intellect to fasten and work on, albeit quickly. In the case of the cookie there is ample time but insufficient material for a true decision to be taken. So the question is not so much one of whether there is time for reflection or self-conscious mental activity occurring. Bona fide choices or decisions do not require such things, even though it is often helpful to have them.

I'm not sure how helpful this is if the question is the adequacy of Aristotle's moral philosophy. The Ethics and Politics make it fairly clear what is meant by "happiness." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right. The objection seems to be, "Someone could say that they do not desire happiness so long as they use the word 'happiness' in a way that is not in accord with what Aristotle means; therefore it is false that everyone desires happiness." This sort of objection would only make sense in a non-Aristotelian context. But this thread is literally about Aristotle and among other things Aristotle's approach to happiness and our final end.

(@J)

Upon thinking about it more, I updated the OP: now it resembles the traditional PDE. — Bob Ross

Very good. It now seems much better to me. :up:

3. My PDE still finds comparing the alternative means (towards the end) necessary (because if there is a means that has no bad side effect to bring about the same good, then that is the best option even if the good effect significantly outweighs the bad effect of the currently selected means) — Bob Ross

Good point.

4. The good effect must significantly, as opposed to merely, outweigh the bad effect—otherwise, it resembles too closely (although it is not) directly intentionally doing something bad as a means towards a good end (e.g., if there are two sick people and there is a means which could cure the one but kill the other, then it seems immoral to use that means).

Number 4 gets me into dicey waters, because I am uncertain if I can still hold my expounded position on the hysterectomy: is saving the mother of cancer significantly outweigh the death of an unborn child? I am not sure. — Bob Ross

This is the sort of ambiguity that seems to always follow the PDE, namely cases which are hard to decide. So this is in line with the tradition of the PDE, and I think it is good to recognize such limitations.

Your approach here is quite obtuse. You appear to be pretending that going to this trough, rather than that, is not making a choice... An odd way to think about it.

No principle can be used by Buridan's Ass to choose which trough to go to. Yet it would be irrational not to make the choice. Therefore it is sometimes rational to make choices that are not governed by principle. — Banno

I think you just need to think a bit harder about what it means to make a choice. You can of course think of a choice as whimsical opting for no reason, but that is not how we usually use the word. Regardless, your argument seems rather silly, <Buridan's ass makes a "choice" without a principle, therefore our choices require no principles>. You are trying to form a rule out of a bizarre thought-experiment exception which is probably physically impossible, and such an approach follows the methodology for bad philosophy:

A very bad way to do philosophy is to take extremely controversial cases and begin there. If someone begins with controversy then the foundations that inevitably get laid to account for the controversy are biased in favor of the emotional-controversial cases. This is a poor approach because controversial cases are by definition difficult to understand, and one should begin with what is easy to understand before slowly moving to what is more difficult. If the mind does not have the principles and the easier cases "under its belt" then it will have no chance of confronting the difficult and controversial cases. This is perhaps one of the most basic problems with modern philosophy, but I digress. — Leontiskos

Whether or not we want to say that you are equivocating on 'choice', your inference is not at all plausible.

This question is reminiscent of the age-old question about the number of the stars:

Of course, it is a good philosophical question whether it is not possible in some circumstances to decide or will to believe something, but these will have to be circumstances more auspicious than those I have described, where one can literally see nothing to choose between p and not-p. To quote Epictetus (Diss. i.28.3), just try to believe, or positively disbelieve, that the number of the stars is even.35

I repeat: try it. Make yourself vividly aware of your helpless inability to mind either way. That is how the sceptic wants you to feel about everything, including whether what I am saying is true or false. . .

35. The example is traditional, i.e. much older than Epictetus. It is a standard Stoic example of something altogether non-evident, which can be discerned neither from itself nor through a sign (PH ii.97, M vii.393, viii.147, 317; cf. vii.243, xi.59). It occurs also in Cicero’s reference (Acad. ii.32) to certain quasi desperatos who say that everything is as uncertain as whether the number of the stars is odd or even, a reference which is sometimes taken to point to Aenesidemus: so Brochard (1923) 245, Striker (1980) 64. — Myles Burnyeat, Can the sceptic live his scepticism?, p. 223

If Gerson is absorbing all of Platonism into his understanding of Plotinus, he does not need the Ur-Platonism for his own purposes. — Paine

Again, maybe he has two (or more) purposes: explicating Plotinus and defending philosophy.

It is no help in distinguishing the difference between Klein and Burnyeat. — Paine

Gerson is very clear that his thesis is not supposed to do such a thing. You seem to be faulting Gerson for failing to do something he says he is not trying to do.

That is more important to me than rooting out miscreants from my City. — Paine

You seem to fall into a strawman on this point again and again, and your caricature here is more evidence of that. If you are unwilling to consider the value of defending philosophy then of course you will not be able to truly assess Gerson's project. And as I said, Plato himself was not above defending philosophy.

Let us agree to disagree. Have the last word if you wish. — Paine

I will just reiterate the central unanswered questions I have already asked you. Have another word if you wish:

But is a proposal to close already an error on your view? I think that both Plato and Gerson seek to bring about a recognition of what is beyond the pale and what is not vis-a-vis philosophy, and I think the only legitimate objections to either of them will be objections to where they draw a line, and not that they draw a line. — Leontiskos

For example your claim was highly Gersonian when you said, "That is a predominantly psychological observation. Where does the philosophy start? Or not?" (↪Paine). If philosophy is important then it is important to understand what philosophy is, and it is particularly important to be able to ferret out false claims to philosophy. This all seems true to me.

...

I think this methodology is incredibly sound, and that we utilize it in all sorts of ways, namely elucidating what something is by reference to clear examples of what it is not. We elucidate justice by way of injustices; we elucidate truth by way of falsehood; we elucidate beauty by way of ugliness; we elucidate health by way of sickness. This isn't to say that we should stop there. Of course there should also be positive accounts of the essence of things like justice, truth, etc. Still, I don't really see the critique you are giving.

Further, even if we reject Gerson's account of philosophy I believe we will still need to engage in the same project he is engaged in, and that it is an important project. The alternative seems to be either committing ourselves to the view that philosophy isn't important or else to the view that there is no such thing as philosophy (and therefore nothing which is necessarily not philosophy).

...

The modern and post-modern landscape complicates things, but I don't think it invalidates Gerson's thesis. Gerson is drawing up the boundaries of the playing field of philosophy, and you keep pointing to philosophical bouts. Gerson has no problem with philosophical bouts. The question is whether they are within the boundaries.

I am wondering if a cultural anti-authoritarianism is impeding Gerson's thesis. This anti-authoritarianism says, "Who are you to say what counts as philosophy!?" I don't see this as a substantial critique. Again, the deeper matter for me is the alternative between either committing ourselves to the view that philosophy isn't important or else to the view that there is no such thing as philosophy. It's not hard to read Gerson's thesis as a proposal rather than an imposition, or as an invitation to think through a necessary problem rather than an overbearing authoritarianism.

...

I think we struggle against sophistry in much the same way that Plato struggled against sophistry. — Leontiskos

Aristotle never defines good in his ethics — Bob Ross

The very first sentence of the Nicomachean Ethics: (or the second, depending on your translation)

...and so it has been well said that the good is that at which everything aims. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, First sentence

Indeed. No "principle" led to choosing this trough and not the other. — Banno

And thus you falsely conclude that we require no principles to make decisions, because you think a coin-toss is a decision.

Which trough the beast heads towards is arbitrary, and a decision that must be made. — Banno

For Aristotle you would be misusing the word "decision." Here is what Aquinas says:

Objection 3. Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is not moved to one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as Plato says (Cf. De Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either side with two portions of food equally appetizing and at an equal distance, he is not moved towards one more than to the other; and he finds the reason of this in the immobility of the earth in the middle of the world. Now, if that which is equally (eligible) with something else cannot be chosen, much less can that be chosen which appears as less (eligible). Therefore if two or more things are available, of which one appears to be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of the others. Therefore that which appears to hold the first place is chosen of necessity. But every act of choosing is in regard to something that seems in some way better. Therefore every choice is made necessarily.

Reply to Objection 3. If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular point of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards that one rather than towards the other. — Aquinas, ST I-II.13 - Article 6. Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?

Presumably then we could opt for one side on the basis of chance or a mental coin flip, seeing that we are hungry and both sides are equally capable of satisfying our hunger. There is no proper decision because our opting is not the consequence of deliberation.

"Why did you choose the left side?" "Because I was hungry and wanted to eat." "But why did you pick the left side rather than the right side?" "For no particular reason—only because the coin showed 'tails'."

Having been introduced to Ur-Platonism on this forum, I started reading Gerson's scholarly papers. That is when I started objecting to his interpretations of texts, for example, here and here as well as the example given upthread. As it concerns this thread, the clear preference for Plotinus shown in those commentaries is not represented as such in the Ur-Platonist stuff. This gives a bit of three card monte flavor to the scene. Is there a bait and switch play between the two enterprises? — Paine

I would simply wonder if Gerson is doing two different things simultaneously.

I am glad to have had to discuss Schleiermacher's resistance to Systems because I am willing to acknowledge that is the lineage I come from. The most important element is the individual participating in the dialogue being witnessed. That theme is also echoed in the Dialogues in many ways that are not shy and retiring. So, I freely admit to an aversion to Gerson's efforts to assemble a system to fight modern foes on the basis of that point of view. — Paine

In a similar way, I wonder if Plato could be doing two different things at once. Plato is obviously crucially interested in individual participation, but he seems to also be interested in repelling sophistry. The dialogues themselves don't seem to present all players as being situated within the same boundaries on the field of philosophy. While granting that Gerson's anti-sophistry—in his case anti-naturalism—is a great deal more clumsy, I would still affirm a similarity between the two.

For Plato I don't see the two things as wholly separate. Anyone who loves something will also fight to protect it, and the philosophy that Plato loves—including the individual participation—requires certain nurturing conditions in order to thrive. It is a temptation for any thinker to blur the line between what is legitimate and what is their own doctrine, and obviously Gerson blurs this more than Plato, but I would recognize the same broad dynamic operating in Plato and I would again affirm this dynamic as laudable.

Burnyeat was claiming he was on to Strauss' magic trick. That is a valid way to characterize persuasion and I don't fault Burnyeat for trying it. He took his chance with it. I don't know what Gerson's trick is. But he proposes to close what I think should not be. — Paine

But is a proposal to close already an error on your view? I think that both Plato and Gerson seek to bring about a recognition of what is beyond the pale and what is not vis-a-vis philosophy, and I think the only legitimate objections to either of them will be objections to where they draw a line, and not that they draw a line.

Buridan's Ass will die unless it makes an arbitrary decision. So sometimes it is rational to make arbitrary choices. — Banno

But is eating arbitrary? When we decide to finally stop deliberating and make a decision our decision is not arbitrary, even if certain aspects of it are underdetermined. The way you and other's assess Buridan's Ass involves a rather odd way of specifying the act, as if the act lay in choosing this rather than that, instead of simply choosing to eat. Technically speaking we should say that the choice lies in eating, and that it is an open question whether choosing this side rather than that side is even a choice or a deliberation at all.

Why not instead think about morality in terms of values? — Banno

In that case one must still provide principles for the interaction of those values.

I think it is a valid question, but Aristotle is on to something. The reason humans want to be happy is because it is the most intrinsically (positively) valuable "thing"...Aristotle just never quite mentions this and starts instead with his idea that what is good is a thing fulfilling its nature. — Bob Ross

Does he, though? In the very first sentences of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle defines good in terms of what is aimed at.

There are cases in which one does not have the answer before one encounters the problem. — Banno

And the formulation of the PDE was occasioned by encountering new problems. The PDE is a result of that encounter.

Making decisions is not always algorithmic. — Banno

Do you mean algorithmic, or rational? Presumably when we encounter a novel problem we may need to formulate new principles, because if we make unprincipled decisions then we are not being rational. It is not so easy to roll one's eyes at principles without also rolling one's eyes at rationality. One can think about morality too algorithmically, but one cannot think about morality without principles.

- I was just trying to explain why I am not interested in donning her hermeneutic given the circumstances. Setting the taxonomic terms of a discussion is not an innocuous or insignificant move. I can understand assessing a claim in terms of a well-known Kantian taxonomy or a commonly accepted taxonomy such as SEP charts, but it seems to me that when you claim that we have run afoul of Sally Haslanger's taxonomy the correct response is, "Who? :chin:"

That approach in general strikes me as a faux pas, but it becomes tricky when you assume that your taxonomic move is innocuous or unobjectionable and launch into a long post on the basis of that presupposition. I did begin responding to the individual arguments of your post, but after tripping over Haslanger's taxonomy enough times I began wondering why I should labor under a strange taxonomy that had been forced upon me. Ergo: I don't accept that taxonomy. You assumed I would, but you know what they say about what happens when we "assume."

No, how can you do better than paying attention, driving within the speed limit and so on, which I outlined? Explain to me how you could do better than that, what doing better than that would consist in in that context. — Janus

You are equivocating on effort and outcome. Doing or trying one's best is a direct measure of effort, not a direct measure of outcome. Supposing two people drive under the speed limit, it does not follow that each of them are applying equal effort to obeying the law. It does not follow that each of them are doing/trying their best to obey the law. Some are more conscientious and effort-applying than others in this regard. Your false argument is, <They both achieved the same outcome, therefore they both applied the same proportion of effort>.

You believe that it follows from the fact we are punished for neglect that volition must be involved? I don't see that, and in any case, you are changing the terms—I spoke in terms of failure of attention (a failure which is not deliberate) and failure of understanding the situation (which obviously also would not be deliberate). You could try to explain to me just what you mean by volition—is volition always deliberate according to you, for example, and then lay out your argument as to why volition would be entailed on the grounds that we are punished for neglect? — Janus

I Googled a paper that might be helpful to you in this regard: "The Moral Neglect of Negligence." Again, an introduction to moral philosophy would probably be even better.

Instead of trying to respond to the different arguments you give, I am going to opt for instead pointing out that I do not take Haslanger to be an authority. She may be an authority for you, but she is not for me, and I don’t find her approach promising. For example, I don’t know why we should accept her dichotomy of how terms are used, why we should take it to be exhaustive, why we should frame the whole question in terms of her taxonomy, etc. At first glance it would seem that she is trying to create a taxonomy of term use in order to answer a contentious societal question about the terms ‘race’ and ‘gender,’ and as I have said recently, I think that trying to set out out general principles on the basis of a controversy is a fundamental philosophical mistake (see <penultimate paragraph>). Haslanger's taxonomy might be more useful in that limited context.

I would opine that when someone wants to leverage a non-mutual authority on a philosophy forum what they need to do is argue that authority’s arguments rather than appeal to their authority. If you can find a way to give in your own words a “Haslangerian” critique then that would be an appropriate way to bring her into the conversation, but at the moment you are imposing her as an authority. Note too how crucially important her taxonomy is. A metaphysical taxonomy of all the mutually exclusive ways of using terms would be more or less on par with divine revelation, and to put forward such a taxonomy on the basis of authority would require a very powerful authority indeed. My favorite philosophers never even attempted such a feat (i.e. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas...).

The thread is about Aristotle and I think it is much better to begin with Aristotle. I think he touches on the same sorts of questions in a more natural way. Let me quote the larger context of what I already quoted in EN I.4, although it is also important to read the first three chapters:

Since—to resume—all knowledge and all purpose aims at some good, what is this which we say is the aim of Politics; or, in other words, what is the highest of all realizable goods?

As to its name, I suppose nearly all men are agreed; for the masses and the men of culture alike declare that it is happiness, and hold that to “live well” or to “do well” is the same as to be “happy.”

But they differ as to what this happiness is, and the masses do not give the same account of it as the philosophers.

The former take it to be something palpable and plain, as pleasure or wealth or fame; one man holds it to be this, and another that, and often the same man is of different minds at different times,—after sickness it is health, and in poverty it is wealth; while when they are impressed with the consciousness of their ignorance, they admire most those who say grand things that are above their comprehension.

Some philosophers, on the other hand, have thought that, beside these several good things, there is an “absolute” good which is the cause of their goodness.

As it would hardly be worth while to review all the opinions that have been held, we will confine ourselves to those which are most popular, or which seem to have some foundation in reason. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.4

EN I.5 directly follows by raising epistemic considerations, not entirely unlike those that you raise via Haslanger. Chapter 6 then begins considering the concrete views of what happiness is.

Indeed, one recommendation is to abandon entirely its common usages in philosophy and substitute eudaemonia. The reason for this recommendation is important: It’s because “happiness” in English is found philosophically wanting. It doesn’t seem up to the job that we’ve asked it to do. — J

I think you are overstating this case. “Eudaimonia” is usually translated into English as “happiness,” and there is a reason for that. Let me quote Jonathan Barnes’ introduction to the Nicomachean Ethics (Penguin) for some similarities and differences:

This natural feeling of dissatisfaction with the chief thesis of the Ethics may be mitigated by a nicer attention to the Greek word eudaimonia. The standard translation, 'happiness', is by no means wholly absurd: it makes sense in most contexts of its occurrence, and it receives some degree of support on general semantic grounds. Yet it is far from adequate as a precise rendering of Aristotle's term. That is quickly shown in an abstract way: happiness, as the term is used in ordinary English, is a sort of mental or emotional state or condition; to call a man happy is (to put it very vaguely indeed) to say something about his general state of mind. Eudaimonia, on the other hand, is not simply a mental state: after setting out his analysis of eudamonia, Aristotle remarks: 'Our definition is also supported by the belief that the happy man lives and fares well; because what we have described [i.e. eudamonia is virtually a kind of good life or prosperity' (1098b21-2). To call a man eudaimon is to say something about how he lives and what he does. The notion of eudaimonia is closely tied, in a way in which the notion of happiness is not, to success: the eudaimon is someone who makes a success of his life and actions, who realizes his aims and ambitions as a man, who fulfils himself. — Jonathan Barnes, Introduction to the Nicomachean Ethics, xxxi-xxxii

I would say that Haslanger’s strongly analytic approach is inappropriate because there is a complex relation here between analysis and synthesis. Happiness is “living well or doing well,” but there is an epistemic quest built into the term insofar as “often the same person actually changes his opinion [about happiness].” Happiness simultaneously represents a unity and a multiplicity. Everyone aims for happiness, and yet they disagree as to what happiness is, or how happiness is achieved, and they at times change their minds.

What is at stake is not Haslanger’s terminological dispute, but rather that, “But when it comes to saying in what happiness consists, opinions differ, and the account given by the generality of mankind is not at all like that of the wise.” It is an argument over man's final end, not an argument over words. The idea is that everyone wants happiness and yet they disagree as to what happiness consists in. It is important to handle the subtle distinction between happiness per se and what happiness consists in, and not to mistake disagreements over the latter for disagreements over the former. Aristotle is already talking about happiness per se long before he introduces the actual word, namely by talking about man’s last end (and this is why it is crucial to read the chapters that precede I.4). Aquinas follows Aristotle very closely in his own treatment (link).

Well, so far as the name goes, there is pretty general agreement. ‘It is happiness,’ say both ordinary and cultured people; and they identify happiness with living well or doing well. — Nicomachean Ethics, I.4 (tr. Thomson)

Now is Aristotle saying, < ∀x(Human(x) → DesiresHappiness(x)) >? He probably does believe this, but he doesn’t commit himself to the claim. Why not? Presumably because trying to place the inductive conclusion beyond dispute is beside the point. If someone wants to dispute the universality of the claim then Aristotle would presumably say, “My book is not for you. Have a nice day.” There is really no point in arguing with them. (I think Aristotle would be much more interested in observing people who do not seek happiness in their actions. I don’t think there are such people, and I suppose one could argue that this is because they destroyed themselves in their quest to live and do poorly, but that strikes me as farfetched.)

But we could still ask whether such a person is saying something true. Do they want to live well and do well, or not? Probably they do and they are just confused or contrarian. The question is whether they want to be happy; it is not a semantic quibble about whether they are willing to adopt this or that word.

Speakers aren’t (usually) making mistakes. My character Pat doesn’t want to be happy, on either a descriptive or a conceptual understanding of the term. — J

It seems to me that the first problem here is a conflation between real people and fictitious characters, and we’ve been over that before. Fictitious characters are not infallible about their desires. And even if your fictional characters are based on real people, they remain somewhat fictitious insofar as they are not present and available for dialogue. It becomes a kind of argument from authority by proxy, where you speak for someone who is not present and who I am not allowed to contradict.

The second problem is that your claims about your fictitious characters seem incorrect, and that is what I argued in my reply. For example, your fictitious Pat said, “I wouldn't trade one minute of my unhappiness for a fool's paradise of Smiley Faces.” I said:

It sounds like you're asking Pat if he wants to be happy at the cost of naivete, and he says no. Naivete is for him a very pronounced form of unhappiness. — Leontiskos

Pat has obviously interpreted your question about happiness as a question about “a fool’s paradise of Smiley Faces.” He says he doesn’t want that fool’s paradise. Does it follow that he doesn’t want to live well or do well? Surely not. Like Aristotle, he doesn’t think that happiness consists in what others say it consists in.

Now I think there are people who despair of happiness and no longer really seek it, but it does not follow that they do not desire it, and even then they still seek out some small measure of it. I think the more central objection is really the objection that the idea of happiness (or also goodness) is equivocal to the point of uselessness, or as Aristotle says:

However, in the case of human beings at any rate, they show no little divergence. The same things delight one set of people and annoy another; what is painful and detestable to some is pleasurable and likeable to others. — Nicomachean Ethics, 1176a10, tr. Thompson

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Let me comment on just one part of your Haslanger section:

“in our culture” the word is used to pick out certain psychological states — J

Are they saying that they don’t believe psychological ease is enumerated among happy states by language users in our culture? — J

A large part of the problem is that you are preferring a secondary definition of happiness. Merriam-Webster gives:

• 1a. A state of well-being and contentment: joy
• 1b. A pleasurable or satisfying experience

Contrary to your claim, eudamonia is not eclipsed in English. In fact something close is still the primary definition of happiness, where wellbeing is involved (1a). There is a more transient and superficial sense (1b) but it is not primary. Long-term, sustainable happiness is still part of the English lexicon. If you wish to talk about happiness as something in the same genus as, “a fool's paradise of Smiley Faces,” then you are preferring an English sense that is both contrary to Aristotle’s term and also is not the primary English sense. This seems to be a quibble over words rather than a substantial objection. In any case, the Aristotelian context of the OP suffices for determining something like 1a rather than something like 1b. It should not be hard to understand what Aristotle means by ‘happiness,’ and his usage is not at all foreign to English speakers.

and yet folk can dream up convolute circumstances too difficult for any given principle — Banno

The problem with "dreaming up convolute circumstances" is that the contrivance that has been dreamed up is superficial. Moral principles pertain to human life, and those who are playing games by dreaming up artificial scenarios are not involved in human life.

In real life we are made to go beyond daydreaming. If, say, conjoined twins are sharing an organ that cannot support them both, then you're bound to think about the principle of double effect whether you want to or not, and no moral platitude or genetic fallacy regarding Catholicism will help you in that case.

There is no reason to strive to do better in a task when the circumstances don't require it. — Janus

And there is no reason to strive to do our best when the circumstances don't require it. If we can do better then we are not doing our best, and we both know that on your definition of "best" we can do better. Therefore your definition fails.

How are you going to do better than attending as best you can in the moment to a degree sufficient to avoid speeding... — Janus

In order to do a better job than what is sufficient or adequate you simply go beyond what is necessary. One can apply more or less effort to the act or rule of not-speeding.

In moral philosophy neglect is a failure of being able to care or a failure of understanding the situation. — Janus

No, that is ignorance.

No one deliberately fails to care or attend to what they understand should be attended to, but no one is perfect and may be distracted or fail to understand what is required or simply not be capable of good judgement. — Janus

We are punished for neglect similar to the way we are punished for direct intention, and therefore neglect involves volition. I would suggest that you work on a theory which incorporates these facts, and really any introduction to moral philosophy will help you with that.

You (and Joshs) could try to make an argument for ethics on determinism, and you could try to say that every time someone gets a speeding ticket it is not because they have neglected a (positive) duty but only because we want to deter or condition them. This is ultimately futile and logically incoherent, but you could try it. Nevertheless, I would not try such a thing before you understand the perennial understanding of justice, including what words like "negligence" actually mean. Better to understand the received and coherent approach before trying your hand at the newfangled determinism-morality.