Women, burdened by gestation, birth, and child-raising, are the ones who should be deciding what's right for themselves and their communities. That's what I think. — frank

b-b-b-b-bingo (merely enthusiastic assent. Not trying to say you have the moral authority lol

It's restricted to denial of a necessary entity, because that's where the contradiction i — Hallucinogen

Then it doesn't, directly, address a-theism. A-theism is russian-dolled into what you're talking about, but is not what you're trying to find a contradiction in. One must an atheist, plus some other ontological belief to come to the contradiction you're implying. It doesn't arise from atheism alone. You can be an atheist and not deny a non-contingent entity at all.

I don't see how you could have deism without the concept of a non-contingent entity. — Hallucinogen

IN fact, my point about deism was exactly this. You can be atheist, but deist. And so you would be able to accept a non-contingent entity. It doesn't provide relevance to the claim, or the objection, which are at odds here.

I should also point out: I am not taken by the use of atheism here. Atheism is, etymologically, and practically-speaking "best" understood as only non-assent to theistic doctrine. It is not a negative belief (i.e a belief in the absence of anything). It is just hte non-uptake of a particular range of beliefs. So, take that on board when reading my comments as its possible you're seeing a corner I simply am not in.

sincerity must be in a different category from the emotions — Ludwig V

I think this is true, but then you can't really employ the term, which I would need to supplant here, of "genuine belief". Though, I think we can simply read this as "A genuine emotional disposition to accept as true". Would that perhaps work for you? It says the same thing, to me.

If my data is wrong, despite my assessing it rationally, then my rationality is not in question. It would be if I became better informed and failed to change my assessment. — Ludwig V

Yes, ok cool. Perhaps I was just insufficiently clear initially. THank you!

I think love and war are two broad categories that encompass most of the important experiences humans have. Likewise, marriage, home, family and community are broadly inclusive of the important human experiences. — ucarr

This is directly contradictory. If the former, not hte latter. If the latter, not hte former. Can you choose one? Is it love and war, or the series of personal opinions on marriage, home , family and community? Honestly, though, it doesn't matter. This does nothing for hte fact that this does not, at all cover the range of human experience, or interest. Not in any way, whatsoever.

oftentimes — ucarr

And why would this inform you of anything but those individual people's proclivities? It says nothing about 'humanity'. This is so dumb. Nothing you have said supports your inconsistent claims.

A singular person who enlists in the armed services during wartime finds home and family within his platoon; he finds marriage through his belief in his country for which he jeopardizes his life; he finds community within the fellowship of related armed services divisions, and he finds community within the localities he protects as a soldier. — ucarr

To put it a little more politely than perhaps htis demands: No, that's an extreme over-reach in usage of those terms, probably purposefully, to increase the vagueries of your claims. THe claims are bizarre, counter to reality and you've provided nothing to support them.

It seems like separating "mind" and "body" requires some sort of unseen and unseeable world where mysterious thinking occurs. It's too 'otherworldly' for my taste. — BC

Thank you - appreciate the elucidation.

Fair enough. The brute acceptance of a connection between the two, in lieu of anything to substantiate it, does the same for me. It's either spooky action between two things claimed to be physical, or spooky action between one physical and one non, as far as I can tell. I'm not 'comfortable' with either, though, tbf. Hmm..Perhaps there's a Masters in this lol

The idea that there is a mind, on the one hand, and a body on the other and maybe a soul on the third hand, strikes me as false — BC

Not to hijack the thread, but I always want to drill into this. What do you think mind is on that account?

The right to choose isn’t a moral issue? — praxis

I think the inference is that rights are brute, rather than something "consider-able". Lots of pro-life people take this stance, instead of Banno's, in siding with the mother.

I think this somewhat misses what dualism is getting at, but that aside, I think its correct that talking about a separate mind (in the physical sense) is not right or helpful. That said, I am not a committed materialist, so I'm at least open to that type of thing.
My issue is that Your body literally does not think. There are dead bodies everywhere. This seems to contradict even the symbolic use of this conflation.

you'd still be a self, though probably insane in short order. — Vera Mont

Hehe :smirk:

My friend, it is you who are incessantly talking about me. — Banno

Risible. As i said, your need is noted.

I don't think there's a 'proper' way to 'do philosophy'. But I think there are 'proper boundaries' to kinds of philosophy. Analytic could be a type, but so too could 'logical inference' so I'm being purposefully vague here because of facts like my (almost wholesale) rejection of Continental Philosophy as helpful, coherent or relevant. Yet, i see things as egregious within something like philosophy of colour, so meh.. Can't bring myself to think anyone is doing philosophy 'properly' but I can bring myself to think some do it 'improperly'.

I don't have quite enough interest yet (most likely, I will in about 10 months time) in phil of science, but yes, quite a bit of ignorance in those early comments.

:ok:

Haven't read ought but hte OP - isn't this the standard philosophical view in science? No one claims to obtain any knowledge without experience, that I can see.

I would say that most everyone knows very well what theft, assault, rape, murder and torture are — Janus

Try reading some case law... (im jesting, but its very, very clear that the boundaries of all these things are murky and mostly institutional. The 'universally recognized' part would be russian-dolled within everyone's differing outer limits).

You continuous need to center yourself has already been noted in subtext. There is simply no need :)

You know only part of the blastocyst becomes a fetus. The rest is a protective covering and the placenta. — frank

I wouldn't bother.

Others value the foetus over the interests of the woman becasue of what they think their invisible friend thinks. — Banno

This type of ignorance can't be reasoned with.

By "adventure" I mean taking action in the world towards a goal and gaining experience as a result. — ucarr

So, this couldn't possibly be restricted to love and war. Are you able to somehow make those two claims work together?

from the state. — ucarr

This is counter to all else you've put forward here. Makes it quite hard to comment on..

I mean love is building marriage, home, family and community; I mean war is taking a partisan stance on behalf of one society of marriages, homes, families and communities in opposition to the same interests held by people in another society. — ucarr

They are not.

Don't be polite. — ucarr

Are you sure?

why building marriage, home, family and community as the important experiences of your life is a claim obviously false. — ucarr

Imagine you did none of these things. You can still experience immense adventure, or war. They have no logical connection to one another. THe claim is both faulty (in that you're not being consistent in what you're claiming) and utterly absurd, in that you are claiming there are two motivations for all behaviour. Patently ridiculous.

We don't always want to do the right thing. — ucarr

This makes much, much clearer what you're getting at; thank you. I find it very hard to say one 'pushes up against a boundary' when internally conflicted. If there were a moral 'boundary' rather than a moral attitude, we would want to say these are not the same thing.

Are you claiming never to have gone back on your commitment to do the right thing? — ucarr

This question is not relevant to my objection, but on it's face, no. I have either continued in one mind, or changed my mind. I have never committed to doing 'the right thing', and then chosen to do the 'wrong' thing, noting that only I could possibly make those claims about my own attitudes. That move (i.e committing to the 'right' thing, and then doing the 'wrong' thing, seems a violation of the nature of behaviour)

I mean to say that the moral guardians of the church are right in their expectation that humans will sometimes fail to faithfully carry out all of their moral commitments — ucarr

Again, this has nothing to do with what you claimed, or I objected to. The church claims humans are 'corrupt' against an ideologically divine doctrine. You are not talking about that, and so your comments have nothing to do with what you're trying to talk about. If all you intend to say is that humans, generally, change their minds and are subject to desire that is correct. It has absolutely nothing, whatsoever, to do with 'corruption' or 'the church'.

Part of my effort in this conversation is defining "interest" as a kind of bias, or partiality towards one particular choice over another choice. So, when I say the slithering snake arouses interest, I'm talking about how the presumed evil of the snake is a type of bias away from the peace of equilibrium towards excitement and, unfortunately, murder. — ucarr

Same as above. This has extremely little to do with what you seem to want to discuss. It's, firstly, ridiculous anyway, but secondly there is no connection between this use of 'interest' and the way you've used it elsewhere. Interest essentially has two senses: "preference", and "right". Neither are objective(other than within law) or derived from ought but, in the first personal, and the second collective attitudes to objects and events (i.e my interests derive from my preferences, and my rights derive from the collective agreements around ownership, protections etc..). I take it what you mean to say is that conflict invokes preferences for one or other side of the conflict. Trivially true, and has absolutely nothing to do with the Snake, the Garden of Eden or morality. The presumed 'evil of hte snake' is a religious nonsense about a fiction. Perhaps it would be better to stop talking in deep, confused metaphors.

I'm trying to say that either jeopardy or joy are necessary to interest because either state is far from the equilibrium - and dullness - of peace and stability too prolonged. — ucarr

Can't understand what you could be trying to say, despite this. The scene you painted is joyous. Peace can be found anywhere along the spectrum you're invoking. There's also no reason to think that they can't coexist. In any case, it still doesn't touch the claims you've made that I've objected to.

Are you saying you believe crimes such as rape and murder have nothing to do with sinful perpetrators? What do you suppose motivates rape and murder if not being sinful? — ucarr

This has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with your claim or my objection. There is no such thing as 'sinful nature'. Crimes are committed for all kinds of reasons. Sin is not one of them.

I retract my support of 180's post.

that a fluid-filled sack of tissue can be removed without moral import. — Banno

That's your moral proclamation. And so be it. It wont be so for many (potentially, the majority) of people. Let's just allow that a blastocyst is, in fact, contrary to the biological literature, a mere cyst. Some will still see this as more important, in direct comparison, than the wants and needs of an adult woman (or, lets make it more fun - a young teenager going through a forced pregnancy due to abuse). I do think your consistent use of 'cyst', whether symbolic, or sincerely held as apt, is causing you to jettison other moral positions as invalid rather than counter to your own. With that..

The argument then is simply that the wellbeing of the woman had overwhelming precedence over that of the conceptus. — Banno

Much better. MUCH better. And this seems to me both 'right' morally, and something which can be defended on any system but one of divinity because

woman has preferences while a cyst doesn't — Banno

doesn't matter to strict moral proclamations from on high, about hte sanctity of a fetus.

I don' think ensoulment, as a concept, can even be brought in here - it's a complete fantasy as regards looking at the facts.

Its just a logical distinction between what things are for us and what they are in themselves. Of course the latter cannot be anything for us by definition apart from being the mere logical counterpoint to phenomena. — Janus

Yes, that is also how I read it. Perhaps something is getting lost in whatever is wrong with the language i'm using. I don't propose there are two worlds - I propose that the 'ding en sich' must logically arouse whatever causes phenomenon to occur in us, and so i guess I just allow for a transitive relation that sounds more robust than a simply logical inference. The below strikes me as entirely sensible, and 'correct', but could be giving the inferences that I would reject. Appreciate if anyone could see where I'm losing it:

The thing in itself is, essentially, the same 'thing' as what is represented in phenomena, but it is not represented and so is, in fact, 'the thing' and not the representation, which is, in fact, the phenomena.

Uses the exact same mistaken notion of belief as JTB. I reject both for using that notion of belief. — creativesoul

I'm not quite sure I understand what you're rejecting. Sincerely thinking something is true is a belief, right? It's not a logical position but an emotional one.

I for one would say that assessing the data is an important function of rationality — Ludwig V

The context here was pretty important, though. If you have accurate (or: near accurate, accurate but incomplete (and similar formulations)) data, I would agree. But, if you are misinformed (particularly purposefully, in the way JTB gets beaten by example, when you're accidentally right despite misinformation) I can't see that your rationality is really in play, in the sense that it's, as it were, on trial, in assessing data which, from a third party perspective, is wrong, but you couldn't know.

I call this personhood. — Echarmion

Ok, fair enough. I suppose I am simply left unconvinced :P Common!

I look at myself and decide what the necessary and sufficient criteria are to be like that. — Echarmion

And I think this is why. Though, if you would accept the following, I think I can get to your lilypad without much issue:

For humans, designating what we are is a matter of assigning a label to the already-known criteria, rather htan assessing hte criteria a priori.

I can see why that would be both more reasonable, and the better logical way of going about it. That said, this wouldn't help with a fetus, or zygote :P

if we're talking about adults. — Echarmion

Yeah, for sure. Think this is where I was going. How do you read those back to a fetus? Or, is it hte case that a fetus (even nine month-ers) aren't persons for this reason?

I would say they're persons. Personally I also consider some primate and whale species at least close to persons based on the complexity of their behaviour — Echarmion

Ah, i see. THis is a relatively novel bullet to bite. Bravo.

Like recognising yourself in the mirror, displaying empathy and complex social relations, having significant discretion in how to react to stimuli. — Echarmion

That's fair, but again, as for the fetus or Zygote (or even infant)?

it seems to me you'd have trouble coming up with a catalogue that included newborn human children without also including a diverse set of non-human animals. — Echarmion

yeah dude - good fun! Thank you :)

It's literally not but that explains you, i guess. No one's arguing with you. You're being corrected. If you're not interested in such, on your way lad.

Well said. We're agreeing interest arises when human life within an existing world passes time with adventures — ucarr

We're not. The term 'adventure' here is nothing to do with what I've said, and I'm not sure what you mean by it. Interests exist in non-humans, in both senses we might need, so I don't agree with that either. Life, generally, coinciding with existence creates an interest. That's all I'm happy to agree with.

how much humans can get away with in their behavior. — ucarr

What do you mean 'get away with'? How 'much' of what? What do you mean by 'much' even here?

Love and war are the two big adventures. — ucarr

This seems to be so obviously false It's hard to respond to politely. Suffice to say: No, they aren't.

Everyone who lives pushes against moral boundaries in their effort at living. — ucarr

No. Morality is within each person who lives. It isn't something that can be pushed up against. Your attitudes guide your behaviour. That's all that can be said.

out of moral boundaries in life, — ucarr

are nothing but our personal attitudes. There are no boundaries you could possibly point me toward that could fill that spot, for your utterances. Do feel free to try!

And thus the church shows its wisdom when it declares human nature corrupt from the git-go. — ucarr

No, it doesn't, in any way that could be conceived by a rational thinker. The church makes this claim based on an ideological Doctrine designed to restrict people's behaviour to that which can be taken advantage of by hte village idiot.

When the slithering demon comes on stage, that's when the interest begins. — ucarr

This, now, seems to be you devolving into a religious recitation of some kind? Nothing in this or hte previous part of your reply has any bearing on the concepts you're trying to discuss.

You say we humans aren't sinful by our natures and that our art likewise -- though sourced from us -- is not sinful. Have you not found that a movie depicting a beautiful sun setting its glow over a vuluptuous woman with soul-stirring music on the soundtrack puts you to sleep after ten minutes if something doesn't go wrong, thus threatening the woman's happiness? — ucarr

I have to say, this sounds somewhat unhinged, in terms of trying to make any kind of point. Schizophrenic, perhaps.

There is no 'sinful' in nature. It doesn't exist. There is nothing which could be symbolized by the claim "humans are sinful by nature". No such possibility arises in reality.
I have no idea what movie you're talking about, or why it's relevant here. But, soul-stirring music does not put me to sleep, almost by definition. Literally no f-ing clue what hte rest of this passage is for/about/meant to evoke.

This is one of my best forward passes with the lance of my wit. It is another one of my central points of focus: the artist wants to threaten the beautiful woman with something of interest menacing her composure. If a man doesn't take delight in this rousing of the feminine will to survive, that man belongs in the vestry with the robes and the sashes. — ucarr

This fails, entirely, to answer the questions I put to you in clarifying what it is you're talking about. As with the previous three replies, I literally have no clue what you are trying to speak about.

Rejecting theism but not nontheism doesn't mean not rejecting theism... it's still rejecting theism. Get it? — Hallucinogen

This is exactly why, as 180 noted twice, you have a problem. Rejecting theism does not entail rejection nontheisms. Therefore, unless you restrict your descriptions to only refer to theistically-derived entities, it doesn't go through at all. Some form of deism, even, could go through.

between accurate and inaccurate information is the only measure of rationality — creativesoul

This doesn't seem, to me, to be true at all. You can be rational with inaccurate information, provided it isn't directly illogical. If you've been mislead, misinformed, lied to etc.. it has nothing to do with your rationality how you assess the data involved, is it? Perhaps you can form a way it is - i'm quite unsure, i'm just giving my intuition. The standard objection to JTB seems to, weakly, support this

Ahh, i see where you're going. Ok, it may just be that we disagree about hte limits of the concept of experience (as opposed to what Kant is treating in the CPR - actual limits of possible experience). Nice catch on that.

The ding an sich as I understand is intended to denote whatever the thing is in itself beyond its potential to affect our senses — Janus

The underlined is where I, not so much as disagree, but can't understand how this could refer to anything, inferred or otherwise. It seems to want to obtain certainty of the existence of something which is claimed to have zero effect on our experience - which, clearly, cannot be the case. If we have literally no connection, whatever, to the thing, it doesn't exist. But it is required for Kant's system to get off the ground, so it seems(on my reading, and account) that Kant would not accept this, but instead say:

it may be the case there is a ground for it, we have no means to determine anything about it, so …..like….who cares? — Mww

That's what I was trying to illustrate Kant actually said, as opposed to claiming there's no connection (which I think is counter to reason, Kant and sensibility viz It would result in no experience, or nothing to be said about it anyhow - and there's an entire CRP LOL.

It must, necessarily, be that from which experience derives rather than arises, to have any aspect whatsoever. The only aspect is it's logical necessity as a grounding for experience, whether or not we can cognize anything at all beyond the necessity for it to exist. Add in the a priori's and we can, at least, see "ding en sich->perception->experience" holds for Kant, regardless of the murkiness, and potentially un-speakable nature of hte first "->". It's this, which the a priori categories are required to fill. And, i think Kant does a good job.

If the thing-in-itself is known to us as appearing objects, why is it said things-in-themselves are unknown to us? — Mww

I think a better version would "Known to exist but nothing about it need, or could be known". Not 'known' in the sense phenomena are known - It's just logically sound to infer it (the above goes some way to elucidating why that's the case).

I will ask you, with respect, at the end of this reply, to do something very specific with your response to me... Please try to do as I ask, because if not, I have no idea what you're talking abotu and can't engage further...

Life on earth is interesting, and art and morality, in turn, are also interesting to the extent they remain connected to life. So existence without life is not interesting and besides, no human knows anything about it. — ucarr

This seems to be just your opinion. I think distilling this, though, we can say that existence is. Life can be. When they coincide in time, interest arises. That said, not all life carries interests in the way you're using it here. So, as with my conclusion here, it's hard to see 'about what' you want to speak... But, i take your point, excepting that we often care about hte interests of non-humans. Even non-living things.

This is a useless supposition because no human lives in a world without human minds. That being the case, the world outside of human minds is irrelevant to us. — ucarr

Yet, it dismantles your premise. So, clearly, its relevant to us in demarcating what is moral. Anything other than ideas in human minds carry nothing moral. You seem to admit this, but deny its relevance? How could you do such a thing! :P (i am joking, this is fun!)

Since we can't escape morality — ucarr

We can, though (in a roundabout way) By realising it's not something to be escaped, or anything actionable. It is, simply put, your attitude towards any given thing. Yes, we can't escape this. But that doesn't butter your bread. I would need to know that Morality is something aside from my attitudes to care.

What I claim to be interesting is the proposition life is bigger than moral life, its derivative — ucarr

Hmm. Well, this is trivially obvious. I'm not sure why it's interesting. Obviously, life exists outside of moral proclamations. What do you find interesting? Genuine question - can't quite grasp what you want to be talking about, in this area.

Now, if art is sinful by nature — ucarr

...it isn't...

humans are likewise sinful by nature — ucarr

We aren't...

then the fight between a more inclusive narrative of human reality and the edited version that's morality-friendly — ucarr

I don't know what you're talking about. This seems to refer to things not present in the conversation. what is "the edited version" and, of what? What is a "more inclusive narrative of human reality"???

Can you please, not lecture, but clarify these for me? I want to say more about your previous statements, but without knowing what these are, I have no idea where you're deriving them, and that might be why they seem nonsensical.

Once you've done so, feel free to then reply to all i've said, in whatever way you please :)

I considered, but that would be very bad faith. I'm unsure Mikie needs to cloak anything. Pretty outwardly incapable of being civil. Maybe time will tell..

If 'the thing in itself' denotes the thing "independent of any experience of it" then how can it be "the thing that excites our senses"? To say that is to contradict yourself. — Janus

There is absolutely no contradiction to say that something in the world triggers a set of processes, the end-result of which are our experience, and denying that we experience the thing that triggered it. This is hte case with plenty of actual objects. We don't experience something by it's shadow. Yet, under certain conditions, we have a fully sensible representation of the thing. It just leaves open error. Obviously. I think Kant scholars are trying, erroneously, to claim we can't even accept the error - there just is nothing. But this would preclude having any experience at all, if we can't infer a cause. It's an over-read of Kant and is just stupid. It's the same as claiming God is the inference from the Kalam instead of 'a cause of some kind'. Just.. silly.

Funnily, you've posted an image that (if taken at face value) proves my account accurate? Thank you Banno :) Ha...ha? Why not just say "Yes, I was wrong. It's not a cyst. But it's still not a person" ??

And again, the point that seems to escape you, these are not images of people. — Banno

It didn't escape me. It wasn't relevant to the correction I've provided. I agree - that's not a person. But that's not relevant as to whether the above is a cyst or not (it isn't). At least try not to totally misread, conflate and ignore.

Or, which is the same thing, representation is always and only of things of possible experience. — Mww

But clearly incorrect. Otherwise, our experiences would be of nothing. And that's not Kant's position.

You said when you stop laughing you’ll take the claim that climate deniers are braindead seriously. — John McMannis

No i didn't.

Thanks for playing.

What you’re really doing is being immature, which according to your post history you often criticize others for. I guess that’s my fault. — John McMannis

Ah. baby Mikie. You'll be fun.

The persistent error I see with this, is the idea that the ding an sich is a 'thing behind the thing', that it's 'the real thing' as opposed to 'the apparent thing'. And the reason why I think that's an error is that it attempts to take a perspective from which you're able to compare them, which, according to Kant, you can never do. — Wayfarer

This seems the only relevant, or rational inference from Kant. Otherwise we're left with ding en
sich- ???????? - experience. Rather than ding???en??sich - perception - experience. Which is what he outlines, filling the ????'s with a priori concepts. That's actually the exact problem he explicitly states is his intention to solve, after Hume. And, I think that's what happens in the book... Whether i agree is different.

What, in your view, is Kant trying to say excites the senses?? The sense data subsequent to a ding en sich in the presence of a human???

Yes, being a person entitles me to define a person. How else would it work? It's neither incoherent or circular. The argument is quite simply that since I'm the one that needs to decide on a moral framework, I need to figure out how to judge who is a person and who isn't. Since the only fixed point I start out with is that I am a person, I need to proceed from that. — Echarmion

My further response applies to everything you've just said. I think it's possible you're not getting me:
That you claim to be a person begs the question, but even if it didn't, it provides absolutely nothing as to a 'necessary or sufficient' set of criteria. You're just saying 'look at me!!'. I could make the same claim about being black. But, as you know, I'd be either laughed at or charged with racism. Fair enough, too. My point is you have to have a set of criteria, prior to your claim to fit them, and then assess whether you fit them (I imagine this can be easily done, it's just not happening here). I'm wanting your criteria. If that is just 'what I, in fact, am' I'll leave it there and just say I'm not convinced.

I agree — Echarmion

Haha nice, perhaps I misunderstood the point of that passage then. Apologies if so!

we determine personhood based on certain cognitive similarities and their expressions in behaviour. — Echarmion

Which ones? And are they derived from your conviction that you're a person? Seems to remain somewhat circular, if inter-personal.

By doing that it seems pretty obvious that a person needs some kind of thinking apparatus. — Echarmion

I wouldn't disagree, and we're getting somewhere now - but following from the previous comments about consciousness, We would want to know at what level does the consciousness reach the level of a 'personal' consciousness - in the sense that an alien species could have cognitive abilities the same as humans, and not be humans. Are they persons, nonetheless? Yes or no is fine, I'm just curious as to where these ideas go... Not sure where i'd land.

I'm not necessarily arguing my own position in those comments. — Echarmion

Fair enough. It feels that way, so you're being a really good sport if not. Appreciate that!

I think it's useful though to consider the possibility that there's no mystical essence to the human form that somehow turns it into its own category. — Echarmion

I think this is likely part of the answer(given we need to assess personhood, and identity, it's a doozy so I'm loathe to think there's anything but a very complex answer). I don't think there's anything mystical, but I do think there might be a moveable moment. This might be the moment hte heart beats for the first time, as a trivial example, which would be different for different fetuses. I don't think it's hard to offer several possibilities for hard-and-fast rules. Just, i don't see anyone agreeing given either (meaning, depending on your view) a life is being ended, or prevented.

And would we consider the equivalent of a three week old human child a person if it happened to not look like a human? You did ask for a fun discussion, did you not? — Echarmion

VERY fun!! I like these lines. I think if a fetus looked like a dog, and lost its hair, drew in its mandible and slowly became bi-pedal over the first six months, we definitely have to make an arbitrary call as to when it 'morally' becomes 'human'. What would you want to say there?

A cyst is a sack of fluid. — Banno

Lucky we're talking about blastocysts which are not sacks of fluid. They contain the groups of cells totalling around 200, including stem cells which are required for the cascades of development a fetus needs to become viable. It also contains an outer layer of protective cells called the trophoblast. This becomes the placenta. You're talking about one aspect, called the blastocoel. This means, funnily enough, that a blastocyst is a structure, in which a cyst sits. It is not a cyst. Onward..

What is NMorality? — ucarr

A typo ;)

However, some things in life bump against the filter with more force than other things. — ucarr

Yes, but that changes from person to person, culture to culture, institution to institution. Says nothing moral, of itself.

Pain. It may not be moral in of itself, but let a human individual experience it beyond a certain level of intensity and s/he becomes hard-pressed not to scream out in rage and despair against that heartless neutrality. — ucarr

Can't figure out what you're saying here. People cry out in pain. That's just a state of affairs. There's nothing moral in this observation. "Rage and despair" is usually not present.

Thich Quang Duc set himself on fire and burned up in protest against political oppression. Although a superb demonstration of life's indifference, it was used as an alarm awakening the minds of the complacent public who are, after all, simply life, albeit life aware of itself. — ucarr

Don't know what you could be tryign to say here, but it didn't move any kind of needle in any direction (the act of self-immolation). So this isn't giving me anything either...

I’d ignore any attempted refutation that does not arise directly from Kantian philosophy. — Mww

This is the crystalisation of what I think is wrong in your approach... And perhaps explains some of the deader-ends you've met in discussions about Kant/CPR.

But I'm not a dog. I do know what I am. That's one of the things that makes me a person. — Echarmion

This is just an elaborate restatement of the initial, incoherent claim, though. So, my response would be the same. It's circular and gives no argument. Just you believe that being a person entitles you to define a person. Which begs the question. *matt walsh voice* "Ok, but what is a person?"

fetus is relevant because it's a future person — Echarmion

This can't possibly be the case. It is , in fact, a fetus. It isn't some future person. I understand what's being got at and am sympathetic, morally speaking, but could you clear up how it is that you could hold a view counter the facts, and hold it morally relevant?

I'm arguing in favour of an evidence-based judgement of personhood. — Echarmion

What evidence? That's the point I'm trying to get across - no level of 'evidence' would satisfy a conflict of conceptual analysis (though, i recognise this lends itself to idiots simply moving hte goalposts, so maybe im being a bit too analytical here).

You're commenting on this discussion without the relevant context of the previous posts/replies. — Echarmion

I'm commenting only on your comportment, not hte discussion. That said, I do have the relevant context in mind. My comments aren't (well, not significantly) askance from the discussion. Though, treat it is a new one if you want to. It would work as such.

Presumably because "relation R", whatever that is, obtains at that time. — Echarmion

Sorry, 'relation R' is psychological continuity, in Parfitean terms. A child of three weeks does not have this relation in either direction, it seems. And so, could not be considered a personality. Not a personality=not a person? That's hte corner I'm trying to canvas.

Are you asking me what the evidence is that a newborn is a person? — Echarmion

No. There couldn't be 'evidence' I am, though, challenging the concept and offering other ways to look at it. I would want to know how you are claiming a newborn is a person. 'evidence' wouldn't help, without this well-understood. If it's a concept I can jive with, and the evidence for the facts are there, we're off to a great start.

I look at the news of extreme heat and floods and stuff like that and it doesn’t seem funny. — John McMannis

Feel free :) You're now talking about somethign other than this thread. Which is why I find funny. I don't really care about the 'climate crisis' but I don't deny the majority of what's claimed about it. It's the reactions I find funny.

But what does Mikie have to do with my question? Is climate change funny because of one person’s posts? — John McMannis

You're not reading very clearly, it seems. No one said climate change is funny.