Are you saying that philosophy is obvious and science is not? And that philosophy’s role is subservient to the facts that science discovers? — Joshs

No, not quite. But clearly philosophy about “things” that doesn’t adhere to the facts as science finds them (perhaps I mean “which does not obey the laws of nature” can’t be of much use. Philosophy needs to deal with the same facts science provides, I guess, to be helpful to humans who cannot but obey them. Pretty new thought so it might simply be crap

Sure LOL. The weirdness I find so interesting there, would be - can the clone be 'more aged' than the (eventual) person from which the clone came? That's very interesting, if it's possible.
There's no weirdness like that with the skin cell.

I think the best philosophies are those which are most in accordance with the facts of human life. — Janus

Most 'facts' of human life are not obvious enough to fall prey to philosophy, in the way you want. Surely, philosophy's main role (at least now, post-religion) is to investigate the 'facts of life' as found by science, say.

I've underlined the first sentence in your quote directly above. It's the gist of your argument for refuting my two quoted statements at the top. — ucarr

It is not an argument. Your phrase contradicts itself. I've had to say nothing at all. Simply quote you. It's getting really boring working through your misunderstandings.

As you can see, by my definition of Love and War, marriage, home, family and community are directly linked to Love and War. — ucarr

Bizarre mate. Not my circus.

making the same claim about each statement, namely that they are broadly inclusive of the important human experiences is not a contradiction because the two claims, in actuality, are about the same thing — ucarr

They are not. Are you even paying attention?

the attributes of two parts of one unit — ucarr

No, they are not. One is talking about hte 'unit' and one is talking about a discreet part of hte Unit. They are not analogous, and cannot be read-between. In some cases, the same will be able to be said about those disparate things, for other reasons. Something being 'robust' could be true of both options, for instance.

ere is a unit articulated into two parts — ucarr

And so they are contradictory. Two parts. Not one. Two. They cannot maintain the same role in your position. This is plain.

are not contradictory. — ucarr

They are, though and you did not show otherwise, in any way. Your specific use is what's making htem contradict one another. Not their inherent properties. As noted, its possible to refer to disparate, but related objects, with the same atrributes - but you cannot assign an attribute of totality, to a part of that which is 'total'. "Love and War" cannot be referred to in the same way as whatever parochial elements your shoehorning into that phrase. Attributes of the whole cannot also be assigned to their parts, because they are literally different things.

Its the combination of the two parts that refutes your ascription of contradiction because contradictions cannot combine. — ucarr

No, it supports it. Abysmal work.

By my definition, Love and War both include: marriage, home, family, community. If this is true, then they can't be contradictory when defined as I've defined them. — ucarr

That is contradictory, already. If both are defined in the same way, they are the same thing and cannot be spoken about as in contrast (which you are doing - this is why your use is what's causing the contradiction). I get the feeling you're trying to do this on the fly, rather than having fleshed anything out before having to meet these objections.

Can you show that, during WW2, it was not the case that there were married couples, homes, families and communities in both America and Germany? An example supporting your argument would have to show that in one country there were marriages, homes, families and communities whereas in the other country there were anti-marriages, anti-homes, anti-families and anti-communities. — ucarr

Sorry, but this is irrelevant and absolute nonsense. Nothing here has anything whatsosever to do with my objection. You seem to not be able to understand the really basic tenets being discussed. You refuse to define your terms, you refuse to acknowledge the shortcomings of whatever it is you're trying to say, and you don't even have a clear, coherent point to make. Its really, really difficult to keep interacting with something tha tis just a mess.

I appreciate this, but this misunderstands what the 'objection' is trying to do. Disagree, as you have, for sure.
But It is no help to simply say science takes one view, and philosophy takes another, though this is obviously true. In discussion, trying to make them cohere seems a reasonable thing to try to do. That said, it probably doesn't butter any bread for what you're saying, just seemed worth noting.

As regards the SEP article, that conclusion on follows if you accept the writer's positions. If you refer to 3.3.1 of that page, it seems pretty clear that what's being done is recasting the indirect realist in a way that it can be subsumed under an extended version of 'direct realism'. I don't really have a problem with this. It allows for what (I think, anyway) my position is and I'd claim indirect realism of some form.

That said, if this page is read in conjunction with the Sense Data page several issues presented actually somewhat fall away. For instance, where it treats Robinson's more recent takes on Sense Data, none of the objections go through: The empirical fact that light takes X time to reach us from objects which no longer exist can't be beaten in the way a lot of 'indirect' perceptual takes can be. There's no philosophical fanangaling which can make a star exist at the time the light reaches our eyes without seriously altering the definition 'exist' (or, importantly, that can make colour inhere in the surface of an object. There simply is nothing but intuition to this). The conclusion is quite telling, in contrast to the one you've quoted:

"Finally, although treatment of color as a primitive property that literally inheres in sense data (whether such data are considered to be surface portions, mental objects, or third things) is not widely favored, it is also true that, metaphysically, there is no settled home for phenomenally experienced color. The endeavor to account for the phenomenal characteristics of objects and their properties is ongoing."

This either contradicts, in some indirect way, that conclusion that there's no longer a debate between the two views (because, indeterminate) or it requires that we're talking about both positions within a concept that can include both. And that may be something more akin to a language problem, the way you seem fairly committed to. However, the conclusion above makes it quite clear: there is no theory which accounts for experience from objects without pretending our perceptual systems aren't as tehy are. Hence, the dichotomy between the scientific, and philosophically-inclined versions of hte discussion. Luckily, neither page gives any logical conclusion on the positions. Rather, several and IBE's it's way to something of a consensus. All very well.

To me it’s no weirder to say that a skin cell is a human than it is to say a fertilized egg is a human. — praxis

I think, for me, the problem is that a skin cell comes from a 'living human', but a Zygote hasn't reached that stage. What are you cloning? Obviously, they're the exact same process genetically, but practically speaking, cloning a Zygote is extremely weird given we have no 'person' to which the 'clone' could be subsequent at that point.
With the skin cell, we do. Point not missed, just found this interesting.

the scope of 'what is real' far exceeds the scope of 'what exists'. — Wayfarer

I have to say, this is entirely intelligible to me and (linguistically) solves a problem I've had for some time - there are clearly non-physical objects of experience. They are real, but do not exist. Thank you for clearing this up for me so succinctly.

I have to say, looking at the writers who are considered under each head, its clear that one camp is after clarity and the other is not. That seems the most obvious difference.
When Satre can be (colloquially) counted amount your group, you've got problems.

In the above quote you make a claim about my statement. Can you show that my statement is a contradiction? — ucarr

It is self evident. See:

I think love and war are two broad categories that encompass most of the important experiences humans have — ucarr

Is in contradiction to the very next phrase:

Likewise, marriage, home, family and community are broadly inclusive of the important human experiences. — ucarr

You cannot have both stand in the same symbolic role. They are contradictory (though, admittedly, indirectly so).

This would be an argument supporting your claim. — ucarr

It wouldn't. But this has become relatively par-for-course in this exchange. The above is not an argument. Its literally highlighting what you've said. There is no further being imparted than your own words. You seem to misunderstand a lot of words you're using...

it invalidates your logic with an alternative interpretation establishing my example as a counter-example: — ucarr

No, it doesn't. It doesn't even brush up against an attempt to do so. It's waffle. Sorry to say. My position (in that regard) does not involve counter-examples of anything. There was no example to begin with. Again, totally misunderstanding words you're using. UNless you're suggesting you have provided a counter-example to your own example? I can't see how that helps though, as the example was irrelevant and did nothing to support your cliam. I see you've now simply turned that onus on me. Extremely poor form. All i need is your own words, so I can meet the challenge, but this is backward.

Fair enough - very much respect that. Thank you!

As I've already stated, love and war are both about marriage, home, family and community. They share a large region of common ground — ucarr

No they don't. I've been explicitly clear that this is simply not hte case, and so none of your arguments, supposing this, can go through.

There is, sorry to say, not a lot of substance in anything you're saying here. For instance:

They stand apart on the issue of their approach to fellowship; love does nog partition fellowship; war partitions fellowship into good and evil, with both sides demonizing the other. — ucarr

This is muddled, nonsensical, rambling attempts at bringing yourself into some kind of focus after failing to make any consistent claim. I am sorry uCarr, but there is nothing to be responded to, other than pointing out the massive inconsistencies, inaccuracies and parochial claims being made.

Women, burdened by gestation, birth, and child-raising, are the ones who should be deciding what's right for themselves and their communities. That's what I think. — frank

b-b-b-b-bingo (merely enthusiastic assent. Not trying to say you have the moral authority lol

It's restricted to denial of a necessary entity, because that's where the contradiction i — Hallucinogen

Then it doesn't, directly, address a-theism. A-theism is russian-dolled into what you're talking about, but is not what you're trying to find a contradiction in. One must an atheist, plus some other ontological belief to come to the contradiction you're implying. It doesn't arise from atheism alone. You can be an atheist and not deny a non-contingent entity at all.

I don't see how you could have deism without the concept of a non-contingent entity. — Hallucinogen

IN fact, my point about deism was exactly this. You can be atheist, but deist. And so you would be able to accept a non-contingent entity. It doesn't provide relevance to the claim, or the objection, which are at odds here.

I should also point out: I am not taken by the use of atheism here. Atheism is, etymologically, and practically-speaking "best" understood as only non-assent to theistic doctrine. It is not a negative belief (i.e a belief in the absence of anything). It is just hte non-uptake of a particular range of beliefs. So, take that on board when reading my comments as its possible you're seeing a corner I simply am not in.

sincerity must be in a different category from the emotions — Ludwig V

I think this is true, but then you can't really employ the term, which I would need to supplant here, of "genuine belief". Though, I think we can simply read this as "A genuine emotional disposition to accept as true". Would that perhaps work for you? It says the same thing, to me.

If my data is wrong, despite my assessing it rationally, then my rationality is not in question. It would be if I became better informed and failed to change my assessment. — Ludwig V

Yes, ok cool. Perhaps I was just insufficiently clear initially. THank you!

I think love and war are two broad categories that encompass most of the important experiences humans have. Likewise, marriage, home, family and community are broadly inclusive of the important human experiences. — ucarr

This is directly contradictory. If the former, not hte latter. If the latter, not hte former. Can you choose one? Is it love and war, or the series of personal opinions on marriage, home , family and community? Honestly, though, it doesn't matter. This does nothing for hte fact that this does not, at all cover the range of human experience, or interest. Not in any way, whatsoever.

oftentimes — ucarr

And why would this inform you of anything but those individual people's proclivities? It says nothing about 'humanity'. This is so dumb. Nothing you have said supports your inconsistent claims.

A singular person who enlists in the armed services during wartime finds home and family within his platoon; he finds marriage through his belief in his country for which he jeopardizes his life; he finds community within the fellowship of related armed services divisions, and he finds community within the localities he protects as a soldier. — ucarr

To put it a little more politely than perhaps htis demands: No, that's an extreme over-reach in usage of those terms, probably purposefully, to increase the vagueries of your claims. THe claims are bizarre, counter to reality and you've provided nothing to support them.

It seems like separating "mind" and "body" requires some sort of unseen and unseeable world where mysterious thinking occurs. It's too 'otherworldly' for my taste. — BC

Thank you - appreciate the elucidation.

Fair enough. The brute acceptance of a connection between the two, in lieu of anything to substantiate it, does the same for me. It's either spooky action between two things claimed to be physical, or spooky action between one physical and one non, as far as I can tell. I'm not 'comfortable' with either, though, tbf. Hmm..Perhaps there's a Masters in this lol

The idea that there is a mind, on the one hand, and a body on the other and maybe a soul on the third hand, strikes me as false — BC

Not to hijack the thread, but I always want to drill into this. What do you think mind is on that account?

The right to choose isn’t a moral issue? — praxis

I think the inference is that rights are brute, rather than something "consider-able". Lots of pro-life people take this stance, instead of Banno's, in siding with the mother.

I think this somewhat misses what dualism is getting at, but that aside, I think its correct that talking about a separate mind (in the physical sense) is not right or helpful. That said, I am not a committed materialist, so I'm at least open to that type of thing.
My issue is that Your body literally does not think. There are dead bodies everywhere. This seems to contradict even the symbolic use of this conflation.

you'd still be a self, though probably insane in short order. — Vera Mont

Hehe :smirk:

My friend, it is you who are incessantly talking about me. — Banno

Risible. As i said, your need is noted.

I don't think there's a 'proper' way to 'do philosophy'. But I think there are 'proper boundaries' to kinds of philosophy. Analytic could be a type, but so too could 'logical inference' so I'm being purposefully vague here because of facts like my (almost wholesale) rejection of Continental Philosophy as helpful, coherent or relevant. Yet, i see things as egregious within something like philosophy of colour, so meh.. Can't bring myself to think anyone is doing philosophy 'properly' but I can bring myself to think some do it 'improperly'.

I don't have quite enough interest yet (most likely, I will in about 10 months time) in phil of science, but yes, quite a bit of ignorance in those early comments.

:ok:

Haven't read ought but hte OP - isn't this the standard philosophical view in science? No one claims to obtain any knowledge without experience, that I can see.

I would say that most everyone knows very well what theft, assault, rape, murder and torture are — Janus

Try reading some case law... (im jesting, but its very, very clear that the boundaries of all these things are murky and mostly institutional. The 'universally recognized' part would be russian-dolled within everyone's differing outer limits).

You continuous need to center yourself has already been noted in subtext. There is simply no need :)

You know only part of the blastocyst becomes a fetus. The rest is a protective covering and the placenta. — frank

I wouldn't bother.

Others value the foetus over the interests of the woman becasue of what they think their invisible friend thinks. — Banno

This type of ignorance can't be reasoned with.

By "adventure" I mean taking action in the world towards a goal and gaining experience as a result. — ucarr

So, this couldn't possibly be restricted to love and war. Are you able to somehow make those two claims work together?

from the state. — ucarr

This is counter to all else you've put forward here. Makes it quite hard to comment on..

I mean love is building marriage, home, family and community; I mean war is taking a partisan stance on behalf of one society of marriages, homes, families and communities in opposition to the same interests held by people in another society. — ucarr

They are not.

Don't be polite. — ucarr

Are you sure?

why building marriage, home, family and community as the important experiences of your life is a claim obviously false. — ucarr

Imagine you did none of these things. You can still experience immense adventure, or war. They have no logical connection to one another. THe claim is both faulty (in that you're not being consistent in what you're claiming) and utterly absurd, in that you are claiming there are two motivations for all behaviour. Patently ridiculous.

We don't always want to do the right thing. — ucarr

This makes much, much clearer what you're getting at; thank you. I find it very hard to say one 'pushes up against a boundary' when internally conflicted. If there were a moral 'boundary' rather than a moral attitude, we would want to say these are not the same thing.

Are you claiming never to have gone back on your commitment to do the right thing? — ucarr

This question is not relevant to my objection, but on it's face, no. I have either continued in one mind, or changed my mind. I have never committed to doing 'the right thing', and then chosen to do the 'wrong' thing, noting that only I could possibly make those claims about my own attitudes. That move (i.e committing to the 'right' thing, and then doing the 'wrong' thing, seems a violation of the nature of behaviour)

I mean to say that the moral guardians of the church are right in their expectation that humans will sometimes fail to faithfully carry out all of their moral commitments — ucarr

Again, this has nothing to do with what you claimed, or I objected to. The church claims humans are 'corrupt' against an ideologically divine doctrine. You are not talking about that, and so your comments have nothing to do with what you're trying to talk about. If all you intend to say is that humans, generally, change their minds and are subject to desire that is correct. It has absolutely nothing, whatsoever, to do with 'corruption' or 'the church'.

Part of my effort in this conversation is defining "interest" as a kind of bias, or partiality towards one particular choice over another choice. So, when I say the slithering snake arouses interest, I'm talking about how the presumed evil of the snake is a type of bias away from the peace of equilibrium towards excitement and, unfortunately, murder. — ucarr

Same as above. This has extremely little to do with what you seem to want to discuss. It's, firstly, ridiculous anyway, but secondly there is no connection between this use of 'interest' and the way you've used it elsewhere. Interest essentially has two senses: "preference", and "right". Neither are objective(other than within law) or derived from ought but, in the first personal, and the second collective attitudes to objects and events (i.e my interests derive from my preferences, and my rights derive from the collective agreements around ownership, protections etc..). I take it what you mean to say is that conflict invokes preferences for one or other side of the conflict. Trivially true, and has absolutely nothing to do with the Snake, the Garden of Eden or morality. The presumed 'evil of hte snake' is a religious nonsense about a fiction. Perhaps it would be better to stop talking in deep, confused metaphors.

I'm trying to say that either jeopardy or joy are necessary to interest because either state is far from the equilibrium - and dullness - of peace and stability too prolonged. — ucarr

Can't understand what you could be trying to say, despite this. The scene you painted is joyous. Peace can be found anywhere along the spectrum you're invoking. There's also no reason to think that they can't coexist. In any case, it still doesn't touch the claims you've made that I've objected to.

Are you saying you believe crimes such as rape and murder have nothing to do with sinful perpetrators? What do you suppose motivates rape and murder if not being sinful? — ucarr

This has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with your claim or my objection. There is no such thing as 'sinful nature'. Crimes are committed for all kinds of reasons. Sin is not one of them.

I retract my support of 180's post.

that a fluid-filled sack of tissue can be removed without moral import. — Banno

That's your moral proclamation. And so be it. It wont be so for many (potentially, the majority) of people. Let's just allow that a blastocyst is, in fact, contrary to the biological literature, a mere cyst. Some will still see this as more important, in direct comparison, than the wants and needs of an adult woman (or, lets make it more fun - a young teenager going through a forced pregnancy due to abuse). I do think your consistent use of 'cyst', whether symbolic, or sincerely held as apt, is causing you to jettison other moral positions as invalid rather than counter to your own. With that..

The argument then is simply that the wellbeing of the woman had overwhelming precedence over that of the conceptus. — Banno

Much better. MUCH better. And this seems to me both 'right' morally, and something which can be defended on any system but one of divinity because

woman has preferences while a cyst doesn't — Banno

doesn't matter to strict moral proclamations from on high, about hte sanctity of a fetus.

I don' think ensoulment, as a concept, can even be brought in here - it's a complete fantasy as regards looking at the facts.

Its just a logical distinction between what things are for us and what they are in themselves. Of course the latter cannot be anything for us by definition apart from being the mere logical counterpoint to phenomena. — Janus

Yes, that is also how I read it. Perhaps something is getting lost in whatever is wrong with the language i'm using. I don't propose there are two worlds - I propose that the 'ding en sich' must logically arouse whatever causes phenomenon to occur in us, and so i guess I just allow for a transitive relation that sounds more robust than a simply logical inference. The below strikes me as entirely sensible, and 'correct', but could be giving the inferences that I would reject. Appreciate if anyone could see where I'm losing it:

The thing in itself is, essentially, the same 'thing' as what is represented in phenomena, but it is not represented and so is, in fact, 'the thing' and not the representation, which is, in fact, the phenomena.

Uses the exact same mistaken notion of belief as JTB. I reject both for using that notion of belief. — creativesoul

I'm not quite sure I understand what you're rejecting. Sincerely thinking something is true is a belief, right? It's not a logical position but an emotional one.

I for one would say that assessing the data is an important function of rationality — Ludwig V

The context here was pretty important, though. If you have accurate (or: near accurate, accurate but incomplete (and similar formulations)) data, I would agree. But, if you are misinformed (particularly purposefully, in the way JTB gets beaten by example, when you're accidentally right despite misinformation) I can't see that your rationality is really in play, in the sense that it's, as it were, on trial, in assessing data which, from a third party perspective, is wrong, but you couldn't know.

I call this personhood. — Echarmion

Ok, fair enough. I suppose I am simply left unconvinced :P Common!

I look at myself and decide what the necessary and sufficient criteria are to be like that. — Echarmion

And I think this is why. Though, if you would accept the following, I think I can get to your lilypad without much issue:

For humans, designating what we are is a matter of assigning a label to the already-known criteria, rather htan assessing hte criteria a priori.

I can see why that would be both more reasonable, and the better logical way of going about it. That said, this wouldn't help with a fetus, or zygote :P

if we're talking about adults. — Echarmion

Yeah, for sure. Think this is where I was going. How do you read those back to a fetus? Or, is it hte case that a fetus (even nine month-ers) aren't persons for this reason?

I would say they're persons. Personally I also consider some primate and whale species at least close to persons based on the complexity of their behaviour — Echarmion

Ah, i see. THis is a relatively novel bullet to bite. Bravo.

Like recognising yourself in the mirror, displaying empathy and complex social relations, having significant discretion in how to react to stimuli. — Echarmion

That's fair, but again, as for the fetus or Zygote (or even infant)?

it seems to me you'd have trouble coming up with a catalogue that included newborn human children without also including a diverse set of non-human animals. — Echarmion

yeah dude - good fun! Thank you :)

It's literally not but that explains you, i guess. No one's arguing with you. You're being corrected. If you're not interested in such, on your way lad.

Well said. We're agreeing interest arises when human life within an existing world passes time with adventures — ucarr

We're not. The term 'adventure' here is nothing to do with what I've said, and I'm not sure what you mean by it. Interests exist in non-humans, in both senses we might need, so I don't agree with that either. Life, generally, coinciding with existence creates an interest. That's all I'm happy to agree with.

how much humans can get away with in their behavior. — ucarr

What do you mean 'get away with'? How 'much' of what? What do you mean by 'much' even here?

Love and war are the two big adventures. — ucarr

This seems to be so obviously false It's hard to respond to politely. Suffice to say: No, they aren't.

Everyone who lives pushes against moral boundaries in their effort at living. — ucarr

No. Morality is within each person who lives. It isn't something that can be pushed up against. Your attitudes guide your behaviour. That's all that can be said.

out of moral boundaries in life, — ucarr

are nothing but our personal attitudes. There are no boundaries you could possibly point me toward that could fill that spot, for your utterances. Do feel free to try!

And thus the church shows its wisdom when it declares human nature corrupt from the git-go. — ucarr

No, it doesn't, in any way that could be conceived by a rational thinker. The church makes this claim based on an ideological Doctrine designed to restrict people's behaviour to that which can be taken advantage of by hte village idiot.

When the slithering demon comes on stage, that's when the interest begins. — ucarr

This, now, seems to be you devolving into a religious recitation of some kind? Nothing in this or hte previous part of your reply has any bearing on the concepts you're trying to discuss.

You say we humans aren't sinful by our natures and that our art likewise -- though sourced from us -- is not sinful. Have you not found that a movie depicting a beautiful sun setting its glow over a vuluptuous woman with soul-stirring music on the soundtrack puts you to sleep after ten minutes if something doesn't go wrong, thus threatening the woman's happiness? — ucarr

I have to say, this sounds somewhat unhinged, in terms of trying to make any kind of point. Schizophrenic, perhaps.

There is no 'sinful' in nature. It doesn't exist. There is nothing which could be symbolized by the claim "humans are sinful by nature". No such possibility arises in reality.
I have no idea what movie you're talking about, or why it's relevant here. But, soul-stirring music does not put me to sleep, almost by definition. Literally no f-ing clue what hte rest of this passage is for/about/meant to evoke.

This is one of my best forward passes with the lance of my wit. It is another one of my central points of focus: the artist wants to threaten the beautiful woman with something of interest menacing her composure. If a man doesn't take delight in this rousing of the feminine will to survive, that man belongs in the vestry with the robes and the sashes. — ucarr

This fails, entirely, to answer the questions I put to you in clarifying what it is you're talking about. As with the previous three replies, I literally have no clue what you are trying to speak about.

Rejecting theism but not nontheism doesn't mean not rejecting theism... it's still rejecting theism. Get it? — Hallucinogen

This is exactly why, as 180 noted twice, you have a problem. Rejecting theism does not entail rejection nontheisms. Therefore, unless you restrict your descriptions to only refer to theistically-derived entities, it doesn't go through at all. Some form of deism, even, could go through.

between accurate and inaccurate information is the only measure of rationality — creativesoul

This doesn't seem, to me, to be true at all. You can be rational with inaccurate information, provided it isn't directly illogical. If you've been mislead, misinformed, lied to etc.. it has nothing to do with your rationality how you assess the data involved, is it? Perhaps you can form a way it is - i'm quite unsure, i'm just giving my intuition. The standard objection to JTB seems to, weakly, support this

Ahh, i see where you're going. Ok, it may just be that we disagree about hte limits of the concept of experience (as opposed to what Kant is treating in the CPR - actual limits of possible experience). Nice catch on that.

The ding an sich as I understand is intended to denote whatever the thing is in itself beyond its potential to affect our senses — Janus

The underlined is where I, not so much as disagree, but can't understand how this could refer to anything, inferred or otherwise. It seems to want to obtain certainty of the existence of something which is claimed to have zero effect on our experience - which, clearly, cannot be the case. If we have literally no connection, whatever, to the thing, it doesn't exist. But it is required for Kant's system to get off the ground, so it seems(on my reading, and account) that Kant would not accept this, but instead say:

it may be the case there is a ground for it, we have no means to determine anything about it, so …..like….who cares? — Mww

That's what I was trying to illustrate Kant actually said, as opposed to claiming there's no connection (which I think is counter to reason, Kant and sensibility viz It would result in no experience, or nothing to be said about it anyhow - and there's an entire CRP LOL.

It must, necessarily, be that from which experience derives rather than arises, to have any aspect whatsoever. The only aspect is it's logical necessity as a grounding for experience, whether or not we can cognize anything at all beyond the necessity for it to exist. Add in the a priori's and we can, at least, see "ding en sich->perception->experience" holds for Kant, regardless of the murkiness, and potentially un-speakable nature of hte first "->". It's this, which the a priori categories are required to fill. And, i think Kant does a good job.

If the thing-in-itself is known to us as appearing objects, why is it said things-in-themselves are unknown to us? — Mww

I think a better version would "Known to exist but nothing about it need, or could be known". Not 'known' in the sense phenomena are known - It's just logically sound to infer it (the above goes some way to elucidating why that's the case).

I will ask you, with respect, at the end of this reply, to do something very specific with your response to me... Please try to do as I ask, because if not, I have no idea what you're talking abotu and can't engage further...

Life on earth is interesting, and art and morality, in turn, are also interesting to the extent they remain connected to life. So existence without life is not interesting and besides, no human knows anything about it. — ucarr

This seems to be just your opinion. I think distilling this, though, we can say that existence is. Life can be. When they coincide in time, interest arises. That said, not all life carries interests in the way you're using it here. So, as with my conclusion here, it's hard to see 'about what' you want to speak... But, i take your point, excepting that we often care about hte interests of non-humans. Even non-living things.

This is a useless supposition because no human lives in a world without human minds. That being the case, the world outside of human minds is irrelevant to us. — ucarr

Yet, it dismantles your premise. So, clearly, its relevant to us in demarcating what is moral. Anything other than ideas in human minds carry nothing moral. You seem to admit this, but deny its relevance? How could you do such a thing! :P (i am joking, this is fun!)

Since we can't escape morality — ucarr

We can, though (in a roundabout way) By realising it's not something to be escaped, or anything actionable. It is, simply put, your attitude towards any given thing. Yes, we can't escape this. But that doesn't butter your bread. I would need to know that Morality is something aside from my attitudes to care.

What I claim to be interesting is the proposition life is bigger than moral life, its derivative — ucarr

Hmm. Well, this is trivially obvious. I'm not sure why it's interesting. Obviously, life exists outside of moral proclamations. What do you find interesting? Genuine question - can't quite grasp what you want to be talking about, in this area.

Now, if art is sinful by nature — ucarr

...it isn't...

humans are likewise sinful by nature — ucarr

We aren't...

then the fight between a more inclusive narrative of human reality and the edited version that's morality-friendly — ucarr

I don't know what you're talking about. This seems to refer to things not present in the conversation. what is "the edited version" and, of what? What is a "more inclusive narrative of human reality"???

Can you please, not lecture, but clarify these for me? I want to say more about your previous statements, but without knowing what these are, I have no idea where you're deriving them, and that might be why they seem nonsensical.

Once you've done so, feel free to then reply to all i've said, in whatever way you please :)